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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the growth and structural adjustment of Vietnamese manufacturing in the process of 
transition from a centrally-planned to market-oriented economy during the period 1986-
2006. 
It begins with a comprehensive interpretative survey of the literature on the role 
of FDI in industrialisation in developing and transition economies, in order to provide 
the analytical context for the Vietnam case study. The next two chapters survey FDl 
policy in Vietnam in the context of overall policy reforms, and examine trends and 
patterns of FDl during the post-reform era from a comparative regional and global 
perspective. The next three chapters, which form the core of the thesis, are devoted to an 
in-depth empirical analysis of the impact of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) on the 
performance of Vietnamese manufacturing. These chapters, in turn, probe the 
implications of the FIE presence for manufacturing productivity, employment 
generation and export performance, paying attention to both direct effects, and spillover 
(indirect) effects operating through the performance of domestic firms. The empirical 
analysis is conducted by applying appropriate econometric techniques to a new firm-
level panel data set constructed from unpublished returns to the Annual Enterprise 
Survey conducted by the Vietnamese General Statistical Office. This is supplemented 
by relevant unpublished data from other official sources. The final chapter summarises 
the key findings, makes policy inferences and identifies areas for further research. 
The findings suggest that the performance of FIEs is generally characterised by 
higher factor productivity growth and greater export propensity compared to local firms, 
both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and purely private firms. FIEs pay higher wages 
and they adjust faster to changes in labour market conditions compared to local firms. 
There is evidence of a strong positive correlation between employment growth in 
manufacturing and the persistent shift in the FIE presence away from domestic-market 
oriented (import substituting) production and toward export-oriented production since 
the late 1990s. 
The overall spillover effects of FIEs on productivity and export performance of 
domestic firms were found to be negative. This finding seems to reflect the early stage 
of industrial transition and the unfinished reform agenda. Spillover effects were found 
IV 
to be highly correlated with the stage of development of the domestic private sector. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the nature and extent of spillover effects vary across 
industries and with the geographic location of firms. All in all, this study provides 
ample support for the view that both the rate of FDI involvement in the economy and 
the national developmental gains from FDI depend crucially on the speed of economic 
transition. The latter is reflected in the extent of privatization/restructuring of state-
owned enterprises, market-based decision making and the creation of a legal and 
institutional framework for foreign and private domestic investment. The findings make 
a strong case for further policy reforms to remove institutional and policy constraints 
impacting on the performance of domestic private firms, in order to enhance. national 
economic gains from foreign direct investment. Liberalization of foreign investment 
regimes alone is unlikely to be sufficient for achieving this objective. 
v 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and scope 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
industrial transition in Vietnam under market-oriented policy reform over the past two 
decades. It will first identify the changes in Vietnam's policy framework that have 
regulated the manufacturing corporate, trade and FDI activities in Vietnam since Doi 
Moi was initiated in 1986. Second, the trends and patterns of foreign investment during 
the period 1986-2006 will be documented and analysed from a compara.tive 
international perspective using both macro and micro data assembled from various 
national and international sources. Third, the core contribution of this thesis will focus 
on the impact of FDI on industrial transition in Vietnamese manufacturing. In other 
words, both the direct and indirect effects of FDI on three important facets of 
manufacturing performance, productivity, export performance, and change in factor 
proportions and employment generation, are investigated. The analysis makes use of a 
new data set compiled from unpublished returns to the annual survey of manufacturing 
industry (1 999-2005) conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). To 
gain perspective, the findings will be compared and contrasted with the findings of 
available studies on the role of FDI in industrial transformation in China and other 
transition economies. 
This study aims to achieve two main objectives. First, it aims to broaden 
understanding of the process of industrial transition in Vietnam under market oriented 
policy reforms and to inform the Vietnamese policy debate on designing appropriate 
policies for promoting FDI and enhancing developmental gains from participation of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the economy. Second, it plans to contribute to the 
fledgling literature on the role of FDI in economic transition. 
Under the renovation reforms (Doi Mai) initiated in 1986 Vietnam has been 
successful in achieving high economic growth and rapid poverty reduction. As an 
integral part of reforms, FDI has been encouraged because the perceived benefits of this 
investment are widely acknowledged as an important component of gross domestic 
investment' and the operation of MNE affiliates in Vietnam has contributed 
1 FDJ in Vietnam as well as in developing countries is more I ikely to supplement rather than to substitute 
for domestic savings (see Chapter 4 for detailed analysis on investment compositions). 
significantly shares to aggregate export expansion and gross domestic product (GDP). 
However, the success in attracting FDI and reaping gains from FDI in the process of 
economic transition is premised on fundamental policy reforms. FDI has been treated as 
an independent ownership type with equal obligations and rights before the law 
compared to other domestic ownership types. Vietnam needs to make further reform in 
the new era of post WTO accession. The WTO commitments force Vietnam to 
undertake a comprehensive reform not only in the FDI law but also in the overall 
investment climate that may include government policy (on investment, ownership, 
international trade, property rights), government institutions, privatisation of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and development of private enterprises in Vietnam. 
There is a sizeable literature on the patterns and determinants of FDI in both 
developed and developing countries. There are also some studies on the role of FDI in 
industrial adjustment and growth in these countries. However, most studies have, by and 
large, focussed on one or more discrete aspects of FDI, rather than examining all facets 
of FDI impact interactively. Spillovers of FDI are an increasing concern of empirical 
research but the results are ambiguous, partly because of the limitations of the data and 
of the estimation methodologies. Moreover, the experience of latecomer reforming 
countries, in particular transition economies such as Vietnam, has not yet been 
adequately studied. In particular, previous studies on FDI in economic trans ition in 
Vietnam have largely focussed on the trends and patterns of FDI using macro-data and 
qualitative information.2 A few recent studies have examined technology spillovers of 
FDI on manufacturing industry productivity (Le Thanh Thuy 2005; Nguyen Thi Tue 
Anh et al. 2005; Le Quoc Hoi 2006). However, fewer studies have investigated the 
impact of FDI on growth and structural transition the Vietnams economy. Moreover 
these studies have largely focus on indirect effects using economy-wide data or data 
relating broader product categories. Theoretically, when direct investors invest in a 
given industry of the foreign market, this may have a direct effect on the aggregated 
performance of the same industry and indirect effects on other firms working in the 
same industry or those who have production linkages with the direct investor. This 
study aims to fill this gap by examining both direct and indirect effects of FDI using 
both industry and firm-level data. 
2 For example, see find ings in Le Dang Doanh (2002), Athukorala (2002), Bui Tuan (2004) and Leproux 
and Brooks (2004) 
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Transition economies have some distinct characteristics that affect the benefits 
obtained from FOi entry. By definition, transition economies are countries undertaking 
economic reform towards a market-oriented economy from a history of central-
planning. The most important feature in the pre-reform economy is the dominance of 
SOEs compared with the weakness of the private economic sector as a consequence of 
pursuing the centrally-planned economy in the past. The process of economic transition · 
essentially involves restructuring SOEs and reallocating resources in favour of private-
sector oriented growth. The way in which this process of transition takes place has a 
significant effect on the success of the economy. In Vietnam SOE reforms have been 
sluggish, partly because of conflict over benefits between the government and other 
stakeholders, like finn managers and employed workers. Moreover, development of the 
private sector is still imbued with outdated views and regulations from the pre-refonn 
period. The effects of FIEs may not always be as expected because of the many 
restrictions still existing in the investment environment and domestic markets. Foreign-
invested enterprises (FIEs) may make a direct contribution to the economy rather than 
having indirect effects on the performance of domestic firms as, the latter have a low 
capacity for absorbing advanced technology from the former. Restrictions in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity may prevent domestic firms from grasping good 
opportunities in restructuring and accessing new technology. 
1.2 Structure and preview 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework 
for analysing the impact of FOi on host countries, focussing on both direct and indirect 
(spillover) effects. The host-country policy and exclusive patterns of transition 
economies are also discussed. The empirical evidence of direct effects and spillovers on 
firm productivity, exports and employment is reviewed separately to discern clear 
patterns as well as gaps in the literature. The evidence for FOi impacts on transition 
economies, including Vietnam, is also reviewed. 
Chapter 3 documents and discusses policy reform in Vietnam over the past two 
decades. A key theme running though this chapter is the achievement of the reform 
process in unshackling private-sector initiatives, which is a key prerequisite for reaping 
gains from FOi. Moreover, a gap identified in the literature on FOi policy analysis in 
Vietnam is filled by thesis attempts to evaluate investment regimes, ownership 
treatment, corporate regulations and the general business environment. Special 
emphasis is placed on the significant reforms in trade and investment regimes 
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undertaken in the lead-up to accession to WTO membership in November 2006. 
Therefore, a comparison is made between the existing law system and the WTO 
commitments in order to draw further implications for policy change. 
Chapter 4 examines the trends and changing patterns of FDI in Vietnam. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on FDI flows, source-country compositions, sectoral 
compositions, regional distribution and forms of investment. The evidence shows FDI 
entry fluctuated depending on the extent of policy reform and international perspective. 
The recent accession to ASEAN, AFTA and WTO has made Vietnam more attractive to 
foreign investors. FDI has occurred in every geographical region and broad-level sector 
of Vietnam, although these distributions are uneven as FDI is located mainly in two 
regions: the Red River delta and the south east area. FIEs play an increasing role in 
special economic zones, such as industrial zones (lZs) and export processing zones 
(EPZs) as a result of clustering and exporting policies. There has also been a transition 
of entry modes, from joint ventures to fully-owned FIEs, whereas MNE activity in 
terms of M&A is still negligible. This trend seems to be opposite to the world patterns 
in FDI, leading to the risk of missing out on important sources of foreign investment. 
The analytical core of the thesis consists of three chapters dealing with the role 
of FDI in productivity performance (Chapter 5), export performance (Chapter 6), and 
factor proportion and employment generation (Chapter 7). Chapter 5 examines both the 
direct and indirect effects of FDl on productivity performance within the standard 
production function framework using a new firm-level panel dataset. First, the direct 
effect is investigated through comparing productivity of foreign invested enterprises 
(FIEs) with pure domestic firms and state-owned enterprises, with FIEs further 
disaggregated into fully-foreign owned FlEs and joint ventures. Then, indirect 
productivity effects (spillovers) from FIEs on domestic firms are examined, with a focus 
on the horizontal spillover effects using inter and within-industry data. Both labur 
productivity (LP) and total factor productivity (TFP) are used as alternative measures of 
productivity. The analysis at both stages carefully control for the impact of special 
characteristics of a transition economy in terms of ownership types, entry modes and 
policy context, in addition to the standard input and industry structure variables 
considered in the production function approach to analyse determinants of TFP. 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is two-fold: to investigate the export behaviour of 
FIEs with emphasis on the determinants of export decision and export intensity, and to 
examine the possible impact of the presence of FIEs on the export performance of 
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domestic enterprises disaggregated by ownership (state-owned and private-owned). In 
spite of the heavy concentration placed by the Vietnamese authorities on enticing 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of promoting export orientation of domestic 
manufacturing, no systematic study has so far been undertaken to assess the outcome of 
this policy emphasis. This chapter aims to fill this gap. In particular, the empirical 
analysis is based on a new dataset constructed from unpublished administrative records 
of the MPI and unpublished returns to the Survey of Industrial Enterprises conducted by 
the GSO in 1999 and 2001. This is the first known attempt to make use of these data 
sources for an in-depth analysis of the role of FIEs in the export performance of 
Vietnamese manufacturing. 
Chapter 7 covers a range of FDI effects including the contribution of FIEs to 
employment generation, the relationship between parentage and factor proportions, 
labour turnovers from FIEs and the difference in wages and labour-demand adjustment. 
With rapid growth in FDI inflows and with this capital invested in the form of fully-
owned FIEs, it is expected that foreign investment creates a large number of jobs to 
employ a growing labour supply in Vietnam. Although FIEs are likely to be small in 
terms of investment and gross output compared to other developing countries, they are 
expected to perform at a higher level of capital intensity and employ more workers than 
domestic firms. Another concern in this chapter is the difference in wages paid by FlEs 
and domestic firms. Up to now, minimum wages have been regulated differently for 
domestic firms and FIEs. Average wages in SO Es are still compressed and affected by 
the old regulations and ideologies, so that a wage gap between the two ownership types 
is expected. The determinants of wages are estimated: the key issue here is to find out 
whether or not FIEs pay higher wages than domestic firms. However, the difference in 
wages may not correlate highly with the labor mobility from domestic firms to FIEs 
because working for domestic firms may help employees reduce the risk of losing jobs. 
With high growth in employment, it is expected that the labour demand of both FIEs 
and domestic firms adjusts quickly but at a different speed in the short and long terms. 
In making this adjustment, the labour demand model is examined following arguments 
in Hamermesh (1993), Navaretti et al. (2003) and Fabbri et al. (2003). 
The final chapter summaries the key findings and discusses policy implications 
for attracting FDI and creating the best conditions for obtaining benefits from foreign 
investment in Vietnamese manufacturing. In addition, a list of suggestions will be given 
for further research on FDl effects using updated data and advanced methodology. 
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Chapter 2: Host Country Effects of FOi: Survey of 
Theory and Evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can have profound effects on host countries in both a 
direct and indirect manner through FDI activity. The direct effect rests on the fact that 
MNE affiliates are an important component of the host-country economy, so contribute 
directly to changes in product and factor markets. In particular, MNEs are regarded as 
sources of capital, advanced technology and management skills. The MNE involvement 
creates new job opportunities and changes the patterns of labour demand. The indirect 
effect may take various forms and influence the organization and operation of local 
firms in various ways. Advanced technology, know-how and management skills can be 
transferred to local firms through production linkages, labour mobility and technical 
demonstration. The purpose of this chapter is to survey both the theory and evidence on 
the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries, with emphasis on 
developing and transition economies. 
MNE involvement in host countries takes two major forms: (a) FDI in fully-
owned firms or joint ventures, and (b) various indirect (non-FDI) fonns of business 
engagements such as licensing agreements, franchising, management contracts, 
production-sharing contracts and international subcontracting with local firms. FDI is 
different from the other types of MNE investment because it originates from the 
decision of an MNE to 'obtain lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another 
country' (IMF 1993, p.96). Here, the lasting interest implies the existence of a long-
term relationship between the MNE and the affiliate (fully-owned or joint venture) and 
a significant degree of influence by the former on the management of the latter. FDI is 
·underpinned by the desire of the MNE to reap benefits from its specific advantages in 
international production (in the form of technological superiority, managerial expertise, 
marketing know-how and so on), which cannot be exploited through various indirect 
modes of entry which essentially involve 'arm's-length' market dealings with unrelated 
firms (Caves 1996; Dunning 1992). · This thesis focuses on FDI because it is the leading 
form of MNE involvement in developing countries and it has a range of distinctive 
impacts on the host economy compared to the other entry modes. 
This chapter is structured in five sections. Section 2 explains basic concepts on 
FDI and the international linkages undertaken by MNEs in a host country. Section 3 
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provides a review on the determinant of FDI in the host country. Section 4 reviews the 
theory on FDI effects in the host country in terms of different dimensions, direct and 
indirect effects, roles of host policy regimes and the perspectives of transition 
economies as important conditions for obtaining impact from FDI. Section 4 surveys the 
empirical evidence of FDI effects in host countries with emphasis on the three aspects 
of manufacturing performance: produc.tivity, exports and employment. In this section, 
the role of FDI in transition economies is reviewed separately in order to find a distinct 
relationship between FDI effects and country perspectives from these countries 
compared with developing nations. The last section reviews FDI-related studies in 
Vietnam, which is important for addressing the gap in FDI study in highlighting the 
literature and proposing the initial ideas for this thesis. The appendix briefly overviews 
typical models on FDI effects and the mechanism for technology transfer through FDI 
or MNE operation. 
2.2 Foreign direct investment: basic concepts 
"Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective 
of a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident 
in another economy" (IMF 1993, p.86). Under this definition, "a resident entity" refers 
to foreign investors including individuals, private or public enterprises, governments 
and other organisations which have direct investment enterprises. A direct investment 
enterprise or a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) can be an incorporated or 
unincorporated firm in which a foreign investor owns a part or whole of the ordinary 
shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an 
unincorporated enterprise. The IMF (1993) gives two options for distinguish ing 
domestic enterprises and FIEs. One is 10 percent of ordinary shares and the other is 
voting power, i.e., the influence of the direct investor on management of the FIE. 
Specifically, the OECD recommends a bundle of factors indicating the power of foreign 
investors like representation on the board of directors, a role in policy making, material 
inter-company transactions, and provision of managerial personnel, technology and long 
term loans (OECD 1996). 
FDI can take one or a combination of three types of capital flows: equity capital, 
reinvested earnings and inter-company loans. Equity capital constitutes a major 
component of FDI which includes all equity in branches and equity shares in 
subsidiaries and associates. Reinvested earnings consist of foreign investors' share of 
earnings neither distributed as dividends nor transmitted to parent companies. The last 
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component, inter-company debts, covers both borrowing and lending transactions 
between direct investors and subsidiaries, associates and branches, whether these loans 
are short-term or long-term investment. Under the OECD's definition, components of 
FDI stocks and flows are listed separately for each type of direct investment enterprise 
(see OECD 1999 for more detail). For example, FDI stock for subsidiaries and 
associates can be measured by three components: i) market value of their share capital 
and reserves attributable to the direct investor; ii) plus net values of loans, trade credit 
and iii) debt securities between the subsidiary/associate and the direct investor. 
The 'lasting interest' is a major criterion to distinguish FDI and other forms of 
foreign capital , such as foreign commercial debt or portfolio investment. Lasting 
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and 
the FIE and a significant degree of influence on management of the enterprise . In 
addition, FDI has been shown to exert a stronger impact on the development of the host 
country because it is a long-term and resilient investment with direct influence from 
MNEs on firm management. In contrast, "portfolio investment includes, in addition to 
equity securities and debt securities in the form of bonds and notes, money market 
instruments and financial derivatives such as options" (IMF 1993, p .91). 
An MNE can commence operation in a given host country either through 
establishment of a new business entity ('greenfield' investment) or merger and 
acquisition (M&A) of existing firms (UNCT AD 2000). Historically, greenfield 
investment has been a major form of MNE entry. Over the past two decades or so, 
cross-border M&A has gained as important as a universal entry mode. Cross-border 
merger takes place from a combination of the assets and operations of two or more 
existing firms. Cross-border acquisitions can be varied, and include shares, assets and 
loans acquired from or sold to foreign direct investors. The most common acquisition is 
undertaken by transfer of assets and operations from domestic to foreign firms with the 
former becoming a subsidiary or associate of the latter. The foreign investor can take 
M&A for the target firm working in the same industry (horizontal M&A) or those 
acting as suppliers/customers (vertical M&A) or those that are unrelated (conglomerate) 
(Chen and Findlay 2002). 
Precise estimation of FDI flows and M&A is impossible for several reasons. 
First, M&A not only include international investment but also local investment and 
most countries do not separate these sources of capital. Second, only a few countries 
separately report data for greenfield and M&A activities. Third, the financial 
transactions between parent companies and their affiliates are complicated and phased 
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over several years, whereas FDI data are reported on a net basis, using the balance-of-
payment concept. Therefore, values of M&A as well as greenfield investment 
experience high measurement errors and it is difficult to obtain details of the actual 
effect from each FDI entry mode. 
2.3 Determinants of host-country FDI 
What determine the attractiveness of a given host country for FDI and what explains the 
difference in FDI inflows among host countries countries? There is a vast literature on 
this subject3 which suggest that FDl entry not only varies according to economic 
conditions but also by other factors, such as host country policy and MNE 
decision/strategy based on ownership-specific advantages (or proprietary assets) and 
international conditions for gaining more benefits from FDI compared to arms-length 
transaction (Navaretti and Venables 2004). 
2.3.1 Economic conditions 
There is wide agreement on the classification of FDI into three types: Market-seeking 
FDI (or "rent" seeking FDI), efficiency-seeking FDI, and resource-seeking FDI (Caves 
1996). Market-seeking FDI is undertaken produce for satisfying the demand of the host-
country market. In order to reduce the costs involved in supplying a foreign market, 
direct investors will carry out production by simply duplicating their plants in the host 
country instead of exporting their home-country products there. Efficiency-seeking FDI 
involves searching for low input costs for production. MNEs relocate some parts of 
their production chain to a specific place that provides lower costs for inputs, such as 
Jabour wages, raw materials, or intermediate. goods. In other words, efficiency-seeking 
FDI aims to exploit the comparative advantages of the recipient country in international 
production. Therefore, this type of FDI is likely to be export-oriented and not affected 
by the market size of the host country. The third type, resource-seeking FDI, enters 
countries which have relatively huge natural endowments such as oil, gas and metals. 
In discussion determinants of FDI, it is now the standard practice to devide 
domestic economic conditions into three groups: market potential,. relative costs of 
production and resource endowment. Of these, domestic market potential is naturally a 
prime determinant of market-seeking FDL Market potential may include both traditional 
and new FDl determinants, such as market size (population), income per capita, 
urbanisation, stability and growth prospects, access to regional markets, distribution and 
3 For example, see Dunning (1993), Caves (1996), Moran (1998), Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
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demand patterns. In general, if either population or GDP per capital grows rapidly, 
aggregate demand will increase and this will then attract more FDl inflows. For 
empirical work, GDP is often used as the best proxy variable for market potential 
because it represents both population and per capita income in a country (Lucas 1993; 
Garibaldi et al 2001; Addison ~nd Heshmati 2003). In addition, the characteristics of 
neighbouring markets also play an important role for the entry of MNEs as they may 
help to reduce transportation costs. However, under globalisation and 
internationalisation, the role of market size may decrease relative to the degree of the 
host country's integration into the region and world markets. High integration 
associated with trade cost reduction may deter market-seeking FDI. 
The second economic condition, production cost advantage, is crucial in 
attracting efficiency-seeking FDI. In most cases, lower production costs will encourage 
entry of direct investors hunting profit maximisation. The cost advantage is not only 
represented by costs for buying inputs such as materials and labour but also by access to 
inputs like labour availability, development of technical and managerial skills; access to 
raw inputs, physical infrastructure, supplier base and technical support. Among these 
factors , labour unit cost is one of the major comparative advantages. However, the wage 
gap seems to reduce significantly among developing countries. On the other hand, 
development of human capital becomes more important as MNEs generally employ 
more skilled workers to operate imported production technology. More highly-educated 
people promote the adoption of advanced technology and technical skills faster at lower 
training costs. In some emerging economies, such as China and India, "created assets" 
in terms of covering all facilitation measurements provided by the host country are also 
an important attraction for MNEs. These may consist of communication and 
transportation infrastructure, marketing networks, technology and innovative capacity. 
The last economic condition, natural resources, including oil, gas and metals are the 
prime mover of resource seeking FD I. 
Apart from the above determinants, geographical conditions are also related to 
the cost advantages and so affect the investment decisions of MNEs. In general, FDI 
favours areas that have convenient geographical conditions, such as being near the sea 
or navigable waterways, having flat terrain, good road systems and a high density of 
population. The level of industrial concentration also affects FD I. High location 
concentration seems to have positive effects on FDI flows for export orientation, 
whereas a high level of industrialisation seems to cause negative impacts on FDI, since 
industrialisation goes together with high labour costs. 
l 
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2.3.2 Host-country policies 
Attitudes toward FDI in developing countries have changed significantly since the 
1980s. As a result, FDI-related policy has also changed as host countries compete in 
attracting FDI. The reasons for the policy changes in most developing countries derive 
from better understanding of the benefits of this type of investment for economic 
development (Athukorala 2007, Chapter 1). Both theoretical and empirical studies have 
demonstrated the important role of host-country policy and investment climate in 
enticing FDI and making this investment more effective (Blomstrom and Kokko 200_3). 
FDI policy can be classified into several specific categories but most literature 
focuses on analysis of "core" FDI and trade policies (including tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers). Of these, core FDI policies consist of all regulations governing the entry and 
corporate activity of foreign investors, forms of investment and functions of the markets 
within which they operate. Core FDI policies also regulate ownership behaviour, access 
to inputs and investment incentives. The evidence shows incentives have been 
important for policy makers in creating competitive international environment for 
investment. Investment incentives can be presented in many comparative forms but are 
all more or less government subsidies to FIEs. The most common incentive schemes in 
developing countries include tax holidays, subsidies for infrastructure and land rents, 
tariff protection, labour training and other fiscal measures. However, the effectiveness 
of these incentives is bounded by related policy and the degree of liberalization within 
the economy. 
There is much controversy on the role of incentives in enticing FDI. In a 
comprehensive survey of this literature, Athukorala and Hill (2000) conclude that 
incentives could become an effective tool in countries during a period of crisis or for 
countries with relatively closed trade regimes (import substitution). Over time, the 
difference in investment incentives between countries narrows and MNE decisions may 
no longer be correlated with host-country incentives, and the effectiveness of such 
policy will reduce accordingly. Moreover, Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) argue that 
competing incentives between countries or regions are not always a good policy. Owing 
to difficulty in measuring benefits received from MNE presence, they conclude that 
subsidized incentives focusing on foreign investors cause at least three problems. First, 
the host country loses public revenue because profit transfers to MNEs as a 
consequence of country (regional) competition in the subsidized game. Second, abuse of 
incentives distorts competition and discriminates against local firms. As a result, local 
firms may have to exit and market concentration will be dominated by MNEs. 
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Incentives may also lead to imbalance in industrial development, since MNEs choose to 
invest in industries which have higher subsidies. Lastly, preference policy for FDI may 
increase the lack of transparency, rent-seeking and corruption. 
2.3.3 MNE strategies 
When the differences between two host countries are not significant, the investment 
decision may then be influenced by internal MNE strategy (Dunning 1993). For 
examples, MNEs may have different risk perceptions on political factors, macro 
management, labour markets and policy stability. In addition, each parent company has 
its own strategy regarding location, sourcing of products/inputs, and integration of 
affiliates, strategic alliances, training and technology. In other words, l'vfNEs are likely 
to interact their ownership-specific advantages with location and internationalisation 
advantages in their owned strategies. "As MNEs increasingly seek to hone their 
competitive advantages, their strategies can be quite diverse, even within the same 
industry" (UNCTAD 1998, p.130). 
There is a general tendency for MNE to b~come increasingly embedded in host 
countries the longer they are present there and the more conducive the overall 
investment climate of the host country becomes over time There is evidence that, with a 
long period of successful operation in the region, many MNEs operating in electronics 
and electrical machinery industries in countries like Singapore, Thailand and Malysia 
have significantly upgraded technical activities in their regional production networks in 
these countries and assigned global production responsibilities to affiliates located in 
more mature countries (Barrus 1997; McKendrick et al. 2000). Also, when selecting 
new sites, MNEs operating in assembly activities are strongly influenced by the 
presence of other key market players in a given country or neighbouring countries. This 
is because concentration of MNE activities in a given locality offers considerable 
agglomeration advantages in business operation (Rangan and Lawrence 1999). 
In conclusion, MNE decision to undertake FDT hinges on many factors which can 
broadly be classified under three categories market potential, cost advantages, natural 
endowments, host-country policies and internal MNE strategies, as summaried in Table 
2.1. In the context of the ongoing process of economic globalisation and liberalization 
reforms in host countries, the relative importance of these determinants may change 
over time. For example, the importance of domestic market size as a determinant of 
total FDI inflow to a given country could well diminish as efficiency-seeking operations 
gain importance global operations of MNEs compared to traditional market seeking 
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operations. Moreover, when domestic investment and trade regimes of host countries 
become increasingly liberal and inter-country differences in policies diminishe, MNEs 
global operation strategies could play an impresting important roles in determining 
inter-country differences in attractive FDI. 
Table 2.1: Determinants of host-country FDI 
Determinants Major indicators 
Economic Market Population, income, urbanisation, stability and growth 
conditions potential prospects, access to regional markets, distribution and 
demand patterns 
Cost Labour availability, costs, skills, trainability, access to 
advantages inputs, physical infrastructure, supplier base and technical 
support. 
Resources Natural resources (oil, gas, metals) and location 
Host country policies Macro policy, ownership policy and development of 
private sector, trade and industry, "core" FDI policy 
MNE strategies Risk perception of MNEs on political factors, macro 
management, labour markets, policy stability; 
Company strategies on location, sourcing of 
products/inputs, integration of affiliates, strategic 
alliances, training, technology 
2.4 Host-country effects 
2.4.1 Direct versus indirect effects of FDI 
The theoretical literature postulates two types of effects of FDI on host countries: direct 
and indirect, depending on the mechanism of the interaction between MNEs and local 
firms. The direct effect accompanies market interaction between firms, whereas the 
indirect effect or spillovers are externalities the market fails to take into account. In 
other words, direct effects refer to primary contributions of FDl as these bring to host 
countries new products, high quality, additional resources (capital, technology, 
management skills) and new demand from MNE affi liates. These contributions help the 
host country to perform more efficiently as well as expand the scale of the economy. On 
the other hand, externalities from FDI refer to informal transfer of advanced technology, 
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management skills and competition pressure from MNE affiliates on the performance of 
domestic firms. 
It is difficult to isolate the spillover of FDI from the direct effect when both 
work though the market (Saggi 2002). Moreover, because of the different approaches, 
the classification of direct and indirect effects of FDI in theoretical studies is still 
ambiguous. Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Saggi (2002) consider the backward and 
forward linkages between MNEs and local firms as one of three channels of spillovers 
(indirect effect). In contrast, Navaretti and Venables (2004) argue all possible effects 
obtained through market transactions are direct, i.e., they can be in the form of licensing 
agreements for technology, supplying inputs, assembling final products or marketing. 
Within this framework, there. are four mechanisms by which effects can be transmitted: 
market transactions, technology extemality, pecuniary externality and pro-competitive 
effects. Therefore, this thesis makes an effort to analyse the possible direct and indirect 
effects of FDI on both factor and product markets. The mechanism of the main indirect 
effect (technology spillovers) will be highlighted in the next sub-section. 
The direct consequence of MNE activity differs according to host country, 
industry and firm-specific circumstances (Dunning 1993). When an MNE enters and 
sets up a subsidiary in a host country it causes many direct changes in both factor and 
product markets. The first change is that the effects of FDI on factor markets can be 
evaluated through direct changes in total investment, employment and technology 
development. Obviously, FOi entry directly supplements total domestic investment. 
This is especially important for developing and transition economies lacking effective 
and large sources of capital and retaining a lot of constraints in the financial market. 
Moreover, both the quantity and quality of domestic employment are also affected by 
MNE presence. Having more greenfield investment, the aggregate demand for labour in 
the domestic market is augmented, especially for skilled employees at least in the short 
term. With the workers employed, MNE affiliates contribute more, relative to local 
firms, in the development of skills mostly through on-the-job training and access to a 
high technology production line. Measurement of the employment effect of FOi was 
developed by Dunning (1993); in this study the direct effect on employment was 
calculated by the number of employees working for MNE affiliates in the host country. 
Second, the direct effects of FDI on the product market are also an interest in the 
literature. Because of their competitive products, the presence of MNEs affiliates causes 
significant changes in domestic market supply and demand. FDI implemented by MNEs 
with advanced technology, know-how and management skills, contributes to an increase 
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m overall productivity level and economic growth. There is no doubt as to the 
superiority of productivity performance of MNE affiliates over local firms in 
developing countries, in most cases. In addition, another positive effect of FDI could be 
a change in industry structure since MNEs tend to enter industries with relatively high 
levels of protection and concentration. Within the product market, the FDI effects on the 
export expansion of the host country have been a focus of the recent literature. The 
entry of MNEs is argued as either an export catalyst or direct competition for domestic 
firms in the world market. Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Saggi (2002) define the 
direct effect as referring to the role of MNE affiliates in host country exports and the 
export performance of local firms as suppliers or contractors to MNEs. UNCT AD 
(2006) also concludes that the impact of FDI on trade varies according to the motive of 
MNEs, i.e., trade performance depends on whether the foreign investment is efficiency-
seeking, market seeking, resource-seeking or asset-seeking. By definition, efficiency-
seeking and resource-seeking investments are likely to increase exports, whereas 
market-seeking investment tends to boost imports. However, the import intensity 
depends on the availability of intermediate products provided for FIEs and policy on the 
local content requirement in the host country. 
The indirect effects of FDI also appear in every type of market. In the factor 
markets, there is little debate on the extent of the crowding-out effect of foreign 
investment over domestic investment.4 On the one hand, MNE investment in developing 
countries is mostly raised from abroad due to the scarcity of domestic finance, so the 
foreign capital source may cause a low crowding-out effect to domestic investment. On 
the other hand, if the capital inflows are large relative to the size of the host country's 
finance market the crowding-out may be higher as an amount of domestic finance is not 
invested (UNCT AD l 999). 
The indirect effect on employment is more difficult to capture because it has to 
take account of triangle relationships: employment change in the local economy caused 
by the spending of MNE workers or shareholders (macro-economic effect); change in 
local firms' employment competing in the same industry (horizontal effect); and change 
in employment for local firms acting as suppliers or consumers of FDI firms (vertical 
effect). Moreover, MNEs exert upward pressure on wages as a result of higher 
productivity performance. With an MNE affiliate and a local firm in the same sector, 
4 By definition, FDI is argued to crowd out domestic investment if an increase in investment of FIEs by 
one dollar will lead to an increase in total investment of the host country by less than one dollar 
(UNCTAD 1999, p.171 ) 
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there may be a turnover of skilled labour from local to foreign firms because of this 
wage difference. In the product market, the literature concentrates on the indirect effect 
of FDI expressed by changes in the market power of local firms and in consumer 
welfare. In other words, this effect is mainly measured by the change in the number of 
local firms, the market share of domestic products and the consumer price index 
(Navaretti and Venables 2004). MNE entry usually encourages competition in the 
domestic market, forcing domestic firms to introduce or apply new technology and run 
their business efficiently. However, when demand in the domestic market is almost 
inelastic or when a country follows an industry-substitution strategy, foreign investment 
could crowd out local supply in protected products. As a result, the number of local 
firms and the market share of local products decrease due to MNE entry. 
As for empirics, product market effects are mainly examined by the effects on 
the local firms through productivity performance and capacity to access foreign 
markets. Of these, productivity spillovers are difficult to capture because the externality 
obtained from technology transfer is a multiple effect. The most common way to 
capture productivity spillovers is through the effect of the level of MNE presence within 
industry and/or in the region on the performance of local firms which have neither 
foreign equity share nor linkages with MNEs. This will be carefully discussed in the 
review of the empirical literature (Section 2.5). Another indirect effect is measured by 
the change of exports of local firms directly to the foreign market. However, it is 
difficult to separate this spillover effect from changes due to competition from other 
local firms. Moreover, the impact on export volatility very much depends on the types 
of linkages. If an MNE sets up backward linkages with domestic firms, it seems to 
increase exports when domestic products are consumed by MNEs or when they act as 
intermediates for export to their home country or other nations. Conversely, if forward 
linkages emerge, the host country seems to import foreign goods to supply dom~stic 
production. Likewise, vertical FDI is likely to boost exports whereas horizontal FDI is 
likely to promote the potential for import substitution. 
2.4.2 Channels of technology spillovers 
Technology spillovers are a key component of the indirect effects of FOL In general, 
there are at least three channels of technology transfer: international licensing 
agreements, international trade and FDI. Of these, FDI is acknowledged as the most 
important and cheapest channel of technology transfer both directly and indirectly to 
developing countries (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998). 
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Theoretically, the presence of MNE affiliates generates technological spillover 
to local firms in three different ways: demonstration effects, turnover of training local 
workforce and vertical linkages (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Saggi 2002). 
Demonstration effects provide more choices for local firms to imitate the technology of 
MNEs or to adopt new technology. In the short term, the number of enterprises 
increases with MNE entry and hence domestic competition is increased. MNEs are 
often characterised by advanced technology, high productivity and product 
differentiation. Consequently, they force local enterprises to reform their strategy, 
technology and management. In order to survive and protect their profits in local 
markets, local firms can invest in R&D activities or buy new technology from MNEs at 
lower prices. Under the pressure of this competition, it is hoped, the productivity and 
efficiency of domestic firms will increase. However, if local firms predominantly focus 
on satisfying local demand, the entrance of FDI may crowd out local supply thereby 
forcing less efficient local firms to exit. Moreover, the MNE decision of investment 
takes carefully account of the behaviour of potential rivals. Foreseeing the consequences 
of technology leakage, MNEs may change the quality of the technology being 
transferred. That is why the level of technology transferred through FDI flows has 
varied amongst countries and industries. Not only is advanced technology transferred in 
this way, but backward technology is also delivered to developing countries, potentially 
worsening the environmental situation in the recipient regions. 
The second channel is the movement of skilled workers from FIEs to domestic 
firms. Training for local people working in MNE affiliates is undertaken more regularly 
than in domestic firms in order to capture the new technology developed or imported. 
There are also different types of training, such as workshops, seminars, on-the-job 
training and short courses. While MNEs also send local workers to long-term formal 
education courses, on-the-job training or learning-by-doing is more common because of 
its lower cost and practical efficiency. Spillovers occur when trained workers move 
from FIEs to local firms or set up their own business. Nevertheless, identifying the 
impact of labour turnover is difficult because of the need to clarify what has been 
learned from previous firms, what kind of new jobs they have and how they apply the 
technology gained. 
The third channel of technology spillovers is through vertical linkages. 
Theoretically, under perfect market competition, linkages will not exist if all of an 
enterprise's needs are easily satisfied through the market. In practice, local enterprises 
may cooperate with MNEs as suppliers of intermediate products or buyers of final 
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goods and technology transfer can occur through those relationships. MNEs tend to 
convey their technology to domestic suppliers rather than to their competitors in order 
to get higher-quality inputs at lower prices (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998~ UNCTAD 
1999; Blalock and Gertler 2005). Moreover, through vertical linkages, MNEs may help 
local firms in other respects, like providing production facilities, purchasing inputs _and 
training employees (Navaretti and Venables 2004). However, the level of technology 
transferred varies for the purpose of minimizing technology leakage. MNEs may also 
want to cooperate with many local firms in order to avoid dependency on a single 
supplier, and hence, advanced technology is less likely to be shifted. 
The magnitude of technology spillovers depends on many factors. This section 
has discussed three channels of technology transferred from FIEs to local firms. Of 
these, closed vertical linkages give more opportunities to obtain benefits from MNEs. 
The previous section · concluded that policy regime affects not only the volume of 
inward FDI but also the extent of FDI effects. In addition, the absorptive capacity of 
local firms (micro level) plays a decisive role in catching a positive effect from the entry 
of MNEs. This can be demonstrated in the form of differences in economies of scale, 
technology level, R&D activity and skill mix between local firms and MNE affiliates. 
Positive spillovers may not be captured even when new technology is directly 
transferred from MNEs as a prerequisite for production linkages until local firms have 
reached a certain level of technology development (Findlay 1978; Aitken et al. 1996). 
At the macro level, host-country development in human capital, technology level and 
financial markets is likely to obtain a positive correlation with FDl in boosting 
economic growth. Empirical analysis throughout the next section will verify this 
conclusion. 
2.5 Empirical evidence 
2.5.1 Productivity effects 
Both direct and indirect effects of FDI have been empirically investigated at different 
intensities. This section aims to review the existing literature to determine whether 
MNEs, on average, experience higher productivity than local firms and whether the 
presence of MNEs generates technology spillovers to local firms. 
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Direct effects on productivity performance 
Navaretti and Venables (2004) argue about the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
distinct approaches used in productivity analysis. The unconditional approach .is aimed 
at comparing the perfonnance of MNEs and local firms using statistical evidence on 
labour productivity or value added and input factors. However, all input factors are 
correlated to labour productivity. Hence, MNEs, with many advantages not available to 
local firms, have higher productivity than local finns . The conditional measures use 
econometric models to compare the performance of MNEs and local firms; in these 
models, the dependent variable is either labour productivity or total factor productivity 
and the independent variables can be both characteristics of firms and ownership status. 
The results indicate that foreign firms are more productive than local firms in both 
developed and developing countries. For instance, Sjoholm (1999) used Indonesian data 
to examine the effects of competition and the technology gap between local firms and 
foreign establishments on productivity growth. Controlling for other effects, Sjoholm's 
results demonstrate the higher technology gap as well as competition level due to MNE 
presence have a significant and positive impact on productivity. 
However, using labour productivity in the estimation may cause a problem as 
some other production factors are not taken into account. N avaretti and Venables (2004) 
therefore choose total factor productivity (TFP) as the appropriate dependent- variable 
and carry out the two-step estimation technique with the equation: 
n v 
ln(Y/) = a, 1n(K:)+a 2 In(L~) +a3 ln(M1k) + L /3;MNE; + L Y,X! +a; (1) 
i=I s=I 
Where Y is output, K is capital, Lis labour, Mis intermediate inputs and MNE;~ 
captures firm ownership. MNE:i can be a set of dummy variables, each taking the value 
I if firm k is invested by an MNE in a given country (i) . The index n implies the 
number of FDI source countries. MNE:i can also be a simple form, taking 1 if firm k is 
foreign invested and 0 otherwise. The set of x.:1 captures all other observed 
determinants of TFP. The residual a,k captures the effect of all other factors that are not 
included in the model like time-invariant unobserved effect of firm, time dummy and 
idiosyncratic productivity shock. 
The two-step estimation is conducted as follows: the model is is first estimated 
without including MNE ownership as an explanatory variable and then the time-average 
residual form this first-stage estimation is regressed on the MNE ownership variable. 
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The estimated coefficients of the second equation reflect TFP difference between the 
MNE affiliates and local firms. However, this methodology still has some problems, 
given the dynamic nature of total factor productivity, unobserved variables and 
problems of simultaneity. Prior to the study of Navaretti and Venables (2004), some 
studies have either partly or fully taken these issues into account. Griffith (1999) 
compares three different estimation methods, OLS, first difference GMM and systems 
estimator in investigating the effects of ownership on total factor productivity. 
Combining the exploitation of both static and dynamic production function, Griffith 
( 1999) overcomes some problems related to biased coefficients, omitted variables and 
weak instruments. 
Beside the effects from firm characteristics and the nationality of ownership, 
some studies have been successful in examining the impact of FOi on productivity 
under different trade regimes. For example, Athukorala and Chand (2000) have studied 
the effects of international production on productivity growth using data on US MNEs 
operating in 44 host countries. They found both factor productivity and total labour 
productivity had robust positive correlations with international production under the 
outward-oriented trade regime. 
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of this study suffers from a number of 
limitations. It does not control for unobserved country-specific differences and 
endogeneity of variables. The liberalization of the trade regime also causes bias in 
calculating and estimating TFP growth. By manipulating the production function for a 
finn in a specific industry and at each point of time, Harrison (1994) comes to the 
conclusion that ignoring the effects of liberalization on competition/ trade reform may 
lead to inaccurate measurement of the effect of trade reform on productivity. Using both 
the "within estimates" and instrumental-variable (IV) estimates respectively, she comes 
up with similar conclusions for each specific industry. Moreover, she proves market 
power, captured by price-cost margins, is significantly higher in sectors with lower 
import penetration and higher tariffs. She also finds that decreasing returns to scale and 
productivity growth are higher in less protected sectors. 
Productivity spillovers 
Two common definitions of spillover variable have been employed in the empirical 
literature, horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers. The horizontal-spillover is 
measured by foreign share of employment or output in an industry or a region. The 
vertical-spillover variable is obtained by the sum of multiples between input coefficients 
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(derived from the Input-output table) and horizontal-spillover variable. By and large, the 
estimation results for either horizontal or vertical spillovers are still ambiguous, 
somewhat because of using different measurements of spillover variable, different 
methodologies and disaggregated data levels (Navaretti and Venables 2004; Moran et 
al. 2005). Reasons for the ambiguous results will be carefully discussed throughout this 
section. 
Aitken and Harrison ( 1999) examine the impact of MNE entry on productivity 
of domestic firms using data for Venezuela. A production function derived from a 
theoretical framework of competition and technology transfer is estimated in log-linear 
form using unbalanced panel data over the period 1976-1989. The key explanatory 
variables include the share of FDI at plant level (FDI_plant), presence of FDI in the 
industry (FDI_sector), and the interaction between them. More specifically, Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) also investigate the effects of location, firm size, industry dummies and 
plant inputs. They compare different types of estimation methods: OLS estimate, 
weighted least square and first to fourth differencing. They find a positive relationship 
between foreign equity participation and performance of small-scale plants which 
receive FDI. However, the effect on larger plants is weaker and the productivity of 
small local firms statistically decreases when foreign investment increases. It is possible 
the MNE presence leads to higher competition, which might mean that small local firms 
with feeble competitive power would be more affected. 
Because there is no single measure of absorptive capacity, the relationship 
between spillovers and firm capacity has not been fully investigated. The two studies 
discussed here use different proxies for absorptive capacity. Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
simply use the conventional employment measure to divide firms into two categories, 
small and large firms. Haskel et al. (2002) investigate FDI effect by firm capacity using 
different measures: total employment, TFP and skill intensity. The two studies come up . 
with the same conclusion on the significance of the FDJ effect on small firm 
productivity in the same sector (by employment measure). However, the direction of the 
effect is found to be quite opposite . Both find no significant effects of FDI by region on 
every type of firm capacity. Aitken and Harrison (1999) discover a negative effect of 
FDI by sector, whereas Haskel et al. (2002) result in a positive effect. A common 
problem in these studies is that they do not make a distinction between efficiency-
seeking and market-seeking MNE affiliates. Theoretically, these two types of FDI have 
different motives and strategies, so the impact on domestic rivals may be different from 
those which have production linkages. 
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Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) argue that the importance of spillovers· may be 
most valid for more developed countries and industries as they found some empirical 
evidence that the average age of the technology transferred to MNE affiliates in 
developed countries was shorter than that for developing countries. This argument 
should be extended to the firm level, as a local firm employing more skilled labour and 
using relatively advanced technology is more likely to obtain positive spillovers. Kokko 
(1994) uses three different proxies for the technology gap between local and foreign 
firms: capital intensity, LP and amount of patent fees. Sjoholm (1999) proposes a 
different way to identify the LP gap by estimating the model of LP on a foreign dummy 
(1 for foreign firms and 0 otherwise) controlling for capital intensity and scale of 
production. The estimate is conducted for each industry and the classification of 
technology gap relies on the magnitude of the dummy coefficient. In other words, the 
higher the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of foreign dummy the higher the gap 
in technology between domestic and foreign firms. Actually, there is strong evidence of 
a highly positive correlation between LP and capital intensity (Aitken et al. 1996). 
Moreover, Sjoholm's method very much depends on the estimation quality and number 
of observations in a sector. The technology gap should be taken into account for more 
disaggregated industry. Therefore, for studying numerous industries, this method may 
be too cumbersome to be appropriate. The results are also controversial. Kokko (1994) 
supports the theory when he finds that a large technology gap associated with high FDI 
presence in a sector prevents spill over effects. ln contrast, Sjoholm (1999) provides 
significant evidence on the positive effect of a high technology gap on spillovers. This 
difference raises the need for further study on spillovers and the absorptive capacity of 
local firms. 
The performance of firms is positively influenced by competition levels in both 
domestic and foreign markets. There have been an increasing number of recent studies 
which have examined the relationship between product-market competition and 
productivity as well as the influence of competition on FDI spillovers. For the first 
examination, Nickell (1996) concludes market power reduces the level of productivity 
but that competition is associated with higher rates of TFP growth. For the second, 
Haskel et al. (2002) includes the same proxies for market competition as Nickell (1996) 
in a model on FDI spillovers5. However, the competition proxies in Haskel et al. (2002) 
just function as controlled variables. More specifically, Sjoholm (1999) uses 
5 Haskel et al. (2002) use industry concentration, market share, import penetration and rents as 
explanatory variables in their model of productivity FDI spillovers 
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competition as a base analysis. He incorporates domestic-market and competition from 
abroad between ERP and the Herfindahl index if ERP is positive and by a ratio between 
them if ERP is negative. Subsequently, industries are divided into low and high 
competition categories. The investigation of FDI spillovers then relies on a separate 
estimation for each degree of competition. The major problem with this competition 
measurement is that it forces industries with negative ERP into the low competitive 
group regardless of the value of the Herfindahl index. 
Data and methodologies also affect estimation results. Cross section data tend to 
result in positive spillovers whereas panel-data based studies have mostly come up with 
negative effects. Obviously, the results depend on other factors like the level of data 
aggregation. Smarzynska (2002) divides the existing literature three ways, by the 
objectives of the research: case studies of specific countries, and industry level and firm 
level studies. The results of the first are not easily generalised; the results of the second 
tend toward a positive correlation between foreign presence and sectoral productivity; 
and the third kind of study is based on firm-level data but mostly fails to find consistent 
and significant evidence of a relationship between FDI and domestic productivity. 
Following this argument, Smarzynska (2002) focuses on vertical spillovers of FDI not 
previously addressed in the literature. Horizontal spillovers refer to the benefits local 
firms receive from the presence of MNEs. On the other hand, vertical spillovers refer to 
productivity spillovers that occur due to linkages between MNEs and local suppliers. 
With a sample of between 1921 and 2712 firms in Lithuania during the period 1996-
2000, Smarzynska (2002) finds consistent evidence of productivity spillovers through 
backward linkages. However, her model ignores the impact of FDl on specific types of 
industry. 
In a survey of 31 empirical articles, Navaretti and Venables (2004) found that 
roughly half of them reported a positive impact from FD! on productivity, only three 
showed in negative signs while the rest were not clear-cut. The main reasons may be 
that these studies all used different types of data (country, industry and firm data), 
methodologies and models. Early studies mainly used cross-section data and almost all 
found a positive effect from MNEs. However, these studies seem to overstate the 
positive impact of FDI on local productivity because they do not control for the self-
selection problem that occurs when MNEs want to invest in some industries which have 
higher productivity. The number of studies done on this topic in developed and 
developing countries is almost the same but there have been few studies on FD! effects 
in transition economies. Apart from the strong influence of the estimation methodology 
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on the result (Giorg and Strobl 2001; Navaretti and Venables 2004), the direction of 
spillovers depends on many other economic factors. Spillovers seem to occur either in 
local firms located nearby (agglomerative effect) or firms interacting with MNEs. 
Smarzynska (2002) finds a positive relationship between MNE presence and . the 
productivity of local firms acting as suppliers for MNE affiliates. 
Summing up, there are many problems relating to data, technique and 
methodology in empirical studies that have investigated the impact of FDI on local firm 
productivity. The results of existing studies have not reached clear conclusions on FDI 
spillovers. 
Trade policy regime and gains from FDI 
The theoretical literature pioneered by Bhagwati (1973) and extended by Brecher and 
Findlay (1983) postulates that that in an export-oriented (EP) policy regime FDI tends 
to have a greater impact on economic growth than under an import-substitution (IS) 
policy regime. The difference between these two policy regimes can be measured 
primarily by comparison between the effective exchange rate on exports (EER(x)) and 
the effective exchange rate on imports (EER(m) - Balasubramanyam et al. 1996).6 EP 
holds when EER(x) = EER(m) and IS holds if EER(m)>EER(x). An IS regime 
encourages FDI inflows to promote indigenous industry thereby reducing imports of 
consumer products. The IS regime is protected by domestic-content requirement policy 
in order to enhance industrial deepening, augment supplier creation, and multiply 
backward linkages in the hope of creating a reasonably vibrant, productive, and 
competitive indigenous industrial base. Domestic content is defined in either physical or 
value added terms. Following the former definition, the policy requires every firm in a 
protected industry to use a certain fraction of total physical units of intermediate inputs 
with a domestic origin. Final producers not achieving that requirement have a penalty 
tariff rate imposed on intermediates imported (Grossman 1981 ). 
However, this policy introduces negative effects on FDI inflows and domestic 
industries as well as on economic growth. Instead of improving market functioning, this 
policy generates many problems for both foreign investors and the host country. The 
average costs of products are high, consumer prices are pushed up and domestic firms 
6 EER(x) and EER(m) are defined as follows: 
EER(x) = n(l +s) and EER(m)= n{l +t) 
Where n is the nominal exchange rate, tis average tariff rate on imports, s is the average rate of subsidies 
on exports. 
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do not capture the full economies of scale. Moreover, other studies have found evidence 
of technological lags in some industrial projects with high domestic-content 
requirements. Instead of supporting transition and economic liberalisation this policy 
produces the opposite effect (Moran 1998; Pham 2004). At the micro level, Grossman 
(1981) concluded, based on the theoretical analysis of profit maximization, that policy 
objectives of increase in domestic value added and output of intermediates may fail to 
be achieved under an JS regime. In particular, enhancement of local content protection 
under monopoly power in the domestic market will cause reduction in the use of 
domestic intermediate goods. Using a quality ladders model, Grossman and Helpman 
( 1991) argue that tariff protection does not aid domestic firms in capturing the market. 
Moreover, even temporary protection ·does not encourage technology adoption by 
domestic firms, and incentives for R&O activity are more effective in a free trade 
regime compared to a protected trade regime (Saggi 2002). 
Under an EP policy regime, FDl is encouraged to enter industries usmg 
comparative-country advantages in order to achieve a certain export-performance 
requirement. Therefore, FOI entry under an EP regime will first increase export 
volatility and then improve the balance of payments of the host country. FIE exports 
may have positive rather than crowding-out effects on local-firm performance. 
Moreover, there may be additional benefits from an EP policy, like setting international 
export and import networks undertaken by MNEs, the agglomeration impact on scope 
of linkages between international investors and indigenous suppliers, and more 
importantly, creating favourable conditions for economic growth (Moran 1998). 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) the first systematic test of the relative impact of 
EP and IS policy regimes on host-country growth effct of FOL They use two 
alternative indicators to measure the degree of export orientation of policy regimes. The 
first indicator is the the ratio of imports to GDP. A country which has a relatively high 
ratio tends to follow EP regimes; otherwise it is likely to follow an IS regime. The 
second indicator is the more general classification of The World Bank to divide 
countries into outward and inward oriented groups. Using the new growth theory 
framework, they find the effect of FOi is stronger on EP countries than JS countries, 
regardless of the categorisations mentioned above. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) 
qualify their findings for the small size of the country sample ( 18 EP and 28 IS 
countries in the first classification). However subsequent studies by Athukorala and 
Chand (2000) and Kohpaiboon (2003) have corroborated their inference that growth 
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impact of MNE involvement tend to be greater under a more open trade policy regime 
than under a restrictive regime. 
2.5.2 Export performance 
One of the important y direct effects of FIEs is their contribution to export expansion. 
The literature has compared the differences in export behaviour between FIEs and local 
firms and concluded that FIEs are more export-oriented than local firms, especially in 
developing countries (Athukorala et al. 1995; Aitken et al. 1997; Siddharthan and 
Nollen 2004). This finding reflects the specific advantage's of MNE affiluiates in 
penetrating foreign markets related to experience, skill and market links. MNEs 
establish affiliates for the purpose of export substitution and extend intra trade between 
affiliates within the parent firm. Trade is a costly activity and hence not every firm can 
participate independently. The world market normally requires a higher competition 
level than the domestic market and, therefore, the capacity of the local firms in 
developing countries may not be sufficient. 
In some more extensive studies, FIEs are divided into two subgroups based on 
the investment source, from developed or developing (third world) countries. For 
instance, Athukorala et al. (1995) argue that third-world MNEs possess some 
characteristics that make them more appropriate for export expansion in the host 
country compared to the operation of MNEs from developed countries. Two questions 
are thoroughly investigated in the literature: the determinants of a firm's exporting 
decision (will a firm sell its product in both domestic and foreign markets?) and factors 
of export intensity (what share of products should be exported?). Comparison of export 
behaviour is often measured by the coefficients of ownership dummies in a pair of 
models of export probability and export propensity (the share of exports in gross output 
or revenue). However, a recent study argues that export behaviour between FIEs and 
local firms is totally different, and should therefore be examined by separate empirical 
models for each group of finns (Siddharthan and Nollen 2004). In the model of export 
performance of FJEs, evidence from Siddharthan and Nollen (2004) shows export 
propensity increases proportionally to the degree of foreign participation which could be 
measured by the foreign share of capital or employment in aggregated industries. 
Firm size and capital intensity arc consistenlly used as conventional 
determinants of export performance (Wakelin 1998; Buck et al. 2000; Siddharthan and 
Nollen 2004). Controlling for other effects, larger firms are likely to be associated with 
higher export intensity since they have comparative advantages such as the capacity to 
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set up an international-sales network, invest in technology and differentiate products 
satisfying foreign markets (Athukorala et al. 1995). However, firm size may be more 
significant for domestic firms than for MNE affiliates and may be not an incentive 
factor for a very large enterprise in increasing exporting activity. In the context of 
developing and transition economies, the existence of domestic monopoly firms in an 
industry is unlikely to provide any motivation for exporting. Siddharthan and Nollen 
(2004) find firm size has a positive effect on domestic firm exports but a negative one 
on FIE_exports. Their study concentrates on information technology, which is one of the 
leading export industries in India, but the results may not be consistent for other 
industries. In an earlier study, Wakelin (1998) found a diminishment in size effect on 
export probability through the negative sign of quadratic term of size. 
The evidence provides a mixed effect for capital intensity on firm exports. For 
example, while a positive effect of capital has been found in some studies (Kumar and 
Siddhartan 1994; Robets and Tybout 1997), capital intensity seems to have had no 
effect or even a negative effect in others (Athukorala et al. 1995; Haddad et al. 1996; 
Wakelin 1998; Siddharthan and Nollen 2004). Perhaps inter-industry study does · not 
determine the true effect of capital because this type of study ignores specific 
characteristics of each industry. 
The evidence on export spillovers is still limited. Two studies (Aitken et al. 
1997; Greenaway et al. 2004) extensively investigate the impact of MNE activity on the 
export performance of local firms. Both rely on the framework of employing 
conventional profit function. Through maximizing profit function and manipulating the 
results, the two studies come up with a specification for the optimal export quantity 
depending on the price of goods, firm input factors, distribution cost in both domestic 
and foreign markets, export activity and MNE behaviour in the host country. However, 
Aitken et al. (1997) concentrate on examining the MNE effects on export probability 
while Greenaway et al. (2004) look at both aspects of export decision and the export 
propensity of local firms. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between spillovers caused by total-export 
activity, MNE-export activity and MNE competition (the presence of MNEs in the same 
industry/region). Models presented in Aitken et al. (1997) encompass two key variables: 
local export concentration and MNE export activity, of which the former encompasses 
the latter but does not include the export of firms in the sample.7 However, Greenaway 
1 Taking geographical effect into account, local export concentration is the state-industry share of 
national-industry export normalized by the state share of national manufacturing export. MNE export 
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et al. (2004) use different measurements for calculating total-export activity and MNE-
export activity, i.e., they do not take geographical conditions into account.8 Moreover, 
this study captures the relative importance of MNEs at five-digit industry level in the 
domestic market by including a horizontal FDI variable in their model. . This is 
interpreted as the competition effect on the export performance of local firms. However, 
ignoring the geographical effect may lead to the results being affected by simultaneity 
problems. On one hand, the former study (Aitken et al. 1997) seems to have better 
specifications, as they take account of geographical effects and argue on the 
endogeneity of interest variables, general export· activity and MNE export activity. On 
the other hand, the latter study controls for the selection bias problem by using the 
Heckman procedure. The findings of these two studies are not perfectly consistent. 
Aitken et al. (1997) find the probability of a domestic plant export is positively 
correlated with proximity to multinational finns but not with local concentration of 
exports. Moreover, local export firms tend to locate near FIE concentration, hence the 
policy development of export processing zones. Greenaway et al. (2004) find 
significantly positive spillovers from MNE presence on the export probability of local 
firms, with both demonstration and competition effects. However, they did not find 
information spillovers for the host country from MNE exporting. 
The choice of estimation technique is also very important when modelling 
export intensity. The selection of OLS or panel estimate is not a good choice since the 
dependent variables receive limited values (varying between zero and 100). Therefore, 
Probit and truncated estimate techniques are preferable to find the determinants of 
export probability and export propensity, respectively. However, using these two 
strategies separately ignores some useful information and the estimates are affected by 
selection bias. A recent study uses the Heckman selection model which takes into 
account the truncated nature of sub-samples and overcomes the selection bias problem 
(Greenaway et al. 2004). This technique also gives an estimate distinction between two 
specifications for export probability and export propensity. This is very important since 
the literature has shovm a clear difference in firm behaviour on export decisions and 
export intensity. For instance, Wakelin (1998) finds no significant effect for capital 
activity, on the other hand, is the share of state-industry MNE exports in national industry exports also 
normalized by the state share of national manufacturing. 
8 Following Greenaway et al. (2004), the effect of overall export activity is measured by the industry 
share of national exports and MNE export activity is the MNE share of industry export relative to the 
MNE share of national exports. 
28 
intensity on export probability but a strongly positive effect on export propensity for all 
kinds of firms in the UK. Except for some special reasons, authors usually propose the 
same specification for two of these dependent variables. In the export decision model, 
Greenaway et al. (2004) add one more explanatory variable (shareholders' fund per unit 
of output) that captures firm capacity in setting up export operations but becaus_e it 
relates to fixed costs, it may not affect firm export propensity. 
To conclude, the literature has concentrated on the determinants of the export 
performance of FIEs and local firms rather than identifying the indirect effects of FDI 
(as discussed in the theory) on exporting activity in the host country. Even when proxy 
variables for MNE presence are included in the model, are not clearly shown the 
variables representing direct effect or spillovers of FDI. This is because the models do 
not control for linkages between MNEs and local firms in either factor or product 
markets. 
2.5.3 Labour market effects 
The literature on the employment effect of FDI is not as substantial as thaf on 
productivity. Three main aspects of employment have been explored: wage rates, labour 
skills and employment volatility. For the first, almost all studies concentrate on the 
comparison of wages paid by local firms and those by FIEs, conditioned on the 
difference in employment group: skilled or unskilled workers . Skills can be measured 
by a division of job types such as production and non-production or white collar and 
blue collar. In line with evidence on productivity comparison between FIEs and local 
firms, wage premium is also statistically higher in FIEs than in domestic firms 
(Dunning 1993; Aitken et al. 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Zhao 2001; Lipsey and 
Mucchielli 2002). The higher productivity in MNEs forces employers to pay higher 
wages to keep the best workers (skilled labour) and attract others. Higher wages also 
compensate for the risk of working for MNE affiliates. For instance, MNEs' concern is 
with productivity and surplus rather than social benefits and as a result may hire and fire 
workers more easily than local firms. 
In general, FIEs are believed to employ more skilled Jabour relative to domestic 
finns. For example, Dunning (1993) present information from Nigeria, Malaysia and 
Thailand, on employment structure and found FIEs employed a higher ratio of 
managerial, skilled and clerical labour than indigenous firms. In a recent study on the 
effect of MNE affiliates on Indonesia's economy, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) evaluate 
employment for three firm ownership types using education levels. They found that 
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both blue-collar and white collar workers in FIEs had a higher education level than in 
domestic-owned plants. Moreover, there is a wide consensus on the parallel correlation 
between wages and skills i.e., the higher the wages paid, the higher the skills required. 
Relying on this argument, the literature focuses on wage effects compared to skill 
effects. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) analyse the data on Mexico's maquiladoras and 
conclude that FDI can account for over 50 percent of the increase in the share of skilled 
labour in total wages. The FIE demand for skilled or unskilled employment may depend 
on what type of FDI is performed in the host country, i.e., efficiency-seeking investment 
in developing countries may employ more blue-collar relative to white-collar workers 
for making competitive goods and services. However, there is no clear empirical 
evidence supporting this argument. By and large, the literature provides only little 
evidence of the composition and dynamic adjustment of skilled labour employed by 
each ownership group. 
Difference between local firms and FIEs relating to employment volatility and 
adjustment has not been fully investigated. Among the few available studies, Williams 
(2003) investigates the impact of FDI on employment change in foreign manufacturing 
firms through entry modes, types of subsidiary and the nationality of FDI. He first, 
investigates the impact of FDI on employment varies among modes of entry, which will 
clearly have a strong effect compared to other types of investment. Second, the degree 
of impact also depends proportionally on the level of autonomy to which FDI firms are 
empowered by their parent. Finally, he tests whether non-European MNEs, especially 
Japanese and US affiliates, have more impact on employment in host countries than 
those from European nations. Testing these hypotheses, Williams (2003) uses the order 
probit estimation model for the ordinal-dependent variable and finds the greenfield 
entry mode from Asia/Pacific countries creates a positive impact on employment 
change. This is contrary to the impact from entry by mergers and acquisition (M&A). 
Surprisingly, the autonomy of a subsidiary does not seem to have any influence on 
employment. In contrast, high value-added affiliates do consistently have a significant 
and positive effect on employment change. However, Williams (2003) does not allow 
for differences in skill levels of workers among industries. Therefore, differences 
between FIEs and domestic firms in the degree of turnover of both skilled and unskilled 
workers remain an unresolved issue. 
A comparison of labour demand adjustment and labour demand elasticity 
between types of ownership is undertaken in Navaretti et al. (2003) and Fabbri et al. 
(2003). Navaretti et al. (2003) study proposes a dynamic response from finns (by 
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ownership) to different kinds of shock like technology, output and factor prices. Three 
specific issues are compared between local firms and FIEs: labour demand adjustment, 
wage and output elasticity of demand in both the short run and the long run. The 
empirical model is set up in logarithmic form for employment at firm level on lagged 
employment, output, capital cost, wages and time trend. Applying the GMM estimation 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and using a firm-data sample of eleven 
European countries, Navaretti et al. (2003) find labour demand in MNEs adjusts almost 
fully within a year and much faster than for local firms. However, in the long run, the 
factor- price elasticity and output elasticity of MNEs is smaller than for national firms. 
This finding indicates that working for MNEs in the long run is safer than working for 
local firms. Fabbri et al. (2003) are not concerned with the speed of labour demand 
adjustment. They concentrate instead on the role of foreign ownership in the elasticity 
of labour demand in the host country. They compare the results for US industry reported 
by Slaughter (2001) with new results from UK industry data. The difference from 
Navaretti et al. (2003) is that Fabbri et al. (2003) take account of skilled and unskilled 
workers by replicating the estimate of the models for each group. Their findings are 
consistent with their argument that MNEs have a higher elasticity of labour demand 
than national firms and in particular that the gap is larger for unskilled labour. 
The positive correlation between wages and the degree of foreign ownership 
holds especially for developing and transition economies. There are two notable labour 
market features in transition economies, high market segmentation and high labour 
mobility costs (Zhao 2001 ). Most of the skilled labourers worked for SO Es in the 
central planning period and even in the transition phase. Although the wages are often 
lower than those paid by FIEs, many skilled workers still prefer to work for SOEs for 
reasons including higher job security, lower working intensity and better social services 
(accommodation, health insurance, bonus and pension). Skilled labour only chooses to 
work for FDI firms if earnings outweigh the costs of changing j obs. Segmentation here 
implies a wages gap between the two sectors: privileged and unprivileged, with the 
privileged sector enjoying higher earnings. Zhao (200 l) is one of few studies that use 
education level to classify skilled and unskilled workers. Using a two-step procedure 
introduced in Heckman (l 979) to estimate the probability of employment choice 
between SOEs and FIEs and wages comparison, he finds the wage differential between 
FIEs and SOEs is imperative in employment choice. The empirical results are consistent 
with his hypothesis that skilled workers move to work for FIEs because higher wages 
compensate for the cost of leaving SOEs. However, his results are at low significance 
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levels and the small sample size does not reflect the situation of FIEs and SOEs in the 
entire Chinese labour market. 
The main focus in the literature on wage effect of FDI is on the direct effect 
rather than on wage spillovers to local firms. Theoretically, there are two possible 
outcomes of wage spillovers. On the one hand, higher wages in MNEs may lead local 
firms to increase wage rates in order to compete in a market with increasing labour 
demand. On the other hand, the high proportion of available skilled labour employed in 
MNEs may force local firms to employ fewer skilled workers thereby reducing their 
total wages. The literature review in Moran et al. (2005) shows a mixed FDI effect on 
wages in local firms, despite the fact that methodology (cross section and panel) and 
data source are different. In particular, Aitken et al. ( 1996) examine spillovers on local-
firm wages in three countries: Mexico, Venezuela and the United States (US). They did 
not find a significant impact from FDI on local- firm wages in the first two countries. In 
contrast, higher wages for local firms in the US were associated with a higher presence 
of FDI. The lack of spillovers in the two developing countries is explained by a big gap 
between local firms and FIEs in absorptive capacity that could be comprised of 
technology and human capital. The previous section argues that productivity spillovers 
have a high correlation with absorptive capacity. However, whether wages or 
productivity spillovers are more sensitive to local-firm capacity has not been fully 
explored. 
2.5.4 Transition economy and MNE involvement 
Centrally-planned versus transition economies 
The transition process that moves an economy from centrally-planned to market-
oriented has been occurring in former Soviet-bloc countries over nearly three decades, 
starting with China's reform in 1978. The process of the transition may differ slightly 
from country to country, but it follows two major approaches: gradual and "big bang" 
reforms. By and large, the patterns of transition may include privatization of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), reduction of government subsidies for SOEs (hard-budget 
constraints), and competitive promotion (Estrin 2002). In other words, the transition 
process has two basic inter-related mechanisms: resource reallocation and firm 
restructuring. Resource reallocation marks a departure from the preferential allocation 
of resources (capital and labour) to the state~owned sector in order to set the stage for a 
private-sector oreinted economy. Firm estructuring involes diversification of firm 
ownership and enhancement of production efficiency. More specifically, restructuring 
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may consist of closing down the most inefficient and unnecessary enterprises, laying off 
workers in those plants, replacing managers who are not efficient in a market economy, 
reducing the hoarding that is a consequence of a planned economy, renovating 
technology and replacing the old capital to produce goods and services satisfying 
conswner demand (Blanchard 1997). 
In a centrally-planned economy, resources are allocated by government bodies at 
the central level based on quantity-based planning. There are two main types of 
ownership: state owned and collectives. Private ownership is weak and has little effect 
on the gross output structure. All economic sectors and enterprises organize production 
relying on quantity-based planning. Therefore both the factor market and product 
market do not exist with their true signs. Capital is exclusively provided by state-owned 
banks and labour distributed to SOEs by government decision. Unskilled employment 
resides in rural areas and participates in collectives. Firms are not autonomous when 
they have no role in the production plan or responsibility for loans, sales and pricing. 
No relationship exists between supply and consumer demand. Long term central-
planning mechanisms have caused many negative consequences. The change in the 
political system in Eastern Europe in the earlier 1990s and macro instability in other 
communist countries created the background for the transition process. In the early 
stage of transition, privatization of SOEs was one of the most important strategies in 
most transition economies. 
"Transition" refers to the process of removing the restrictions and distortions of 
a centrally-planned economy and setting up a market mechanism in order to increase 
production efficiency. However, not all people in the society will like these changes and 
SOEs are likely to resist restructuring for at least two reasons. First, some firms will be 
closed due to long-standing losses, and the restructuring associated with efficiency 
improvement causes bad managers and a number of workers to be laid off. 
Consequently, SOE insiders may oppose the changes. Second, SOE reform requires 
large capital in order to acquire advanced technology and capital goods since most SOE 
assets are outdated. As they are heavily indebted and state subsidies have been removed, 
this is often impossible. 
The positive effects of transition are unlikely to materialize in the short term. 
Evidence from Eastern-European countries shows an increase in unemployment rate and 
a decrease in outputs in the early stage of reform. Moreover, the removal of subsidies 
may not lead to an improvement in the government budget. However, both productivity 
and output are likely to rise and unemployment to shrink as SOEs and privatized firms 
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accumulate capital over time (Blanchard 1997). The mam difference between a 
transition economy and other types of economies is the significant role of SOEs and the 
relative weakness of the private sector. Success of the transition process is measured by 
a liberalized economy moving toward a market mechanism, where development, 
dominance of the private sector and improvement in state-owned sector efficiency are 
the main indicators. 
Privatization and the role of MNEs 
Privatization of state-owned enterprise is crucial in the early stage of microeconomic 
reform in transition economies. This process aims to improve the efficiency of SO Es by 
selling whole or part of state-owned assets to other stakeholders and institutionalizing a 
separation between the state and the enterprise sector (Estrin 2002). Enhancement of 
efficiency and revenue are the main objectives in privatizing SO Es. If the government's 
main concern is SOE efficiency rather than other macro objectives, like employment, 
tax and stability, it will speed up the privatization process. However, if the government 
focuses on macro objectives, like unemployment rate and public wellbeing, the 
privatization process may be slower (Maw 2002; Guo and Yao 2005). 
Moving to a market economy substantially reduces priorities and preferences in 
favour of SOEs. The new mechanism allows for free entry and participation of the 
private sector in every industry and service. Prices are set by the supply-demand 
relationship in the market. All economic entities are responsible for their own 
production and distribution phases. The financial situation and market power of SOEs 
are weakened accordingly. Moreover, market liberalization also forces government to 
cut subsidies to SOEs and eventually privatize them. However, the degree of excessive 
debt in SOEs and the capacity of the government can slow the privatization process. 
The government must decide whether or not to retire SOE debts in order to get the 
highest possible price for firm assets. In addition, the government also has to be 
concerned with social stability as many workers will be made redundant by the 
arrangement. 
The privatization process is not the same amongst transition economies. Almost 
all European transition countries have followed ' big bang" reform and hence 
privatization has been undertaken in a short time. In contrast, China and Vietnam have 
pursued a "gradualism" approach where privatization has been ongoing. Privatization 
can follow different paths like auction, restitution and mass privatization. While the 
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extent of privatization varies substantially amongst transition economies, most choose 
"partial privatization". The rationale is derived from the subjective purpose of the 
government as well as the characteristics of the transition country. Governments are 
reluctant to lose full control of SOEs. Government capacity and a developing market, 
especially a stock-flow limitation, do not allow for full privatization of many SO Es. The 
theory indicates that worse performing SOEs should be privatized first as this may bring 
larger gains. In fact, not every transition economy follows this rule since poorly-
performing SO Es in the hands of the government could worsen in the long run because 
of mismanagement and possible corruption. 
The transition process, in particular privatization, gains benefits from the entry 
of MNEs. The direct and indirect effects of FDI in the host country have been 
discussed, and for transition economies these effects seem more straightforward. 
Development of the private sector, including local private and FIEs, diversifies 
ownership structure and increases competition. The prevailing small number of SOEs in 
the domestic market will be replaced by competition between SOEs, local private firms 
and MNE affiliates. The indirect effects of FDI on SOEs may include both pro-
competitive effects and product-market effects, since SOEs in transition economies 
normally have low competitive power and are blocked to external markets. Therefore, 
MNE entry will help SOEs to improve efficiency and export their products to 
international markets. 
FDI also has a direct effect on the reform of SOEs when the privatization 
process involves attracting M&A activity or forming joint ventures with foreign 
investors. There are alternative points of view on the participation of foreign investors 
in the privatization process. The first is where government aims to bound and regulate 
foreign ownership. The second treats foreigners as domestic investors and encourages 
them to participate in the privatization process. ln the bidding process for a domestic 
asset, the level of foreign purchase price depends on both the foreigners and the host 
government. Foreign investment and sales to outsiders are the most effective method of 
privatization (Maw 2002). Foreign investors with better technology, experience and 
management skills could be willing to pay more for privatizing a SOE, particularly 
when they want to expand business and access the host country market. However, 
uncertain policy and ownership restrictions in the host country may diminish their 
willingness. The removal of ownership and market restrictions will enhance the 
participation of MNEs and hence speed up the privatization process. The cost of entry 
and doing business in a host country is another factor that affects the bargaining of 
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MNEs. These costs, even if small, may have a large effect on the decision of 
participants to privatize SOE assets, as well as on host country revenue. 
There has been some debate over the comparative performance of state-owned 
and private firms (excluding MNE affiliates) during the transition process. Konings 
(1997) finds an interesting conclusion that de novo private firms performed better than 
privatized and SOE enterprises. Moreover, his results show the growth of privatized 
firms is the same as that of SOEs although he failed to find the underlying reasons for 
this. One possible explanation is that privatization takes time to have an effect. Another 
study, undertaken by Li (1999) clearly points to efficiency improvement for SOEs due 
to reform. Although the product composition of SOEs decreased by more than a third in 
China, the absolute value of AOE products has still grown rapidly during the eight years 
since 1980. The main reasons include the emergence of non-state domestic enterprises 
and the entry of MNE affiliates. Li concentrates on the performance of small and 
medium SOEs during the early stage of reform in China (1978-1990). Using data on a 
relatively developed province in China, Li ( 1999) shows that the transition from a 
centrally-planned to market-oriented economy also compels efficiency in SOEs, in 
addition to the privatization process. Increased market openness and competition 
boosted the productivity of SOE geographically. Rationales for SOE improvement can 
be market incentives and the high growth of non-state sectors, including domestic 
private and FDI firms. Market competition has multiple effects. First, employees in 
SOEs are forced to work harder. Second, more opportunities for SOEs to restructure are 
provided, thereby increasing market demand. However, different measures of 
productivity provide different results and Li's calculation may overestimate the level of 
productivity. The focus on one relatively developed province does not seem to be a 
good representative for all SOEs in China. Moreover, the study does not undertake 
comparison of firm performance between different ownership types therefore the impact 
of reform on firm efficiency has not been investigated. 
Evidence of FDI effects in transition economies 
The literature on the role of FDI in transition economies has expanded recently but not 
as much as for developing countries. The two main types of research are comparative 
and case studies. The former centres on the impact of FDI between European transition 
countries. For instance, Konings (1997, 2001) and Angelucci et al. (2002) use data from 
three countries whereas Damijan et al. (2003) compare the FDI effect in the top ten 
transition economies. There are some country-specific studies, like Kinoshita (2000), 
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Djiankov and Hoekman (2000) exploring the firm-level data for manufacturing in the 
Czech Republic. A number of recent empirical studies have also concentrated on the 
roles of FDI in China as this country became the largest recipient country in the 
developing world. For instance, Xiaodong Wu (2001), Haishun Sun (2001), Liu and 
Wang (2003) and Lai et al. (2006) investigated, in turn, the impact of FDI on returns to 
skill, export performance, total factor productivity and economic growth. 
The available evidence on FDI spillovers in transition economies is rather 
mixed. Damijan et al. (2003) use both static and dynamic panel data techniques to find 
horizontal and backward spillovers in ten countries. Horizontal spillovers are revealed 
in four countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) whereas backward 
linkage effects are found in three nations (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia). 
However, the positive FDI effect in the Czech Republic in this study does not seem to 
be consistent with other literature. For example, both Kinoshita (2000) and Djiankov 
and Hoekman (2000) investigate the Czech data in two consecutive periods, 1992-1996 
and 1995-1 998. They failed to detect a clear difference between the two periods. The 
results run counter to those from a comparative study by Kinoshita (2000). This study 
finds no evidence of either superior MNE affiliate productivity or spillovers and 
Djiankov and Hoekman (2000) come up with a negative FDI effect on local firm 
productivity. Technology spillovers are more likely to be achieved in more liberalized 
transition countries which allow foreign involvement in the privatization process 
(Konings 2001 ; Damijian et al. 2003a, b). 
Most studies on spillovers in transition economies focus only on horizontal 
spillovers. Only two (Smarzynska 2002 and Damijan et al., 2003), have taken vertical 
spillovers into account. The measurement of horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers 
is different in these two studies. The latter seems better because it gives a more accurate 
measurement based on arguments that spillovers could be diminished due to the effects 
of export and import activities in FIEs. However, the calculation of backward spillovers 
using input coefficients (derived from the Input-Output table) at the two-digit level may 
not be accurate as the literature shows spillovers vary significantly by industry 
classification. 
Both Kinoshita (2000) and Damijan et al. (2003) examine the mechanism of 
R&D and technology spillovers via FDI in European transition countries. They estimate 
empirical models which include both R&D investment and FDI presence within an 
industry and produce different results. Kinoshita (2000) explores the data of Czech 
manufacturing firms and finds the coefficient of R&D is positive and significant, 
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implying the innovative effect of R&D on productivity is dominating. In the model 
showing interaction between R&D and technology spillovers she finds the role of R&D 
in increasing absorptive capacity is greater than its renovation role. In contrast, Damijan 
et al. (2003) did not discover a significant role for R&D in enhancing innovative and 
absorptive capacity during the transition period in ten Eastern European transition 
economies. In some countries, like Hungary, Latvia and Estonia, R&D is revealed as an 
obstacle to FDI spillovers. There are some possible explanations for this. First, the 
former study uses OLS estimates while panel data techniques are applied in the latter 
study. Sample size and selection bias also affect the results. Damijan et al. (2003) use 
the two-step Heckman procedure to correct for selection bias while Kinoshita (2000) 
does not. Moreover, there may be a high correlation between R&D expenditure and 
foreign presence in a sector since FIEs often spend more money on R&D activities than 
local firms. Therefore, the R&D variable may crowd out the effect of the ownership 
dummy and spillovers when all are included in the same model. This argument is 
supported by the high significance of the interaction between R&D and spillovers while 
each individual effect is found to be insignificant by Kinoshita (2000). 
FDI is also beneficial to transition economies as it can contribute to 
improvement in corporate governance in privatized finns. In particular, FDI brings 
effective capital to joint-ventures with SOEs, reducing the financial reliance on banks 
and government, hence leading to hardening the budget constraint. Konings (2001) is 
the first study of both FDI direct effects and horizontal spillovers conditioned on 
different types of local ownership. He compares the re~ults estimated by OLS and by 
the dynamic estimation method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991 ). For the direct 
effect, the dynamic estimate shows privatized firms do not perform better than SOEs. 
This is surprising since the local private sector seems more active and productive than 
the state owned sector. For the indirect effect, Konings (2001) investigates data of three 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania and Poland) and found negative coefficients · for 
spillovers in two out of three countries (Bulgaria and Romania). This implies two 
things. First, in less open economies, or in the first stage of transition, spillovers are 
negative due to domination of the competition effect that forces less efficient firms to 
exit (mainly SOEs). Second, spillovers may occur in the long term, when the absorptive 
capacity of local firms has improved. 
Angelucci et al. (2002) use firm-level data in the same countries studied by 
Konings (2001) to examine the effects of domestic and international competition and 
ownership on productivity performance. They use an augmented production function to 
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estimate the effects of local private share and foreign share of capital on real value-
added, controlling for other factors: employment, capital, concentration and import 
penetration. This model does not take the specific characteristics of sectors and firms 
into account. They compare three different econometric methods and conclude that a 
fixed effect estimate is more appropriate but the conclusion is confused due to 
interpreting all three estimates together. The results vary amongst countries, partly 
because of different degrees of economic transition towards privatisation and 
competitive markets. For Bulgaria and Poland, the direct effect of local private 
ownership and foreign ownership are positive and significant. However, this effect is 
not clear in Romania. By including an interaction between private share and the 
Herfindahl index, a high concentration seems to diminish the effect of local private 
firms in Bulgaria. That means privatisation takes effect when the market achieves a 
certain level of competition. The interactions in Romania and Poland are not significant, 
and hence the results are inconclusive. Perhaps their model omits some exogenous 
determinants of productivity and they do not deal with the endogeneity of FDI or with 
the privatisation variable. 
The privatization process has transferred state ownership to differentiated 
private owners with higher incentives to increase than decrease exports of privatised 
firms. On the one hand, outside shareholders have an expectation of efficiency, so that 
export activities would be encouraged. On the other hand, inside shareholders, 
especially managers, are more inclined to protect their position and raise their stake 
values rather than focus on firm performance. Consequently, export capacity may be 
restricted. Besides, SOEs which are a significant part of the industrial structure also 
have dual effects on export. If the government follows an export-led growth strategy 
and supports firm efficiency rather than macro objectives (employment, stability, 
inflation) international trade will be promoted. If the opposite is the case, state 
ownership will be a barrier to exporting activity. Buck et al., (2000) used firm-level data 
for three former Soviet countries (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) to investigate the 
determinants of expmi propensity for local firms. Including both the managerial stakes 
and its square, they found a higher level of managerial ownership had a significantly 
negative effect on export propensity. However, state ownership does not have an 
important effect (even with positive sign) on the exporting decision of the firm, mainly 
because government only holds a small share of firm equity. The story could be 
different in countries where mass privatization is not adopted. 
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The employment effects of FDI have been explored by a few studies. Of these, 
Mickiewicz et al. (2000) and extended by Radosevic et al. (2003) concentrate on 
Eastern European transition economies. Mickiewicz et al. (2000) examine the effects of 
FDI on job creation and preservatipn in four Eastern European countries: Hungary, 
Czech Republic; Slovak Republic and Estonia. In the early period of transition, 
evidence from three of the four countries shows an increase in unemployment in total 
manufacturing as well as in some specific industries. Fortunately, there has been a 
remarkable growth of employment created by FlEs during that period. ln a country with 
positive change in employment (Hungary), FIEs were found to play a dominating role 
in generating that employment. Overall, Mickiewicz et al. (2000) conclude that FDl acts 
as a supplementary factor rather than a substitute in employment generation in transition 
economies. 
2.6 Empirical studies on FDI effects in Vietnam 
This section is placed separately from the previous section in order to highlight the 
contribution of this thesis to the literature on FDI in economic transition based on the 
Vietnamese experience. A number of studies have been undertaken on trends and 
patterns of FDI and reviewing related policy in Vietnam. However, there has been a 
dearth of studies on the economic effects of FDI, mostly because of data constraint at 
both micro and macro levels. This section focuses only on the few available studies on 
the latter subject in order to place the empirical analysis of this thesis in context. 
There have been two studies of the role of FDJ on economic growth undertaken 
using unpublished data from Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPl) and 
the General Statistics Office (GSO) (Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa 2003; Nguyen Thi Tue 
Anh et al. 2005). Both studies draw upon the new (endogenous) growth theory, but 
adopt different methodologies. Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa (2003) uses provincial-level 
data for the late 1990s to examine the impact of FDJ on GDP growth, whereas Nguyen 
Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) undertake a time series analysis in which the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of quarterly real GDP per capita. 
Concerning empirical specifications, Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) 
incorporate the effect of FDI with three proxy variables for human capital, namely, the 
proportion of working people who finished primary school, the proportion that finished 
secondary school, and the rate of literacy for the total population. The results are 
slightly complicated. In all specifications, FDI does not provide a clearly positive effect 
on growth even though its interaction with human capital supports a hypothesis that a 
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positive relationship exists between FDI and human capital in a growth model. 
Moreover, FDI is shown to have a complementary effect on domestic investment and 
foreign capital is more efficient than domestic capital, as the coefficient of FDI is 
greater than that of gross investment. The growth model used in Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et 
al. (2005) is likely to have been underspecified since it does not control for fundamental 
effects such as labour force, trade policy regime and other types of investment. The use 
of govenunent expenditure as a proxy for capital stock is not sufficient, since 
government consumption plays a decreasing role in a more liberalized economy. The 
model in Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa (2003) is more complicated as she includes some 
exogenous variables like public investment, the growth rate of the workforce and 
population, inflation, education and share of skilled workers. Therefore, the results are 
more consistent, and show a positive effect of FDI on GDP growth and a positive 
interaction effect of FDI and human capital, regardless of the difference in human 
capital measurement. 
The nexus between FDI and trade has been examined in Nguyen Nhu Binh and 
Haughton (2002), Pham Hoang Mai (200 l ), Phan Minh Ngoc and Ramstetter (2004a), 
and MPI and USAID (2005). Since 2000, there has bee.n a concern about the causal link 
between international trade and FDI, especially the impact of the U.S-Vietnam bilat.eral 
trade agreement (BT A) on inward FDI, trade performance and economic growth. 
However, there are only two studies focusing on the impact of FDI on firm export 
performance. 
The study by Pham Hoang Mai (200 l ), explores unpublished data on MPI to 
identify the determinants of FIE export probability. This study covers not only 
manufacturing firms but also firms working in the primary sector. The major limitations 
could be that Pham Hoang Mai (200 l) includes a small sample of FIEs (because data 
were unavailable at that time) and has omitted several variables; the study is particularly 
lacking some of the essential determinants of export behaviour, such as capital intensity, 
firm size, export orientation, etc. Besides, the use of a simple linear regression analysis 
for an export model might not be appropriate. Pham Hoang Mai (2001) has looked at 
the different effects of FDI based on the FDI home country. However, instead of using 
several country dummies, he includes only a discrete variable for country source which 
makes it difficult to interpret the coefficient. 
Phan Minh Ngoc and Ramstetter (2004a) examine the relationship between 
foreign ownership and export propensity using the same data source but with a larger 
sample than Pham Hoang Mai (2001). For empirical work, they narrow their study on 
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the comparison of FIE export behaviour divided by groups of two digit Vietnamese 
Standard of Industrial Classification (VSIC)9 sectors as well as comparing a group of 
heavily foreign-owned projects with the rest. A Tobit estimate has been carried out 
using data for 2000 and 2001, respectively. The estimation results suggest export 
propensity is higher in heavily foreign-owned projects compared to minority foreign-
owned projects. Unfortunately, the significance and signs of effects rely on industrial 
sector and weighted/non-weighted models. Moreover, the model reveals a fundamental 
limitation in its use of an unbalanced data sample for the regression, so that no 
comparison could be conducted between the two years. As for the study approach, their 
models do not seem to have been controlled or tested for the lack of some necessary 
variables of FDI determinants, like trade and industry policies. Those two studies have 
looked only at one side of the whole picture of the market access effects of FDI. There 
have been not any studies which compare the behaviour between FIEs and domestic 
firms on international trade or the effect of FIEs on the export performance of local 
firms in Vietnam. 
Kokko et al. (2003) investigate the determinants rather than the roles of FDI in 
Vietnam's economy. They use data on licensed and withdrawn FDl projects during the 
period 1988-2000 to explain why Vietnam has a high ratio of unsuccessful FDI 
projects. 10 Based on theory of investment failure, Kokko et al. (2003) set up a Probit 
model of the probability of a given FDI project to fail on age, size, and type of project, 
location, source, poverty level and effective rate of protection. Their study uses the 
transaction cost approach to investigate how different project characteristics are related 
to transaction costs and hence to the risk of failure of licensed investments. Based on 
those arguments, some crucial hypotheses are presented and examined. One problem 
with this model is that it does not include some essential determinants of FDI, like host 
country policy and external circumstances, which are important to the success of FDI 
projects. 
As for the indirect side of FDl effects, three studies have scrutinized 
productivity spillovers (Le Thanh Thuy 2005; Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005; Le 
Quoc Hoi 2006). All focus on the effects of FDI on labour productivity through a 
9 VSIC has been adjusted mostly the same as the International Standard of Industrial Classification 
(!SIC). 
10 The projects were approved but not implemented for different reasons. In some studies they are called 
fai led projects. In the 1990s, the rate of failed projects over total FDI proj ects in Vietnam was relatively 
high. 
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theoretical framework using an endogenous growth model. However, there are some 
noteworthy differences among them. Firstly, Le Thanh Thuy (2005) estimates a log 
linear labour productivity model and estimates the equation conditioning by three 
different aspects: spillovers with capital intensity, spillovers with technology gap and 
spillovers with domestic private sector. In contrast, the other studies investigate 
spillovers by diverse approaches, which not only take into account spillovers 
differentiation by the absorptive capacity of domestic firms but also look at different 
effects in industry, ownership and geography. The definition of technology gap at 
industry level in Le Thanh Thuy (2005) may not be convincing when foreign-sector 
productivity is weighted in a broad industry. 
Secondly, Le Thanh Thuy (2005) explores aggregated data on 29 different 
industries, which include both primary and manufacturing sectors during the period 
1995-2002. Owing to the differences in the method of data composition across 
industries, she runs separate regressions for two sub-periods, 1995-1999 and 2000-2002. 
Perhaps the estimate in the study faces more serious problems with the use of 
aggregated data in conjunction with model misspecification. The high variation between 
two-digit VSIC industries is not controlled in the empirical model due to using the poor 
quality of the data source. In contrast, both Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) and Le 
Quoc Hoi (2006) were more convincing as they use firm-level data collected by GSO 
surveys. The former study explores one year of data whereas the latter uses richer data 
from the period 2000-2004. Using a common theoretical model in which labour 
productivity is controlled by fundamental factors like capital intensity, firm size and 
other determinants like the share of skilled labour, economies of scale and industry-
specific characteristics. Another strong point in Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) and 
Le Quoc Hoi (2006) is that they estimate spillovers with respect to the difference in 
geographical FDl inflows. Moreover, these studies concern not only spillovers but also 
the determinants of labour productivity, in which the role of FDI acts as an exogenous 
variable. However, the use of simple OLS technique might overestimate the results, so 
neither Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) nor Le Quoc Hoi (2006) is able to see the 
long term variation in FDI spillovers. 
The results are mixed as Le Thanh Thuy (2005) and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 
(2005) find a positive effect of FDI, whereas Le Quoc Hoi (2006) comes up with 
negative horizontal spillovers. In particular, Le Thanh Thuy (2005) discovers smaller 
spillovers in capital intensive industry compared to the labour intensive sector. A wide 
technology gap also decreases spillovers. However, these findings are only significant 
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in the second short period. Surprisingly, Le Thanh Thuy (2005) finds a constructive role 
of private sector concentration in enhancing FDI spillovers in the more liberalized 
period from 2000. This could support the hypothesis that privatization, especially 
development of the private sector in Vietnam, is in line with competitive market 
construction and hence results in higher benefits from FDI entry. The results reported 
by Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) also provide good evidence that private firms 
have advantages in gaining positive spillovers from FDI entry. Unfortunately, SOEs, 
with larger scale and longer existence, face more difficulties in the presence of MNEs in 
the domestic market, despite the fact that they have received a lot of government 
preferences and subsidies. In general, spillovers on labour productivity are found in 
inter-industry analysis rather than within-industry estimates. Their findings on a positive 
effect from FDI also only apply to the food processing industry but not in either the 
textiles-garments or mechanic-electronic industries. 
There are some explanations for the negative effect of horizontal spillovers 
while vertical spillovers are positive but mostly insignificant in Le Quoc Hoi (2006). 
First, it is the first study using panel data at firm level. Second, the utilization of a 
simple OLS method for both cross section and panel data may not always produce the 
same results. Third, and perhaps the most important reason is the difference in defining 
spillover variable. Using two-digit data, the spillover variable in Le Thanh Thuy (2005) 
may be not captured accurately. Both Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) and Le Quoc 
Hoi (2006) calculated horizontal spillovers at 4-digit VSIC level. Le Quoc Hoi (2006) 
seems to make a considerable effort to estimate both horizontal and vertical spillovers. 
However, the calculation of vertical spillover faces a big measurement error as he relies 
on the Vietnam Input-Output table which mixes up information on vertical linkages and 
imported goods. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed both the theory and empirical literature on the effects of FDI 
from host-country perspectives focusing on three aspects of firms' operations: 
productivity, exports and employment. The direct benefits from MNE presence are 
clearly identified through contributions to economic growth, export expansion and 
factors of production. There remains some debate in the empirical work on the spillover 
effect on domestic firm performance. This effect is found to have a strong connection 
with other economic factors, like absorptive capacity, development of host-country 
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technology, human capital, market competition and firm location. Spillovers also 
depend on the methodology adopted in the study and level of data aggregation. Most 
empirical studies concentrate on examining spillovers in developed and developing 
countries while transition economies with exclusive features are less considered. This 
theoretical framework provides a background for the empirical chapters in this thesis 
which consider the effects of FDI in the transition period in Vietnam. 
Few available studies on impact of FDI in Vietnam have failed to investigate 
both direct and indirect effects on various important aspects of manufacturing 
performance including productivity, exports and factor proportions. Their inferences on 
FDI spillovers are also largely ambiguous mainly because of data limitations, in 
particular limited sample size and time coverage. Furthermore, none of these studies 
have paid attention to the role of host country conditions such as firm capacity, 
technology level, human capital endowment and investment climate in determining the 
the nature and extent of economic implications of FDI in the process of economic 
transition. 
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Chapter 3: FDI Policy Regime and the Investment 
Climate in Vietnam 
3.1 Introduction 
Opening up the economy to foreign direct investment at successive stages has been a 
key policy element in Vietnam's transition from a centrally-planned to a market-
oriented economy. The reforms have included efforts to improve laws relating to 
investment, business activities and firm ownership. These reforms have motivated both 
FDI inflows and domestic investment, creating a fundamental background for export 
expansion and economic growth. The policy reform in Vietnam met with international 
approval that led to several agreements being signed and treaties ratified. Over ten years 
ago, Vietnam became a member of ASEAN and AFTA and on the 7'h November 2006, 
became a new member of the WTO. Vietnam has also signed bilateral trade agreements 
with many countries, most significantly a bilateral trade agreement (BT A) with the US 
in 2001. 
This chapter investigates the evolution of the FDI policy regime in Vietnam over 
the 20-year period of reforms (1986-2006) and of the other key elements of 
liberalization reforms which have a direct bearing on MNE entry and the performance 
of FIEs. This sets the stage for the ensuing analysis on trends, patterns and the 
development implications of FDI. The next section of this chapter discusses the 
investment regime with particular emphasis on reviewing the initiative and reform of 
Jaws on FDl, the unification process of the Law on Promotion of Domestic Investment 
·with the FDI law by adopting a new Law on Investment and other related documents. 
The third section concentrates on trade-related policy affecting the entry and 
effectiveness of FDI in Vietnam. This section takes into account Vietnam's preparation 
and commitments as a member of the WTO. The fourth section reviews the process of 
SOE restructuring and privatisation and the unification of corporate rules in 2000 and 
2005 for all ownership types through issuance of new laws related to enterprises. The 
last focal point is an evaluation of the current business climate in Vietnam followed by 
some conclusions. 
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3.2 Investment regime 
This section reviews separately the processes of fonnation and of amendment of the 
Law on FDI and other related legal documents, before concentrating on the new Law on 
Investment, the best alternative for both FDI and domestic investment legal regimes. 
3.2.1 The law on FOi 
Since the early stage of Doi Moi 11 (renovation refonns), the Vietnamese government 
has acknowledged the importance of FDI in the process of economic transition. A new 
Law on Foreign Investment was approved by the National Assembly just one year after 
the reform was launched in 1986. This law was amended five times in 1990, 1992, 
1996, 2000 and 2003. Each amendment was aimed at removing restrictions and 
covering practical issues. In particular, the original law in 1987 contained six chapters 
with 42 articles providing basic rules for the activities of foreign investors. This law had 
a lot of shortcomings as Vietnam had just launched the reform with no experience of a 
market economy. 
The first amendment to the FDI Law in 1990 introduced the following 
significant changes: (a) permitting domestic private enterprises to fonn joint venture 
companies with foreign investors, and (b) specifying the scale of government incentives 
in terms of tax exemption/reduction on firm's profit. The law clearly showed that the 
strategy of enticement of FDI was a substitute for imported products. The second 
amendment in 1992 was aimed at reducing discrimination against fully-owned FIEs 
compared with joint ventures. One of the most significant changes in this amendment 
was setting up a special economic zone called the export processing zone (EPZ) and 
encouraging FDI to locate in this area. However, the regulations for the EPZ at this 
stage were quite simple and were replaced by a more detailed document - Decision 
519/TTg/l 996 that developed a strategy for building up industrial zones including 
EPZs. Moreover, the second amendment of the FOi law was marked by an increase in 
duration of foreign ownership in investment projects, from 20 to 50 years (70 years for 
special cases) in accordance with more guarantees and compensation commitments for 
investment in Vietnam. 
Amendments to the FDI Law in 1996 and 2000 clearly reflected a marked shift 
in the emphasis of Vietnam's development strategy away from import-substitution and 
11 This term refers to the reform process initiated in the 1986 Communist Party Congress with the aim of 
removing the centrally-planned mechanism and setting up a market-oriented economic model. 
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towards export orientation. For instance, the 1996 amendment earmarked export 
production, a high technology sector, labour-intensive industry and infrastructure as key 
policy priorities in attracting FDI. Since 2000, the government has provided special 
encouragement for FDl projects operating in difficult and remote areas. The most 
serious problems, encountered initially with procedures for obtaining investment license 
and registration, have been eased. The time for assessing an investment license has been 
significantly reduced. Under the 1996 FDI Law, foreign investors had to wait at least 90 
days following their request for an investment license. The adjustment to the 2000 law 
reduced this waiting time by two~thirds. Procedures were simpler, i.e., foreign investors 
no longer had to submit irrelevant papers to different administrative bodies. 12 Instead, 
following a one-stop-shop policy and decentralisation ideology, issuance of investment 
certificates is now undertaken by an administrative body set up exclusively for overseas 
investment in all areas. Policy relating to decentralisation of FDI approval and 
monitoring has been streamlined in many policies rather than in investment 
management. Since 1996, the responsibility for licensing and monitoring all FDI 
projects has been decentralised. The provincial authority and management board of 
industrial zones have the rights to issue and withdraw investment licenses for projects 
with a scale of investment under a certain threshold and provided the projects do not 
operate in conditional sectors 13 . 
Compared to the previous amendments, the 1996 and 2000 FDI laws introduced 
lower and specific rates of corporate income tax and tax for the remittance of earnings 
abroad. In addition, depending on the types and purpose of investment, many options 
for tax reduction, exemption and reimbursement were initiated. FDI firms also have full 
freedom to use after-tax profits. The revised laws allow FDI firms to mortgage land use 
rights, borrow from banks, buy foreign exchange and sell or purchase equity shares with 
others. At the 2001 IX Party Congress, the foreign investment economic sector was 
sanctioned for the first time as an independent economic sector (like the state or private 
sector). Over the past three years, the government has conducted regular semi-annual 
meetings to gather information on obstacles and enhance attracting FDI with a view to 
improving Vietnam's investment climate. 
12 Before 2000, private investors had to visit I 0 government agencies and submit about 20 different 
documents in order to obtain a business registration certificate (CIEM 1998; Mallon 2004). 
13 The total investment threshold, where the provincial level has full rights for licensing and managing 
investment projects has been relaxed over time. Currently, the local authori ty can issue an investment 
certificate for FDI projects with a total investment of less than 50 mill USD. 
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3.2.2 The new unified Investment Law 
On 29th November 2005, the National Assembly passed a new law on investment 
(Investment Law) that became effective on 1st July 2006. This land-mark legislation set 
the stage for treating the investment activities of both foreign and domestic investors 
uniformly and is expected to induce a new wave of foreign investment. In accordance 
with the new Law on Enterprise, adoption of the Investment Law is an important step in 
creating an appropriate investment climate and integrating into the international market 
under the requirements of the WTO accession. "With regard to the investment 
environment, the new law makes an important contribution by forming a common 
playground for all investors on the basis of WTO principles such as the most-favoured 
nation, and publicity and transparency principles" (Phillips Fox 2006, p.2). 
As an important part of the new Law steps have been taken to reduce the amount 
of paperwork involved in FDI approval/monitoring. No formal approval is required if 
foreign investment in a given project is less than 300 billion dong (about 20 million 
USO), provided the project is not in 'conditional' sectors. 14 Under the old FDI law, all 
foreign investment proposals had to provide an economic-technical statement to 
accompany other materials. The response time for issuing an investment certificate has 
also been officially reduced. For example, the provincial administrative body for 
investment now has to issue an investment certificate within 15 days from the date of 
receiving all legal materials. Evaluation will only be required for obtaining an 
investment certificate for investments above 300 billion dong and for conditional 
investment within 30 days from the date of an investor's request. Another positive 
change as presented in the l 2'h article of the new law is more flexible dispute resolution 
and any dispute to which a foreign investor is a party can now be resolved by either a 
domestic or an international arbitration body. 
In order to meet the requirements for WTO accession, the new law removed ·any 
requirements for FIEs to use domestic inputs (local content requirement), export 
14 The new law regulates eight cond itional sectors (Article 29) related to: 
a) National defence and society security, 
b) Finance and banking 
c) Community health 
d) Culture, information, publishing and printing 
e) Entertainment services 
f) Real estate business 
g) Natural resource exploration and environment 
h) Education and training development 
However, these rules are very broad with no information on specific conditions to be applied when the 
investor wants to register to do business in those se.ctors. 
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perfonnance requirements and and conditions relating to technology transfer (article 8). 
Lastly, compared with the 2000 FOi law, investment incentives, supports and 
guarantees from the government are highlighted and specified in different chapters. 
Incentives cover many aspects like tax reduction or exemption, carrying forward losses, 
depreciation of fixed assets, land use and land rents, as well as a particularly high level 
of incentives for encouraged sectors, such as industrial zones, export processing zones, 
high-tech zones and special economic zones. Investment support is provided for 
advanced technology transfer and worker training with financial resources being 
available from the state budget. 
Notwithstanding significant amendments to the law over the past decade, FDI 
policy still contains some restriction on the entry of FDI and operation of FIEs. For 
instance, the minimum 30 percent foreign share of capital required for all joint-ventures 
incorporated between Vietnamese partners and one foreign investor is impracticable. In 
addition, there are many protected sectors into which foreign investors are not allowed 
entry or can only enter for a given form of investment (for example, foreign investors 
can invest in telecommunication and electricity in the form of joint-ventures only). In 
terms of incentive instruments, the complicated tax system associated with heavy 
'informal costs' also deters foreign investors. The government can still interfere deeply 
in investment decisions as Article 51 of the new Investment Law states all adjustments 
on objectives; scale, location and time of operation have to be reported to the 
administrative body for investment and to obtain approval from this organization. 
Burdensome paperwork as well as feasibility evaluation still applies to domestic 
investors; they have to obtain investment licenses if making a large investment. 
3.3 Trade Policy 
Trade reform has played a decisive role in Vietnam 's transition from a centrally-planned 
to a market-based economy. The "gradualism" of reform in Vietnam dominates every 
aspect of the economy. In the initial period, trade reform objectives were intended to 
partly remove the restrictions on a number of trade entities (with the participation of 
private enterprises), reduce export duty and relax export shipment licensing. Most 
quotas for imported goods have been removed and replaced by import duties since 1988 
when the Law on Export and Import Duties became effective (Riedel and Comer 1998). 
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The government also eliminated the "dual price system 15" and unified the exchange rate 
system but still controlled the current account balance and protected import-substitution 
industries. When the US removed the economic embargo in 1995 and Vietnam became 
a member of ASEAN, the objectives of trade reform became broader and more 
demanding. Under the AFTA regime, most Quantitative Restrictions (QR) have already 
been abolished and tariffs have been cut to a maximum level of 5% for all imports other 
than those in a limited 'sensitive' list (Athukorala 2006). 
Vietnam has intensified trade liberalization over the past ten years as part of 
meeting requirement for WTO accession. First, restrictions on quantities of imported 
products have been almost removed. Currently, all quotas on imports have been 
removed except for sugar, petroleum products and a list of other sensitive items. 
Accordingly, the tariff schedule was reformed twice, once in 1992 and again in 1999. In 
terms of tariff structure, Vietnam uses three sets of tariff rates: Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariff rates accounting for 75 percent of imports, Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) accounting for nearly 25 percent of imports and General tariff rates . In 
general, the MFN average rate increased from 12.3 percent to 15. 7 percent over the 
period 1996-2002, whereas the average CEPT rate decreased from 12.7 percent to 10.7 
percent in the same period and was expected to decrease further to three percent in 2006 
under the commitment among ASEAN countries. The tariff structure has also become 
more simplified through the shrinking of a number of tariff lines and the tariff range 
(Athukorala 2002, 2006). 
15 Under the "dual price" system, SOEs were forced to sell products to the state at lower market prices 
and financed the loss by subsidized cred it from state-owned banks. SOEs were allowed to sell excess 
products (after selling the planned quantity to the state) to other consumers at market prices under "three 
plan" policy in early 1980s (Riedel and Comer 1998). 
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Table 3.1: Major changes in FDI and Trade Policy, 1987-2006 
Year Policy change Remarks 
1987 Adoption of Law on FDI In • Provided a guideline and state guarantees 
December 1987 for FOi activity in Vietnam 
1988 Adoption of the law on Import and • 
export Duties 
1990 The first revision of the Law on FDI • Domestic private firms were allowed to 
make joint ventures with foreign 
investors 
• Incentives on tax were specified 
1991 Regulation on setting up export • Foreign exchange trading floors opened 
processing zones promulgated at State Bank of Vietnam 
• Private enterprises were allowed to 
Revision of law on exports and export and import directly. 
imports • Imported inputs used to produce exports 
exempted from duty 
1992 The second revision of the Law on • Reduced the waiting time for an 
FDl investment licence 
• Reduced discrimination in favour of j oint 
Harmonized system of Tariff ventures over fully-owned FIEs 
nomenclature introduction • Introduced BOT concept 
• Introduced and encouraged FDI in export 
processing zones 
• Foreign share in legal capital to be 30 
percent or higher. 
• Exports and imports of FIEs restricted 
• Preferential tax applied for given priority 
(10 percent within 15 years of 
commencement of operation) 
1994 Adoption of Law on Domestic • Provided licensing guidelines and 
Investment Promotion incentives for domestic investment 
• Vietnamese overseas regulated by this 
law with lower rate on remittance fee. 
• Form of domestic investment more 
diversified than that of foreign 
investment 
1995 Vietnam became of member of • Range of goods subject to management 
A SEAN and preparation for AFT A by import quotas reduced to seven 
and WTO accession • Coverage of export quotas reduced to one 
Law on State Enterprises approved commodity: rice 
• Reduction m number of turnover tax 
rates from 18 to I I 
1996 Major amendment of the Law on • Encouragement of export-oriented FDI 
FDI • Removal of foreign exchange remittance 
• FIEs allowed to choose forms of 
investment, share of capital and partners 
• Removal of requirement on export 
approval from the government agencies 
1997 • FIEs responsible for own foreign 
currency balance 
• Reapplied restrictions on remittances due 
to the Asian crisis 
1998 The second amendment of Law on • Foreign investors with less than 30 
Domestic Investment Promotion percent of legal capital regulated by this 
law 
• More support from government for 
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Year Policy chane:e 
1999 The forth amendment of the Law on 
FDI 
Adoption of the Enterprise law 
2000 A U.S-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement was signed and became 
effective in 2001 
2002 Amendment of implementing decree 
of the Trade law 
2003 A new law on State Enterprises 
adopted to replace the 1995 law 
2005 Adoption of a new Investment Law 
and a new Enterprise Law. Both 
became effective in July 2006 
2006 Accession to WTO membership on 
th November 2006 
Adoption of implementing decrees 
on Investment Law and Enterprise 
Law as part of WTO commitments 
Remarks 
infrastructure 
• Investment encouraged m technology 
development and infrastructure, exports 
• Higher tax reduction for investment in 
remote/difficult areas 
• Common JCT rate is 25 percent 
• Unification of Company Law and Law 
on private individual enterprises 
• Removed of all discrimination against 
private ownership 
• Vietnam to benefit from MFN access 
when exporting to the US market 
• Published a list of FIEs permitted to do 
business without an investment licence. 
• Registration fees removed 
• Foreign investors allowed to buy equity 
in domestic firms 
• Rate of international remittance and fee 
on profit remittance removed. 
• FIEs allowed to act as dealers for export-
import services 
• All legal entities allowed to export 
without a special license. 
• Separate regulations for equitised SOEs 
and fully-state-owned enterprises 
• Provided introduction for restructuring 
and equitization 
• Removal of most subsidies and priorities 
for SOEs 
• Unification of the FDI law and a law on 
Promotion of domestic investment 
• Harmonized rules for domestic private 
enterprises, SOEs and FIEs 
• Re-registration and conversion of FIEs 
and SOEs into new forms 
I 
• Limits on foreign ownership in the 
service sector abolished 
• Foreign investors to have full rights on 
• 
• 
• 
imports, exports and domestic 
distribution 
Removal of remaining subsidies for 
domestic production 
Tariffs to be reduced to a range of zero to 
35 percent over the period 2007-2014. 
SOEs are to be privatised and remaining 
preferential treatments between state-
owned and private sectors to be removed 
speedily. 
Source: CIE ( 1998), Auffret (2003), Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) and relevant Decrees 
issued by the Vietnamese government. 
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Second, since 1996 all export quotas have been abolished except for those on 
textiles and garments. However, real liberalisation of participating related to 
international trade has been occurring since the amendment of the Trade law in 2001, 
permitting all legal business entities to export most goods without any special license 
from the export-import managing office. This reform, perhaps, is a follow-up activity of 
implementing a BTA between Vietnam and the United States. The BT A was the most 
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement of either Vietnam or the United States. It 
required Vietnam to undertake wide-ranging change in every field including the 
customs system, administrative procedures to assist international trade, trading rights, 
especially in services, intellectual property rights, business procedures, foreign 
investment treatment, especially for investment from the United States. In turn, the BT A 
committed to provide Vietnam the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) and National 
Treatment to most goods and services exported to the US. Under this commitment, U.S 
tariffs for most imported products from Vietnam fell from 40 to 3-4 percent (Riedel 
2003). 
Third, the foreign exchange market has also been liberalized toward removing 
price distortions between the domestic market and the world market. The nominal 
exchange rate has been adjusted several times making it closer to the real market rate. 
Tax on the remittance of inward foreign exchange was lifted in 1996. Furthermore, the 
tax on the remittance of foreign invested earnings in Vietnam regulated in the 2000 Law 
on Foreign investment (with three levels dependant on the legal capital share of foreign 
investors: three percent, five percent and seven percent) was removed in February 2004 
by Circular 20/2004/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance. After the onset of the Asian 
'financial crisis in 1998, the SBV introduced an 80 percent foreign exchange surrender 
requirement for every trade entity. This was subsequently reduced many times and 
eventually removed in 2004. Moreover, Decree 27 issued in March 2003 officially 
removed the trade-balance requirement and foreign exchange controls. By this 
regulation, the government secured foreign exchange balance and FIEs were allowed to 
buy or sell foreign exchange for business transactions. 
Most significantly, following 11 years of preparation and negotiation, Vietnam 
became the l 501h member of the WTO on 7th November 2006. Vietnam's effort has 
been highly appreciated by the international community. WTO Director-General Pascal 
Lamy said: "The remarkable efforts that Vietnam has put into preparing for membership 
should be an inspiration to us all, as several members have observed" (WTO 2006b, 
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p.l). To be accepted, Vietnam made commitments on a range of trade in goods and 
services. The most important of these and applying to most goods is a range of duty 
rates, from zero to 35 percent with delays on some until 2014. Some products like eggs, 
tobacco, sugar, and salt remain protected by tariff quotas. Vietnam is not permitted to 
subsidize the exports of agricultural products but can spend unlimited amounts on 
support that does not distort trade (WTO 2006a). In service, Vietnam is committed to 
removing the limits on foreign ownership in most sectors but this can be phased out in 
different stages. In some special services, like telecommunications, foreign ownership 
limits can be applied. In trading rights, the WTO commitments declare that all domestic 
and foreign firms have full rights to import and export under the same registration 
procedures. Trading rights also include the right to distribute imported products in 
Vietnam's territory and the right to choose local distributors. During the transition 
period, some products (rice, minerals and some wood products) will continue to be 
exported by wholly Vietnamese-invested enterprises under the WTO commitments 
(WTO 2006a). 
3.4 SOE policy 
3.4.1 SOE restructuring and ownership mobility 
The SOE reform program was initiated in 1992 as most SOEs were running at a loss, 
leading to large number of "bad debts" and budget deficits for the state-owned 
commercial banks and government, respectively. The SOE reform comprises two 
components. The most important part is privatisation or equitization, under which either 
a fraction or the entire SOE assets are transferred from the state to the private sector. 
The second strategy concentrates on restructuring the remaining SOEs with market-
oriented rules. Under the reform program, the number of SOEs has declined sharply 
from 12,400 in 1995 to about 3,000 by mid 2005. Of existing SOEs, over 24 percent 
(730 enterprises) are in the public service, national defence and forestry cooperatives 
(Nguyen Ke Tuan 2006). During the period 1992-2005, over 3,000 SOEs were 
privatized, of which 80 percent of firms were privatised since 2000. Most privatized 
firms are small or owned by provincial governments. Moreover, apart from fully-owned 
SOEs, the government still controls about 1200 privatized firms with an equity share of 
over 50 percent in each firm. The sale of SOEs was limited to foreign investors with 
only 25 privatised firms in the same period (O'Connor 1996; Sjoholm 2006; 
Vietnamnet 2006). 
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There has been wide criticism on the slow progress ofrestructuring SOEs which 
stems from government ideology on the leading role of SOEs in the economic reform 
process. This has been demonstrated by a consecutive increase in government 
investment in SO Es since the early 1990s (see Chapter 4: Trends and Patterns of FDI). 
Furthermore, "the framework of bureaucratic control that existed under the command 
economy system has remained largely intact" (Riedel and Comer 1998, p.202). In 
particular, Vietnam has no independent body responsible for managing state investment 
and supervising SOE operation. Most SOEs are still supervised by local authorities or 
related ministries. For example, the Vietnam's Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
SOE finance and its utilisation but has no formal control over firms' management and 
business plans. These are controlled or directed by other ministries related to the 
business field (Sjoholm 2006). It seems these agencies would prefer to retain their 
influence and give more priorities to SOEs. This "dual role" of government in the 
economy may deepen the budget deficit, slow down SOE privatisation and deter the 
creation of level playing fields for development of the economy driving forces, such as 
domestic private firms and FIEs. 
In SOE privatization, discriminatory treatment by ownership type of potential 
buyers has also existed for a long time. At the initial stage of reform, foreign investors 
were not permitted to buy equity from privatised SOEs. A recent legal document 
(Decision No. 36/2003QD-TTg) allows foreign investors and individuals to make a 
capital contribution or purchase a maximwn of 30 percent of the legal capital of 
Vietnamese enterprises, including privatized SOEs, joint stock companies, private 
companies and any other corporate types. Restrictions have also been relaxed in the 
securities market. Under Decision No. 238/2005/QD-TTg foreign organisations and 
individuals may hold a maximum of 49 percent of total listed shares for any one 
organisation listed or registered for trading m a Security Trading Centre. The 
privatisation of SOEs is regulated by a separate legal document (Degree 
No.187 /2004/ND-CP) incorporating more restrictions on the participation of domestic 
private and foreign investors. For instance, only FlEs, foreign investors doing business 
in Vietnam, and overseas Vietnamese are eligible to purchase the legal capital of 
privatized SOEs. 
WTO accession commitments have forced removal of most restrictions related 
to SOE restructuring and ownership. In particular, most SOEs will be privatised or 
equitized under a transparent mechanism, except for selected strong business groups and 
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enterprises supplying public goods. The remaining SOEs will be transferred as single 
member limited companies or joint stock companies. The government will reduce. the 
list of firms/industries in which state-owned enterprises can hold 100 percent of the 
capital. Second, all legal entities and individuals are allowed to make a capital 
contribution, purchase shares of SOEs or form a joint stock company with SOEs with 
no restrictions on equity share and no different treatment amongst ownership types in 
buying SOE equity. Foreign investors, especially those who have invested in Vietnam 
in the form of joint ventures or fully-owned FIEs, will be treated as domestic investors 
in purchasing domestic firm equity and making capital contributions. 
3.4.2 Ownership discrimination and the corporate law 
According to a resolution passed at the ih National Party Congress from 1991 "all 
citizens are entitled to freedom of business activity in accordance with the law, and to 
guarantee as to legal ownership and income" (CPV 1991, p.14). The 8th National Party 
Congress in 1996 decreed "the state creates appropriate-economic and legal conditions 
to encourage long-time investment of private entrepreneurs, to diversify business 
cooperation with internal and external counterparts" (CPV 1996, p.51). Moreover, 
Resolution 51/2001 of the National Assembly regulates seven types of ownership (state-
owned, collective, private individual, households, private capitalist, state capitalist and 
foreign investment) and treats them as equal before the law. 
Despite central directions from the Communist Party Congress and the National 
Assembly, reform aimed at hannonising rights and obligations of state-owned and 
private sector has been slow. Until July 2006, SOEs, domestic private firms and FIEs 
have all been regulated by different legitimate systems. The features of the law on FDI 
and SOEs were analysed in the previous sections. This section focuses on three episodes 
in the development of the legal system that governs the corporate regimes of private and 
state-owned sectors: before 2000, from 2000-2005 and from July 2006 onwards. 
Before 2000, the legal system for enterprises was isolated and changeable. 
Following an official definition by a party-congress resolution in 1996, Vietnamese 
economy was divided into six different economic sectors: state economy, collective 
economy, individual economy, private-capitalist economy, state-capitalist economy and 
foreign-invested economy. Under the legal framework, these economic sectors were 
governed, respectively, by the Law on State-Owned Enterprises ( 1995, 2003), 
Collectives Law (l 996), Law on Private Enterprise (1990, 1994) and Law on 
Companies (1990, 1994 ). Due to several restrictions and biases, this system did not 
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encourage development of the non-state economic sector. In particular, whilst there was 
not much difference in governing the establishment and operation of companies and 
private enterprises (individual economy) they were nevertheless operating under two 
different set of laws. The procedures for obtaining a business licence or re-organisation 
were complicated and inconsistent, raising fixed costs. 
The law prior to 2000 also encouraged opportunities for bureaucracy and 
corruption because it gave government staff the power to conduct an inspection both 
before and after a business registration was obtained. One main problem that has been 
emphasised is the practical priorities given to SOEs even though the state ensured 
equality of all enterprises before the law. Access to land is one typical example. Since 
the pre-reform period, most SOEs had been endowed with large and well-located areas. 
New SOEs were also provided with land and legal capital not available to private finns. 
Difficulty in land access continues to be a major constraint in accessing other sources of 
factors of production like capital and technology. 
The policy of equal treatment has only slowly come into being, as most 
commercial banks and credit funds initially gave priority to SOEs. Loans given to SOEs 
were guaranteed and encouraged by the state budget and this special relationship has 
been in existence since the central planning episode. Until 2002, only 55 percent of 
private companies had access to formal bank loans, whereas 85 percent of subsidized 
credit was given to SO Es (Nguyen Van Thang 2006). Consequently, development of the 
domestic private sector over the period 1986-1999 was relatively weak compared with 
other economic sectors, and especially with the foreign invested sector (Mallon 2004) 
The 2000 Enterprise Law was introduced to resolve problems relating to 
business registration, types of business and ownership discrimination against non-state 
owned enterprises. This law provided security for private enterprises and owners with 
full guarantees from government (article 4) in terms of recognition of the long-term 
existence and development of enterprise types, equality amongst enterprises, rights of 
asset ownership and other interests; and commitment to not nationalize or expropriate 
assets or capital. The most significant change was to clarify and simplify the procedure 
for setting up a new enterprise with only four documents to be completed for acquiring 
a business registration certificate. Previously, the procedures for acquiring this 
certificate were not clearly defined. The responding time by registration bodies was 
reduced from 30 to 15 days. The 2000 Enterprise Law has become a good example for 
guiding firm activity as it covers a range of business management issues. ln comparison 
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with previous laws, it provides details on firm types with emphasis on limited 
companies and shareholding companies. Moreover, it initially regulated the security 
market, M&A activity and privatised SOEs. The law also included regulations that 
require enterprises to be more transparent and accountable. The impact of this law was 
widely acknowledged; for example, the four-fold increase in the number of private 
enterprises over the period 2000-2005 compared with the previous period 1991-1999 is 
persuasive evidence of the law's effectiveness (Ngo Van Giang 2006). 
However, there were separate legal treaments for FIEs, SOEs and domestic 
private firms. An independent law for SOEs that existed until 2006 was criticised as 
being a way of protecting state interests but preventing generation of a level playing 
field. It is noteworthy that SOEs were governed by both the 2000 Enterprise Law and 
the 2003 State Enterprise law. For example, SOEs were divided into several levels of 
ownership types even though all were State-controlled. State companies and 
shareholding companies where share holders were state organisations were ruled by the 
2003 State Enterprise law, whereas State limited companies and shareholding 
(privatised) companies were regulated by both laws. The most important issue relates to 
enforcement of the 2000 Enterprise Law in business licensing. The cost of entry for 
domestic firms remains high in Vietnam compared with other countries (see next 
section). Although the law has simplified paperwork for business registration, sub-
licenses were issued in many sectors and locations. Lastly, the 2000 Enterprise Law has 
not been fully integrated with the international agreements which Vietnam has now 
signed. 
In order to establish a level playing field for all firm-ownership types and to 
prepare for WTO accession, a new Law on Enterprise in accordance with a new law on . 
Investment (as discussed above) has been approved and became effective in July 2006. 
Under this law, the business activities of all firm types; FIEs, domestic private and 
SOEs are governed by the same regulations. The new law has inherited the positive 
features of the 2000 Enterprise Law, such as the simplified procedure for licensing and 
more autonomous rights for enterprises. It has also removed the power of related 
ministries and local authorities to issue irrelevant conditions or sub-licenses. Article 7 
states that "allied ministries and people committees at all levels do not have the right to 
issue a list of conditional sectors or business conditions". A list of documents required 
for business registration is provided for every firm type and the body for business 
registration is not allowed to request submission of any other materials. 
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Under the new Law, all SOEs will have been converted either to a single-
member limited liability company or a shareholding company within four years from 
July 2006. FIEs are also encouraged to transit into a new enterprise regime within two 
years from July 2006.16 This is a welcome provision, so FIEs can retain their existing 
investment-enterprise regime, with these firms being governed by the terms of their 
investment licensing. However, non-transitioning FIEs will encounter many future 
difficulties if they then want to change their investment licenses or corporate regime. On 
the side of governance, as no fees are required from FIEs given the number of existing 
FIEs, this transition may be expensive in terms of consuming financial and human 
resources from the government agencies. 
3.5 Investment climate: comparative evidence 
This section reviews Vietnam's business environment using three different sources of 
data. The first source is a World Bank assessment of the investment climate across 57 
developing countries since 2001. The second comprises data selected from the annual 
survey of investment-related cost comparison in major Asian cities and regions 
conducted by the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO). The third source is 
recent survey data used for constructing the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCT). 
The investment climate survey (ICS) undertaken by The World Bank covers the 
same topics across countries; it includes both objective and perception questions on 
regulations, governance, access to finance and infrastructure services. lt also collects 
information on corporate activities like investment, employment and productivity, 
targeting manufacturing firms. The Vietnam lCS in 2005 covered a relatively large 
number of firms participating compared to the other 56 countries (1,l50 enterprises). 
Based on the survey, Table 3.2 reports the perception of firms on potential constraints 
related to 18 possibilities in Vietnam and two other selected countries, Thailand and 
China. Thailand is a neighbouring country regarded as a good example for comparison 
with Vietnam because of its similarity in socio-economic perspectives. Moreover, the 
!CS in Thailand was undertaken mostly over the same time as in Vietnam. China is an 
emerged transition economy having a comparable reform strategy. In addition, the 
16 Under Decree I 01 -2006/ ND-CP, fully-owned FIEs and joint ventures can take one of two trans ition 
options: re-registration (no change in corporate form) or conversion (change in corporate form). 
Corporate form in the new Enterprise Law comprises the single-member limited liability Company, the 
multiple-member limited liability Company and Shareholding Company. 
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average levels across East Asia and developing countries on firms' evaluation of 
business constraints are also presented in the same table. A measurement unit for all 
surveyed indicators is the percentage of firms which consider constraint to be either 
major or severe. Apparently, the four top constraints in Vietnam included access to 
finance, access to land, worker skills and transportation. In addition, except for the 
constraint in labour skills, the rest of the top constraints appeared to be more severe than 
in Thailand as well as in other regional countries. 
Access to finance is the biggest constrain because most commercial loans are 
provided at a low quality level by state-owned commercial ban.ks. Structural weakness 
is associated with obsolete lending regulations (for example, requiring a high ratio of 
collateral over loans) in these banks as a result of protection policy for domestic credit 
institutions. Access to land is also very difficult for two reasons. One is that most 
commercial and industrial land is in the hands of SOEs, even though they account for a 
small fraction of total enterprises in Vietnam. High density of SO Es in a province can 
have a negative effect on private access to both land and loans (Nguyen Van Thang 
2006). The other main reason is that the supply of land is small and discrete because of 
the overwhelming population density in urban areas and the low transformation of 
agricultural land into industrial land in rural areas. 
On the remaining indicators, on average, Vietnam seems to have a better ran.king 
compared to all other countries listed in the table (including China and Thailand). For 
example, Vietnam was ranked as the best country in terms of security and political 
stability. As a result of dramatic policy changes in investment, business and trade 
relations in the past few years in order to become a WTO member, Vietnam has 
removed most obstacles for enterprises. This demonstrated by the low percentage of 
firms that consider the legal system, tax administration and business licensing and 
permits to be serious constraints. Corruption in Vietnam also seemed to receive less 
negative discrimination from entrepreneurs as its importance was ranked lower than for 
any other country including China and Thailand. The most reasonable explanation 
originates from the attitude of entrepreneurs. They "have learned how to live with 
corruption" even though it spread over most government agencies at all levels (World 
Bank 2005, p.48). Another widely agreed reason in previous studies is that the average 
bribe in Vietnam is smaller than in many other countries. Moreover, this corruption may 
not seriously affect the businesses and investments of entrepreneurs. However, the lCS 
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and other previous studies may not reflect the rea1 situation in the business of state-
owned enterprises and public services. 
Table 3.2: Binding Constraints Private Sector Business Operation: Comparative 
Performance of Vietnam1 
Constraints Vietnam Thailand China East Developing 
Asia2 world3 
1. Corruption 12.8 18.3 27.3 28.6 36.8 
2. Crime and theft 4.0 10.3 20.0 19.3 25.7 
3. Policy uncertainty 14.7 29.l 32.9 32.5 40.2 
4. Legal system 5.5 - - 27.3 21.6 
5. Macroeconomic instability 16.8 37.4 34.1 40.2 
6. Anti-competitive behaviour 12.3 20.1 21.6 29.7 
7. Customs and trade regulation 12.5 38.3 20.l 21.6 
8. Tax administration 8.7 22.3 26 .7 22.4 32.4 
9. Tax rate 13.8 24.4 36.8 28.2 40.5 
10. Business licensing and permits 1.4 7.4 21.3 14.4 15.9 
1 1. Access to finance 37.4 22.6 22.3 17.4 30. 1 
12. Cost of finance 21.3 25.0 20.2 36.1 
13. Access to land 26.4 13.2 9.4 14.5 
14. Electricity 15.7 25.6 29.7 24.4 24.4 
15. Transportation 21.6 13.8 15.2 12.4 
16. Telecommunication 6.5 12.6 12.9 10.3 
17. Labour skills and education 22.3 30.0 30.7 23.8 20.4 
18. Labour relations 10.9 l l.4 20.7 17.4 17.3 
Note: 
1. Data generated by the World Bank Investment Climate Survey conducted in each · 
country. Figures indicate the percentage of firms which consider that the constraint is 
either major or severe. 
2. Based on data for Cambodia, Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand. 
3 Covers 57 developing countries and transition economies. 
Source: World Bank (2005), Table 4.1 expanded by including data for Thailand and 
China from World Bank (2006) 
The perception of entrepreneurs may not be entirely consistent with the real 
situation of the investment climate in Vietnam. Fortunately, the ICS of the World Bank 
collects both perception and actual information on variety aspects of the investment 
enviromnent. Table 3.3 reports selected indicators measuring the investment climate in 
terms of bureaucracy, corruption, court, crime, finance, infrastructure, innovation, 
employment, tax and trade relations. 
This comparative evidence shows the investment climate conditions in Vietnam 
have more advantages than disadvantages in comparison with China or other ASEAN 
countries. In particular, senior managers in Vietnam have to spend about six percent of 
their weekly time in dealing with the requirements of govermnent regulations. However, 
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this is far below the level in China. Although Vietnam was regarded as a corrupt 
country with nearly 50 percent of firms giving gifts to tax inspectors, the unofficial 
payments and values of gifts were lower than in the other countries. In addition, the 
legal system in Vietnam has been improved, resulting in high confidence from 
entrepreneurs and firms paying lower costs for security and crime. As discussed earlier, 
the high collateral required has prevented more than 70 percent of firms from accessing 
formal loans, but this performance is still better than that of the other countries, except 
for Thailand. Vietnam also ranks higher than the other countries in terms of spending on 
R&D (1.42 percent of total sales) and in having the highest growing employment 
market. Tax and trade relationships have been significantly improved by, for example, 
reducing the waiting time for clearing customs procedures. However, infrastructure in 
Vietnam is relatively worse than for the other countries as firms have to spend more on 
transportation and suffer longer times for electrical outages. 
Since 1995, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) has been conducting an 
annual comparative survey of investment costs in the major cities of Asian countries. 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City have been selected as representative of Vietnam. In this 
section, the investment costs in these two cities are compared with four other ·regional 
cities: Shanghai, Singapore, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Information from the JETRO 
survey on major indicators representing wages, land rents, telecommunication expenses, 
public utility, transportation and taxation for two selected years (2002 and 2005) are 
summarised in Table 3.4. An increase in wages was recorded for both Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City, for workers, engineers and managers. The evidence shows that the 
comparative advantage held by Vietnam in wages in the past has diminished over time. 
In contrast, Thailand became more competitive with a reduction in the wages of workers 
and middle-level managers in Bangkok. Land rents are represented by three indicators: 
industrial estate rent (per m2 monthly), expenses for office lease (per m2 monthly) and 
house rent for foreign representatives. It seems only industrial estate rents in Vietnam 
are lower than in other countries. The expenses of leasing offices and houses (for 
foreigners) in Vietnam increased significantly over the three years, especially for Hanoi. 
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Table 3.3: Investment climate in Vietnam and selected countries 
Country Low- China Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
middle Total Domestic FlEs 
mcome firms 
Bureaucracy 
Senior management time spent in dealing with requirements of 
government regulation (%) 7.00 18.52 3.98 6.88 1.29 5.83 5.78 6.27 
Corruption 
Unofficial payments for typical firm to get things done(% of sales) 1.40 1.62 1.14 1.24 .. 0.47 0.47 0.44 
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors(%) 32.30 38.74 1] .22 27.55 .. 48.44 49.28 42.42 
Value of gift expected to secure government contract(% of contract) 2.30 1.83 0.22 1.26 .. 0.53 0.53 0.54 
Courts 
Confidence in the judiciary system (%) 58.10 82.45 59.19 66.22 74.22 76.87 77.54 71.09 
Time spent in resolving dispute (weeks) 12.60 8.38 5.13 9.60 .. 15.76 15.76 .. 
No resolutions in courts for overdue payments 49.10 75 .08 89.94 83.63 0.00 50.88 46.00 85.71 
Crime 
Security costs (% of sales) 1.70 0.54 0.79 2.62 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.53 
Losses due to theft, robbery, vandalism, and arson against the firm 
(%of sales) 1.20 0.12 0.22 0.87 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Finance 
Internal finance for investment (%) 65.00 15.24 41.89 57.96 19.33 30.1'2 29.76 32.74 
Bank finance for investment(%) 14.90 20.37 16.34 13.29 58.33 27.91 29.20 18.67 
Informal finance for investment (%) 4.90 7.73 24.47 10.77 2.50 5.45 5.92 1.99 
Supplier credit financing(%) 8.50 2.27 3.54 11.42 13.61 7.43 7.20 9.13 
Value of collateral needed for a loan(% of the loan amount) 134.40 80.80 116.32 .. ·87.03 142.67 143.86 132.48 
Loans requiring collateral(%) 80.20 66.93 87.17 67.57 83.25 88.72 88.97 85.25 
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Table 3.3: (Cont) 
Country Low- China Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
middle Total Domestic FIEs 
mcome finns 
Infrastructure 
Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days) 20.60 10.45 12.24 6.47 23.64 17.57 16.78 20.87 
Number of electrical outages (days) 24.00 .. 3.52 4.65 1.12 10.89 10.86 11.08 
Value lost due to electrical outages(% of sales) 3.70 l.23 3.30 5.93 1.37 1.26 I.28 1.00 
Number of water supply failures (days) 12.00 .. l.49 3.26 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 
Delay in obtaining a mainline telephone connection (days) 26.80 6.02 19.15 9.06 15.52 8.83 7.93 14.90 
Firms using the Web in interaction with clients/suooliers (%) 43.20 .. 24.33 24.42 34.44 29.39 27.52 42.22 
Innovation 
ISO certification ownership(%) 13.40 35.92 22.13 15.79 44.63 37.84 35.89 51.33 
Spending on R&D (%sales) 1.10 1.28 .. 0.37 0.15 1.42 1.41 1.51 
Jobs 
Firms offering formal training(%) 42.80 84.78 23.83 21.74 76.25 60.14 59.88 62.20 
Permanent skilled workers receiving training(%) 22.70 47.66 .. 26.59 .. 24.99 25.67 19.26 
Employment growth over the last 3 years(%) 18. l 0 2.63 .. 1.14 11 .50 30.44 30.49 29.92 
Tax 
Sales amount reported bv a typical firm for tax purooses (%) 81.30 58.11 73.14 78.20 .. 95.28 95.02 97.16 
Average time firms spent in meetings with tax officials (days) 3.40 12.03 1.07 3.00 1.47 2.52 2.63 1.67 
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Table 3.3: (Cont) 
Country Low- China Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
middle Total Domestic FIEs 
income firms 
Trade 
Average time to clear direct exports through customs (days) 4.00 6.16 3.38 5.37 1.33 2.50 2.66 1.98 
Longest time to clear direct exports through customs (days) 7.30 5.78 6.48 9.33 2.83 4.72 4 .91 4.15 
Average time to claim imports from customs (days) 5.70 7.60 4.82 7.1 7 3.67 3.68 3.89. 3.00 
Longest time to claim imports from customs (days) 19.10 10.48 10.08 13.14 8.20 6.83 7.19 5.72 
Firms that export directly(%) 24.50 17.77 38.40 31 .68 54.66 38.27 33.57 73.68 
Source: World Bank enterprise survey on www.worldbank.org, 2006 
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Table 3.4: Comparison of business costs among some Asian cities (USO) 
Indicators Hanoi Ho Chi Minh Shan2hai Sin2apore Ban17kok Kuala Lumpur 
2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 
Worker's salary/month 79-116 80-163 101-134 111-185 153-261 172-301 462 455-604 163 146 208 205 
Engineer's salary/month 184-345 201-385 188-458 249-373 312-661 334-593 1282 1668 296 316 710 790 
Middle-level manager's 484-573 451-661 524-661 572- 593-985 772- 2339 2831- 671 584 1518 1643 
salary/month 1054 1521 3154 
Industrial estate rents (per 0.21- 0.16- 0.08 0.16- 0.50- l.O 0.66- 4.95- 4.6 4.86 
m2 monthly) 0.22 0.23 0.23 2.20 2.75 12.5 - -
Expenses for office 21 28.7 21 23 45 28.4 45.77 34.8- 10.13 11.67 15.58- 9.96-lease/month!m2 36. l 17.00 14.21 
Expenses for house rent 1660 2000- 2000 2200 2400- 3400- 2836 1529- 1496- 1581 763 924-for foreign representative 2400 4000 3500 2646 1726 1056 
International telephone 
cost (3 minute call to 6.93 1.65 6.93 1.65 2.9 3.0 1 0.99 2.07 l.46 l.42 1.43 
Japan) 
Internet connection fee: 5.39- 14.67-
telephone line (monthly 1.96 0.84 1.96 0.84 0 0 56.72 22.93 13.79 24.32 1.32 26.14 basic charge) 
Electricity cost for 0.05- 0.05- 0.05- 0.05- 0.03- 0.04- 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 business/KWh 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.11 
Container transportation 1480- 1070- 200- 940- 1340- 820-( 40/ft/container) from 1470 3600 1078 3670 700 2000 550 3255 1304 3913 884 3200 factory to Yokohama port 
Normal petrol price ( 1 0.35 0.60 0.35 0.60 0.38 0.58 0.72 0.10-106 0.36 0.61 0.35 0.43 litre) 
Personal income tax 50 40 50 40 45 45 26 21 37 37 28 28 (highest rate,%) 
Corporate income t..u. 25 28 25 28 33 33 24.5 20 30 30 28 28 (effective tax rate) 
Source: JETRO (2003 and 2006) 
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Amongst the five cities, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have a comparative advantage in 
costs of investment. Two indicators are adopted for telecommunication costs; the costs 
of an international telephone call for 3 minutes to Japan; and an internet connection fee 
(monthly basic charge). Telephone costs have declined in Vietnam as a consequence of 
several revisions in 2005 of installation fees and telephone charges. The basic charge for 
an internet connection also declined in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and is currently 
lower than in other overseas cities, with the exception of Shanghai. For transportation 
costs, an increase in the world price of petroleum has pushed up domestic prices and 
container ship costs to Japan. However, although Vietnam has significantly subsidized 
petroleum, the price is not strongly competitive in comparison with the other countries. 
The last comparative aspect is taxation with the emphasis on personal and corporate 
income tax. Although Vietnam has reduced the ceiling rate of personal income tax from 
50% to 40% it is still higher than in any other ASEAN countries. The new draft decree 
on personal income tax is causing a controversial debate as it widens the taxable income 
coverage and imposes tax on savings interest and profits from the immature securities 
market. Moreover, the unification of two investment laws has increased corporate 
income tax to 28 percent, the same level as in other countries in the region. In short, 
Vietnam's comparative advantage arising from of low wages has been diminishing 
although over the time other investment costs have come down to the same level as in 
other Asian countries. 
The PCI was initiated by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI) and the USAID-funded Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI). This 
index's usage commenced in 2005 with the participation of 2,020 enterprises from 42 
provinces and cities. This index attracted over 6,300 firms from all 64 provinces and 
cities to participate in the 2006 survey. PCI is a corporate index based on information 
about the perception of enterprises in relation to the surrounding local-investment 
climate. In 2005, nine sub-indices capturing almost all aspects of local business 
investment in Vietnam were used to obtain information about enterprises' perceptions 
of the investment and business environment. In 2006, two important sub-indices, 
reflecting government influence on business climate were added: labour training and 
legal institutions. Table 3.5 presents the estimated weights, average value, standard 
deviation and coefficient of variation of all sub-indices in two years of surveying PCI. 
All sub-indices rank provinces on the same 10-point scale, whereas the final PCI uses a 
100-point scale with different weights for each sub-index. Scores are not normalised by 
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the international standard but by the best practice found in Vietnam. Weights of each 
sub-index are estimated by using multivariate regression rounded to give three basic 
levels 17• The focus is not on the construction of the PCI but on the importance of some 
sub-indices. Entry costs (business establishment costs) had the highest weight in 2005 
and the lowest in 2006 (However, the comparison between the two years may seem 
ridiculous because of structural change of the PCI from 9 to ten sub-indices and the 
number of firms that participated). By and large, the reduced importance of entry costs 
indicates a significant improvement in simplifying procedures for business registration 
in most provinces. The simple average of this sub-index in 2006 across provinces was 
7.32, the highest level amongst ten indicators. Computing the coefficient of variation 
(CV) across 64 provinces shows entry costs vary less than many other sub-indices. 
Another sub-index, covering enterprise perception of state-sector bias, remained 
relatively important. The weight of SOE bias in 2005 and 2006 was 13.1 and 6.0, 
respectively (see VCCI for details of measurement of this sub-index). Although the 
average point of this indicator was quite high (6.57 in 2006) and consistent across 
provinces, the local authorities will need to strengthen SOE privatisation and remove 
any preferences in favour of SOEs if they want to improve the investment climate. 
The 2006 PCI also confirmed the important role of local government services 
for development of the private sector, as its weight was 17.2 percent in 2006. Under this 
circumstance, government services include activities in providing market information, 
trade promotion, and development of infrastructure and industrial zones. Evaluated by 
entrepreneurs, the average value of this sub-index in 2006 was quite low compared to 
other indicators (5.01) implying poor practice by the government in development of the 
private sector. However, this sub-index was the most diverse compared with other 
indicators (CV was 0.30). In other words, only a few provinces in Vietnam have 
delivered high quality services for private sector development. Most provinces have 
persisted with a biased attitude towards the private sector and the driving force of 
growth has continued to be the state-owned sector. The detailed 2006 PCI for 64 
provinces is reported in Table 3 .6. This index has a great impact on local authorities and 
other stakeholders. Diagnostic workshops have been conducted in various provinces 
with the participation of provincial leaders to identify problems, give feedback on 
policy reform and streamlined initiatives to improve local business treatment. The PCI 
17 For more details on the methodology used in estimating weights, see USAID and VCCI (2006) 
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has also become popular with many foreign investors and donors as a good indicator for 
location selection of investment, planning, monitoring and evaluation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the legal system behind Vietnam's investment regime, 
international trade, business activity and ownership discrimination. Recently, 
investment laws have changed quickly to remove restrictions, diversify investment 
incentives and simplify registration procedures. The business law has been unified to 
treat all firm types in the same way, especially with the removal of favouritism for 
SOEs. Trade laws have also moved towards more liberalization and integration into the 
international market. Commitments to the WTO accession have forced Vietnam to 
reinforce policy reform in order to create a better investment-business climate for all 
investors, no matter whether they are from overseas or of domestic origin. As a result of 
these reforms, the investor perception of the Vietnamese economy has improved 
considerably since the initiation of Doi Moi in the late I 980s, in particular since the 
dawri of the New Millennium. However, Vietnam still has a considerable way to go in 
improving the attractiveness of the foreign direct investment regime and overall 
business climate to the level of that of the high-performing East Asian economies. 
70 
Table 3.5: Sub-index for the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 
Subindiccs 2005 PCI 2006 PCI 
Average Average Standard Coefficient Average Average Standard Coefficient 
weights value deviation of variation weights value deviation of variation 
(SD) (CV) (SD) (CV) 
Entry cost 17.1 6.11 1.11 0.18 3.3 7.32 0.89 0.12 
Land access and Security of Tenure 9.6 6.16 0.98 0.16 3.6 5.92 0.83 0.14 
Transparency and access to 16. l 4.65 1.06 0.23 16.2 5.21 1.27 0.24 
information 
Time cost of regulatory compliance 8.4 6.34 1.08 0.1 7 11.8 4.40 0 .82 0.19 
lnfonnal charges 7.6 6.25 1.26 0.20 5.7 6.35 0.70 0.11 
SOE bias (competition environment) 13.l 5.87 0.80 0.14 6.0 6.57 0.69 0.11 
Pro-activity of provincial leadership 16.8 5.63 1.75 0.31 13.2 4.88 1.35 0.28 
Private sector development services 11.1 5.19 1.59 0.31 17.2 5.01 1.50 0.30 
Labour training 
- - - -
15.3 5.09 1.36 0.27 
Legal institutions 
- - - 7.7 3.69 0.84 0.23 
Implementation of central policy 0.2 6.22 1.16 0.19 - - - -
Total/average 100% 56.95 7.69 0.14 100% 51.46 7.62 0.15 
Source: www.vnci.org, 2006 
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Table 3.6: The 2006 Provincial Competitiveness Index 
I Province Entry land Transparency Time Costs Informal SOE Bias Proactivity Private labour legal 
D Costs Access and and Access and Charges (Competition of Sector Training Institutions 
Security of to Regulatory Environment) Provincial Development 
Tenure Information Compliance Leadership Services 
8.49 6.21 8.50 7.12 6.46 7.24 9.08 8.86 6.52 5.46 
2 Da Nan 9.17 4.70 7.68 5.83 6.18 6.47 6.38 9.62 9.60 6.38 
3 Binh Dinh 7.16 6.86 7.97 4.93 6.88 7.50 6.64 8.15 6.18 3.95 
4 8.44 6.80 6.25 4.91 6.80 7.33 5.10 7.50 7.96 4.86 
5 7.02 6.27 6 .18 4.95 6.99 6.31 6.00 7.76 8.45 3.79 
6 7.78 5.93 7.80 4.33 6.78 8.40 6.59 7.01 6.46 3.52 
7 7.07 5.07 6.97 5.12 6.02 6.35 6.18 7.63 7.35 3.81 
8 Vinh Phuc 7.31 6.30 6.27 3.25 6.13 6.36 7.74 6.31 6.98 4.03 
9 An Gian 7.64 6.37 6.64 4.57 7.00 6.43 7.59 7.06 4.55 3.38 
10 Can Tho 6.55 6.70 6.83 4.87 5.70 6.57 3.52 8.68 5.56 3.80 
11 7.92 6.38 5.81 3.87 7.44 7.43 6.06 6.30 6.14 3.20 
12 Yen Bai 7.20 6.32 5.99 5.70 6.90 8.30 6.38 4.49 5.12 3.81 
13 Tra Vinh 6.85 6.35 5.79 3.81 6.86 6.46 6.31 6.14 5.85 3.63 
14 7.76 5.55 4.44 4.32 5.27 6.96 6.61 5.26 5.70 6.31 
15 8.18 6.01 5.81 4.78 6 .32 6.66 4.89 5.31 6.41 4.00 
16 6.65 6.91 6.49 5.36 7.64 7.82 5.82 5.53 3 .89 3.52 
17 7.49 5.38 5.43 5.59 5.85 5.70 5.46 5.82 5.56 4.73 
18 Ninh Binh 7.87 5.92 5.11 5.87 6.29 6.17 5.64 4.78 6.60 3.63 
19 Soc Tran 7.82 7.98 5.78 4.00 6.30 7.20 7.31 4.50 4.16 4.06 
20 Khanh Hoa 8.23 5.30 6.02 5.37 6.51 6.36 5.11 6.12 5.08 3.27 
2 1 Phu Yen 8.83 7.03 6.09 2.64 5.35 6.58 5.09 6.49 5.44 3.73 
22 Bae Ninh 7.25 6.06 6.09 3.04 6.24 6.76 5.75 4.60 6.53 4.14 
23 N heAn 7.85 5.56 5.78 5.06 6.29 6.15 4.69 4.28 6.53 4.53 
24 Phu Tho 8.32 6.50 5.35 4.73 6.61 6.96 4.59 5.70 5.56 3.70 
25 Quan Ninh 6.81 6.31 4.77 4.74 6.47 6.46 6.03 5.25 4.74 4.30 
26 Ben Tre 7.65 6.20 4.90 3.73 8.35 . 5.99 6.38 4.42 5.47 3.5A 
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Table 3.6: (continued) 
I Province Entry Land Transparency Time Costs Informal SOE Bias Proactivity Private Labour Legal 
D Costs Access and and Access and Charges (Competition of Sector Training Institutions 
Security of to Regulatory Environment) Provincial Development 
Tenure Information Compliance Leadership Services 
27 7.08 6.16 6.03 3.26 7.32 6.36 4.91 5.77 5.06 3.68 
28 7.02 5.66 6.08 3.66 6.18 6.66 3.53 5.25 6.64 4.05 
29 6.19 6.15 5.81 4.23 5.70 7.28 5.84 5.09 4.52 3.91 
30 6.39 5.92 6.71 4.22 7.27 7.06 4.47 4.58 5.64 3.02 
31 7.67 6.01 5.12 3.97 7.74 6.08 6 .79 3.98 4.67 4.06 
32 7.20 6.97 5.54 4.83 6.56 6.37 3.82 6.39 4.19 3.93 
33 5.85 6.43 4.48 4.59 7.25 6.65 5.31 5.76 5.05 3.60 
34 8.83 5.67 4.93 4.79 6.52 6.85 4.26 4.12 6.78 3.32 
35 6.48 5.95 4.99 4.83 6.03 6.74 5.87 5.27 4.19 3.74 
36 Kien Gian 7.87 7.72 4.86 4.42 6.63 6.01 5.60 4.88 3.89 3.89 
37 Thai Binh 6.89 5.46 5.27 6.13 6.62 7.17 4.81 3.73 5.13 2.92 
38 TI-Hue 7.52 4.99 5.43 4.40 5.98 6.23 4.63 4.68 5.79 2.98 
39 Lon An 7.88 7.07 3.62 3.88 5.68 7.02 5.59 5.63 4.85 3.16 
40 Ha Noi 5.73 4.19 5.60 5.25 5.21 4.70 4.23 6.12 5.24 3.39 
41 6.62 6.57 5.13 5.02 7.39 7.30 4.61 3.51 5.16 3.62 
42 7.38 4.48 6.07 4.41 5.54 5.85 3.76 4.98 5.83 2.98 
43 6 .87 4.39 5.65 5.17 6.21 6.50 3.30 5.20 5.07 3.65 
44 7.40 5.71 3.63 4.84 6.65 7.54 5.16 4.75 4.48 3.37 
45 Bae Kan 7.21 4.34 3.18 4.60 6.47 7.04 4.02 3.28 6.21 6.55 
46 7.39 6.19 5.03 3.44 6.01 6.44 4.92 4.87 4.52 3.04 
47 8.49 6.26 4 .56 3.70 6.12 6.06 4.11 4.42 4.30 5.09 
48 8.02 6.07 5.46 4.05 7 .22 6.17 3.55 3.84 4 .92 3.46 
49 Ha Nam 6.58 5.58 6.48 3.90 6.51 6.29 4.79 4.39 2.87 3.09 
50 8.59 5.13 4.04 4.09 6.47 7.02 4.57 5.30 3.43 3.50 
51 7 .65 4.83 4.62 4.70 6.30 7.44 4.38 3.07 5.10 3.07 
52 Binh Phuoc 4.96 6.82 4 .36 5.28 6.12 6.37 4.72 4.36 4.13 2.52 
53 Ninh Thuan 7.50 6.66 5.39 3.48 6.08 5.52 2.60 3.84 5.50 3.47 
73 
Table 3.6: (continued) 
I Province Entry Land Transparency Time Costs Informal· SOE Bias Proactivity Private Labour Legal 
D Costs Access and and Access and Charges (Competition of Sector Training Institutions 
Security of to Regulatory Environment) Provincial Development 
Tenure Information Compliance Leadership Services 
54 Thanh Hoa 7.83 5.95 4.63 4.73 5.24 6.79 3.11 4.61 3.73 3.53 
55 Son La 7.78 5.94 3.95 3.50 5.82 7.40 4.37 4.65 3.44 3.63 
56 Quan N ai 6 .73 5.99 5.24 4.42 5.44 5.79 2.36 4.57 4.94 2.13 
57 Ca Mau 5.99 5.74 5.07 4.33 6.97 5.73 4.10 3.47 3.65 3.00 
58 Bae Lieu 5.67 6.91 2.53 4.24 6.34 5.60 4.17 4.32 4.30 3.41 
59 Ha Tinh 7.36 5.93 2.86 4.93 5.05 6.22 3.09 3.99 5.10 2.59 
60 Dien Bien 8.82 5.72 4.38 4.19 6.45 5.60 3.24 3.42 3.50 2.99 
61 Kon Tum 8.73 4.95 4.28 3.22 5.17 6.09 3.43 3.33 3.60 3.74 
62 Ha Ta 6.12 4.92 5.56 4.28 5.07 6.70 2.53 3.60 2.92 3.13 
63 5.56 4.82 2.15 3.81 6.66 5.07 4.15 2.40 4.11 4.83 
64 Lai Chau 7.99 3.84 2.46 3.06 5.20 7.10 4.32 2.96 1.99 4.05 
MIN 4.96 3.84 2.15 2.64 5.05 4.70 2.36 2.40 1.99 2.13 
MAX 9.17 7.98 8.50 7.12 8.35 8.40 9.08 9.62 9.60 6 .55 
Source: www.vnci.org, 2006 
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Chapter 4: Trends and patterns of FDI in Vietnam 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades Vietnam has achieved notable success in attracting FDI. By 
2005, FDI accounted for over 15% of total domestic investment for development in the 
Vietnamese economy. Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) have begun to make a 
significant contribution to employment generation and export expansion. The 
impressive economic outcome of FDI participation in the economy has served to 
strengthen government commitment to further reforms to improve Vietnam's attraction 
to foreign investors, particularly in export-oriented manufacturing. 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the trends and patterns of 
FDI in Vietnam over the past two decades of reform with emphasis on source-country 
composition, industry profile, regional distribution and forms of investment being 
analysed carefully in different sections. This chapter is based on data compiled from 
administrative records of the Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) and 
international databases on FDI. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the overall trend 
of FDI inflows in comparison with selected host countries. This is followed by a 
discussion on the changes in the form of investment that are closely linked with policy 
reform. Patterns of source country and sector allocation of FDI will be analysed in the 
following sections. ln addition, this chapter assesses the geographical distribution of 
FDI in Vietnam with emphasis on the role of FDI in special economic zones. Short 
conclusions on trends and patterns of FDI in Vietnam will be presented in the last 
section. 
4.2 FDI inflows 
The data on FDI in Vietnam suffer from two major limitations. One is the significant 
difference between the data published by Vietnamese government agencies and the data 
from international organizations. For example, Table 4.1 compares FDl inflows from 
three different sources: the MPI, UNCTAD and the General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
(GSO). The MPl is a legal administrative body for managing FDI and Official 
Development Aid (ODA). The difference amongst data sources stems from the method 
of measuring FDI. The MPI defines FDI as total investment in foreign invested firms 
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(FIEs) and, therefore, includes shares of capital from both domestic and foreign 
partners. A change in the FIE capital stock as a result of earnings invested is also 
regarded as a change in FOi. Meanwhile, most international organisations, like 
UNCT AD define POI by two types of investment: greenfield investment measured by 
the actual capital inflows from multinational enterprises (MNEs) and cross-border 
M&A activity. This mostly explains why MPI figures on realised investment18 are much 
bigger than those in the UNCTAD source. Another reason for the difference originates 
from the capability of the statistical agency in identifying FOi. Until 2003, POI data in 
Vietnam did not cover either reinvested earnings or M&A. 
Table 4. l also shows some discrepancies in data reported by the two government 
agencies: MPI and GSO, especially for the early years of the post reform period. There 
are two possible reasons for this: difference in the time of reporting data and 
inconsistency in data compilation between government bodies. Investment of 
Vietnamese people who are citizens of overseas countries (Viet kieu) is almost excluded 
from the official record on FDI because most of this investment is undertaken through 
their relatives who are Vietnamese residents. 
Evidence from the ASEAN secretariat and UNCTAO database shows FDl 
inflows began before l 986 - the first year of reform initiated by the VI Communist 
Party Congress. However, most foreign investment in the planned economy phase was 
composed of official aid from governments of the fonner Soviet-bloc countries. The 
data began to reflect the entry of POI only after the 1987 FDI Law became effective. 
Using any data source in Table 4.1, twenty years of attracting FDI can be divided into 
several episodes. In the first four years (1988-1991), FOi inflow was small. This was 
not surprising given the many remaining restrictions on foreign investment coming from 
the centrally-planned economy, domestic economy instability, and policy uncertainty. A 
significant increase in FDI had just occurred when many FOi-related policies changed 
in accordance with stabilizing macro economic problems by the end of 1991. The next 
episode (1992-1997) witnessed continuous massive FDI inflows reaching a peak in 
1996 with registered and realized capital at 8.2 and 2.9 billion USO, respectively (FOi 
data on the MPI website 2006). FDI inflow then slowed as a result of the Asian 
18 The terminology used in this chapter is consistent with the Vietnamese regulations. Registered capital 
is total investment reported to the authority and stated in the firm's charter. Legal capital refers to the 
minimum capital required to establish a new firm and is also stated in the firm's charter. Realised capital 
(in some papers, called implemented capital) includes all assets and money invested in Vietnam. 
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financial crisis until 2000. A recovery period of FDI inflow began slowly from 2001 
due to the cautious behaviour of foreign investors following the crisis. For instance, 
although reform had been extended further, registered capital for 2005 was considerably 
lower than in 1996. Fortunately, inward FDI seems more reliable as the ratio between 
realized . capital and registered capital in 2005 was higher than 1996. Using realized 
capital inflow as an indicator for this analysis, the recovery period of FDI inflows 
commenced after 2000. The UNCTAD data including only new FDI projects shows the 
recession episode ended in 2002. 
Table 4.1: Registered and realized FDI flows to Vietnam by sources of data 
(million USD) 
Year FOi flows, MPI source Actual FDI flows, GSO source 
Number Registered Realized FOi No of Registered Realized 
of capital capital flows, licensed capital Capital 
licensed UNCTAD projects 
projects source 
1988 38 322 - 8 38 322 -
1989 68 526 - 4 68 526 -
1990 108 735 - 180 108 735 -
1991 151 1,284 428 375 151 1292 329 
1992 197 2,077 575 474 197 2209 575 
1993 274 2,829 1,118 926 274 3347 1018 
1994 367 4,262 2,241 1,945 367 4535 2041 
1995 408 7,925 2,792 1,780 408 7699 2556 
1996 365 9,429 2,923 1,803 387 9735 2714 
1997 348 5,822 3,218 2,587 358 6055 3115 
1998 275 4,781 2,375 1,700 285 4877 2367 
1999 311 2,197 2,537 1,484 311 2264 233 5 
2000 379 2,494 2,420 1,289 389 2696 2414 
2001 550 3,236 2,430 1,300 550 3230 2451 
2002 802 2,805 2,591 1,200 802 2963 2591 
2003 772 3,128 2,650 1,450 748 3146 2650 
2004 723 4,222 . 2,860 1,610 723 4222 2852 
2005 922 6,339 3,300 2,020 
- -
-
Total 7,058 64,413 34,458 22,135 6,164 59,853 30,008 
Source: GSO website, MPl database (various source) and UNCTAD database on website 
"-": data not available 
The overall trends of FDI flows to Vietnam over the past two decades is closely 
comparable to that of Malaysia and Thailand, i.e., flows increased until 199711998 and 
decreased afterwards (Figure 4.1 and Appendix A4.2). However, FDI inflows to 
Vietnam have been relatively more stable than in the other two countries. Flows to 
China and Singapore seemed not to have been affected by the financial crisis and 
reached an extremely high level compared to other countries. For the whole period 
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(1988-2005), FDI flows in Vietnam were far below the levels in other ASEAN 
countries. However, over the past four years, the values of these capital flows in 
Vietnam and Thailand have been mostly similar. 19 The gap between Vietnam and other 
countries may be explained by the difference in improving the investment climate. 
Despite these other countries previously having some reservations about the benefits of 
FDI, they all rapidly developed favourable environments for FDI entry from the early 
1980s. However, Vietnam remained hesitant about reforming the investment climate. 
The long-lasting effect of the Asian crisis in Vietnam compared with the other nations is 
a typical example of factors causing the sluggish change in policy to overcome negative 
externality. After the crisis, many ASEAN countries introduced additional incentives 
and more aggressive investment promotion programs (JICA 2003), whereas the 
fundamental policy changes in Vietnam have occurred only from about 2000 (see 
Chapter 3). Vietnam has so far had two main forms of foreign investment, joint ventures 
and fully-owned FIEs. Apart from these entry modes, other nations have received more 
capital from encouraging M&A and any other forms of investment, so that the total 
capital going to these countries is more volatile than that going to Vietnam. 
Country comparison by other indicators, such as shares of FDI flows in total 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) and the FDI flow/GDP ratio, shows different trends 
(Figures 4.2 and 4.3). The FDI share in GFCF in Vietnam increased quickly in the first 
five years, reaching its highest level in 1994 (about 50 percent). However, after that, the 
share of FDI in GFCF decreased because of slowing new FDI and the expansion of 
public and domestic private investment. By 2005, the FD! share in fixed capital 
formation was about 15 percent. Compared with the other four countries (Singapore, 
China, Malaysia and Thailand), the role of foreign investment in Vietnam was relatively 
higher, standing second behind Singapore. The third indicator - FDl/GDP ratio has the 
same features, i.e., reaching a peak in 1994 (11 . 9 percent) and then going down to 
nearly four percent of GDP in 2003. However, this ratio in Vietnam is still higher than 
in China and Malaysia even though the value of capital flow is much lower. 
19 Using data provided by MPI, FDI inflows to Vietnam in 2005 and 2006 surpassed the levels of 
Thailand and Malaysia. 
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investment fell relative to domestic investment although the absolute value of foreign 
investment continued to rise. On average in the second period, FDI accounted for 18.8 
percent of total investment. In contrast, the ·share of domestic private investment 
declined sharply in the first period (1985-1994) and then reduced slowly until 2002. 
This is explained by the structural change in the economy as a result of Doi Mot. In' the 
past, collectives (an important component of non-state investment) had played an 
imperative role in the economy, especially in rural areas. The reform toward a market-
oriented economy forced most agricultural collectives to close down or transform into 
providing corporate services. With the recent policy improvement, especially the united 
Enterprise Law that became effective in 2000, the private sector has developed quickly, 
contributing over 30 percent of total investment. 
However, state-owned or public investment still dominates with a stable share in 
total investment of over 50% in the second period (1995-2005). This type of investment 
also achieved the highest growth index (532.8), fo llowed by the domestic private 
(400.0) and foreign-owned sectors (201.2). It can be roughly concluded that a 
significant proportion of the public investment was for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in order to guarantee the leading role of SOEs in the economy. This preference policy 
could become a major constraint for creating an adequate investment climate and 
developing the private sector. 
Table 4.3 provides additional information for FDI flows decomposed by the 
nature of investment projects and the share of Vietnamese partners in total investment. 
As displayed, there were a significantly increasing number of projects which expanded 
their scope of investment using either new capital from parent companies or profits 
from previous investment in Vietnam (re-invested earnings). The value of expansion 
investment also increased over time and contributed almost half of total FDJ inflows in 
2004 and 2005. This may indicate a positive signal for the investment climate in 
Vietnam in attracting new FDL 
However, there was also a considerable amount of FDI outflow, particularly 
after the Asian financial crisis. The ratio between expired investment (including all 
kinds of FDI projects that no longer existed in Vietnam) and FDI inflows fluctuated, 
rising to a high level in the post-crisis period (1998-2003). A major proportion of the 
expired investment was from approved projects not yet started. Kokko et al. (2003) 
investigated the determinants of the likelihood of failed projects and found that most 
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failed FDI projects were approved in the early 1990s in the form of j oint ventures and 
located in remote areas. 
Moreover, the high expired/FD! inflow ratio was also caused by the complicated 
procedures that were in place for project licensing and assessments. The second finding 
from Table 4.3 is the ownership share in total realized investment. With the exception 
of 2005, domestic partners actually contributed a small proportion of total investment, 
approximately l 0 percent. All domestic-partner contributions were in joint ventures. As 
a result, the share of domestic partners in total realized capital decreased over time 
because the share of j oint ventures in total investment declined relative to fully-owned 
FIEs. 
Table 4.2: Composition and Growth of Total Investment for Development, 1985-
2005 
Year Composition (%) Growth Index (1994=100), at 1994 price 
FDI Domestic State- FOi Domestic State- Total 
private owned private owned 
1985 0.0 28.5 71.5 0.0 25.3 52.0 27.8 
1986 0.0 40.2 59.8 0.0 34.0 41 .2 26.4 
1987 0.0 47.2 52.8 0.0 38.0 34.8 25.3 
1988 2.5 44.2 53.3 2.4 40.4 39.9 28.6 
1989 13.6 40.9 45.5 14.4 42.1 38.4 32.3 
1990 13.1 46.7 40.2 17.5 61 .0 42.9 40.8 
1991 14.3 47.7 38.0 22.8 73.8 48.0 48.4 
1992 21.0 43.9 35.1 51.1 103.8 67.9 74:0 
1993 25.2 30.8 44.0 83.7 99.4 116.0 101 .0 
1994 30.4 31.3 38.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1995 30.4 27.6 42.0 119.0 105.0 130.7 119. 1 
1996 26.0 24.9 49.1 117.0 109.0 175.4 136.9 
1997 28.0 22.6 49.4 150.1 117.8 210.6 163.2 
1998 20.7 23.7 55.5 114.4 127.0 242.8 167.5 
1999 17.3 24.0 58.7 104.6 141.2 281.7 183.9 
2000 18.0 22.9 59.1 125.4 154.9 327.3 212.0 
2001 17.6 22.6 59.8 138.1 172.0 372.3 238.4 
2002 17.5 26.2 56.4 156.6 228.0 401.4 272.7 
2003 16.3 29.7 54.0 165.4 291.7 434.4 308.0 
2004 15.5 30.9 53.6 175.1 338.8 481.2 343.6 
2005* 15.7 32.1 52.2 201.2 400.0 532.8 390.5 
Source: C.E.l.C As ia Database, 2006 
* Preliminary estimate from GSO website, 2007 
82 
Table 4.3: FDI inflows decomposed by situation of operation 
lndicators\year 1988- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1990 2002 2003 2004 2005 
FDI projects 
New registered projects 214 151 197 274 367 408 365 348 275 311 379 550 802 772 723 922 
Capita l increased projects 1 9 13 60 84 151 162 164 162 163 174 241 366 416 497 607 
Registered capital inflows 
(million USD) 1,582 1,284 2,077 2,829 4,262 7,925 9,429 5,822 4,781 2,197 2,494 3,236 2,805 3,128 4,222 6,339 
New projects (million USD) 1,582 1,275 2,027 2,589 3,746 6,607 8,640 4,649 3,897 1,568 2,018 2,604 1,669 1,993 2,222 4,268 
Expansion (million USD) 0.3 9 50 240 516 1,318 788 1, 173 884 629 476 632 1,136 1,135 2,000 2,070 
Terminated /inflows (% ) 1.7 18.8 20.0 4.2 6.9 7.0 13.6 9.8 51.2 35.8 72.0 44.7 41.3 57.2 4.6 0.5 
Realized capital inflows 
428 575 l,118 2,241 2,792 2,923 3,218 2,375 2,537 2,420 2,430 2,591 2,650 2,860 3,300 
(million USD) 
Foreign share (%) 87.6 85.6 83.3 86.8 83.9 86.7 88.6 93. I 88.8 90.4 92.4 90.5 96.2 95.0 70.0 
V ietnam partner share (%) 12.4 14.4 16.7 13.2 16. l 13.3 11.4 6.9 11.2 9.6 7.6 9.5 3.8 5.0 30.0 
Source: FDl database of MPl, 2006 
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4.3 Form of foreign direct investment 
The stock value of FDl decomposed by form of investment in Table 4.4 shows fully-
owned FIEs dominating with 74.7 percent of total projects and 51.0 percent of total 
registered capital. Joint ventures stand second in terms of amount of registered capital 
but are first on realized capital. These figures also imply fully-owned FIEs are smaller 
size than average in terms of capital, although they use more workers than any other 
firm . types.21 In joint ventures, foreign investors may also provide tacit technology, 
management skills and know-how. Vietnamese counterparts may contribute legal 
knowledge, trademarks, and infrastructure in terms of mostly land and space. On 
average, joint ventures are much larger than fully-owned FIEs in capital stock because 
most of the former have been established through cooperation between foreign investors 
and large SOEs. Other entry modes, like BCC and BOT, are concentrated in · some 
highly protected industries. Recently, two new forms of investment, shareholding 
companies22 and capital holding companies, have been set up as a consequence of a 
policy change that allows foreign investors to buy equity shares from domestic 
enterprises or to work in financial services. 
Looking at the structure of registered capital stock at different points of time 
(Figure 4.4), a remarkable adjustment amongst forms of investment can be seen. In the 
early stages (1988-1990), there were only three forms of investment and most foreign 
investors preferred to cooperate with SOEs Goint ventures) to access government 
preferential treatment on credit, land ownership and other administrative procedures. 
The engagement of foreign investment in joint ventures may also reflect the high risk 
and uncertainty in the economic environment at that time. Moreover, foreign investors 
had to rely on cooperation with SOEs because development of the domestic private 
sector was not equally encouraged at that time. In the second period (1991-1995), those 
three forms of investment became more equal with a significant increase in fully-owned 
FIEs. Nevertheless, joint ventures continued to increase because foreign investors were 
only allowed to establish joint ventures in many protected industries. Joint ventures 
21 See more information on the factor proportions in Chapter 7. 
22 A shareholding company defined in the new Enterprise Law is an enterprise in which a) the charter 
capital shall be divided into equal portions called shares; b) shareholders shall be liable for the debts and 
other property obligations of the enterprise within the amount of capital contributed to the enterprise; c) 
the minimum number of shareholders shall be three and there shall be no restriction on the maximum 
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were still a driving force with more than two-thirds of total registered capital. Since 
2001 , the evidence reveals a decrease in the share of joint ventures in total registered 
capital as well as the share in a number of projects. The last episode (2001-2005) 
observed two fundamental changes. One is that the forms of investment were more 
diversified with the participation of two more entry modes (shareholding companies and 
capital holding companies). Another was fully-owned FIEs overwhelming joint 
ventures and other entry modes. There were two main reasons for this. Policy reform 
had significantly improved the investment climate (see Chapter 3) and foreign investors 
were now allowed to set up any form of investment in most industries and servi.ces. 
They seemed to follow the trend in preferring to form fully-owned enterprises, probably 
in order to avoid benefit conflict and make business decisions easily. Second, there was 
a huge increase in the number of domestic firms although most were at low competitive 
capacity. Therefore, co-operating with domestic firms in terms of forming a joint 
venture is not the best solution. MNEs with their comparative advantages easily 
compete in taking market power. 
In short, ownership conversion has become popular in most FDI host countries 
as there has been a rapid increase in FD 1 in the form of M&A compared to greenfield 
investment (UNCTAD 2006). In the case of Vietnam, with a developing financial 
market and high protection, especially for SOEs, most ownership transformation has 
occurred with direct investors preferring to set up their own corporations instead of 
joining with domestic partners. M&A activity in terms of forming shareholding 
companies was still preliminary over the past two decades, but recently, there were 
increasing flows of foreign capital into the stock market. Perhaps, there has been some 
ownership conversion within joint ventures between foreign and domestic partners but, 
if so, this has not been captured by any empirical study so far. 
number; and d) shareholders may freely assign their shares to other persons (Vietnam National Assembly 
2005). 
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Table 4.4: FDI by form of investment as of December 2005 (stock value, million 
USD) 
Form of investment No of Registered 
Projects capital 
Fully- owned FlEs 4,504 26,041 
Joint-ventures 1,327 19,181 
BCC 184 4,17 1 
BOT 6 1,370 
Shareholding 
company 8 199 
Capital holding 
company 1 56 
Total 6,030 51,018 
Source: Database ofMPI on website, 2006 
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Figure 4.4: Change in form of investment over time (registered FOi, million 
USO) 
Source: MPI database, 2006 
4.4 Source country composition 
As at December 2005, there were 6,030 FDl projects in operation in Vietnam with total 
registered and realized capital of approximately 51 and 28 billion USD, respectively. In 
terms of the source-country composition, FDI came from an increasing number of home 
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countries. In 2005, 75 countries and territories invested in Vietnam compared to 69 in 
2004. Based on the stock value of effective projects23, Table 4.5 presents information 
for the top ten source-FOi countries which is comprised of seven Asian and three 
European nations. There was a high concentration of source countries: ten nations 
contributed about 80 percent of total registered capital and 77 percent of total projects. 
Individually, Taiwan surpassed Singapore as the leading country in FOI flows to 
Vietnam. However, Japan was the largest contributor in terms of realized capital, 
followed by Singapore. In terms of investment performance measured by the ratio 
between realized and registered capital, the Netherlands stood first followed by Japan. 
The performance indicator of these two countries was much higher than for any other 
countries. For instance, although Taiwan was the largest investor in Vietnam, its 
performance level was the lowest amongst the 10 leading investors. 
Table 4.5: Top ten source countries of FDI as at December 2005 (stock value, 
million USD) 
Countries/territories Number Registered Realized Realized O/o 
of Capital capital /registered of total 
% of 
total 
projects (million (million registered Projects 
USD) USD) 
Taiwan 
1,422 7,769 2,831 36.4 15.2 23.6 
Singapore 
403 7,61 I 3,62 1 47.6 14.9 6.7 
Japan 
600 6,290 4,669 74.2 12.J 10.0 
Korea 
1,064 5,338 2,591 48.5 l 0.5 17.6 
Hong Kong 
360 3,728 l ,986 53.3 7.3 6.0 
British V irgin Islands 
251 2,693 1,240 46.1 5.3 4.2 
France 
164 2,171 1, 188 54.7 4.3 2.7 
Netherlands 62 1,996 1,924 96.4 3.9 1.0 
Malaysia 
184 1,571 840 53.5 3. l 3. 1 
Thailand 
130 1,456 804 55.2 2.9 2.2 
Subtotal 4,640 40,622 21,694 53.4 79.6 76.9 
Total country FDI 6,030 51,018 27,986 54.9 100.0 100.0 
Source: FDI database on website of MPI 
Table 4.6 shows changes in source country composition over time, 
disaggregated by conventional classification of countries and selected individuals. In 
general, FOi in Vietnam looked like following the common trend that "developed-
23 Effective projects refer to projects implemented at the point of time. Therefore, fa iled and outdated 
projects arc excluded from the FDI data. 
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country MNEs are less likely to invest in poorer economies with small markets, whereas 
developing-country MNEs tend to invest in neighbouring developing countries" 
(UNCT AD 2006, p.185). For instance, FD I from developing Asian countries dominated 
with a share of 56.4 percent in total investment, followed by the OEGD group (32.2 
percent) and Tax-haven British Virgin Islands (7.6 percent). FOi from transition 
economies (excluding China) was very small, accounting for only about one percent To 
be more specific, registered FOi declined significantly from 20.4 to 14.7 billion USO 
between two periods, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. 
The share of OECD capital increased from 26.4 percent in 1996-2000 to 35 
percent in 2001-2005. This may be a positive impact as the literature argues for more 
advanced technology transferred from developed-world FDI than from the developing-
world one. The relative increase of OECD capital in the second period was constituted 
by new investment from the US, the Netherlands and Canada, and because of the sharp 
investment reduction from developing Asia in the second period (2001-2005). Within 
this group, investment from Taiwan and South Korea was substantially increased. In 
contrast, the drop of Singaporean FDI in the period caused a fundamental change in 
source-country composition and put Singapore behind Taiwan in terms of total 
investment in Vietnam. Mainland China also significantly increased investment in 
Vietnam between two sub-periods when its composition rose from 0.5 to 3.3 percent. 
The combination of Hong Kong and mainland China makes this country grouping one 
of the five largest investors in Vietnam. 
Noteworthy is the FDI from two leading economies: Japan and the US. Some 
studies argue that FOi from Japan and the U.S has been invested indirectly through 
other small foreign companies in developing countries (MPI 2005). A study by MPI in 
2005 compiled US FDI and defines all capital invested by US-based companies and 
their overseas subsidiaries as an indicator, "US- related" FDI. The FDI undertaken by 
the US-based companies is called "US-reported" FOL Table 4.7 presents the capital 
flows and stock values of both the US-related FDI and the US-reported FDI. The share 
of the capital invested through the US overseas subsidiaries in total US-rel.ated FDJ was 
high, from 50.0 to 80. 7 percent. In terms of capital stock, investment from US overseas 
subsidiaries accounted for over 50 percent of registered and 72.3 percent of realized 
capital. Using the US-reported FDI as an indicator for country-source comparison 
places the US among the top ten countries which have invested in Vietnam. Figure 4.5 
gives more evidence on the resident country of FDI from the US overseas subsidiaries. 
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Over 800 (million USD) of U.S capital was invested through subsidiaries in Singapore, 
followed by Mauritius, Bermuda, the Netherlands and Hong Kong. This study also 
pointed out that most of this intermediate investment was for heavy industry, food-
stuffs, oil and gas and was concentrated in the South of Vietnam. 
Table 4.6: Registered FDI by source country (million USD) 
Country group 1996-2000 2001-2005 
Total % Total 
investment investment 
OECD Countries 5,391.4 26.4 5,155.6 
UK 1,255. l 6.1 77.8 
France 1,197.6 5.9 455.5 
Australia 144.3 0.7 294.8 
Switzerland 111.6 0.5 28.3 
Belgium 30.6 0.1 5.4 
Germany 188.2 0.9 46.6 
Italy 39.I 0.2 26.7 
Netherlands 123.5 0.6 787.8 
United State 581.2 2.8 721.9 
Japan 1,550.3 7.6 1,555.4 
Canada 64.6 0.3 231.0 
Other 105.3 0.5 924.4 
Transition/Centrally 1,426.4 7.0 96.1 planned economies 
Russian 1,391.2 6.8 81.7 
Ukraine 4.0 0.0 4.9 
Other 31.2 0.2 9.5 
Developing Asia 11,606.6 56.8 7,572.5 
China 97.4 0.5 488.2 
Thailand 586.3 2.9 247.6 
Philippines 39.1 0.2 12.2 
Malaysia 446.J 2.2 537.9 
Taiwan 1,744.8 8.5 2,358. l 
Singapore 4,324.7 21.2 739. l 
South Korea 1,790.3 8.8 1,986.7 
Hong Kong 1,776.1 8.7 1,129.7 
Indonesia 198.3 1.0 15.4 
Other 603.5 3.0 57.6 
Tax-haven Islands 1,118.1 5.5 1,066.2 
British Virgin Islands 742.4 3.6 901.9 
Bermuda 142.0 0.7 -
Channel Islands 141.9 0.7 0.5 
Other 91.8 0.4 163.8 
Other countries 887.2 4.3 855.8 
Total 20,429.7 100.0 14,746.2 
Source: C.E.J.C Asian database (for sub periods) and 
MPI website for the whole period 1988-2005. 
The data of MPI covers only effective projects. 
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16,443.8 32.2 
1,248.3 2.4 
2,171.2 4.3 
664.8 1.3 
686.4 1.3 
74.7 0.1 
344.4 0.7 
54.9 0.1 
1,996.0 3.9 
1,455.1 2.9 
6,289.7 12.3 
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739.2 1.4 
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51,017.9 100.0 
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Table 4. 7: The U.S - Related and reported U.S FDI (million USD) 
Realized FDI flows US-Related FDI US-Reported FDI Difference 
Value 
1996 220 75 145 
1997 266 133 133 
1998 271 89 182 
1999 274 53 221 
2000 196 62 134 
2001 258 93 165 
2002 169 61 108 
2003 449 132 317 
2004 531 162 369 
Effective FDI stock value 1998-2004) 
Registered capital 2,602 1,291 1,3 11 
Realized capital 2,634 730 1,904 
No of Projects 267 215 52 
Source: MPl (2005) 
Notes : Registered capital is calculated at the time of establishment, excluding subsequent 
changes 
Realized capital flows include both effective and expired projects 
Mauritus 
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Figure 4.5: Resident country of FDI from US overseas subsidiaries (1988-
2004) 
Source: tv1PI (2005) 
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4.5 Sectoral composition 
Table 4.8 provides data on accumulative FDI during 1988-2005 disaggregated by the 
main economic sectors. As of December 2005, half of the registered capital and over 60 
percent of total FDI projects were allocated in manufacturing industry. Within this 
sector, most foreign capital was invested in heavy industry (26.5 percent), followed by 
light industry (16.6 percent) . The FDI composition of food processing (foodstuffs and 
seafood) was negligible. Construction investment accounted for about 23 percent of 
total investment and 7.5 percent of total projects. Most of this investment was in 
building new residential apartments and offices. The service sector attracted about l 7 
percent of total registered investment as well as FDI projects, with the concentration of 
FDI in transportation and telecommunication services (5.7 percent) the same as in hotel 
and tourist services (5.6 percent). In terms of FDI disbursement, the primary sector had 
the best performance with a realized/registered FDI ratio of 134.4 percent. This was due 
to the oil and gas exploration in the East Ocean attracting a significant amount of 
resource-seeking FDI. Manufacturing had the lowest ratio of realized FDI over 
registered FDl compared to the other sectors. Within the service sector, the 
realized/registered capital ratio in transportation and telecommunication was lower than 
other services because some big FDI proj ects had been approved but not yet started. 
Data on the sectoral composition of cumulative FD I during I 99 1-2005 are 
summarised in Table 4.9.24 The most striking feature of this table is that FDI has 
increased significantly in manufacturing relative to other sectors. In the early 1990s, 
FDI flowed mostly into mining, quarrying and services . Subsequently, there was a sharp 
decline in FDI for these sectors that were replaced by an increase in manufacturing FDI. 
The FDl for services was stable except for a high fluctuation fo llowing the Asian crisis. 
The more detailed analysis for this sector may not be absolutely accurate due to the 
different data classification between the MPI and C.E.l.C Asian database. These two 
data sources had to be combined as the MPI data source does not allow decomposing 
annual FDI flows by sector although they are mostly compatible. 
24 The sectoral classification in Table 4 .9 differs slightly from that used in the preceding one due to data 
unavai lability and inconsistency in coverage over time. 
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Table 4.8: Sectoral compositions of FDI stock in 1988-2005 
Sector Number Registered Realized 
of capital capital 
Projects (million (million 
~-
USD) USD) 
Primary 
702 
production 
5,357 7,202 
Crude oil 27 1,891 5,542 
Agriculture and 
675 3,466 1,661 
forestry 
Manufacturing 3,824 25,447 11,736 
Light industry 1,693 8,471 3,143 
Heavy industry 1,754 13,528 6,543 
Foodstuff 263 3,139 1,895 
Seafood 114 309 155 
Construction 453 11,526 4,684 
New resident Park 316 4,011 2,326 
New cities 4 2,552 51 
Office-building 112 3,937 1,780 
EPZ&lZ, 
infrastructure 21 1,026 527 
construction 
Service 1,051 8,688 4,364 
Transportation & 
166 2,924 741 
telecommunication 
Hotel, Tourism 164 2,864 2,342 
Finance-Banking 60 788 643 
Cultural-Health-
205 908 284 
Education 
Others 456 1,203 354 
Total 6,030 51,018 27,986 
Source: 
Notes: 
FDl database on website of MPI, 2006 
Data are for effective projects only 
% of 
projects 
11.6 
0.4 
11.2 
63.4 
28.1 
29.1 
4.4 
1.9 
7.5 
5.2 
0.1 
1.9 
0.3 
17.4 
2.8 
2.7 
1.0 
3.4 
7.6 
100.0 
% of Realized/ 
Registered Registered 
capital capital 
10.5 134.4 
3.7 293.0 
6.8 47.9 
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5.0 2.0 
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1.5 81.6 
1.8 31.3 
2.4 29.5 
100.0 54.9 
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Table 4.9: Sectoral composition of realized FDI flows to Vietnam (percentage of total) 
Sector\year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001. 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Agriculture 9.8 5.2 6.0 3.0 5.6 5.0 8.4 5.2 9.1 9.1 7.6 3.2 10.4 17.3 3.2 
Agriculture-Forestry 4.6 3.6 5.4 2.7 5.0 4.5 7.8 5.0 8.6 8.0 7.3 2.0 7.8 16.8 2.8 
Fishing 5.2 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 l.l 0.3 1.1 2.6 0.5 0.4 
Industry 66.5 49.4 66.3 66.9 55.9 62.2 65.3 63.5 61.1 68.3 79.1 76.0 62.6 60.6 60.3 
Mining and Quarrying 53.2 32.3 23. l 32.0 20.6 13.2 8.3 13.9 12.3 11.9 33.8 2.2 1.1 0.6 0.5 
Manufacturing 13.3 17.2 40.7 31.9 34.6 47.7 55.2 48.0 47.5 54.4 44.8 73.8 6 1.6 60.0 59.7 
Electricity, Gas and 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.3 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Water Supply 
Construction 0.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 2.5 4.8 4.4 2.1 2.8 0.9 0.6 5.7 15.1 7.8 9.3 
Service 23.7 44.5 26.9 29.1 36.1 28.1 21.9 29.l 27.0 21.7 12.7 15.1 11.9 14.4 27.2 
Wholesale and Retail 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.5 
trade/service 
Hotels and Restaurants 6.7 11.6 11.0 12.6 11.1 9.9 7.3 10.2 6.0 7.7 2.0 10.4 7.0 10.2 1.0 
Transport, Storage and 8.8 7.9 3.5 3.8 9.5 4.1 3.5 3.3 5.0 1.2 2.8 1.3 0.9 1.6 17.7 Communication 
Financial Intermediation 2.3 19.7 5.0 2.3 3.8 2.8 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Renting business activity 5.5 4.2 4.7 6.8 10.5 9.5 9.8 
and Consulting 
13 .3 12.9 9.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cultural-Health and 0.3 1.1 2.7 3.6 1.0 1.8 1.1 0.9 0 .9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 6.0 Education 
TOT AL (million USD) 427 558 1,117 2,238 2,794 2,901 3,156 2,440 2,240 2,301 2,018 1,333 1,513 2,054 3,811 
Source: MPI 1991-2001 and C.E.l.C Asia Database 2002-2005 
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Next, the ASEAN database is used to analyse the FDI distribution within 
manufacturing industries. Figure 4.6 presents the FDI composition of every two-digit 
VSIC industry using total registered capital for the three years 2000-2002. It shows that 
FDI appears in every industry and the largest shares of this capital are in labour-
intensive and export-oriented industries, such as manufacture of leather, wearing 
apparel, textiles and food processing. In addition, electronics and automobile industries 
have also attracted a significant fraction of FDI to meet an increasing domestic demand 
for cars and high technology products. Although the data are only available for a short 
period, it can be concluded that FOi in Vietnam mostly aims to take advantages of the 
lower costs of wages, agricultural products and the plentiful skilled and unskilled labour 
supply. Recently, this investment has caused a significant movement of allocation from 
import substitution to export-oriented industries. Based on the same source of data, we 
found on average for 2000-2003, about 60 percent of FDI is concentrated in export-
oriented sectors. The classification relies on the performance of the export/output ratio 
presented in Chapter 6. 
37: Recycling 0.02 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c ·---- 3.47 
35: Manufacture of other transport ----• 2.32 
34: Motor vehicles. trailers and semi-trailers ·---------6.53 
33: Medical and optical Instruments.watches and clocks 
32: Radio, television and comrrunication equipment ·----• 3. 72 
31: Bectrlcal machinery and apparatus n.e.c ·---------6.41 
30: Office, accounting and computing machineries 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c -----• 3.72 
28: Fabricated metal products ·------- 5.41 
27: Manufacture of basic rretals 1.55 
26: Manufacture of other non-metanic mineral products ·--------6.04 
25: Rubber andplastic product ·------4.53 24: Cherricals and chemical products ,_ _______ 5.44 
22· Publishing and printing 
21 : Paper and paper products 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products ·-------5.40 
19: Manufacture of leather products ·--------------9. 70 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel ·---------------10.48 
17: Manufacture of textiles ·--------------• 10.27 
16: Manufacture and tobaco products 
15: Food product and beverages ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1_('._0.~47~ 
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 
% of total FDI for manufacturing 
Figure 4.6: Compositions of FDI flows to manufacturing industry in 2000-
2002 (approval and total project cost basis) 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN FDI database, 2003. 
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4.6 Regional distribution of FDI 
Table 4.10 presents the accumulative FDI during 1988-2005 disaggregated by the six 
regions of Vietnam and ten leading provinces. Despite the Vietnamese government's 
effort to encourage regional diversity of FDI location, the evidence indicates a notable 
imbalance in FDI distribution amongst provinces and regions. As of December 2005, 
about two-thirds of FDI projects associated with over 60 percent of total registered FDI 
were invested in the South East area of Vietnam. The Red River delta was second with 
nearly 30 percent of total registered FDI; these two regions accounted for about 90 
percent of total FDI. Moreover, all ten leading provinces were located in these two 
regions that received 84.3 percent of total foreign investment. In contrast, 54 other 
provinces and cities received only 15 percent of total FDI. This implies the 
concentration level of FDI still very much depends on conventional factors like 
geographical conditions (transportation costs), population density (market size), labour 
supply and the competition level. These areas are also more welcoming than other 
regions in terms of the investment climate where infrastructure development and policy 
openness play a decisive role. 
Geographical location of top ten provinces is presented in Figure 4.7. Of these, 
Ho Chi Minh City was the largest recipient with 31.0 percent of FDI projects and 24.0 
percent of registered capital, followed by Hanoi and Dong Nai. Dong Nai and Binh 
Duong have emerged as the most attractive places for FDI. Although there is a clear gap 
in the absolute value of FDI, the gap measured by the realized/ registered FDI ratio is 
not so large across leading provinces. FDI in the oil and gas industry is separated from 
provincial FD! to avoid possible distortions. 
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Table 4.10: Regional distribution of FDI in Vietnam as of 12/2005 (million USD) 
Regions Number Registered Realized 
of capital investment 
projects 
Northern 
Mountains 158 771 307 
Red River 
Delta 1,287 14,515 6,258 
Central Coast 320 2,730 1,323 
Central 
Highlands 88 267 178 
South East 3,974 31 ,203 18,794 
Mekong Delta 203 1,531 1,127 
Total 6,030 51,018 27,986 
Top ten provinces 
Ho Chi Minh 1,869 12,240 6,056 
Hanoi 654 9,320 3,402 
DongNai 700 8,495 3,842 
Binh Duong 1,083 5,032 1,862 
Baria Vungtau 120 2,896 1,254 
Hai Phong 185 2,035 1,228 
Vinh Phuc 95 774 41 4 
Long An 102 766 332 
Hai Duong 77 720 375 
Thanh Hoa 17 713 410 
-
Sub 10 4,902 42,990 19,176 
provinces 
Source: 
Notes: 
FDl database on website of MPI. 
Stock values of effective projects only. 
% of % of Realized I 
projects Registered Registered 
capital capital 
2.6 1.5 39.8 
2 1.3 28.5 43.I 
5.3 5.4 48.4 
1.5 0.5 66.7 
65.9 61.2 60.2 
3.4 3.0 73.6 
100.0 100.0 54.9 
31.0 24.0 49.5 
l 0.8 18.3 36.5 
11.6 16.7 45.2 
18.0 9.9 37.0 
2.0 5.7 43.3 
3.1 4.0 60.4 
1.6 1.5 53 .5 
1.7 1.5 43.3 
1.3 1.4 52. J 
0.3 1.4 57.5 
81.3 84.3 44.6 
96 
List of province 
Mountain North 
2 Ha-giang 
9 Tuyen-Quang 
14 Lai-chau 
15 Son-la 
3 Cao-bang 
7 Thai-nguyen 
8 Bae-can 
1 Lao-cai 
10 Yen-bai 
4 Lang-son 
16 Hoa-binh 
11 Phu-tho 
6 Bac-giang 
Red River Delta 
5 Quang-ninh 
12 Vinh-phuc 
13 Bac-ninh 
18 Hanoi 
20 Haiphong 
17 Ha-lay 
22 Hung-yen 
19 Hai-duong 
21 Thai-binh 
24 Nam-dinh 
23 Ha-nam 
25 Ninh-binh 
Central coast 
26 Thanh-hoa 
28 Ha-tinh 
27 Nghe-an 
29 Quang-binh 
30 Quang-tri 
31 Thua-thien-Hue 
32 Da-nang 
33 Ouang-nam 
34 Ouang-ngai 
35 Binh-dinh 
36 Phu-yen 
37 Khanh-hoa 
Central Highlands 
39 Gia-lai 
38 Kon-tum 
40 Dak-lak 
41 Lam-dong 
South East 
43 Binh-thuan 
42 Ninh-thuan 
48 Ho Chi Minh City 
47 Binh-duong 
45 Binh-phuoc 
44 Dong-nai 
46 Tay-ninh 
49 Barla-Vungtau 
Mekong Delta 
50 Long-an 
52 Dong-thap 
53 An-giang 
51 Tien-giang 
54 Vinh-long 
55 Ben-Ire 
56 Tra-vinh 
58 Can-tho 
57 Soc-trang 
fi~ KiFln-ni;rnn 
- High concentration of FDI 
(Top 10 FD! provinces) 
Figure 4.7 Geographical allocation of FOi in Vietnam 
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The realized FDI flows divided into four periods in Table 4.11 may help explain 
more about the geographical allocation of foreign capital. In the first period (1988-
1990), only five of six regions received FDI and there was extremely high concentration 
in the South East area (72.4 percent of total). In the following two periods (1991-1995 
and 1996-2000), FDI seemed more evenly distributed in all six regions with significant 
increases for the Red River Delta and the Central Coast. The last period (2001-2005, 
from a different and comparable data source, C.E.l.C Asian database) was associated 
with a small increase in FDI for the North Mountainous area, while the dominating role 
remained for the South East. Across these four periods, it is easy to see better 
performances in the last two periods compared with the first two. However, this 
classification may fail to reveal the impact of the Asian crisis on FDI inflows, i.e., for 
the third period, the poor performance in the late 1990s (1998-2000) may be offset by 
the better performance in the two previous years, 1996 and 1997. 
Table 4.11: Realized FDI flows to Vietnam by regions (million USD) 
Regions\episode 1988-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1988-2005 
North Mountainous area 
- 109 87 421 6l7 
Red Riv~r Delta 18 1,853 3,185 2,953 8,009 
Central Coast 1 289 1,159 623 2,073 
Central Highlands 0 59 73 36 167 
South East 58 2,604 6,295 6,541 15,498 
Mekong Delta 3 195 625 352 1,176 
Total 81 5,109 11,424 10,926 27,539 
Compositions (% of total) 
North Mountainous area - 2. 1 0.8 3.9 2.2 
Red River Delta 22.3 36.3 27.9 27.0 29. 1 
Central Coast 1.3 5.7 10.1 5.7 7.5 
Central Highlands 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 
South East 72.4 51.0 55.1 59.9 56.3 
Mekong Delta 3.8 3.8 5.5 3.2 4.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: FDI database ofMPI (1988-2000) and C.E.l.C Asian database (2001-2005). 
Notes: MPI data may exclude a significant proportion of FDI managed by central level. 
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4.7 FDI in special economic zones (EPZs and IZs) 
This section examines the role of export processing zones (EPZs) and industrial zones -
(IZs) in attracting FDI. By definition, the main difference between EPZs and IZs is that 
the former specializes in the production of exported goods and the provision of services 
for the production of exports and export activities. Therefore, establishment of EPZs 
should be assessed more carefully especially as the government offers exceptional 
regulations and ~ncentives for the operation of EPZs. However, as continuing market-
oriented policy refonns lead to the removal of most trade and none-trade barriers, and 
special rules and incentives for EPZs would have beome less important over the years. 
In addition, the government's emphasis has shifted from EPZs to lZs in order to redress 
inequality in regional development. This has also narrowed the differences between 
EPZs and IZs in terms of investment incentives. 
The first EPZ was established in 1991; 12 IZs/EPZs were set up before legal 
regulation for development of IZs/EPZs was adopted in 1996. Under this regulation, 
100 IZs/EPZs were planned to be set up by 20 IO. In the l 996-2000 period, there were 
actually 44 new IZs/EPZs established. As of 2003, 149 IZs/EPZs were approved by the 
government and 96 are operating, although only five are EPZs. Table 4.12 shows the 
situation of development of IZs/EPZs at the end of two consecutive years (2002-2003). 
There was a big increase in the number of lZs (including EPZs) between these two 
years (20 new lZs). Contribution of FD I to development of this area was predominant as 
it accoW1ted for over 50 percent of firms and 70 percent of investment. Overall, FDI 
invested in IZs/EPZs was about 30 percent of country FDl and 60 percent of 
manufacturing FDI. This is a highly export-oriented sector, as on average in 2000-2003, 
the export/output ratio was over 50 percent (MPl 2004). It seems that the general policy 
on lZs rather than EPZ policy is a good strategy for attracting export-oriented FDl. 
Of the five EPZs, only three (Tan Thuan, Linh Trung and Da Nang) are in 
operation. All of these are located in Ho Chi Minh City. Almost investment in these 
EPZs is by overseas investors. There was a significant increase in the number of FIEs 
and in investment capital. However, the absorptive capacity of these EPZs was fairly 
poor as only a third of the potential land was rented. ln particular, only one of the three 
EP Zs in operation (Linh T rung) has rented I 00 percent of the land. 
Geographically, nearly half of the total number of lZs is located in the South 
East of Vietnam; IZs/EPZs are difficult to set up in the Highlands and Northern 
Moill1tain areas. A high ratio of land has been rented in these regions because they have 
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had a smaller number of IZs and most domestic firms already existed before the 
establishment of the IZs. In general, the region with the highest concentration of 
IZs/EPZs received the highest concentration of FDI in IZs/EPZs (see the Red River 
Delta and South East area). However, this may not hold for a comparison between 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Hanoi had only 6 IZs/EPZs and the FDI share in total 
investment in these IZs/EPZs was 99 percent, whereas, while Ho Chi Minh City 
contained 13 IZs/EPZs the FDI share in total investment was only 65.1 percent. 
Moreover, it cannot be said that the role of FDI in Hanoi IZs/EPZs is more important 
than in Ho Chi Minh IZs/EPZs because the absolute value of FDI in the latter is much 
higher than in the former. This implies that Ho Chi Minh City has succeeded in 
encouraging not only foreign but also domestic investors to invest in IZs/EPZs. The 
poor performance of the IZs/EPZs locating in Hanoi (representing the Red River Delta) 
measured by low ratios of land rented and total investment provides more evidence for 
the comparison between the two cities. High concentration and performance of IZs as 
well as FDI in Ho Chi Minh City and surrounding provinces relative to other areas are 
likely rooted in by differences in policy openness and practical supports for investors, 
like infrastructure development and public administration services rather than from 
conventional factors, such as geographical conditions, local labour supply and 
production costs. There may also be a contagion effect from the investment by Viet kieu 
in the south of Vietnam although no official information is available to confirm this 
argument. 
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Table 4.12: FDI allocation in special economic zones (IZs/EPZs) 
Area Number of Number of firms 
IZs/EPZs located in 
IZs/EPZs 
2002 2003 2002 2003 
North mountain .2 3 27 38 
Red river delta 15 22 108 2 13 
Central coast 14 16 339 478 
High land I l - 3 
South East Area 39 47 1,609 l,898 
Mekong River delta 5 7 106 143 
Hanoi 5 6 57 63 
Ho Chi Minh City 13 13 707 855 
EPZs 4 5 123 199 
Total/average 76 96 2,189 2,773 
Source: MPI database, MPI (2004). 
Notes: Exchange rate for 2002: 15258 VND/USD. 
Exchange rate for 2003: 15500 VND/USD. 
Foreign share in 
nnmber of firms 
2002 2003 
25 .9 2 1.1 
77.8 55.4 
15.0 14.0 
- 0.0 
61.7 61.4 
34.0 27.3 
94.7 92.1 
47.5 46.0 
98.4 97.5 
53.4 50.4 
Total investment (million Share of foreign Ratio of land 
USD) investment(%) rented(%) 
2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 
77.8 93.l 33 .7 29.3 68.9 58.8 
828.9 1,347.9 95.7 85.2 11.4 20.0 
762.8 l,454.5 35.7 47.2 59.1 58.5 
- 9.0 
-
0.0 0.0 30.3 
10,264.2 12,3 17 .1 78.9 73.2 48.3 42.4 
333.8 442.7 63.5 59.7 44.4 50.1 
649.0 704.4 98.9 99.0 24.0 26.2 
1,887.0 2,364.5 71.2 65. l 55.8 46.0 
689.2 1,024.8 99.6 99.9 31.7 35.4 
12,267.5 15,664.2 76.6 71.1 43.0 41.0 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has scrutinized the trends and patterns of FDI in Vietnam since refonn was 
initiated in 1986. FDI inflows have fluctuated over this period, with a huge increase in 
the mid 1990s followed by a depression. Recent fast changes in policy and in · the 
investment environment under BTA and WTO commitments can be expected to result 
in a new wave of FDI. The source-country analysis revealed that most FDI originated 
from Asian countries with high export orientation. Vietnam has a growing FDI from the 
OECD countries, indicating an extent of advanced technology has been imported. The 
evidence also confirms FDI from the US was indirectly invested through intennediate 
Asian MNEs. 
The sectoral pattern of FDI in Vietnam also exhibits some differences from 
other host countries, as most FDI has been invested in manufacturing. This pattern may 
change as the WTO commitments become effective so that there is no limit on 
ownership m service sectors or protection for domestic enterprises. Within 
manufacturing, FDI shows its heavy concentration in labour-intensive or low 
technology industries. 
Notable in the regional distribution of FDI is the high concentration of this 
investment in two regions: the South East and Red River Delta areas. Nine of the 10 
leading provinces which account for nearly 90 percent of total investment are within 
these two regions. FDI also plays an important role in IZs and EPZs with about one 
third of total FDI invested in these areas. Deregulation for local authorities. and the 
management boards of IZs/EPZs have created cut-throat competition amongst provinces 
in enticing FDI. However, the rapid expansion of similar IZs as a result of excessive 
competition in some nearby provinces has reduced the effectiveness of the policy on 
FDI and IZs. 
Another noteworthy development is the rapid change in the fonn of investment 
from joint ventures to fully-owned FIEs. Initially, joint ventures were mainly 
established between foreign investors and SOEs and this firm type dominated in the 
early stage of reform (in the early 1990s). Positive changes in the investment climate 
(including policy reform) are the main reasons for the change in attitude of foreign 
investors. However, FDI in the form of M&A was still trivial compared to greenfield 
investment. Implicitly, the restriction in ownership has deterred Vietnam from 
exploiting a highly effective finance resource for the enhancement of domestic-finn 
capacity and economic development. 
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Chapter 5: FOi and Productivity Performance of 
Manufacturing Firms 
5.1 Introduction 
Because technology development is very expensive, generally only countries with large 
and specialised companies can invest in high-level human capital and finance R&D 
activities. Firms in developed countries, especially multinationals, focus on i1U1ovation 
of the state-of the-art technology, whereas firms in developing countries are likely to 
imitate existing technology. As a result, FDI becomes one of the main cha1U1els of 
international technology transfer. For example, royalty payments by MNE subsidiaries 
to parent firms accounted for 80 percent of total royalty payments for international 
technology transfer in 1995 (Saggi 2002). 
Since about the late 1970s, developing countries have become increasingly 
receptive to FDl, resulting in deregulation and ope1U1ess in FDI policy regimes. Many 
countries now encourage FDl inflows following acknowledgment of the FDI 
contribution to total investment for development, employment generation, advanced 
technology transfer, and international market access for indigenous firms. Moreover, 
FDI entry through horizontal and vertical linkages may generate positive externality so 
that domestic firms can improve productivity, competitive power and export 
performance. Both the direct and indirect effects from FDI or MNE affiliates in host 
countries have been substantially investigated despite the fact that the results regarding 
spillovers are still controversial. Fewer studies have fully examined the relationship 
between spillovers and other productivity determinants like the technology development 
of the host country, firm absorptive capacity, firm geographic conditions, and 
competition levels in the domestic market. Even fewer studies have examined the 
relationship between spillovers and entry modes. 
The FDI effects in a transition economy possibly contain different patterns and 
trends to other economies. This is because at the early stage of economic transition a 
transition economy may be dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which operate 
under a soft budget constraint in line with the 'political pecking order', a restricted 
investment environment and undeveloped factor markets. Opportunities for technology 
transfer from MNE affiliates to the domestic economy may be limited until the local 
private firms develop capabilities to operate under free market conditions. Due to these 
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specific characteristics, the behaviour of MNEs in a transition economy may also be 
different. Up to date, these transition features and their relationship with FDI effects 
have been partly demonstrated by some empirical studies, like Konings (1997, 2001), 
Kinoshita (2000), Smarzynska (2002), Angelucci et al. (2002, and Damijan et al. 
(2003a). While MNE affiliates are found to be more productive, the spillover effects on 
domestic firms are ambiguous. However, the number of studies of transition economies 
is negligible compared to those of either developed or developing countries. 
This chapter examines the implications of FDI for productivity performance in 
Vietnamese manufacturing. lt focuses on both direct productivity implications of 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and their effects on the productivity performance of 
domestic firms (productivity spillovers). The direct productivity implications are 
examined by two alternatives, the effect of foreign capital participation (foreign share in 
equity capital) on productivity and the productivity comparison by ownership dummies. 
Both experiments are carefully controlled for other relevant firm-and industry-specific 
characteristics which all impact on productivity performance. Productivity spillovers are 
investigated with emphasis on the role of horizontal FDI effects determined by key 
factors, such as domestic firm types (pure private firms versus SOEs), firm location, 
absorptive capacity, entry modes and competitive pressure in the product market. 
This chapter explores the unbalanced panel dataset constructed from the 
unpublished returns to the annual survey of manufacturing Industry conducted by the 
General Statistical Office (GSO) in the five year period (2000-2004). The empirical 
work will focus on firm-level data and re-estimate experiments using industry data as a 
robustness check for the findings. All necessary indicators at the current price are 
deflated to constant price using appropriate price deflators specifically constructed for 
purpose of this study by combining the available producer price data with data on the 
input-output structure of Vietnamese manufacturing. The data description and method 
of variable construction are detailed in Appendix A4. l. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The next section discusses model 
specification, estimation methodology, data sources and the method of data compilation. 
The third section presents both in-depth statistical analysis and estimation results for the 
direct and indirect effects of FDl on manufacturing productivity. Conclusions follow 
and the last section is an "Appendix for Chapter 5" containing all supplementary figures 
and tables. 
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5.2 Model specification 
This section presents the empirical models that are used to separately test the direct and 
indirect effects of FDI on productivity through the transformation of the production 
function. 
5.2.1 Direct effect on productivity performance 
For the purpose of modelling direct effect of FDI on productivity performance, we 
focus on two measures of FDI presence, namely foreign share in capital equity and the 
difference in productivity by ownership category. In other word the purpose here is to 
design empirical models to test whether an increase of the foreign share in firm equity 
leads to a rise in productivity and whether FIEs are more productive compared to other 
ownership groups. 
Assuming a firm produces a single output at time t with a Hicks-neutral Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
(5.1) 
Transforming the function by natural logarithm gives the preliminary equation of total 
factor productivity (TFP): 
(5.2) 
Where Y, K, L and M capture real output, real capital, employment and real 
intermediate inputs of a given firm, respectively. The residual aijt = ln(Au1) is 
interpreted as a unique contribution to TFP because it is a non-input factor in the model. 
So, the level of a1J1 is interpreted as TFP. Most theoretical studies decompose a iJr into 
three specific components: aiJt = µiJ + t1 + ~iJt of which the first captures firm-specific 
differences in productivity and is time-invariant; the second captures the common 
macro shocks; and the third is a firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity shock. 
A key component of firm-specific differences is ownership. Ownership types are 
assumed to be fixed over a short time. However, for a firm with multiple ownership 
partners, the extent of control by each partner may affect productivity. In particular, a 
foreign invested enterprise (FIE) owned by both domestic and foreign investors may 
perform in a different way with a change in the role of foreign investors measured by 
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the amount of capital or equity they contribute. Therefore, for the purpose of examining 
the direct effect of FDI on overall TFP, this study assumes a1J1 to be a function of FDI 
and others, e.g., alJ1 = G(FDiu1>1liJ ,t, e1J1 ). Incorporating this equation with (5.2), gives the 
following equation: 
(5.3) 
For empirical Work, the factor FDiiJi is measured by the foreign share in a firm's 
legal capital. Both foreign investment and firm legal capital may change over time and 
hence FDI varies accordingly. A firm with a higher share of foreign capital is expected 
to gain higher TFP because FIEs may take more advantages in terms of advanced 
technology, management skills, market access and other benefits from their parent 
companies. Therefore, the coefficient of FDI is expected to be positive. 
There is a high correlation between FDl and ownership type. A zero foreign 
share in capital means a firm is owned by the domestic investor. Fully-owned FIEs are 
in line with FDI equal to 100 percent. For that reason, in addition to examining the 
effect of FDI on TFP, the ownership difference in productivity is investigated by using 
ownership dummies. One way of doing this is to include an intercept dummy that is 
unity for foreign invested enterprises and zero for domestic enterprises (FOR). Legally, 
a firm is called "an FIE" if the foreign share of capital is 30 percent or above. Another 
solution is an addition of three main forms of foreign investment, respectively. 
Following the classification of the General Statistics Office (GSO), these are joint-
ventures with SOEs (SOEFDI), joint- ventures with domestic private enterprises 
(PRIFDl) and fully-owned FIEs (PUREFDI). 
The GSO classifies 11 different categories of domestic ownership. For 
simplicity and in order to see the difference in FDI effects on two economic ownership 
sectors (private and state-owned sectors), 11 specific categories of local firms are 
aggregated into two main ownership types: private and SOE firms that are presented by 
two dummies, PRIVATE and SOE. Consequently, TFP can be evaluated not only 
between FIEs and local firms but also between five different ownership types, i.e., fully-
owned FIEs, domestic private firms, SOEs, joint ventures with SOEs and with domestic 
private firms. 
Inter-firm differences in productivity depend not only on the nature of 
ownership but also on firm/industry-specific factors. For instance, TFP could be 
different by industry features and firm location. However, insertion of too many 
disaggregated industry dummies makes the model cumbersome. ln accordance with 
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previous studies, sector dummies of every two-digit industry level will be included 
(SECTOR). Likewise, firm TFP also depends on the location and other regional fixed 
effects (REGION). According to the commonly-used categorization in Vietnam, 61 
provinces are accommodated into six geographical regions, with most FIEs located in 
the South East and Red River Delta. To control for the regional fixed effect, six proxy 
dummies are also included in all specifications and the first region acts as the base 
dummy. Furthermore, there is a remarkable variation between the two biggest cities 
(Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City) and the remaining areas. Ho Chi Minh City has many 
advantages in geography, policy openness and investment climate compared to Hanoi. 
Finns locating in Ho Chi Minh City are likely to have higher productivity because of 
expedient access to the world markets and domestic resources (skilled labour, natural 
gas, land coverage). This city also receives the largest remittances from Viet kieu and 
most of this money is invested in domestic private enterprises, making this area more 
competitive. Therefore, control for differences in productivity between the two largest 
cities and the remaining area is necessary. 
The theoretical framework also supports investigation of effects from 
competition and economies of scale. Domestic competition is represented by the 
Herfindahl25 index (HERF), which is measured by the sum of squared firm share of total 
industry employment. A high value of this index indicates a high concentration 
occurring in each industry or a low competition level. Since Vietnam has not yet fully 
integrated into the world market, the export/output ratio could also be accepted as an 
indicator of foreign competition. However, firm-level data on trade are unavailable for 
four of the five years being studied (2000-2004). Therefore, this thesis focuses on 
competition in the domestic market with the participation of both domestic and foreign 
products. On the other hand, a high effective rate of protection (ERP) in a sector 
presumes a low competition level in the domestic market. Therefore, this study 
incorporates ERP and the Herfindahl index (HERF) by their product (HERFERP)26 and 
this variable can act as a good proxy for the competition level. The high value of 
HERFERP indicates high concentration or low competition. 
25 Herfindahl index measured for an industry U) as HERF1 = f. (!_!!___)
2 
i = 1, 2 ... n, x(iJ) is 
I XJ 
employment of firm I, XU) is total employment of industry U) 
26 This index is calculated by the same construct used for the competition index in Sjoholm ( 1999). 
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The definition of scale economies (SCALE) is measured here as the ratio between firm 
output and average output in the same sector, disaggregated at four-digit VSIC level. If 
scale economies occur, the coefficient of SCALE will be positive and significant. 
Lastly, the literature supports the inclusion of firm ages (AGE) in studies on 
productivity (Olley and Pakes 1996; Biesebroeck 2005). The second term in TFP 
equation is time dummies (t) taking the value 1 for a given year and 0 otherwise. 
Incorporating these variables into (5.3) results in the following equation which 
examines the contribution of foreign share in capital (FDI) to overall TFP. 
Next, Equation (5.5) simply compares productivity differences between FIEs and 
domestic firms taking into account other fixed effects like specific characteristics of the 
firm, the industry and the firm's location. 
37 
Yu1 = ~ +aku1 + fllu, + fmyt + ¢FOR + l.1SCALEJI +Ai_HERFER~, + ~SK1Llu1 + 'Lc1SECTOR1 
J~l 5 
6 
+ L dxREGJON,_ + /.4 AGE!i + t1 + 6 ljl 
x~J 
(5.5) 
For another attempt, equation (5.6) decomposes ownership into five different types with 
a base dummy representing local private enterprises. 
37 6 
+J..3SKILL;p + 'L c1S ECTOR; + L dxREGIONx + J..4 AGEu +t, +&;;1 (5.6) 
)~1 5 x=I 
Where27 
Y;p Firm output in log form SCALE Economies of scales 
k ijt Capital stock in log form HERFERP Competition index 
I iJt Employment in log form SKILL Share of skilled workers over total 
m ;11 Inputs in log form employment 
SOE A dummy for SOEs REGION A vector of six region dummies 
SOEFDI A dummy for joint SECTOR A vector of 22 industry dummies 
ventures with SOE (two-digit VSIC level) 
PRIFDI A dummy for joint AGE Firm age 
ventures with private firms The stochastic error term 
6 
PUREFDI A dummy fo r fully-owned t, A vector of year dummies, T2000-
FI Es T2004 
27 See detailed description of variables in Appendix AS .4. 
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5.2.2 Productivity spillovers 
The main question here is whether or not the presence of FIEs affects the TFP of 
domestic enterprises in Vietnamese manufacturing. To examine this issue, equation 
(5.4) is adjusted as follows: 
(5.7) 
The definitions of all variables are the same as above. This model is concerned with 
only domestic firms as denoted by subscript "d" (private enterprises and SOEs), because 
the main consideration is whether domestic firms benefit from the presence of foreign 
firms. In comparison with the productivity-performance model (5.5), the spillover 
model (5. 7) replaces the foreign share of capital ( FDI iJt ) with a vector of new variables, 
as follows: 
FDISJt: horizontal spillovers at 4-digit VSIC level 
FDISR;r1 : horizontal- regional spillovers at 4-digit VSIC level 
JVS 11 and GREEN Jt : entry-mode spillovers measured presence of joint 
ventures and fully-owned FIEs, respectively at 4-digit VSIC level 
These spillover variables are used interchangeably. The first proxy, FDIS is · 
defined as the foreign share of employment in a given industry G) at time t. FDIS is 
measured at 4-digit VSIC level in order to control for a possible problem caused by 
using aggregated data. The second measurement for spillovers (FDISR) is derived from 
an important argument that spillovers could be differentiated by firm location, i.e., 
domestic firms locating near FIEs could derive more benefits than more distant 
domestic firms. FDISR is the foreign share of employment in a given industry (j) at a 
given region (r) at time t. By the same token, equation 5.7 is estimated with the 
inclusion of FDIS for each region separately. The last option for spillovers is the 
inclusion of JVS and GREENS initiated from a hypothesis that during the initial stage 
of economic transition with the existence of several entry modes, the effects from these 
entry modes may differ significantly, especially in a host country with low technology 
development (Estrin and Meyer 2004). 
There are two main entry modes of investment in Vietnam. Joint ventures were 
the dominating ownership type in the initial phase of the reform and fully-owned FIEs 
have been a recently favoured form of investment. Joint ventures have strong linkages 
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with local partners, especially with SOEs, whereas fully-owned FIEs may retain a close 
relationship with parent companies. However, linkages in the form of joint ventures 
may lead to possible conflicts between partners and prevent MNEs from transferring 
state-of-the-art technology. In the long term, these conflicts may result in one of two 
options, where either the domestic or the foreign partners will fully acquire the joint 
venture. Moreover, when all barriers are removed, in order to avoid conflict over power, 
foreign investors usually prefer to form fully-owned FIEs as opposed to joint ventures 
so that the latter type becomes negligible. 
Since the Law on Enterprises and the amendment of the Law on Foreign 
Investment became effective in 2000, there has been a notable expansion in the 
domestic private sector in Vietnamese manufacturing. However, most of these new 
domestic private enterprises are small and yet to gain experience in business operations. 
SOEs which receive considerable government support still dominate many industries. 
Investment in the state-owned sector predominates in total investment for development, 
despite strong criticism of SOE inefficiency. On the other hand, as a result of the 
reform, many SOEs have reconstructed and presumably become more efficient over 
time (Huang 2003b). Most SOEs are large firms employing more skilled workers than 
private firms. Therefore, in the first period of reform, because of the weakness of the 
private sector, the spillover effects of FDI on private firms and SOEs may have been 
different due to the absorptive capacity of the former being lower than that of the latter. 
For this reason, the difference in spillover effects on the productivity of domestic 
private and SOEs is taken into account. 
There is no single proxy for the absorptive capacity of a firm. Following the 
previous studies a number of proxy variables are used: firm size, labour productivity 
gap, R&D expenditure and the quality of workers (Sjoholm 1999; Nguyen Thi Tue Anh 
et al. 2005; Le Quoc Hoi 2006). The first proxy is a dummy variable representing firm 
size, i.e., data are divided into two groups for large and small firms , respectively. Under 
the regulations of the Vietnamese government and in accordance with the common 
classification in the literature, firms with fewer than 50 employees are referred to as 
small, and those above 50 as large. The second proxy, labour productivity (LP) for 
domestic firms and FIEs is calculated separately and aggregated up to 4 digit VSIC 
level. The ratio between the LP of FIEs and domestic firms (aggregated up to industry 
level) is computed and the data divided into two groups based on this ratio. This is an 
indirect measure of the technology gap discussed by Findlay (1 978), Wang and 
Blomstrom (1992) and Kokko (1994). 
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Because of data unavailability, we do not use royalty payment for patent rights 
fas a proxy for the technology level of FIEs for the third approach as in Kokko (1994 ). 
Instead, the R&D expenditure of local firms will act as a good representative for 
absorptive capacity. A firm with higher R&D costs in the whole period under study 
(2000-2004) is assumed to have a higher capacity to receive technology benefits from 
FIEs. Ideally, R&D expenditure should be integrated in the models as a determinant of 
productivity. However, as information on R&D expenditure is not provided for every 
year, this study sums up R&D expenditures across the time period for every firm, anq 
local R&D expenditure for every industry (at 4 digit VSIC level) is then aggregated. 
Division into low and high local R&D groups is based on this indicator. 
The last proxy variable for firm capacity is the quality of workers. In particular, 
FDIS is interacted with the share of skilled workers in total employment (SKILL). 
Alternatively, a ratio between skilled workers over unskilled workers is used for 
dividing data into low and high quality groups and an estimation of spillovers conducted 
for each group. 
In addition, the estimate of spillovers relies on industry level data as a result of 
the hypothesis that spillovers are more likely to occur when using aggregated data rather 
than firm-level data. In other words, the specific level of data aggregation may affect the 
result of estimating FDI spillovers. In this study, estimation of equation (5.7) is 
replicated using 4-digit VSIC data. Moreover, both direct effects and spillovers from 
FDI may differ significantly across industries and debate continues between inter-
industry spillovers and within-industry spillovers. Therefore, estimates of equations 
(5.4) and (5.7) will be conducted for some specific industries. From the results of the 
statistical analysis, this study chooses three groups of industries (at two digit VSIC 
level) for investigation of FDI effects. The first group is food products and beverages 
(VSIC 15) which represents the largest number of firms (most are domestic enterprises). 
The second group is textiles and garments (VSIC 17-18) which includes all firms 
manufacturing textiles, manufacture of wearing apparel and manufacture of leather 
products. This group is export-oriented with a restriction on export quotas. Textiles ·and 
garments in Vietnam are also quite competitive due to participation of a large number of 
FIEs, SOEs and domestic private firms. However, this group has the lowest LP relative 
to other sectors. The third sector is the manufacture of electronic products, and includes 
all firms of two digit VSIC industries coded from 30 to 33. This is a group of capital-
intensive industries with a dominating contribution from FIEs in industry output. 
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In examining the spillover effect it is important to allow for its path-dependence 
nature. That is, current firm output may be partly explained by gains from previous 
years. Moreover, both theoretical and empirical studies strongly argue that spillovers 
take time to materialize (Haskel et al. 2002). In other words, old FIEs may have more 
impact on local-firm productivity than new FIEs because the fonner have contributed to 
market-structure change by their products. 
Based on these hypotheses, a dynamic model is constructed by including the 
first Jag dependent and first lags of spillover variables (following Arellano and Bond 
1991 and Blundell and Bond 1998). First, for brevity, it is assumed z is a vector of all 
exogenous variables with an exception for spillover proxies: 
zif1 =F(k,l,m,SCALE, HERFERP,SKILL)and this variable 1s substituted into the general 
spillover model (5.7) to obtain the expressions for YiJr and YiJt-1: 
With a suspicion regarding the possibility of the first-order autocorrelation, AR (1 ), i.e., 
sif, = ps;p- i +v;Jf ; taking a product between the first lag of the dependent variable (5.9) 
and p gives: 
Lastly, taking the difference between (5.8) and (5.10) and using new notations for 
coefficients gives the final dynamic model for estimation in (5 .11): 
d d • .. 
Y yt == IPo + <fJ1 Yij1-1 + rpzFDJ Jt + <p3 FDI ; 1- 1 + (fJ4Z iJ1 + (fJ5ZiJ1-1 + (1 - P)T/ if + (1- p)t, + ui}I 
(5.11) 
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5.3 Data and estimation method 
5.3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on data compiled from unpublished returns to the annual 
enterprise survey conducted by GSO. This survey commenced in 2001 (reference year 
2000) and for this study data for manufacturing firms for the five years from 2000 to 
2004 are used. The survey covers enterprises operating in all production and service 
sectors, with the exception of agricultural cooperatives, the forestry sector and 
household businesses. Data are collected on all key aspects of enterprise performance: 
gross output, capital stock, employment, wages bill, total sales, intermediate inputs and 
ownership type. The GSO relies on statistical offices at both district and provincial 
levels to conduct this survey. Data on every firm are entered and stored individually by 
tax code and VSIC at the four-digit level. Based on the main business activity, each 
enterprise belongs to a unique code of VSIC. Currently, the VSIC is determined to 
make data comparable to the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
Firms which are closing or not yet operating are not included in the survey. After the 
data are transferred to the central office, they are examined by technical staff under the 
supervision of World Bank experts. 
Initially, the finn level data were tabulated by 14 different ownership types. This 
study classifies enterprises into five main ownership categories: State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), domestic private enterprises, joint-ventures with SOEs, joint-ventures with 
private enterprises and fully-owned FIEs. The raw data are then cleaned to satisfy 
requirements for panel data estimates. All observations with negative values on capital, 
output, input, FDI and legal capital are excluded. Any missing values in the years after 
2001 are extrapolated by taking the average values of the year immediately before and 
after that year. Where values were missing in three of the five years, they were 
excluded, except for the case of new firms. The panel data contain around 21,000 firms 
covering the period 2000-2004. 
All current value series in the panel dataset were transformed into real values at 
1994 prices using deflators constructed at the two-digit VSIC level. The output deflators 
are the implicit deflators computed from current and constant price series of 
manufacturing outputs obtained from the official GSO statistics. Likewise, deflators for 
capital stock series are obtained using the current and constant values of fixed-capital 
formation from the national accounts of GSO. Deflators for the intermediate input series 
are constructed as weighted averages of the output prices using the weight derived from 
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the 2000 Input-Output Tab_le (I-0 table). First, the 66 manufacturing sectors in the I-0 
table are aggregated at the two-digit VSIC level using the concordance obtained from 
the GSO. The input shares are then calculated for every sector and applied to two-digit 
output price indices to obtain input price indices. Finally, real value-added is computed 
as the difference between output and intermediate inputs at constant prices. Real wages 
are measured by using the consumer price index (CPI)28 as a deflater. HERFERP series 
are constructed using HERF series derived using GSO data and ERP estimated obtained 
from Athukorala (2006). 
5.3.2 Estimation method 
Equations (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) are estimated to investigate the direct productivity 
effects of FIEs. In Equation (5.4), the key variable, FDI, varies over time, and thus 
permits the use either the fixed-effect estimator or the random effect estimator. Based 
on the Hausman test the fixed-effect estimate method was found to be more appropriate. 
It is widely claimed in the literature that endogeneity of FDI could be a serious problem 
affecting the estimation results of production function (Chapter 2, Section 2.5. l ). The 
endogeneity of FDI may be rooted in the high correlation of this variable with omitted 
variables. This is a common problem encountered when working with firm-level survey 
data in developing countries. In addition, endogeneity may be caused by simultaneity of 
ownership and the performance of firms. This is because foreign investors generally 
tend to acquire the most productive firms or to invest in regions and/or industries 
characterised by high productivity (Wooldridge 2002; Navaretti and Venables 2004). To 
control for possible endogeneity of FDI in (5 .4), the first lag of this variable is used as 
the instrument in instrumental variable estimation. 
For the last two equations, (5.5) and (5.6), the fixed effect estimate is 
inappropriate because all key variables (FOR, PUREFDI, PRlFDI, SOEFDl and SOE) 
are ownership dummies which are time-invariant. Therefore, this chapter explores Two-
Stage-Least Square (2SLS) estimates with control for the possible endogeneity of two 
ownership dummies, FOR (in 5.5) and PUREFDI (in 5.6). The most important 
estimation step is finding valid instruments for these variables. FDI firms may be 
associated with high industry R&D expenditure, wage rates and information access. 
28 CPI is a country-wide index follow ing the Laspeyres formula and using the retail prices of 396 goods 
and services. Calculation of CPI is computerised using monthly data surveyed from all 16 conventional 
rural and urban areas. 
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Therefore, these variables will be tested to determine whether or not they have 
significant correlation with endogenous variables in the reduced form. 
The investigation of FDI spillover effects (Equation 5.7) is estimated with 
several alternative specifications to control for firm absorptive capacity, geographic 
features, competition, entry modes and domestic ownership types. All relevant variables 
(FDIS, FDISR, JVS and GREENS) are time-variant, and hence the fixed effect 
estimator can be used. The suspicion of endogeneity of FDI as argued by the literature 
(for the same reasons discussed above) is treated by using the first lags of the 
endogenous variables as additional instruments. 
For estimating the dynamic spillover model (Equation 5.11), the above 
discussed estimation methods are appropriate. Instead, we use the dynamic-panel 
estimator called "First difference GMM estimator" developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991 ). This estimator is widely used for estimating models using moderately persistent 
data over a fairly short period (Blundell and Bond 1998). The method is based on the 
combination between the first-difference estimate and the GMM estimate. Because the 
first lags of key variables (FDIS, FDISR, JVS and GREENS) are in the model, their 
second lags will be explored as instruments in the case where they are endogenous 
variables. One limitation in using this technique is that it requires a relatively long series 
panel, whereas the data availability is only for 5 years. Therefore, this study explores 
results from the dynamic model as a complementary contribution and robust check for 
the fixed effect estimates discussed earlier. 
5.4 Results 
The first part of this section presents both statistical description and econometric results 
on the differences in productivity between FIEs and domestic firms. The second 
presents results on indirect effects of FDl controlling for important determinants of 
these spillovers, such as competition level, absorptive capacity, domestic ownership 
types, firm location and industry characteristics. 
5.4.1 Direct effects 
This section first compares productivity performance by ownership type and uses this 
finding as a complementary contribution for analysing regression results on the direct 
effect of FDI. The influence of MNEs on their foreign affiliates does not necessarily 
depend on the degree of ownership, i.e., the level of foreign share in equity capital. For 
example, some .MNEs may take a minority ownership position (because of the existing 
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ownership restriction in a host country) but still have a big influence on the affiliate' s 
performance. For this reason, the literature prefers using ownership dummies instead of 
a continuous equity-share-based variable. For the purpose of robustness check, this 
study uses both alternatives as discussed in section 5.2.1. 
Productivity is measured using two alternative indicato_rs, labour productivity 
(LP) and total factor productivity (TFP). LP is defined as real value-added per worker. 
TFP refers to the ratio of a real value-added to a weighted average of employment and 
capital stock, where weight is the industry averages of the ratio of wages to value-added 
over the full period 2000-2005. Both LP and TFP are examined at the two-digit VSIC 
level for every ownership type. Average LP in the period 2000-2005 is computed by the 
common method because annual LP may not capture the true gap between FIEs and 
domestic enterprises. TFP is calculated to compensate for the weakness of using LP, 
i.e., LP may reflect the capital intensity rather than the efficiency of firm performance. 
This study estimates the TFP index between the initial year (2000) and the ending year 
(2005). As a result, LP and TFP for each industry averaged over the period 2000-2005 
are measured by the following formulas: 
'" 5 2= I r ij, 
LP j = -'-;-'~1'-'-'1 =:...:..l __ 
m S 
(5.12) 
IL Lij, 
i = I t = I 
'T''FP _ Yj,2004 I Y;,2000 
1
' }04- 00 -
' s[LJ,2004 I L1,2000]+(1 -s)[K1,2004 I K j ,2000 ] 
(5.13) 
Where, Y and L are real value added and employment for a given firm at time t; 
mis the number of firms in a given industry j; the time period is five years (2000-2005). 
In the second method for calculating TFP, Y, L and K represent real value added, 
employment and capital stock for a given industry at two points of time: 2005 and 2000; 
s is time average wage/value added ratio where both numerator and denominator are 
measured at real values. 
The data on manufacturing production at disaggregated VSIC level in Vietnam 
have only been available since the late 1990s. Transformation from the old 
classification system to the compatible !SIC system has just been undertaken in the 
GSO with technical support from The World Bank. With the purpose of investigating 
the long-term effect of FIEs in manufacturing, this study explores the published 
information on manufacturing output over the period 1995-2005 provided by the 
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C.E.I.C Asian database29. Prior to 1995, the statistical system of Vietnam did ·not 
provide separate information on the contribution of domestic and foreign-invested 
sectors. Table 5 .1 shows that the share in manufacturing output of the foreign-invested 
sector has increased steadily over time, with an average from l 7.8 percent in 1995 to 
35.9 percent by 2005. In particular, the contribution of FIEs to manufacturing output 
increased in every two-digit VSIC industry. By 2005, seven out of 21 industries were 
dominated by FIEs with their share in total output over 50 percent. This preponderance 
occurred mostly in capital intensive industries, like manufacture of electronic products 
(VSIC29-33) and automobiles (VSIC33-34) with an exception for manufacture of 
leather products (VSIC l 9: 59 percent). However, the role of FIEs rapidly expanded in 
some other export-oriented industries, like manufacture of textiles, garments and 
furniture products. There were only two protected industries in which the foreign share 
in total outputs was negligible (less than 10 percent). One was the manufacture of 
tobacco products, which is not encouraged, not only in Vietnam but also in many other 
countries. The other was the manufacture of publishing and printings products which is 
still restricted under current government policy. 
Estimates reported in in Table 5.2 show a vast variation of LP amongst the 22 
sectors and five ownership types. In general, the average LP of FIEs was significantly 
higher than that of domestic enterprises (28.5 vs. 24.2). Disaggregating by entry modes, 
the LP of joint ventures was highest, achieving a manufacturing average of 82.8. In 
contrast, the LP of fully-owned FIEs was much lower. A major proportion of these 
firms operates in labour-intensive industries with very low productivity (textiles, 
garments and leather products). On average, SOEs obtained relatively high LP 
compared to domestic private firms and even to fully-owned FIEs i.e., because of both 
past and current government priorities. Fully-owned FIEs are more productive than 
domestic private firms but the LP gap is not very wide. Across two-digit industries, 
fully-owned FlEs have higher LP than SOEs in 14 of 21 industries. As with joint 
ventures, the higher LP of SOEs compared with fully-owned FlEs in some sectors is 
associated with difference in capital intensity. Moreover, the measurement of real value-
added in SOEs may be less accurate as it is missing some inputs like government 
subsidies and land rents. In general, SOE performance has become more diverse and 
some of them had become stronger through restructuring and privatisation programs. As 
discussed in the previous section on grouping ownership types, SO Es include both 100 
29 This data are the same as GSO data available at www.gso.gov.vn 
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percent state-owned enterprises and a large number of privatised firms with government 
majority share. 
There have been no specific studies on the efficiency of the privatised SOEs. 
But but some evidence in Vu Quoc Ngu (2003) and Sjoholm (2006) indicates that these 
firms have performed better than before privatisation. Friedman (2004) argues the 
persistently strong performance of SOEs in Vietnam is hard to find in other transition 
countries. SOEs are found in almost all industries in Vietnam (at broad ISIC level) and 
dominate in some areas. The majority of SOEs were established in the pre-transition 
period, whereas most domestic private enterprises only started business since the mid 
1990s or later. 
Estimates of TFP growth between 2005 and 2000 for two-digit industries are . 
presented in Table 5.3. Total manufacturing TFP growth between the two years is 2.5%. 
Moreover, only 9 of 22 VSIC sectors had an increase in TFP (food processing, textiles, 
electrical machinery and communication equipment etc). In general, the TFP of FIEs 
was statistically higher than that of domestic firms (132.5 vs. 85.6). Fully-owned FIEs 
had the greatest TFP level (149.4) despite the fact that their LP was much lower than 
either joint ventures or SOEs. Dome~tic private firms had a fairly high TFP (I 04.9) 
compared to SOEs (79.5). This confirms that the higher LP in SOEs can mostly be 
explained by higher capital intensity in these firms. Across sectors, TFP varies 
substantially. This is the first attempt to calculate LP and TFP for Vietnamese 
manufacturing. The foreign economic sector gained a higher overall LP level as well (as 
an average TFP level), compared to the domestic economic sector. However, in some 
specific sectors this pattern was reversed. Using TFP index in order to remove the effect 
of capital intensity on labour productivity, fully-owned FIEs and domestic private firms 
were found to be more productive than other ownership types. 
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Table 5.1: The share of FIEs in manufacturing outputs(% of sectoral total) 
Two digit VSIC sector\year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
l 5: Food products and beverages 19.l 20.0 21.0 23.0 21.7 22.3 22.1 23.3 24.1 24.3 26.5 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 0. 1 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.8 
17: Manufacture of textiles 17.3 16.2 20.1 27. l 21.0 26.0 23.8 26.0 26.7 27.6 30.0 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 18.2 15.0 20.5 22.7 23.3 24.8 26.4 29.5 36.2 36.0 38.1 
19: Manufacture of leather products 35.7 41.4 46.1 47.5 45.3 44.8 43.7 46.2 51.4 54.8 59.3 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 9.0 8.7 10.l 10.0 9.4 12.1 12.5 14.0 15.0 16.2 18.5 
21 : Paper and paper products 15.3 15.2 14.8 13.8 12.7 11.9 12.2 13.5 14.5 15.7 17.2 
22: Publishing and printing 2.5 2.6 2.5 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.2 3.0 3.2 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 14.6 22.2 20.5 23.7 27.3 29.4 30.8 33.6 36.9 37.4 42.0 
25: Rubber and plastic product 13.8 14.3 18.5 19.7 22.0 23.7 25.0 24.8 25.l 26.l 29.5 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 4.9 6.8 12.5 16.9 19.0 21.8 24.2 23.8 23.7 22.9 22.8 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 29.6 31.9 32.4 37.5 44.6 45.4 45.6 45.4 36.4 32.7 30.3 
28: Fabricated metal products 11.5 18.l 24.9 26.9 28.5 26.8 26.l 25.5 25.9 28.7 31.2 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 10.9 6.0 9.1 15.3 23.4 32.9 35.8 36.8 40. l 46.8 52.2 
30: Office, accounting and computing machineries 2.9 79.5 100.0 100.0 98.5 98.2 96.7 95.0 98.7 97.7 96.l 
3 1: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 13.9 20.4 25.5 27.9 33.8 35.3 43.8 44.0 44.2 75.5 45.7 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 46.0 59.5 75.2 77.6 81.4 81.3 72.8 76.l 75.4 78.8 78.5 
33 : Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 20.6 53.2 35.4 68.7 71.4 72.8 76.3 85.0 78.3 81.0 85.2 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 70.6 68.9 71.0 67.2 70.6 80.2 80.7 81.5 81.1 80.7 82.3 
3 5: Manufacture of other transport 45.0 41.5 ~3.9 56.9 69.3 73.3 66.1 66.9 67.4 67.3 66.9 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 7.5 16.2 20.0 21.8 26.8 28.0 30.6 33.2 36.6 37.3 40.7 
All manufacturin2 17.8 20.2 22.9 26.1 28.4 30.1 30.2 31.6 32.9 33.8 35.9 
Source: Author's calculation based on data from C.E.I.C Asian database, 2006. 
Ratios are calculated based on the 1994 constant price. Full data are unavailable in current price. 
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Table 5.2: Period-average labour productivity (LP) by ownership and manufacturing sector (2000-2005), million dong at 1994 price) 
Sector Total All FIEs Fully- Joint All domestic Domestic SO Es 
manufactur owned FIEs ventures firms private 
ine firms 
15: Food products and beverages 37.8 88.1 71.4 118.5 29.5 20.2 40.6 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 351.6 230.7 - 230.7 354.5 106.8 358.0 
17: Manufacture of textiles 21 .1 36.5 35.6 41 .1 16.5 16.0 16.9 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 3.2 1.1 1.0 2.0 4.3 1.8 6.9 
19: Manufacture of leather products 7.4 .9.9 9.7 11 .9 4.8 5.5 3.3 
20: Wood and wood products 9.0 13.2 10.2 24.0 8.3 6.4 13.0 
21 : Paper and paper products 26.2 33.2 35.7 -9.6 25.0 20.9 31 .8 
22: Publishing and printing . 29.1 15.9 12.4 26.1 29.7 18.8 33.0 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 53.2 117.9 87.9 163.1 38.1 36.0 39.2 
25: Rubber and plastic product 29.6 29.8 26.5 45.6 29.6 29.6 29.5 
26: Other non-metallic minerals 77.1 205.8 85.0 332.3 63.8 57.3 69.1 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 42.4 128.3 63.6 236.7 30.8 50.2 23.4 
28: Fabricated metal products 13.8 20.5 12.2 52.5 11.5 12.8 9 .7 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 27.7 79.1 69.9 113.1 20.8 26.6 17.5 
30: Office, accounting and computing 52.0 53.7 53.8 -4.0 18.7 26.0 -1.7 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 19.7 20.2 17.0 60.3 18.9 19.7 18.4 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 57.0 67.9 38.6 147.2 39.3 34.2 42.6 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches -4.1 -5.8 -6.7 0.3 -2.2 -2.8 -1.0 
34: Motor vehicles,.trailers and semi-trailers 44.3 85.9 36.6 180.7 16.9 9.5 21.5 
35: Manufacture of other transport 28.3 51.8 39.5 64.7 16.5 20.5 14.9 
36: Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 5.7 5.9 6.0 4.8 5.6 4.6 10.0 
Total 25.5 28.5 18.1 82.8 24.2 16.8 32.2 
Source: Author' s calculation based on the unpublished GSO enterprise survey 2001-2005. 
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Table 5.3: Period-average TFP indices by ownership and manufacturing sector (2000 -2005) 
Sector Total All FIEs Fully- Joint All domestic Domestic SO Es 
manufactur owned FIEs ventures firms private 
in2 firms 
15: Food products and beverages 122.9 139.8 154.3 138.8 112.7 - 84.8 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 123.7 317.8 0 .0 317.8 127.6 328.8 127.0 
17: Manufacture of textiles 146.8 246.4 324.1 117.5 124.7 130.9 120.0 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 88.4 248.8 261.4 196.6 62.4 192.4 45.3 
19: Manufacture of leather products 155.7 199.3 199.2 194.1 122.4 123.4 116.3 
20: Wood and wood products 59.4 84.6 98.0 81.2 52.4 59.8 43.9 
21: Paper and paper products 78.7 213.9 174.1 -47.9 63.4 56.9 64.0 
22: Publishing and printing 94.6 80.5 179.4 33.3 95.6 116.8 88.3 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 51 .3 68.8 71.2 65.6 41 .8 44.5 38.3 
25: Rubber and plastic product. 111.4 127.7 103.0 212.1 103.1 96.2 111.0 
26: Other non-metallic minerals 154.2 225.1 304.7 197.3 122.1 139.8 109.6 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 22.5 32.7 73.2 34.0 16.0 11 .8 19.2 
28: Fabricated metal products 143.7 158.8 157.6 156.1 126.6 105.1 126.4 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 81.3 100.9 100.5 101 .5 74.9 89.9 65.9 
30: Office, accounting and computing 
-28.7 -28.8 -28.8 0.0 -20.3 -29.9 0.0 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 188.9 201 .8 559.0 65.4 159.7 142.8 133.7 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 135.2 185.4 207.7 160.7 69.6 62.2 58.4 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and 80.8 64.5 52.8 -60.5 -273.8 87.2 -
34: Motor vehicles, trai lers and semi-trailers 69.1 84.0 84 .3 86.8 36.2 51.7 32.6 
35: Manufacture of other transport 18.8 35.5 43.0 33.7 10.7 9.1 14.0 
36: Furniture, manufacturing n.e .c 91 .5 120.8 111 .9 279.4 71.4 86.8 44.9 
Total 102.4 132.5 149.4 126.4 85.6 104.9 79.5 
Source: Author's calculation based on the unpublished GSO enterprise survey 2001-2005. 
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Regression results 
As the results of the Hausman test support using the fixed effect estimator instead of the 
random effect, this study focuses on results from the former method.30 In addition, 
testing for endogeneity of the continuous variable (FDI) found no clear evidence to 
suggest the results are seriously affected by an endogenous problem. Therefore, this 
study presents the results of both estimation methods with the emphasis on fixed effect 
estimator controlling for heteroskedasticity but not endogeneity. Table 5.4 presents. the 
estimation results for equation (5.4) using fixed effect estimates and firm-level data. The 
coefficient of FDI is positive and statistically significant in all equations, supporting the 
hypothesis that FDl plays a significant and positive role in productivity performance in 
Vietnamese manufacturing. The results suggest a 1 percent increase in foreign share in 
capital is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in manufacturing productivity. When 
the first lag of FDl is used to control for endogeneity (Table 5.5); the magnitude of the 
FDI coefficient increases without any notable change in the statistical significance level. 
In the first three equations, the competition effect is taken into account with two 
alternatives: domestic product concentration (measured by HERF) and the interaction 
between this variable and the effective rate of protection (ERP) denoted by HERFERP. 
As a result, the coefficient on HERF is statistically significant with negative sign. This 
implies that high concentration in domestic manufacturing is associated with low 
efficiency in production. The interaction (HERFERP) also has an expected sign and 
significance level although the magnitude of this effect is smaller than HERF. All other 
things being equal, the low competition level in the domestic market causes a negative 
impact on productivity and the effect from production concentration is larger than the 
impact from trade protection. The data on ERP are available for one year. This variable 
can not be an independent variable in fixed effect analysis. Therefore, this study will use 
HERFERP as a proxy for the degree of competition because it controls for both 
domestic product concentration and trade protection. To investigate the effect of 
competition on the role of FDI, equation 3 includes additional interaction between FDI 
and HERF. A negative sign and significance of the coefficient implies that a higher 
foreign share in firm capital may not lead to increased productivity in a low competitive 
industry. 
30 See Appendices A5.5 for testing results and A5.7 for results of random effect estimate. 
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Firm size plays an important role in explaining difference in productivity. This 
variable is however, highly correlated with FDI variable in the productivity model. 
Based on this observation, the Chow test is conducted for the difference between large 
and small firms (classified by the number of employees). The testing results support 
separate estimation for large and small firms (with test statistic F=l 1.97). The 
coefficient of FDI is positive and significant in both estimations but with no notable 
difference in the magnitude. 
As the spatial distribution of FDI in Vietnam may also affect regional 
productivity, all regional dummies are included. Moreover, this study compares the 
difference in FDI effect between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. In applying the Chow 
test, this study found no difference between the two cities in the role of FDI on 
productivity even though the estimate is recommended to run separately. The results are 
consistent with the overall model as FDI acts as an important factor for TFP generation 
at firm level. 
The regression also provides expected outcomes for three fundamental 
production factors: capital, employment and input as all are positive and significant 
regardless of different specifications. A proxy for economies of scale (SCALE) is 
positive and strongly significant in all equations. However, the share of skilled labour 
(SKILL) seems not to influence firm output. This may reflect the low demand for 
skilled workers in both domestic firms and FIEs because of using low-level technology. 
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Table 5.4: Contribution of FDI to productivity of Vietnamese manufacturing: Fixed Effects Estimates 
Dependent All firms Firms disa!!!!ree.ated by Firms size Firm disa22re2ated by location 
variable: Log of (1) (2) (3) ( 4) Small firms (5) Large firms (6) Hanoi 
output (v) 
FDI 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(7.98)*** (8.03)*** (8.40)*** (4.56)*** (8.69)*** (2.77)*** 
(k) 0.082 0.081 0.083 0.081 0.103 0.073 
(14.36)*** (14.25)*** (14.43)*** (11.54)*** (10.32)*** (5.12)*** 
(m) 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.844 0.727 0.81 7 
(139.92)*** (139.88)*** (139.89)*** (121.48)*** (65.19)*** (38.67)*** 
(1) 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.091 0.128 0.138 
( 17.65)*** . (17.67)*** (17.59)*** (12.46)*** (14.14)*** (6.94)*** 
SCALE 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.014 0.014 
(7.99)*** (7.99)*** (8.00)*** (6.13)*** (5.38)*** (3.94)*** 
SKILL -4.04e-07 -3.99e-07 -3.47e-07 -0.0002 -l.29e-06 -0.00003 
(0.89) (0.88) (0.77) (2.67)*** (2.61)*** (0.51) 
HE RF ERP -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 
(5.25)*** (4.20)* ** (1.94)* (2.84)*** 
HERF -0.237 -0.1 77 
(2.50)** (1.81)* 
FDI*HERF -0.006 
(2.71)*** 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64473 64473 64473 43134 21339 7660 
Number of firms 21411 21411 214 11 16097 5314 2745 
F value 5050 5078 4632 3743 1634 806 
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.86 
Notes: All equations use fixed effect estimates controlled for heteroskedasticity and conditioned on Hausman test for choice between random 
and fixed effects. 
All specifications include annual time dummies. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported here . 
***Significant at I% level;** significant at 5% level; and* significant at 10% level. 
(7)HCM 
0.003 
(4.20)*** 
0.082 
(6.23)*** 
0.856 
(75.84)*** 
0.082 
(7.55)*** 
0.011 
(4.78)*** 
-0.00002 
(2.04)** 
-0.00004 
(2.26)** 
Yes 
15795 
5630 
1574 
0.85 
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Table 5.5: Contribution of FDI to productivity of Vietnamese manufacturing: Fixed Effects Estimate with control for endogeneity 
Dependent All firms Firms disa{!:l!re2ated bv Firms size 
variable: Log of (1) (2) (3) (4) Small firms (5) Large firms 
output (v) 
FDl 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 
(12.89)*** (l3.0l)*** (12.48)*** (7.56)*** (15.64)*** 
(k) 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.049 0.090 
(14.82)*** (14.68)*** (14.92)*** (11.97)*** (12.58)*** 
{m) 0.853 0.853 0.854 0.885 0.744 
(450.47)*** (450.18)*** (451.25)*** ( 430.35)*** (175.98)*** 
(l) 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.069 0.103 
(21.74)*** (21.78)*** (21.68)*** (15.84)*** (16.79)*** 
HERF -0.277 -0.187 
(4.29)*** (2.80)*** 
SCALE 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.011 
(32.45)*** (32.42)*** (32.5 1)*** (34.19)*** (15.57)*** 
Skill l .05e-06 l.08e-06 1.04e-06 -0.0002 3.67e-07 
(0.88) (0.90) (0.87) (4.11)*** (0.29) 
HERFERP -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00002 
(4.23)*** (3.46)*** (l.01) 
FDl*HERF -0.012 
(5.74)*** 
WaldX1 4.7le+07 4.71e+07 4.7le+07 2.6le+07 2.30e+07 
F test for all u(i)=O 2.53 2.50 2.53 2.00 3.98 
Observations 57681 57681 57681 39322 18359 
Number of id 21 411 2141 1 21411 16097 5314 
Notes: All specifications include annual time dummies. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported here. 
The fixed effects assume FDI to be endogenous. An instrument is the first lag of this variable. 
*** Significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
Firm disa22re2ated by location 
(6) Hanoi (7) HCM 
0.006 0.004 
(4.83)*** (5.50)*** 
0.058 0.035 
(6.63)*** (5.33)*** 
0.873 0.900 
(162.59)*** (248.12)*** 
0.097 0.060 
(9.32)*** (10.33)*** 
0.011 0.008 
(4.86)*** (7.44)*** 
-5.81e-06 -0.00001 
(0.12) (1.35) 
-0.00004 -0.0001 
(2.04)** (3.22)*** 
5.78e+06 l.85e+07 
2.08 2.67 
6960 14319 
2745 5630 
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Ownership comparison of productivity performance 
A common approach to examining the direct effect of FDI is comparing productivity 
performance between FIEs and domestic enterprises. As argued in Section 5.3.2, this 
study explores the Two-Stage-Least-Square (2SLS) estimate to investigate time-
invariant effects with part control for the endogenous and simultaneous problems 
caused by FDI. Relying on data availability, inter-correlation and test of significance in 
the reduced form estimation,31 three additional instruments were selected: a dummy for 
firms using internet (INTERNET), real wages (w) and industry average of R&D 
expenditure of FIEs (FDIRD _A). They have shown to be valid instruments for 
endogeneity of ownership dummies, FOR and PUREFDl. 
Table 5.6 reports estimation results for ownership comparison on productivity. 
The first equation simply compares FIE and domestic-finn productivity with inclusion 
of a dummy for FIEs (FOR). The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant 
with a magnitude of l J 71. All else being equal, this indicates productivity of FIEs is 
about twice that of domestic enterprises. The positive consistency remains when 
comparing productivity between five ownership types: SOEs, fully-owned FIEs, joint 
ventures with SOEs, joint ventures with local private firms and domestic private firms 
(the base dummy). Ce/eris paribus, all three forms of foreign investment and SOEs 
have higher productivity than domestic private firms. 
However, these results rely on the quality of the additional instruments and the 
number of endogenous variables . The results rely on an assumption of endogeneity of 
FOR (a dummy for all FIEs) and PUREFDI (a dummy for fully-owned FIEs) as joint 
ventures account for a small number of observations compared to fully-owned FIEs. 
Moreover, the estimation will be more complicated and less efficient if many 
endogenous variables are included. The estimate may be less efficient in the second 
equation when all three forms of investment (PUREFDI, SOEFDI and PRIFDI) are 
assumed to be endogenous. By and large, the coefficient of FOR strongly indicates FIEs 
are more productive than domestic firms. Moreover, the productivity comparison was 
also conducted separately for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and the gap for Hanoi is 
higher than for Ho Chi Minh City. This could be explained by the lower productivity of 
31 This study estimates the reduced form of dependent variable, which is the foreign ownership dummy, 
on all exogenous variables and additional instruments and tests the significance of these instruments. 
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domestic firms and high concentration of joint ventures (having high LP) in the northern 
city compared to the southern city. 
Table 5.6: Ownership comparison of productivity performance (2SLS estimate) 
Dependent Overall 5 ownership Hanoi HCM Size eff~ct 
variable: Log types 
of output (y) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FOR 1.171 l.614 0.894 2.055 
(24.13)*** (9.37)*** (14.08)*** (4.82)*** 
PRIFDI 0.216 
(11.74)*** 
PUREFDI 0.777 
(21.26)*** 
SOE 0.163 
(22.81)*** 
SOEFDI 0.298 
(17.12)*** 
FOR*SIZE -1.496 
(2.09)** 
(k) -0.058 -0.016 -0.070 -0.047 -0.064 
(12.08)*** (4.28)*** (5.82)*** (6.13)*** (10.97)*** 
(m) 0.913 0.9 15 0.891 0.927 0.916 
(306.99)* * * (317.45)*** (91.11)*** (193.11)*** (254.98)*** 
(I) 0.090 0.066 0.155 0.061 0.127 
(29.52)*** (26.24)**"' (10.63)*** (11.48)*** (7.06)*** 
AGE 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.007 
(23.56)*** (I 7.93)*** (8.50)*** (13.49)*** (10.05)*** 
SCALE 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.009 
(3 .22)*** (3.90)*** (5.31)*** (3.78)*** (4.43)*** 
HE RF ERP -0.00002 -0.0000 I -8.57e-06 -0.00004 -0.00002 
(3.44)*** (2.28)** (0.61) (3.36)*** (2.68)*** 
SKILL -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -9.39e-07 
(0.81) (0.39) (1.31) (3.97)*** (0.03) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
Regional Yes Yes No No Yes 
dummies 
Observations 59953 59953 7083 14113 59953 
F value 29719 43150 6208 11977 37029 
R-squared 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 
Notes: All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. 
The 2SLS estimates assume dumm ies on FlEs (FOR) to be endogenous. The additional 
instruments for 2SLS are INTERNET dummy, real wages and FDIRD _A. 
These variables are selected based on high correlation with FOR and high significance 
in the reduced form regression. 
*** Significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 5% level; and *significant at l 0% level. 
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Direct effect of FDI in selected industries 
The preceding section reported the results of the differences in productivity between 
FIEs and domestic enterprises and confirmed a high variation of productivity across 
industries. Foreign investors may choose a higher productivity industry for investment 
and hence, the effect of FDI to aggregated productivity is not the same across all 
industries. This argument is the background for conducting estimation for specific 
selected industries: food processing (FOODS); garments and textiles (GAR) and 
electronics (ELEC). Table 5.7 shows the results with three method options: fixed-effect 
estimate with control for heteroskedasticity; fixed-effect estimate with control for 
endogeneity of FDI; and 2SLS estimate with control for endogeneity of FIE dummy 
(FOR). Regardless of specifications, the coefficient of FDI is always positive and 
significant (the first six columns). Controlling for endogeneity, the results are not much 
different except for a notable increase in the magnitude of the FDI coefficient in all 
three industries (columns 4-6). 
For the purpose of productivity comparison, only three ownership dummies are 
considered, representing FIEs, SOEs and domestic private firms (the base dummy) 
because the number of joint ventures in these sectors is relatively small. The results 
indicate a superior productivity performance of FIEs compared to local private firms. 
The productivity gap is highest in food processing and lowest in textiles and garments. 
A possible reason for this is that the manufacture of garments and textiles employs more 
workers than the food processing industry (see Chapter 7: FDI, employment and wages) 
implying domestic firms in labour intensive industries can narrow the productivity gap 
with FIEs. 
SOEs are more productive ihan local private firms but at different levels across 
industries. The productivity gap between two domestic ownership types is small and 
insignificant in the manufacture of textiles and garments but large and significant in 
electronics. This indicates domestic private enterprises can compete with SOEs in 
export-oriented and low capital-intensive industries. Most domestic private firms are 
immature relati ve to SOEs and capital accumulation and capturing technology may 
require a long time. The increasing role of the private sector is premised on choosing 
good strategies, including investment concentration in labour-intensive and export-
oriented industries. 
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Table 5.7: Contribution of FDI to productivity in specific industries 
Dependent variable: Fixed effects estimate Fixed effects with endo rreneitv 2 SLS estimates 
Log of Output (y) (1) Food (2) Garments (3) (4) Food (5) Garments (6) (4) Food (5) Garments (6) 
orocessin!!: and textiles Electronics processin2 and textiles Electronics orocessin2 and textiles Electronics 
FDI 0.0028 0.0039 0.0028 0.0054 0.0089 0.0056 -
- -
(2.87)*** (3.59)*** (2.24)** (3.93)*** (6.86)** * (3.53)*** 
FOR 
- - - -
- - 0.752 0.317 0.448 
(9.17)*** (2.96)*** (3.72)*** 
SOE - -
- - - -
0. 156 0.028 0.191 
(9.80)*** (0.88) (4.19)*** 
(k) 0.111 0.116 0.136 0.070 0.067 0.076 0.023 0.005 -0.004 
(8.60)*** (6.62)*** (3.69)* ** (8.79)*** (5.61)*** (3.55)*** (3.03)*** (0.35) (0.20) 
(m) 0.799 0.795 0.817 0.847 0.834 0.844 0.895 0.867 0.921 
(73.22)** * (54.01)*** (26.48)*** (235.84)*** (134.44)*** (73.23)*** (169.75)*** (96.38)*** (65.45)*** 
(I) 0.094 0.108 0.079 0.082 0.077 0.092 0.067 0 .106 0.051 
(8.58)*** (8.56)*** (2.05)** (10.56)*** (7.94)*** (4.18)*** (14.02)*** (13.48)*** (3.28)*** 
HERFERP 0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.013 -0.006 -0.0023 0.0059 0.006 
(1.11) (0.64) (0. 73) (0.22) (3.13) *** ( 1.23) (2.20)** (2.78)*** (4.16)*** 
SCALE 0.025 0.020 0.0 17 0.019 0.021 0.007 0.0025 0.007 -0.0001 
(6. 14)*** (3.25)*** (2.25)** (I l.30)*** (8.1 O)*** (0.99) (2.42)** (3.43)* ** (0.04) 
SKILL 0.0003 -0.00006 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0008 
(3.37)*** (0.90) (0.33) (8.01)*** (1.25) (1.51) (2.99)*** (1.29) (1.10) 
AGE - - - - - - 0.004 0.005 0.004 
(6.54)*** (4.55)*** (2.15)** 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fl2(fixed effect) 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.96 0.96 0.98 
F value/ Wald chi 2 1150 799 204 8.49E+06 4.77E+06 2.27E+06 23901 5464 7922 
No of observations 16753 7064 2022 14584 6399 1805 15906 4696 1711 
Notes: Al 1 robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. The fixed effects estimates with endogeneity of FDI use the first lags of this variable as an instrument. 
The 2SLS estimates assume dummy on FDI firm to be endogenous. The additional instruments are INTERNET dummy, log of real wage and FDIRD_A. These 
variables are selected based on high correlation with FDI firm dummy and high s ignificant in the reduced form regression. 
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5.4.2 Spillover effect of FOi 
Absorptive capacity of firms and productivity spillovers 
Obviously, there is no single proxy for firm absorptive capacity. This study ~xamines 
spillovers controlling for firm size, local R&D expenditure, LP gap and quality of 
workers, respectively. The model (5.7) including FDIS (measured by the foreign share 
in employment aggregated at four-digit VSIC level) forms the core model of analysis in 
this section. Estimation results of this model are presented in Table 5.8 and include 
results for the overall equation, and disaggregated groups by firm size, R&D intensity, 
LP gap and quality of workers. Of these, large and small firms are decided by the 
number of employment as recommended by previous studies. The ratio of industry 
average R&D expenditure of FIEs over industry average R&D expenditure of local 
firms is a criterion for dividing into sub groups. LP gap is decided by the ratio of LP of 
FIEs to LP of domestic firms at four digit VSIC level. Similarly, this study also uses 
quality of workers measured by a ratio between the numbers of technical employees 
over non-technical employees to represent firm capacity. Another estimation approach 
constructing interactions between spillover variable and each proxy variable for firms' 
capacity, in sequence (firm size, R&D intensity, LP gap and quality of workers) is 
presented in the appendix (A5.10). 
In the overall equation (the first column of Table 5 .8), the coefficient of FDIS is 
negative and significant. It seems that an increase in foreign presence (measured by 
employment share) by one percent is associated with a decrease in productivity of 
domestic firms of 0.65 percent. This finding is plausible given that most domestic 
enterprises have a fairly short history of business operation and most are small scale 
firms. Many MNE affiliates, especially joint ventures, which concentrate on supplying 
the domestic market demand seem to have a crowding-out effect on domestic firms. 
Moreover, FIEs in Vietnam are the majority in the employment of low-wage and low-
skilled labour,32 and therefore may bring little spillovers to domestic firms in terms of 
upgrading human capital and technology development. 
Except for the FDIS variables, all other explanatory variables have expected 
signs: first, capital and employment play more important roles in large firms compared 
to small finns, while large firms are less influenced by concentration level than small 
firms. Second, the division by R&D expenditure for domestic firms seems more 
32 See chapters 4 and 7 for the finding on characteristics of F!Es. 
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appropriate. A local firm with high R&D expenditure will not be affected by the 
presence of FIEs. In contrast, a low R&D domestic firm will be more severely 
influenced by foreign investment with the negative FDIS coefficient sign being three 
times larger than the overall equation. Despite the lack of information on technology 
intensity at firm _level, there is wide consensus on the low investment in R&D activity as 
well as in importing technology in most domestic firms and even in many FIEs. 
Third, the absorptive capacity represented by the gap between FIE and domestic 
firm LP does not provide any evidence of difference in spillover effect between firms 
with high and low LP gaps. The spillovers are negative and highly significant for both 
the low and high LP gaps. This effect on productivity is even more severe for the low 
LP gap than the high LP gap. As· discussed in Chapter 2 and Section 5 .2, using the LP 
gap as a proxy for the technology gap may cause a little distortion because LP is more 
attributable to the differences in capital intensity and scale of production rather than 
technology. 
Lastly, usmg quality of workers as a criterion for absorptive capacity also 
provides straightforward results. This proxy is helpful with a negative and significant 
spillover effect in the low labour-quality group and an insignificant effect in the high 
labour-quality group. Although the role of skills as an exogenous factor of productivity 
is controversial, the high share of skilled workers may help domestic firms imitate and 
innovate technology, so they can compete against the prevalence of FlEs. 
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. Table 5.8: FDI spillovers and absorptive capacity of local enterprises 
Dependent All firms Firms disaggregated by Firms disaggregated by Firms disaggregated by Firms disaggregated by Quality of 
variable: log (1) size R&D Intensity LP 1?:aP workers 
firm output (y) Small firm Lan~e Hieb R&D LowR&D Low eap Hieb eao Interaction Low Hieb 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FDIS -0.0065 -0.0038 -0.0091 -0.0003 -0.0092 -0.0125 -0.0037 -0.0064 -0.0055 -0.0039 
(11.02)*** (4.80)*** (10.62)*** (0.23) (12.56)*** (9.54)*** (5.57)*** (10.79)*** (6.96)*** (0.66) 
(k) 0.088 0.084 . 0.128 0.079 0.094 0.095 0.085 0.088 0.073 0.068 
(15.35)*** (11.81)*** (12.09)*** (10.36)*** (10.82)*** (9.35)*** (12.11)*** (15.34)*** (11.29)*** (1.17) 
(m) 0.807 0.837 0.685 0.814 0.801 0.792 0.815 0.807 0.842 0.774 
(129.61)*** (116.06)*** (53.93)*** (82.9)*** (97.83)*** (66.02)*** (111.9)*** (129.61)*** ( 126.03)** * (9.24)*** 
(l) 0.097 0.089 0.127 0.107 0.085 0.114 0.089 0.097 0.074 0.158 
(16.52)*** (12.05)*** (13.12)*** (12.24)*** (10.99)*** (10.58)*** (12.67)** * (16.54)*** (11.75)*** (2.16)** 
HERFERP -0.00004 -0.00004 -1.75£-06 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.0005 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00005 0.00001 
(4.15)*** (4.01)*** (0.07) (2.91)*** (3.10)*** (5.96)*** (3.44)*** (4.03)*** (4.86)*** (0.08) 
SCALE 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.027 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.068 
(15 .24)*** (6.29)*** (10.57)*** (29.74)*** (7.95)*** (7.67)*** (13.00)*** (15.30)*** (9.02)*** ( 1.28) 
SKILL 0.00003 -0.0002 0.00004 0.00005 -0.000 I 0.0001 -0.00002 0.00003 0.0002 0.00002 
(0.54) (2.42)** (0.60) (0.77) (l.83)* (l.04) (l.44) (0.54) (1.26) (0.29) 
TECH*FDIS 
- -
-
-
- - -
-0.00006 
- -
(2.98)*** 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL 0.83 0.86 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.82 
F value 4402 3435 1054 2233 2341 1447 3020 4041 3857 50 
No of 56837 40853 15984 28913 27924 20236 36601 56837 47599 9238 
observation 
No of firms 19131 15 175 3956 9851 9280 7 167 11964 19131 18960 7994 
Notes: All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. For brevity, coefficients of time dummies are not reported. *** Significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 
5% level; and* significant at 10% level. Firm size is measured by the average number of employees. A large firm has more then 50 employees. Quality of workers 
is based on the ratio of technical employees over non technical employees. High R&D and low R&D groups are classified by the sum ofnrm R&D expenditure over 
the study period. 
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Spillovers and firms' location 
Two different approaches are used in this section. One is to estimate separately the 
spillover model for each region with emphasis on comparison between the two largest 
FD I-recipient cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The other is to calculate a new proxy 
for spillovers taking account of both industry and location perspectives (FDISR). The 
results in Table 5.9 support a hypothesis on the difference in spillovers by the 
geographical location of domestic firms. Furthermore, there is evidence that a high 
concentration of FIEs in a region is associated with negative effects. For instance, the 
Red River Delta (Region 2) and South East area (Region 5) attract the bulk of FOi in 
Vietnam. Accordingly, the FDIS coefficient from these two regions is negative and 
larger than for other regions. FDIS in three regions with small FDI inflows (the 
Northern Mountain, the Central Coast and the Highlands areas) is insignificant albeit 
negative. This is reasonable because most domestic firms are also located in the high-
density FDI regions making the competitive level at these regions higher. The spillover 
pattern is the same for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City because they mostly represent the 
two most competitive regions. Despite the same direction of the FDI effect between the 
two cities, the absolute value of spillovers in Ho Chi Minh City is much higher than in 
Hanoi (0.0097 and 0.0055). 
Using FDISR which captures FDI presence in a given sector and a given region 
provides further evidence for negative spillovers. In order to examine the difference 
between FDIS and FDISR, the overall equation was reestimated for two sub-groups 
(using R&D expenditure as a dividing criterion) after substituting FDISR for FDIS. In 
the overall equation (equation 8 of Table 5.9), FDISR is negative and strongly 
significant as FDIS (see equation 1 of Table 5.8). However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of FDISR is smaller than of FDIS (0.0036 versus 0.0065). This indicates that 
the measurement of FDI presence while controlling for geographical location of this 
investment may result in a smaller estimated coefficient of spillover effect. The 
estimation results for the low and high R&D groups also support this implication as the 
FDISR coefficient in both groups is noticeably smaller than that of FDIS in the 
preceding analysis (the last two equations of Table 5.9). In the high R&D group, the 
FDISR coefficient is positive but insignificant. In contrast, negative spillovers exist in 
the low R&D group. Once again, R&D investment can help protect domestic firms from 
the negative impacts of foreign investment. To conclude, the measurement of FDI 
presence is important to capture spillovers from this investment. The method controlling 
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for both sector and region characteristics (FDISR), yield smaller spillover estimate 
compared to the method that controls for only FDI presence (FDIS). 
Spillovers, domestic ownership and competition level 
The idea for incorporating the domestic ownership and competition level is based on the 
situation in Vietnam that a high concentration of SOEs still exists in many protected 
industries and, hence, the competition effect may not be as important as its is to 
domestic private firms. For the first attempt, the overall spillovers model is estimated 
using the data for each group: SOEs and local private firms. FDIS is negative and 
significant in both ownership types (equations l and 4 of Table 5 .10). However, the 
negative spillover effect on SOEs is lower than on local private firms. It may be argued 
that the harmful effect on SOEs is smaller because these firms are larger, have higher 
capital intensity, are more advanced technologically and relatively rooted in the 
domestic economy compared to domestic private firms. Many of SOEs achieved better 
performance because of privatization. SOEs have also benefited from the government's 
investment and its more favorable policy (see Chapter 3). In contrast with the long-term 
existence of most SO Es, a number of domestic private firms are newly established and 
these firms may be more vulnerable than SOEs in participating in the market. 
To capture one of these arguments, the interactions between the spillover 
variable (FDIS) and firm size (SIZE) are included for both SOEs and domestic private 
firms (equations (2) and (5), Table 5.10). The results show negative spillovers hold for 
both small and large domestic private firms but not for SOEs. Given the quantitative 
dominance of domestic private firms in the domestic market, spillover differences by 
firm size are not explained by the difference in scale of SO Es but by the scale of private 
firms. However, the severely negative effect on large firms compared to small firms 
could be due to two reasons. One is that small domestic private firms could be more 
adaptive as they have been established in the recent competitive environment. Another 
reason is firm size measured by scale of employment does not reflect true firm capacity. 
Large firms in terms of employment may be more vulnerable than small firms under the 
imperfect competition market in Vietnam. 
The correlation between spillovers and competition is investigated by interacting 
FDIS and FDISR with HERFERP, respectively (the last two equations of Table 5.10). 
The results suggest the degree of negative spillovers is highly associated with high 
concentration and protection for domestic market oriented production. In other words, a 
low competitive market seems to obtain a crowding-out effect rather than a positive 
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extemality from FIE presence. Again, the magnitude of the negative coefficient of FDIS 
is considerably higher than that of FDISR. In particular, the estimate within the SOE 
group (equation (3), Table 5.10) shows the interaction between HERFERP and FDIS is 
insignificant, indicating the relationship between concentration and spillovers is not 
important to SOEs. The same comment applies for the private-firm group (equation (6)) 
and.results in negative and significant coefficients for both FDIS and its interaction with 
the competition proxy (HERFERP). Implicitly, more FDI presence in highly 
concentrated industries may cause more negative consequences for the development of 
domestic private firms. 
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Table 5.9 Spillovers and geographical allocation of manufacturing firms 
Dependent Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Hanoi HCM FDISR High local Low local 
variable: log R&D R&D 
of local firm (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
output (v) 
(k) 0.0877 0.0624 0.0629 0.1025 0.0907 0.1205 0.0702 0.0761 0.0882 0.0788 0.0944 
(2.56)** (7.16)*** (4.19)*** (3.01 )*** (8.39)*** (8.42)*** (4.79)*** (6.15)*** (15.24)*** (10.36)*** . (10.78)*** 
(m) 0.7258 0.8299 0.7957 0.7865 0.8306 0.7724 0.8135 0.8587 0.8071 0.8138 0.8008 
(13.78)*** (66.02)*** (41.76)*"* (21.51)*** (73.43)*** (67.05)*** (36.88)*** (72.63)**" (129.34)*** (82.88)*** (97.48)**~ 
(/) 0.1491 0.1094 0.1081 0.1267 0.0763 0.0888 0.1375 0.0667 0.0970 0.1079 0.0846 
(3.84)*** (9.41 )*** (5.05)*** (3.88)*** (8.37)*** (6.98)*** (6.56)*** (5.99)*** (16.44)*** (12.25)*** (10.85)*** 
FDIS 0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0091 -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0097 
(0.37) (4.96)*** (1.47) (0.31) (9.30)*** (4.45)*** (3.15)*** (7.29)*** 
HERFERP -0.0001 -0.00003 -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 
(2.02)** (2.35)** (2.12)** (0.17) (1.73)* (2.46)* (2.55)* (0.82) (4.54)*** (2.98)*** {3.57)*** 
SCALE 0.0048 0.0188 0.0249 0.0095 0.0185 0.0670 . 0.0133 0.0149 0.0207 0.0188 0.0273 
(1 .22) (4.81)*** (4.36)*** (3.35)*** (25.21 )*** (7.42)*:>* (3.62)*** (4.84)*** (14.84)*** (29.75)*** (7.95)*** 
SKILL -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 8.33-e06 -0.00003 0.0003 0.00003 -0.0001 0.00003 0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.68) (0.91) (0.61) (0.09) (1.53) (2.64)*** (0.48) (2.02)** (0.52) (0.77) (1.85)* 
FDISR -0.0036 0.0003 -0.0053 
(8.12)*** (0.52) (8.94)*** 
Observations 2185 16169 5831 1133 19952 11567 7135 13366 56837 28913 27924 
Number of id 758 5842 1939 363 7015 3214 2596 4974 19131 9851 9280 
R-squared 0.76 0.86 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1 % level. 
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Table 5.10: Spillovers, domestic ownership type and competition level 
Dependent variable: SO Es Domestic private firms All domestic firms 
log of real output (y) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDIS -0.0055 -0.0035 -0.0056 -0.0066 -0.0038 -0.0067 -0.0066 
(2.47)** (0.42) (2.53)** (10.96)*** (5.16)*** (11.08)*** (1 1.16)*** 
(m) 0.5899 0.5899 0.5899 0.8215 0.8221 · 0.8215 0.8075 0.8070 
(13 .11)*** (13.12)*** (13.11)*** (135.85)*** (135.83)*** (135.83)*** (129.59)*** (129.34)*** 
(k) 0.1287 0.1287 0.1291 0.0861 0.0859 0.0860 0.0887 0.0883 
(4.58)*** . (4.58)*** (4.59)*** (14.93)*** (14.91)*** (14.91)*** (15.34)*** (15.26)*** 
(l) 0.1788 0.1788 0.1790 0.0925 0.0924 0.0925 0.0975 0.0971 
(4.29)*** (4.29)*** (4.29)*** (16.02)*** (16.00)*** (16.03)*** (16.53)*** (16.46)*** 
HE RF ERP -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 
(0.68) (0.66) (3.85)*** (3.43)*** 
SCALE 0.0163 0.0163 0.0163 0.0226 0.0225 0.0226 0.0206 0.0207 
(5.65)*** (5.65)*** (5.64)*** (8.00)*** (8.22)*** (8.01)*** (15.27)*** (14.89)*** 
SKILL -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003 0.00003 
(0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.67) (0.69) (0.67) (0.54) (0.52) 
SIZE* FDIS -0.0022 -0.0083 
(0.25) (6.70)*** 
HERERP * FDIS -6.65e-7 -2.04e-6 -2.lOe-6 
(0.35) (6.01)*** (6.04)*** 
HERFERP * FDISR -2.13e-6 
(5.76)*** 
FDISR -0.0038 
(8.42)*** 
Observations 10287 10287 10287 46550 46550 46550 56837 56837 
Number of id 5729 5729 5729 13402 13402 13402 19131 19131 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.83 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
** Siguificant at 5% level; * ** significant at 1 % level. 
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Entry modes and spillovers 
Two major entry modes of FDI in Vietnam (fully-owned FIEs and joint ventures) were 
carefully discussed in Chapter 4. Joint ventures mostly formed in cooperation with 
SOEs have higher LP than fully-owned FIEs. Through close linkages with joint 
ventures, SO Es may get more benefits. However, a large number of fully-owned FIEs 
may crowd out the market participation of domestic firms, especially domestic private 
ones. Based on these arguments, this study replaces FDIS by two variables representing 
the presence of joint ventures (JVS) and fully-owned FIEs (GREEN) in a given 
industry. 
The estimation results with control for the entry-mode difference in spillovers 
are presented in Table 5.11. In the overall equation, both entry modes cause a negative 
impact on domestic productivity but to a plausibly higher extent from fully-owned FIEs 
(0.007 vs. 0.005). Specifically, the presence of joint ventures has a negative and 
significant impact on only domestic private firms, whereas this entry mode causes no 
harmful effect on the performance of SO Es. Quite the opposite, fully-owned PIEs cause 
a negative impact on both SOEs and domestic private firms to about the same degree. 
Incorporated with the analysis in the previous section, negative spillovers on 
productivity of domestic private firms are more severe than for SOEs because of 
differences in entry modes and firm absorptive capacity. Apart from reasons discussed 
in the previous section, SOEs are less affected because they may have stronger linkages 
with MNEs through establishing joint ventures and setting up relationship with many 
foreign investors through the host ministries. Moreover, the difference in spillovers 
between entry modes may stem from ownership power because, with full ownership of 
a firm, foreign investors are unlikely to transfer advanced technology to domestic firms. 
The previous section concluded that negative spillovers are significant in three 
out of six regions and the magnitude of spillovers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City is 
about the same as in the regions where these cities are found. Therefore, the analysis for 
entry-mode spillovers pays attention to the difference between these cities. The JVS 
effect is on about the same scale in both cities but is only significant in Ho Chi Minh 
City. The GREENS effect is negative and significant for both cities but the absolute 
value in the southern city is twice that of the northern city. This again confirms that the 
geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam seems to have a negative effect on 
domestic partners in the short term. This impact seems to overwhelm the possible 
positive effects from the local openness policy that prevails in the southern city 
compared to the capital city. 
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Table 5.11: Productivity spillovers by entry modes 
Dependent Overall Local ownership types Location 
variable: SO Es Local private Hanoi HCM 
log of local firms 
firm output (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(v) 
NS -0.0046 -0.0020 -0.0048 -0.0056 -0.0056 
(3.39)*** (0.44) (3.48)*** (1.40) (2.42)** 
GREENS -0.0070 -0.0065 -0.0070 -0.0054 -0.0109 
(10.60)*** (2.52)** (10.49)*** (2.65)*** (7.32)*** 
(k) 0.089 0.129 0.086 0.070 0.076 
(15.38)*** (4.58)*** (14.95)*** (4.81)*** (6.18)*** 
(m) 0.807 0.590 0.822 0.813 0.859 
(129.51)*** (13.11)*** (135.72)*** (36.88)*** (72.43)*** 
(!) 0.097 0.179 0.092 0.137 0.067 
(16.52)*** (4.30)*** (16.01)*** (6.57)*** (5.96)*** 
HERFERP -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00002 
(4.52)*** (0.90) (4.17)*** (2.49)** (l.09) 
SCALE 0.021 0.016 0.023 0.013 0.015 
(15.31)*** (5.66)*** (8.03)*** (3.62)*** (4.85)*** 
SKILL 0.00003 -0.00025 0.00004 0.00003 -0.0001-2 
(0.54) (0.86) (0.67) (0.48) (2.02)** 
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
RL 0.83 0.63 0.85 0.86 0.86 
F value 4040 151 4276 660 1321 
No of 56837 10287 46550 7135 13366 
observation 
Number of 191 31 5729 13402 2596 4974 
firms 
Notes: Fixed effect estimates are applied for all equations. 
All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. For brevity, coefficients oftime 
dummies are not reported. 
FDJS is replaced by JVS and GREEN to control for FDI effects by entry mode. 
*** Significant at 1 % level;** significant at 5% level; and *significant at 10% level. 
Intra~industry spillovers 
As for the previous section, three specific industries are selected for investigation: food 
processing, garments and textiles, and electronics. Table 5.12 shows the estimation 
results using three alternatives for spillovers: FDIS, FDISR and entry modes (JVS and 
GREENS). Looking at the first three columns, without control for FIE location, 
spillovers are found to be negative in food processing and in textiles and garments. In 
contrast, positive but insignificant spillovers are found in the electronics industry. With 
control for location of FIEs, the result is slightly different, i.e., the coefficient of FDISR 
is negative but insignificant for the food processing industry. Jn the third option, with 
control for the difference in entry modes, fully-owned FIEs cause negative spillovers on 
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two sectors (food processing and textiles and garments) while joint ventures cause a 
negative impact on only one sector (textiles and garments). Furthermore, domestic 
enterprises gain significant benefits from the presence of joint ventures in electronics. 
The scale of this effect is higher than in the inter-industry equation (0.0191 versus 
0.0046). It indicates that technology transfer seems to take place in the high-tech 
industry: joint ventures could act as a good channel for this transition. 
For the purpose of comparison between SOEs and domestic private firms m 
each sector, we estimated the same equations for two groups of ownership separately. 
For the same reasons discussed earlier, SOEs gain more benefits from FIE presence 
than domestic private firms regardless of industry location. In particular, spillovers are 
positive and significant for SOEs working in electronics, no matter what the spillover 
proxies are. This sector experienced a positive effect from joint-venture presence only 
for domestic private firms. Both ownership types receive negative spillovers but to a 
lesser extent for SOEs in the manufacture of textiles and garments. In food processing, 
spillovers are likely to be negative and significant only for domestic private enterprises. 
In conclusion, spillovers seem to vary from industry to industry and the inter~industry 
estimate would be biased if the model did not control for specific industry 
characteristics. Inclusion of industry dummies in the fixed-effect estimate is impossible, 
so it is necessary to undertake a regression for both inter-industry and within-industry 
purposes. ln addition, the relative high technology industry in the host country may 
have a higher probability of obtaining positive externality from FDI than labor-intensive 
industry, regardless of the extent of foreign share in the existing product market. 
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Table 5.12.: Spillovers in selected manufactur ing industries 
Dependent All domestic firms Only SOEs Only domestic private firms 
variable: (y) FOODS GAR ELEC FOODS GAR ELEC FOODS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FDIS -0.0030 -0.0194 0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0230 0.0102 -0.0028 
(2.25)** (8.97)*** (l.03) (0.27) (3.93)*** (2.16)** (2.09)** 
FDfSR -0.0011 -0.0092 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0090 0.0028 -0.0012 
( 1.00) (6.03)*** (0.40) (0.31) (1.91)* (0.56) (l.06) 
JVS -0.0046 -0.0546 0.0191 0.0092 -0.0598 0.0265 -0.0068 
(1.14) (8.46)*** (2.96)*** (0.76) (2.36)** (2.79)*** (1.55) 
GREENS -0.0026 -0.0157 -0.0002 -0.0072 -0.0170 0.0077 -0.0018 
(1.96)** (7.15)*** (0.11) (0.72) (2.44)** ( l.49) (1.39) 
Notes: Fixed effect estimates are applied for all equations. 
All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. 
All equations include other variables like model (5.7). For brevity, only coefficients of interest variables are reported. 
*** Significant at 1 % level; * * significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
GAR ELEC 
(8) (9) 
-0.0182 -0.0026 
(7.94)*** ( l.15) 
-0.0088 0.0001 
(5.51)*** (0.07) 
-0.0539 0.0135 
(8.06)*** (1.75)* 
-0.0147 -0.0047 
(6.40)*** (2.08)** 
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Table 5.13: Productivity spilJovers using industry-level data 
Dependent variable: FDIS Entry Low SOE High SOE Interact with Low domestic R&D High domestic R&D 
(y) modes dominant dominant LP2ap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
K 0.293 0.293 0.323 0.228 0.292 0.218 0.218 0.408 0.415 
(4.15)*** (4.14)*** (3.42)*** (3.21)*** (4. 11)*** (4.04)*** (4.06)*** (3 .27)*** (3.36)*** 
M 0.569 0.569 0.574 0.721 0.566 0.588 0.590 0.554 0.551 
(1 1.87)*** (1 1.94)*** (10.21)*** (8.88)*** (11.83)*** (12.99)*** (13.59)*** (6.29)*** (6.30)*** 
L 0.203 0.203 0.089 0 .073 0.205 0.270 0.271 0.012 0.007 . 
(4.25)*** (4.25)*** (1 .33) (0.96) (4.42)*** (5.57)*** (5.60)*** (0.14) (0.08) 
FDIS -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 
(2.05)** ( 1.95)* (2.82)*** (0.84) 
FDIS*TECH -0.00004 
(3.08)*** 
NS -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
( 1.10) (1.27) (0.37) (0.66) (0.96) 
GREENS -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 0.006 
( 1.83)* (3.33)*** (2.36)** (2.81)*** (1.97)** 
HE RF ERP 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00001 0.00001 0.00006 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.00003 
(1.44) (1.40) (0.16) (0.21) (1.46) (l.32) . (1.12) (0.54) (0.59) 
SKILL 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.57) (0.57) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.21) (0.17) 
SOES -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
( 1.71)* ( 1.69)* (l.46) (l.07) (1.00) (1.91)* (l.99)** 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rl 0.93 0.93 0.96 0 .84 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.89 
F value 543 522 300 125 549 415 394 157 156 
No of observation 703 703 340 482 703 358 358 345 345 
Number of industries 145 145 92 130 145 75 75 70 70 
Notes: Ftxed effect estimates are applied for all equations. All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses. For brevity, coefficients oftime dummies are not 
reported. ***Significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 5% level; and* significant at 10% level. . 
The div ision into low and high SOES relies on the state-owned share in capital stock. The median value is used to separate data into subgroups. 
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Aggregate industry analysis of FDI spillovers 
Estimates based on industry-level data shows some differences compared to those based 
on firm level data. The control for the geographical allocation of domestic firms and the 
proxy for scale of economies are both excluded. The relationship between spillovers and 
domestic ownership is not fully investigated. Instead, this study includes the share of 
state-owned capital in total industry capital (SOES) and its interaction with spillover 
variables. SOES indicates whether or not an increase in state owned investment in 
accordance with government control leads to enhanced productivity. The interaction 
between SOES and FDIS brings a change in spillovers effect with a change in 
government control. 
The results of estimating some selected equations using industry-level data are 
presented in Table 5.13. In the overall equation, negative FDI spillovers are found 
confirming the results obtained from of the firm-level analysis. However, the 
significance level and magnitude of the coefficient are notably lower. When the entry 
mode proxies are included, the coefficient of both both JVS and GREENS are negative 
but only the latter is significant at the 10 percent level. Remarkably, in both first 
equations, the coefficient of SOES is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. 
This indicates a counter effect on productivity from an increase in government control 
in domestic investment. M.oreover, a high government share in capital stock may 
worsen spillovers when the interaction between SOES and FDIS is also negative and 
slightly significant (column three of Table 5.13). 
In another attempt to investigate relationship between spillovers and the 
government control level, we divided the firms into high and low government control 
groups based on SOES values (the cutoff point used here is 50 percent). However, the 
results are not very different between these two groups. Looking at the relationship 
between spillovers and absorptive capacity, the results show a negative and strongly 
important impact on productivity from correlation between the FDIS and LP gap. Using 
the domestic R&D classification, the results are consistent with the firm-level data 
estimate, i.e., negative spillovers are found only in industries with low domestic R&D 
expenditure. FDIS in the high R&D group is positive but not significant. 
The importance of domestic R&D investment is revealed further when FDIS is 
replaced by entry mode proxies. Despite the unimportant externality from joint venture 
entry, the spillovers from fully-owned FIEs are moderately positive associated with the 
extent of local firm investment for R&D activity. The spillover effect from fully-owned 
FIEs is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the high local R&D group. The 
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opposite effect from this entry mode occurs in the low local R&D group. This finding is 
important when fully-owned FIEs account for the majority of total FIEs in 
manufacturing as well as in other industries. 
Spillovers in the dynamic model 
The testing for an endogenous hypothesis of spillover variables and capital stock 
provided ambiguous conclusions. The results depend on the estimate methodology, the 
proxies used for spillovers and the functional forms. Taking into account possible 
endogeneity of FDI and the dynamic nature of productivity function, this study uses the 
first different GMM estimate developed by Arellano and Bond (1991 ). As discussed in 
the methodology section (5.3.2), due to the data limitations, the results from the first 
different GMM estimate act in a supplementary role for investigating FDI spillovers. 
Therefore, only the overall equation and ownership subgroup estimates are conducted. 
For brevity, the first column of Table 5.14 reports only coefficients of the interest 
variables and P values for testing of over-specification and for the first autocorrelation 
(AR (1 )). 
In general, the effect of FDI is the same as in the static model, i.e., negative and 
significant. A striking feature is the influence of the first lag of spillovers variables. All 
the first lags of FDIS, FDISR and GREENS are negative and significant except for JVS 
(positive but insignificant). This shows FDI takes time to have an impact on the 
performance of domestic firms. When controlling for geographic conditions, the 
spillovers are mixed. FDISR is positive in both the general equation and specific 
ownership groups. In contrast, the first lag (FDISR(t-1)) is negative across equations. 
Once more, SOEs are more likely to benefit immediately from FDI than private firms 
despite the use of different proxies for spillovers. However, the above results are 
restricted by the low quality of specification, even though the first autocorrelation is 
partly controlled by mathematical manipulation. Moreover, the Sargan test seems to 
reject the null hypothesis on non over-identification of the empirical model. In an 
attempt to argue for the endogeneity of both FDl and capital stock (the last three 
columns) the results are almost the same as in the first column and the quality of 
specification is improved. 
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Table 5.14: Endogeneity and dynamic adjustment on spillover model (Arellano-Bond GMM estimate) 
Dependent Overall Impact on Impact on local private firms Endogeneity of both capital and 
variable: log SO Es (5) . 
of local firm (1) Sargan AR(l) (2) Sargan AR(l) (3) Sargan AR(l) (4) 
output (y) test test test 
FDIS -0.018 0.040 -0.006 -0.016 
(2.3 1 )** 0.00 0.47 (1.91)* 0.03 0.09 (0.93) 0.00 0.07 ( 1.67)* 
FDIS (t-1) -0.022 0.008 -0.019 -0.030 
(4.39)*** (0.37) (4.17)*** (3 .63)*** 
FDISR 0.031 0.089 0.030 0.029 
(3.05)*** 0.00 0.00 (2.21)** 0.70 0.90 (3 .19)*** 0.000 0.000 (2.98)*** 
FDISR (t-1 ) -0.028 -0.026 -0.030 -0.026 
(3.61)*** (0.96) (3 .97)*** (3.22)*** 
JVS -0.008 -0.018 0.004 -0.040 
(0.54) (0.61) (0.24) ( 1.39) 
N S(t- l) 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.023 
(1.01) 0.00 0.01 (0.32) 0.02 0.52 (0.05) 0.00 0.00 (1 .29) GREENS 0.007 0.026 0.007 0.022 
( 1.36) ( 1.88)* ( 1.22) (2.14)** 
GREENS(t- -0.034 -0.013 -0.032 -0.036 
l) (5.38)*** (0.93) (4.88)*** (3.05)*** 
LnY(t-1) 
-
- -
-
*** *** *** *** 
Notes: For brevity, only coefficients of interest variables are reported. 
All T statistics are presented in pare ntheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and* significant at 10% level. 
The P values are reported for Sargan test for over identification and for the first autocorrelation test. 
FDI 
Sargan AR(l) 
test 
0. 14 0.03 
0.09 0.00 
0.08 0.54 
Equation I and 3 assume only proxies for FDI spillovers to be endogenous, whereas equation 4 assumes both capital stock and proxies for FDI spillovers to 
be endogenous. The first lagged dependent variable is negative and highly significant in all specifications. Not a ll its values can be reported in a cell of this 
table. · 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined both the direct and indirect productivity effects arising from 
FDI in Vietnam using firm-level data over the period 2000-2004. The direct effects 
were investigated through the contribution of foreign share in capital in FIEs to TFP and 
a comparison amongst five ownership types in productivity performance. The indirect 
effects (spillovers) were examined by looking at the effect of foreign presence on 
domestic productivity using inter and within-industry data at firm level. Spillovers were 
taken into account within the relationship with other fundamental factors (as listed in 
the previous paragraph) and special characteristics of a transition economy in terms of 
ownership types, entry modes and policy context. 
The results consistently show the important role of FDI as a catalyst for 
enhancing productivity at both firm and industry levels. A positive and significant 
contribution of foreign share in firm capital stock to overall TFP was found, regardless 
of treating the key variable (FDl) to be exogenous or endogenous. FIEs were found to 
be more productive than domestic firms even though foreign investment could be 
undertaken in different entry modes. SOEs also perform with higher efficiency than 
domestic private firms but the gap between them is negligible. The analysis for three 
specific industries (textiles and garments, food processing and the electronics industry) 
brings more consistent results with higher efficiency in FIEs compared to local private 
firms. Again, SOEs perform better in food processing and electronics manufacturing 
than in textiles and garments. 
The spillover effects of FIEs are found to be significant but negative in most 
inter-industry estimates. Within an imperfectly competitive market and given the early 
stage of domestic private sector participation in manufacturing production, MNE entry 
seems to crowd out operations of domestic firms. Using four different proxies for 
absorptive capacity and the technology gap between FlEs and domestic firms, this study 
reaches some interesting conclusions. The large domestic firms in terms of employment 
arc likely to be more vulnerable than small domestic firms to competition from FlEs. 
Possibly, the higher fixed cost in large firms under the share of market demand with 
FIEs leads to increased average costs more than for small firms. Ceteris paribus, 
domestic firms which pay attention to R&D activity and recruit a relatively higher share 
of skilled labor have a higher probability of receiving benefits from FDI spillovers. A 
high LP gap between FIEs and domestic firms in the same industry also exacerbates the 
negative effect from FDI. Because of the dynamic nature of productivity, the 
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classification into two groups by LP gap seems not to be as appropriate as using the LP 
gap as an independent variable interacting with the spillover proxy. The negative effect 
on SOE productivity is different for domestic private firms. Competitive pressure from 
FIEs on SOEs is less than on domestic private firms, partly because of the 'political 
pecking order' and the close relationship that developed between SOEs and MNEs in 
the initial stage of openness. 
This study also provides persuasive evidence of regional differences in 
productivity spillover effects. However, there is no evidence to suggest that high 
concentration of FDI in a region may bring in positive spillover effects to domestic 
firms. This is because geography is one of the many factors which determine spillover 
effect. When controlled for the geographic location of firms, the negative effect on local 
firms from FDI was still discovered but to a lesser degree. This result was robust to the 
choice of other control variables. 
Within-industry estimation gives different results. lt seems capital-intensive 
industries (like electronics) receive positive spillovers, whereas labor-intensive sectors 
are affected negatively. This is especially true when spillovers are examined with the 
use of entry modes for each industry. The coefficient of JVS is positive and significant. 
The difference in spillovers by entry modes of FDI supports the argument about the 
patterns of FDI effect and relationship with ownership. The presence of joint ventures 
causes no harmful effects on SOEs whereas fully-owned FIEs have a negative effect on 
both domestic types. 
The results from industry-level estimates are, by and large, consistent with the 
firm level estimates. According to industry-level estimates, positive spillovers seem 
more probable particularly in industry with higher R&D investment from domestic 
firms. The LP model (in Appendix A5. l 0) analysis brings the same patterns but with 
more apparent importance for domestic-firm R&D and the capital-intensive sector in 
capturing positive spillovers. Lastly, using modern techniques for estimating the 
dynamic nature of spillovers provides some further implications. Ignoring specification 
problei11s, the results show significant evidence on the effect of FDI changing over time. 
Positive spillovers are found when the model measures FIE presence with control for 
both industry and firm 's location (i.e., using FDISR). However, because of the short 
time coverage of the dataset, the results from the dynamic model estimate may not be as 
convincing as the findings from the fixed-effect estimator. 
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Chapter 6: Foreign Investment and Export Behaviour in 
Vietnamese Manufacturing 
6.1 Introduction 
In the past two decades, export performance of Vietnamese manufacturing has been 
impressive. Exports by foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) have expanded at a m·uch 
faster rate than either state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or private domestic firms. The 
purpose of this chapter is twofold - (a) to investigate the export behaviour of FIEs with 
emphasis on determinants of export decision and export intensity, and (b) to examine 
the impacts of the presence of FIEs on the export performance of domestic enterprises 
disaggregated by ownership (state-owned and private-owned). ln spite of the heavy 
policy emphasis placed by the Vietnamese authorities on enticing foreign direct 
investment as an instrument for promoting export orientation of domestic 
manufacturing, no systematic study has so far been undertaken to assess the outcome. 
The empirical analysis is based on a new dataset constructed from unpublished 
administrative records of the MPI (Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and investment) and 
unpublished returns to the Survey of Industrial Enterprises conducted by the GSO 
(Vietnam's General Statistics Office) in 1999 and 2001. Unfotunately, unlike the 
previous chapter, it is not impossible to construct panel data for econometric analysis 
because the two GSO surveys have collected firm-level information using different 
codes for individual firms. This is the first attempt to make use of these data sources for 
an in-depth analysis of the role of FIEs in the export performance of Vietnamese 
manufacturing. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the 
role of FlEs in the expansion of manufacturing exports from Vietnam to provide the 
background for the ensuing empirical analysis. Section 6.3 presents the analytical 
framework employed in the analysis. Section 6.4 discusses empirical models including 
FIE-export behaviour, spillovers of FIE on the export performance of domestic firms, 
data sources and estimation methodology. The results are discussed in Section 6.5 and 
the key findings are summarised and policy implications discussed in the final section. 
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6.2 FDI and manufacturing exports in Vietnam 
6.2.1 An overview of export performance 
Figure 6.1 depicts total export earnings and the share of non-oil exports and 
manufacturing exports in total-export earnings over the period 1990-2005. Total exports 
in 2005 (30.7 billion USO) were almost 13 times higher than in 1990 (2.4 billion USO). 
Since 1995, exports of oil and gas have played an increasingly important role in total 
exports. Exporting oil and gas is entirely undertaken in the form of technical 
cooperation agreements and joint ventures between foreign investors and Vietnamese 
partners. However, manufacturing exports have increased faster than oil and gas 
exports. Manufacturing accounted for 52.6 percent of total exports in 2004, up from 
only 8.8 percent in 1990. 
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Figure 6.1: Export performance in Vietnam, 1990-2005 
Source: Adapted from GSO data on website: www.gso.gov.vn. 
C.l.E, 1998 (Table 1.2, p2) for manufacturing exports from 1990-1994 
C.E.I.C for manufacturing exports from 1995 onward. 
MPI for FIE manufacturing exports (1996-2003). 
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Table 6.1 provides data on the commodity composition of non-oil exports based 
on the Standard International Trade Classification (S lTC). Since about 1995 there has 
been a clear shift in the composition of merchandise exports away from primary 
products towards manufacturing. In particular, manufacturing has become a driving 
force of export expansion since 2002 with its contribution to total exports accounting 
for 50.4 percent. However, the primary sector, consisting of a major proportion of 
agricultural and mineral products, still plays a significant role in total exports. 
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The patterns of manufacturing exports are further investigated by compiling firm 
data from the GSO enterprise survey (Table 6.3). The overall export/output ratio shows 
a big change in the export intensity of manufacturing products between 1998 and 2000 
(from 25.3 to 47.0 percent). The number of exporting firms has also more than doubled, 
in association with the explosion in the number of manufacturing firms established. This 
affirms the effectiveness of government policy changes since 2000 in revising the trade 
laws to permit all legal entities to export most goods with a special license and the 
adoption of the 2000 Enterprises Law. 
Changes have occurred at both firm and sector levels. In 1998, only four of 22 
manufacturing sectors (defined at two-digit level of VSIC) had export/output ratios over 
50 percent. By 2000, the number of sectors exporting over 50 percent of gross output 
had doubled, with an especially impressive performance in textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather products and wood products. Although every industry increased the absolute 
value of exports, the composition changed after two years. In 1998, the three sectors 
with the highest share in total exports (over 15 percent) were food and beverage 
products (VSIC 15), leather products (VSIC 19) and office, accounting and computing 
machinery (VSJC30). By 2000, export composition had evened out amongst sectors. 
Only three industries held a relatively high share of total exports. Of these, textile 
products (VSIC 17) and wearing apparel (VSIC 18) showed a big increase m 
composition due to the entry of large numbers of new firms participating m 
international trade and with high export intensity. 
Table 6.2 reports data on the directions of manufacturing exports. As discussed 
in Section 6.2.1, manufacturing exports grew to the highest proportion in total exports 
since 2003. However, the commodity composition of exports varies by destination. 
Vietnam exported relatively more manufactured goods to developed countries (64.4 
percent) but less to developing countries (34.7 percent). For example, the EU, the US, 
NICs and Japan imported the highest proportion of manufactured relative to primary 
products from Vietnam. In contrast, neighbour countries including China and ASEAN 
imported mostly primary products. In terms of composition of manufacturing exports by 
destination, in the period 1997-2003, the share of products exported to developed 
countries increased sharply, from 48.5 to 75. l percent. The major markets for Vietnam 
manufactured goods were the EU, the US and Japan. Of these, the composition of 
manufacturing exports to the EU and Japan fluctuated, whereas there was a remarkable 
export expansion of manufacturing products to the US. This represents one important 
impact of the BT A which became effective at the end of 200 I. 
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Table 6.1: Composition of exports, 1995-2004 by Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
SITC 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total exports (million USD) 5,449 7,248 9,182 9,357 11,537 14,476 15,029 16,704 20,145 26,482 
Primary Products 3,664 4,538 4,781 5,006 5,996 8,079 8,010 8,290 9 397 12,554 
Manufactured Productsjj 1,785 2,710 4,401 4,350 5,541 6,398 7,019 8.415 10,748 13,928 
Chemical and Related Products (SITCS) 31 66 107 94 147 159 222 262 340 421 
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by 
Material (SITC6) 350 383 563 441 865 911 990 1,125 1,355 1,890 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
(SITC7) 89 415 753 809 978 1,276 1,399 1,337 1,793 2,562 
Miscellaneous Manufactures (SITC8) 1,315 1,847 2,979 3,007 3,551 4,052 4,408 5,691 7,260 9,055 
Commodities not Classified elsewhere In 
SITC - 1 3 4 5 6 0 2 4 3 
Percentai?;e of total exports(%) 
Manufactured Products 32.8 37.4 47.9 46.5 48.0 44.2 46.7 50.4 53.4 52.6 
Chemical and Related Products 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by 
Material 6.4 5.3 6.1 4.7 7.5 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.1 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 1.6 5.7 8.2 8.6 8.5 8.8 9.3 8.0 8.9 9.7 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Article 24.1 25.5 32.4 32.1 30.8 28.0 29.3 34.1 36.0 34.2 
Source: Author's calculation from C.E.I.C database, 2006. 
33 STIC 5 to 8 less SITC 68. 
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Table 6.2: Directions of manufacturing exports in Vietnam 
Country group\ Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
The manufacturing exports/total exports ratio(%) 
Japan 39.4 27.4 51.3 50.8 58.8 57.7 60.3 
United States 22.1 1.1 33.3 23.2 20.1 58.8 68.4 
China 8.5 9.6 8.0 3.4 7.6 8.7 14.9 
EU (25 members) 71 .1 49.7 80.4 79.5 83.5 85.0 82.3 
ASEAN 26.0 29.5 37.2 33.6 33.2 30.4 29.9 
NICs (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea) 70.6 33.4 70.8 63.2 64.3 62.3 63.5 
Australia and New Zealand 23.8 75.5 11 .1 7.8 10.6 10.3 11 .2 
Others 28.7 49.5 28.0 30.8 33.7 40.8 42.5 
Developed countries 47.7 48.1 55.7 51 .5 56.8 60.9 64.4 
Developing countries 41 .2 37.8 38.6 32.4 34.7 34.7 34.7 
All countries 44.1 41.6 47.6 42.7 46.3 49.9 53.1 
Compositions of manufacturing exports(%) 
Japan 16.3 3.6 16.7 21 .1 21.2 16.9 16.4 
United States 1.6 0.1 3.1 2 .8 3.1 17.3 25.2 
China 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.6 2.6 
EU (25 members) 29.9 26.1 38.7 38.2 37.8 33.8 30.9 
A SEAN 12.7 11.3 14.2 14.2 12.2 8.9 8.3 
NICs (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea) 29.0 8.7 16.0 14.6 . 14.2 12.2 9.6 
Australia and New Zealand 1.5 7.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 
Others 8 .2 42.9 8.7 6.6 8.4 7.7 5.5 
Developed countries 48.5 42.9 61 .5 64.8 64.5 70.7 75.1 
Total manufacturing exports (million USD) 4,053 3,893 5,490 6,181 6,962 8,333 10,689 
Source: Author's calculation from COMTRADE database. 
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Table 6.3: Key indicators of export performance of manufacturing in Vietnam 
Classification 1998 2000 
Export Export/ Export No of Share Export Export/ Export No of Share 
(Billion output composition exported in total (Billion output composition exported in total 
donq) ratio firms firms dono) ratio firms firms 
Bv 2 dieit VSIC level 
15: Food products and beverages 6,790 22.8 21.5 212 22.2 24,900 34.2 20.9 431 12.7 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 38 0.8 0.1 3 20.0 80 1.0 0.1 6 26.1 
17: Manufacture of textiles 3, 111 35.0 9.9 90 44.1 21,300 155.9 17.9 174 44.1 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 2,007 40.2 6.4 92 25.5 15,200 135.7 12.8 387 69.0 
19: Manufacture of leather products 6,762 79.2 21.4 71 50.4 19,000 133.7 16.0 183 72.3 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 771 55.5 2.4 100 40.5 6,085 158.9 5.1 201 29.9 
21: Paper and paper products 272 7.8 0.9 30 15.6 762 10.2 0.6 58 15.6 
22: Publishing and printing 2 0.1 0.0 2 1.3 150 3.6 0.1 14 5.1 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 537 5.2 1.7 58 24.9 2,647 14.2 2.2 107 26.4 
25: Rubber and plastic products 962 21.3 3.0 91 34.9 2,550 28.3 2.1 172 38.6 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 460 4.8 1.5 81 13.3 1,153 6.0 1.0 121 11.3 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 434 7.1 1.4 19 26.0 435 4.9 0.4 22 17.5 
28: Fabricated metal products 301 9.0 1.0 29 11.1 1,175 17.8 1.0 84 14.0 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 408 15.4 1.3 29 18.1 1,130 26.2 0.9 51 20.6 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 4,945 101.0 15.7 1 33.3 8,266 97.6 6.9 2 40.0 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 574 17.6 1.8 24 24.5 4,083 51.2 3.4 50 34.2 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 1,595 28.8 5.1 23 32.9 2,886 37.8 2.4 40 40.4 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 118 27.5 0.4 6 22.2 850 74.2 0.7 12 30.0 
34: Motor vehicles, tra ilers and semi-trailers 21 1.2 0.1 4 4.3 315 4.7 0.3 15 8.8 
3 5: Manufacture of other transport 22 0.5 0.1 12 9.0 1, 148 8.5 1.0 37 15.2 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 1,417 63.7 4.5 103 40.1 4,791 91.0 4.0 222 42.0 
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Table 6.3: (continued) 
Classification 1998 2000 
Export Export/ Export No of Share in Export Export/ Export No of Share in 
(Billion output ratio composition exported total firms (Billion output ratio composition exported total firms 
dong) firms dong) firms 
By ownership 
Private firms 3,604 28.2 11.4 437 15.4 24,900 48.4 20.9 1,174 15.5 
SO Es 7,316 13.2 23.2 262 26.0 32,300 32.9 27.1 483 32.1 
JV with SOEs 3,543 13.5 11.2 112 44.6 6,809 15.9 5.7 160 63.5 
JV with private firms 179 11.6 0.6 22 40.7 886 18.0 0.7 43 63.2 
100% foreign invested 16,908 59.1 53.6 249 61.6 54,100 96.7 45.5 534 78.6 
By location 
North Mountainous area 772 16.4 2.4 24 18.0 1,406 18.9 1.2 65 19.2 
Red River Delta 3,940 15.9 12.5 216 16.5 27,900 50.6 23.5 438 18.3 
Central Coast 2,345 32.4 7.4 99 28.3 6,068 33.3 5.1 210 22.3 
Central Highlands 0 907 42.0 0.8 57 27.7 
South East 23,342 27.9 74.0 717 31.4 69,200 51.0 58.2 1,457 41.9 
Mekong Delta 1J151 28.4 3.6 26 5.5 13,400 38.7 11.3 167 6.1 
Hanoi 2,548 16.2 8.1 127 16.5 20,800 85.8 17.5 192 19.1 
Ho Chi Minh city 9,563 19.0 30.3 425 31.6 37,500 48.8 31.5 910 46.0 
Total 31,550 25.3 100.0 1,082 23.77 118,995 47.0 100.0 2,394 23.76 
Sources: Author's calculation from industrial survey ( 1999) and enterprise survey (200 I) conducted by GSO. 
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6.2.2 The role of FIEs in export expansion 
Figure 6.2 presents three main indicators of the role of FIEs in manufacturing export 
performance: FIE shares in total exports, non-oil exports and manufacturing exports. In 
the first five years (1990-1994), oil and gas exploration had not yet begun, so the share 
of FIE exports in total exports increased but remained negligible. The FIE share in total 
exports increased sharply from 1995 reaching its highest level by 2004 (56.4 percent). 
However, from 1995, there was also a large FIE share in oil and gas exports. The graph 
in Figure 6.2 shows the FIE share in total exports was higher than for non-oil exports. 
Over time, the FIE-export share in non-oil products also increased sharply, reaching 
43.5 percent of total non-oil exports by 2005. The share of FIEs in manufacturing 
exports was also higher than in non-oil exports but fluctuated more. The role of FIEs in 
exporting manufactured products grew rapidly. However, this ratio may be less 
convincing as it is derived from two different consistent data sources (C.E.I.C Asian 
database and CIE 1998) and the information is only available for a short period (1996-
2003). 
Additional evidence on the relationship between ownership types and 
manufacturing exports is shown in Table 6.3. Data is disaggregated by five ownership 
groups, namely SOEs, joint ventures with SOEs, joint ventures with domestic private 
firms, fully-owned FIEs and domestic private firms. All groups have increased · the 
number of exporting firms as well as export values. The domestic private sector has 
obtained the highest growth in terms of the number of firms but not in terms of export 
value. This sector accounted for nearly 50 percent of exporting firms but only 20 
percent of exporting value. Fully-owned FIEs held the largest proportion, reaching over 
45 percent of total manufacturing exports. SOEs also had significant growth in export 
value despite their share in exports reducing between 1998 and 2000. By 2000, fully-
owned FIEs had achieved an extremely high level of export intensity (96. 7 percent), 
whereas both types of joint ventures were still quite low (15.9 and 18.0 percent). 
Plausibly, most joint ventures having SOEs as main partners have been directed by 
import-substitution policy rather than by export-oriented policy. 
Looking at export data at the regional level, there is clear evidence of a heavy 
concentration of export-oriented firms in the South East area of Vietnam and the Red 
River Delta. The number of manufacturing exporters in the former increased from 7 I 7 
to 1,457 in the period 1998-2000 and from 216 and 438 in the latter. These two areas 
accounted for 86.2 percent of total exporting firms in 1998 and above 80 percent by 
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2000. In particular, firms in Ho Chi Minh City accounted for about 40 percent of total 
exporting firms in I 998 as well as in 2000. Hanoi is the second most favourable place 
with around l 0 percent of total exporting firms being located there. 
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C.I.E, 1998 (Table 1.2, p2) for manufacturing exports from 1990-1994. 
C.E.I.C for manufacturing exports from 1995 onward. 
MPI for FIE manufacturing exports (1996-2003). 
6.2.3 The .patterns of FIE exports 
This section focuses on the export performance of FIEs. Table 6.4 reports the 
composition of exporting FIEs by geographical location and by form of investment. In 
general, patterns of FIE exports derived from MPI data are likely to be the same as the 
patterns for all exporting firms as discussed previously using GSO data (Section 6.2.2). 
Exports by FlEs are heavily concentrated in the South East area and the Red River Delta 
but there has been a significant change in composition. During the period 1996-2004, 
the share in the number of export-oriented FIEs in total FIEs increased from 13.3 to 
26.3 percent for the Red River Delta, whereas this indicator for the South East area 
decreased from 75.2 to 53. l percent in the same period. The trends in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City (the two largest cities for the Red River Delta and the South East area, 
respectively) are slightly different. The share in total exporters in Hanoi increased a 
little, whereas this ratio in Ho Chi Minh City sharply declined (from 54.9 to 23.2 
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percent) in the same period. This is a consequence of removing most trade and non-
trade barriers so that FIEs located in other provinces can access the world market. The 
data also showed a significant increase in the number of exporters from export 
processing zones (EPZs) and industrial zones (IZs). For example, the share in the 
number of exporting FIEs locating inside EPZs/IZs increased from 20.8 percent in 1996 
to 43.1 percent by 2004. More exporting FIEs have located inside these special 
economic zones in order to benefit from reforms in tariffs, taxes, infrastructure, land 
rents and other incentives. 
Table 6.5 provides key indicators of export performance of FIEs with additional 
information on relevant industrial characteristics, location, forms of investment, source 
country and business operation situation. FIEs were engaged in every two-digit VSIC 
industry but exhibited a high variation in terms of the number of firms and total 
investment. The industries with more FIEs included wearing apparel (VSIC 18); food 
products and beverages (VSIC 15); rubber and plastic products and chemical products. 
Moreover, fully-owned FIEs became the most common entry mode with 75 percent of 
the total number of FIEs and 62 percent of total foreign investment in manufacturing. 
Consistent with the GSO data source in Table 6.3, this firm type showed a much higher 
export/output ratio than joint ventures (on average over the period 2001-2004, achieving 
62.0 percent and 12.l percent, respectively). By region, the South East area attracted 
about two thirds of FIEs and 60 percent of foreign capital. FIEs in the south also 
performed at higher export intensity than the north. The FIE export/output ratio in the 
Central Highlands was quite high because this area attracted only a small number of 
FIEs and most of these firms were export-oriented, because of their comparative 
advantages in agricultural products like rubber, coffee, pepper and wood. Looking at the 
two biggest cities, Ho Chi Minh had about four times the total of FIEs and m_ore than 
twice that of manufacturing FDI compared to Hanoi. FlEs in Ho Chi Minh City also 
performed at higher export intensity than Hanoi (48.5 percent vs. 34.7 percent). 
For most FIEs, the realized export-output ratio is lower than the ' committed' 
ratio.34 For instance, during the four years (2001-2004), while the average-committed 
ratio was 45.5 percent, whereas the overall realized export/output ratio was only 37.9 
percent. Moreover, based on the period average estimate, only six of 22 industries 
exceeded the committed ratio on exports, namely wearing apparel (VSIC 18); leather 
products(VS1Cl9); wood products (VSIC20), machinery and equipment (29); and 
34 When FIEs register their business they propose two important indicators: the export/output ratio (called 
the committed ratio) and foreign share of total investment. 
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electrical machinery and apparatus (31 ). Among the three forms of direct investment 
(fully-owned FIEs, joint ventures and others), on average, fully-owned FIEs not only 
had higher export commitments but their performance surpassed that commitment in 
three out of the four years. However, the other forms of investment never achieved the 
committed ratio even though their promised ratio was relatively low. Between 2001 and 
2004, nine out of 22 industries had a higher export/output ratio but three leading export 
industries experienced a slight decrease in export intensity (VSIC 17, VSIC 18 and 
VSIC19). 
There are also interesting patterns observed by country source (Table 6.5). The 
average of committed export/output ratio ranges from above 30 to 50 percent with the 
highest ratio from Japan, USA and the NICs (Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong). The FIEs 
from developed countries, especially those from Japan and the US, indicated high 
export/output ratios in their applications. However, except for Japan, the 
implementation of FIEs coming from these countries was far below their commitment. 
FIEs invested in MNEs from the NICs were the best performers, with their implemented 
export/output ratio surpassing their commitments (57.1 vs.50.5 percent). It may be 
agued that young firms have a lower export/output ratio than older firms because FIEs 
that settle well in Vietnam may achieve the committed export ratio. In answering this 
question, it was found that the correlation coefficient between firm age and 
export/output ratio was very small (0.003). Moreover, Figure 6.3 sketches the 
relationship between these two variables and finds no strong positive correlation 
between firm age and export performance. Theoretically, MNE affiliates with more 
advantages in technology and market access will commence exporting more speedily 
than domestic firms. In sum, although FIEs have contributed an increasing role in total 
exports many have performed below their commitment. 
Source-country composition of exports measured by the share in total FIE 
exports of each country group is reported in Table 6.6. It shows that FIEs from Ja:pan 
and East Asian NlCs are the major exporters from Vietnam. The export share of 
Japanese FIEs increased remarkably from 10.4 percent in 1996 to 41.0 percent in 2004 
whereas the exports of the NIC FIEs were in a downward trend (from 69 percent to 36.9 
percent). Exports by the European and U.S FIEs were still negligible. The last two 
columns of Table 6.6 indicate the average composition of exports and the composition 
of total registered FDI in the period 1996-2004. Generally, FIEs from developed 
countries are more export-intensive than FIEs from the developing world (the former 
account for 28.5 percent of investment but contribute 38.0 percent of total exports). In 
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particular, only FIEs from Japan (a developed country) and the NICs (developing 
countries) showed higher exports relative to investment. Investment from ASEAN 
countries seems to be domestic-oriented with a significant proportion of investment (23 
percent) but only contributing a small percentage (seven percent) of total exports. 
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Table 6.4: Regional distribution of FIE exports in Vietnam(% of total exporting FIEs) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
By geographical location 
Outside EPZ, IZ 79.2 70.5 63.6 64.6 54.7 53.9 53.3 51.2 56.9 
Ins ide EPZ, lZ 20.8 29.5 36.4 35.4 45.3 46.I 46.7 48.8 43 .1 
By geographical location 
Hanoi 8.4 10.0 8.2 8.0 5.7 6.3 5.7 7.4 9.8 
Ho Chi Minh City 54.9 45.6 39.5 39.4 40.9 37.7 32.8 25 .5 23.2 
North Mountainous area 1.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2 3.1 
Red River Delta I 3 .3 16.7 15.8 15.1 12.4 13.3 14.2 15.9 26.3 
Central Coast 4.9 3.6 4.5 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.4 8.1 
Central Highlands 0.9 I. I 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.9 
South East 75 .2 73 .3 72.5 74.9 78.2 77.3 75.9 71.5 53.l 
Mekong De lta 4.0 4.6 5.2 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.7 4.4 6.5 
By form of investment 
100% foreign invested firms 6 1.l 63.3 66.0 66.9 73.9 76.5 77.3 75.3 72.2 
Joint ventures 36.3 34.2 32.6 3 1.4 23.6 22. l 2 1.4 23.3 26.6 
Othersj) 2.7 2.5 1.4 1.7 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.2 
Total number of exporting FlEs 226 281 291 350 614 671 777 365 418 
Source: Calculat ion from unpublished MPI data. 
35 Other fonns of investment may include BCC, BOT, shareholding and capital holding companies. 
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Table 6.5: Key indicators of export performance of FIEs in Vietnam (2001-2004) 
Number Compositio Capital Committe Committe Com posit Com posit Exportf Export/ Export/ Export/ Average 
of firms n of per d FOi d export/ ion of ion of Output Output Output Output Export/ 
registered wor1<er share output workers revenue ratio ratio ratio ratio Output 
capital (1000 ratio 2001- 2001- 2001 2002 2003 2004 ratio 
USO) 2004 2004 
By VSIC 
15: Food products and 
beverages 372 12.5 122 84.9 33.1 6.0 11.6 16.4 19.3 13.8 24.5 18.5 
16: Manufacture of 
tobacco products 2 0.2 2,980 85.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
17: Manufacture of 
textiles 195 9.5 114 91.7 54.4 4.8 3.3 49.3 49.8 49.6 47.l 49.2 
18: Manufacture of 
wearing apparel 629 5.2 17 92.8 67.3 18.0 4.8 88.9 87.5 81.2 81.7 85.7 
19: Manufacture of 
leather products 259 6.1 10 94.9 71.l 34.3 11.3 97.1 101 .2 99.5 93.4 99.1 
20: Manufacture of wood 
and wood products 198 2.2 147 93.3 62.9 0.9 0.2 81.1 87.2 63.6 97.9 87.0 
21 : Paper and paper 
products 122 2.1 127 92.0 32.9 1.0 0.7 29.8 34.0 l l.1 33.8 29.3 
22: Publishing and 
printing 49 0.2 51 87.6 32.4 0.3 0.1 4.4 8.0 36.1 58.2 21.8 
24: Chemicals and 
chemical products 345 6.9 98 85.9 23.9 4.1 10.1 17.5 13.9 8.4 8.3 12.2 
25: Rubber and plastic 
products 326 4.0 78 90.9 47.4 2.9 3.1 42.4 49.3 23.4 26.3 35.5 
26: Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
products 326 15.2 251 81.3 35.8 3.5 6.1 7.9 8.0 3.7 3.2 6.1 
27: Manufacture of basic 
metals 61 3.4 235 75.9 19.6 0.8 5.2 6.2 6.7 2.6 8.3 5.5 
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Table 6.5: (continued) 
Number Com posit Capital Committe .Committe Com posit Com posit Export/ Export/ Export/ Export/ Average 
of firms ion of per d FOi d export/ ion of ion of Output Output Output Output Export/ 
registere worker share output workers revenue ratio ratio ratio ratio Output 
d capital (1000 ratio 2001- 2001- 2001 2002 2003 2004 ratio 
USO) 2004 2004 
28: fabricated metal 
products 321 4.5 94 92.2 35.9 2.8 2.9 30.2 34.4 18.9 23.5 28.4 
29: Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c 239 3.6 58 90.2 36.0 3.6 3.6 62.5 63 .3 68.6 73 .7 67.5 
30: Office, accounting 
and computing 
machineries 34 0.6 226 87.9 60.7 0.2 0.2 3.5 37.7 100.0 11.8 25.3 
31: Electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c 2 12 5.7 61 87.2 41.9 5.5 9.3 80.6 77.7 98.6 74.0 81.7 
32: Radio, television and 
communication 
equipment 32 0.9 91 84.0 33.6 0.6 2.1 38.4 37.4 22.7 15.6 30.0 
33: Medical and optical 
instruments, watches and 
clocks 49 0.8 79 93.3 57.0 0.6 0.4 24.6 77.8 82.0 25.0 49.7 
34: Motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 208 7.0 107 92.4 24.3 3.8 15.8 3.2 10.0 3.2 2.2 4.4 
3 5: Manufacture of other 
transport 42 2.0 59 86.0 39. l 1.9 7.4 31.4 27.6 12.8 14.6 .20.2 
36: Manufacture of 
furniture, n.e.c 228 1.9 25 92.8 60.7 4.5 1.6 86 .5 90. l 92.8 97.6 90.7 
By investment form 
100% FDI 3,240 62.0 44 100.0 50.3 81.2 51.8 60.I 62.7 71.9 49.5 62.0 
Joint-ventures 914 37.0 120 . 60.8 31.4 17.8 47.l 12.9 15.6 8.9 11.2 12. l 
Others 119 1.0 55 57.0 22. l 1.0 1.1 9.1 8.4 10. 1 9.9 9.3 
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Table 6.5: (continued) 
Number of Compositio Capital per Committed Committed Compositio Compositio Export/ Export/ Export/ Export/ Average 
firms n of worker FDI share export/ n of n of Output ratio Output ratio Output ratio Output ratio Export/ 
registered (1000 USD) output ratio workers revenue 2001 2002 2003 2004 Output ratio 
capital 2001-2004 2001-2004 
By country sources 
I. Japan 391 16.1 70 89.4 49.3 13.3 29.l 45.6 45.0 37.8 30.9 39.6 
2. USA 152 3.7 207 89.l 49.1 1.0 2.4 3.1 11.7 6.0 16.8 10.6 
~- NICS: Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong 2,268 39.5 36 92.9 50.5 63.9 34.6 57.6 59.0 64.6 39.4 57.1 
~- ASEAN 470 16.5 135 87.4 31.4 7.1 17.6 14.5 19.4 12.4 14.0 15.2 
5. Australia and New 
Zealand 81 l.8 141 81.4 3 l.O 0.7 l.9 2.8 7.6 4.6 3.6 4.3 
k>. European countries 524 18.4 102 84.0 41.9 10.4 12.5 22.6 27.9 20.1 16.7 22.3 
7. Others 387 4.0 66 82.7 36.3 3.5 2.0 59.8 45.9 49.0 28.4 45.0 
lt\Jl developed countries 1,107 34.3 83 87.5 45.5 24.0 45.l 34.8 36.9 30.8 25.6 32.1 
By region 
North Mountainous Area 110 1.4 70 82.9 41.0 1.1 2.2 36.1 29.6 8.3 20.2 17.8 
Red River Delta 818 21.0 88 81.9 36.9 13.8 28.9 12.2 17.8 16.1 19.6 16.7 
Central Coast 210 12.5 146 82.4 37.5 5.0 3.6 22.3 33.3 22.0 66.6 33.7 
Central Highlands 28 0.2 31 87.2 72.0 0.4 0.4 95.2 66.4 86.4 95 . .3 88.8 
South East 2,930 60.0 46 92.8 48.8 75.7 62.J 51.4 51.5 56.9 29.4 48.7 
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Table 6.5: (continued) 
Number of Compositio Capital per Committed Committed Compositio Compositio Export/ Export/ Export/ Export/ Average 
firms n of worker FOi share export/ n of n of Output ratio Output ratio Output ratio Output ratio Export/ 
registered (1000 USO) output ratio workers revenue 2001 2002 2003 2004 Output ratio 
capital 2001-2004 2001-2004 
Mekong Delta 177 4.9 72 85.9 38.4 3.9 2.8 28.8 39.1 19.7 32.8 31.8 
Hanoi 309 7.5 101 82.6 34. l 4.3 9. 1 30.2 30.3 38.l 37.8 34.7 
Ho Chi Minh City 1,196 16.1 27 89.7 50.9 34.8 23.0 50.2 59.2 43.9 26.2 48.5 
By the current situation 
Operating 1,537 55.5 37 89.6 41.3 86.3 93.0 37.9 40.7 40.2 24.l 36.3 
Starting up 1,146 15.8 109 94.3 53.0 8.4 5.3 57.8 78.3 78.2 67.l 71.4 
Temporary stop 862 8.1 421 94.5 52.4 1.1 0.1 45.5 44.7 12.7 48.8 44.9 
License withdrawn 162 4.9 524 87.3 35.8 0.5 0.1 90.6 82.9 0.0 72.6 79.2 
Closing down 566 15.6 246 73.6 34.0 3.7 1.5 21.8 30.0 16.5 9.4 21.7 
Total 4,273 100.0 58 89.6 45.5 100.0 100.0 38.3 42.6 41.8 27.2 37.9 
Source: Calculat ion by author from unpublished MPI data. 
Composition of registered capital, capital stock per employee, committed FDI share and committed export/output ratio are average numbers for the 
period 2001-2004. 
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Table 6.6: Compositions of FIE manufacturing exports by source country(% of total FIE exports) 
Country\year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Exports FDI 
96-04 96-04 
1. Japan 10.4 29.6 33.7 35.6 38.4 33.0 28.l 24.3 41.0 31.5 7.6 
2. USA 0.2 0.2 0.2 0. 1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 2.3 0.5 3.4 
3. NICS (Korea, Taiwan, 
69.0 56.8 53.2 51.7 47.6 49.4 52.6 62.5 36.9 52.3 30.0 
Hong Kong) 
4. ASEAN 9.1 7.4 5.8 7.3 6.9 8.0 7.4 4.8 8.9 7.1 23.0 
5. Australia and New 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.3 
Zealand 
6. European countries 8.6 4.3 4.7 3.9 4.7 7.2 9.1 4.6 8.6 6.3 20.6 
7. Others 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1 2 .1 14.1 
All developed countries 19.0 33.8 37.9 38.8 43.1 40.1 37.3 29.4 51.6 38.0 28.5 
Total exports (million 
660.5 1,147.6 1,540.3 1,780.2 2,955.3 3,005.7 4,059.1 3,385.7 1,990. l 20,524 28,453 
USD) 
Source: Calculation by author from unpublished MPI data. 
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6.3 Model specification 
This section first outlines the analytical framework for the analysis of export behaviour 
at firm level based on the rule of profit maximization before developing empirical 
models for determinants of FIE exports as well as the impacts of FDI presence on local-
firm exports. 
6.3.1 Analytical framework 
The empirical analysis in this chapter draws upon the analytical framework originally 
developed by Aitken et al. (1997) and subsequently extended by Greenaway et al. 
(2004 ). When firms produce for both domestic and international markets, the total cost 
function (TC) can be specified as the sum of the production cost function (denoted by h) 
and distribution cost function in each market (denoted by m): 
Where d denotes the domestic market and f denotes the foreign market. Both the 
production and distribution cost functions are assumed to be increasing with scale and 
are convex. The distribution cost for the foreign market ( m 1 (q1 )) is greater than for the 
domestic market ( md (qd) ). Based on the first assumption, the production and 
distribution cost functions can be written as : 
Where, g and c are the functions of cost variables given in the production 
decision. Obviously, g and c contain not only the common factors (X) for both markets 
but each is a function of other specific variables (Zi) for each market. Therefore, their 
functional fonns are assumed to be: 
Apart from the common factors of production relevant for all firms, like capital 
and employment (X), the production cost function of domestic firms may be influenced 
by some externalities like the entry and operation of MNEs, government policy and 
ownership, technology development and changes in the international market. For the 
purpose of this chapter, the effect of FDI entry is denoted as FDIS and other 
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externalities as z P • FDIS may capture the competition and demonstration effects of 
FIEs on domestic-firm production (Greenaway et al. 2004). Likewise, the distribution 
cost for the domestic market varies by the common factors and other specific factors 
( zd ). The focus here is on investigating the cost for distribution in the foreign market. 
Apart from export-specific costs ( z 1 ), it is hypothesized that the export performance of 
a given firm may be influenced by other competitive exporters nearby and/or within the 
same industry. Moreover, exports of FIEs may have some exclusive patterns compared 
to exports of domestic firms because FIEs derive benefits from the marketing network 
and expertise of parent companies. Consequently, FIE status may involve information 
externalities or other influences not available to purely domestic firms. This explains 
why it is proposed to separate the effects of total-export activity (EXA) and total FIE-
export activity (FIE_ EXA)36 in the distribution cost function. Positive spillovers are 
achieved when the following inequalities hold: 
Where, EXA (total-export activity) and FIE_EXA (total FIE-export activity) are 
calculated for every industry to which a firm belongs (see details in section 6.4). 
Greenaway et al. (2004) extend FDIS by separate investigation of competition and 
demonstration effects by deriving the first derivatives of production cost function with 
respect to proxies for MNE innovation activities and MNE relative power in the 
domestic market ( n, \f' ). lt is assumed that the greater the R&D activities undertaken by 
FIEs the higher the probability of technology imitation for domestic firms. Likewise, 
the greater the entry of MNEs in the domestic market, the stronger the competition that 
will be created, thereby forcing domestic firms to reduce production and distribution 
costs 
Including all the above expressions of the cost and profit functions, the 
following problem (6.4) is to be solved for finding the optimal solution of firm product 
quantity for export as well as for domestic consumption. 
36 The terminology used is as proposed by Greenaway et al. (2004 ), while Aitken et al. (1997) propose 
those two factors as "local export concentration" and "MNE export activity''. 
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m1(q1)== ~b1qJ +c1q1;J=f,d 
g=g(X,FDIS,ZP ) cd =cd(X,Zd); c1 =c1 (X,Z1 ,EXA,FIE_ EXA) 
Taking the first derivatives with respect to qd,qf and focus ing on the corner solutions 
for the variableq1 , the optimal solutions for qd,qf are derived as follows: 
• I q1 = [P1 -aqd -g(X,FD!S,Zp)-c1 (X,Z1 ,EXA, FIE EXA)] (6.6) a+b1 
Of which, qj is the latent variable that takes the value of q1 if qfi > o and otherwise, 
takes zero. 
In the empirical application, the estimate equation varies by the nature and 
measurement of the dependent variable and data availability. To see the effects of FDI 
on export probability and export propensity, the optimal solution of q 1 for a given firm 
(i) could be transformed into a linear function: 
• qfi = a 0 + a 1P1 +a2 qd + a 3X + a 4 FDIS + a 5Z P + a 6Z 1 + a 7 EXA +a8FIE _ EXA +u fl 
(6.7) 
Based on this equation, two common approaches of estimating export behaviour 
at firm level which are complementary to each other have been explored in the literature 
(Wakelin 1998; Buck et al. 2000). The first is to identify the determinants of export 
probability or export decision ( P(q ~ > O)) by including all exporting and non-exporting 
firms, using the Probit model: 
y, = I 
Y; = 0 
if q ~ = (7) > 0 
o/w 
(6.8) 
If firm exports are positive the dependent variable (y) takes one and zero, otherwise. 
The second approach 1s to examine the export propensity/intensity 
( EXR; = qj, !(q~ + q ~;)) using the Tobit model: 
Y; = EXR 1 
Y1 =0 
if EXR ; > 0 
o/w 
(6.9) 
For simplicity, export intensity measured by the export/output ratio (EXR) is also 
expressed as a linear combination of exogenous variables like optimal export value (q*) 
in (6.7). 
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6.3.2 The empirical model 
The empirical models for the export performance of FIEs rely on the solution in (6.7) 
and two common approaches in (6.8) and (6.9) but with considerable modification. The 
effects from both total FIE-export activity and total-export activity are not of concern at 
this stage and hence are dropped from the model (FIE_EXA and EXA). Of most interest 
is the internal factor of FIEs, i.e., the foreign share in firm capital stock (FDI). A higher 
foreign share in firm capital may be associated with a higher extent of firm control from 
foreign investors, leading to a higher export ratio. A positive effect from foreign equity 
share means greater competitiveness of FIEs in the foreign market and the host 
country's trade balance may benefit from this. Moreover, if this study finds a positive 
impact of FDI on exports of FIEs, it may partly conclude that the policy reform towards 
attracting export-oriented FDI has taken effect. In addition, the form of investment (or 
entry modes) in the host market may have linkages with international trade flows. The 
results of the preceding section on the pattern of FIE exports suggests the hypothesis 
that fully-owned FIEs have a higher export intensity compared to joint-ventures or other 
ownership types, because high foreign control may be associated with easy access to 
proprietary assets from parent companies and intra-firm trade arrangements with other 
affiliates. 
Another policy issue relevant in investigating the determinants of FIE-export 
behaviour is the need to control for the effect of economic zones specifically set up for 
export promotion. The establishment of export processing zones (EZPs) or industrial 
zones (IZs) can be regarded as a catalyst for exporting, since they not only reflect 
overall existing reform but also place upward pressure on further market openness 
(Johansson and Nilsson 1997). In principle, incentives offered to EPZs are distinct from 
those offered to IZs. Firms located in an EPZ are required to be export-oriented. At the 
end of 2003, Vietnam had only three EPZs in operation, whereas nearly 100 IZs had 
been established. The number of FIEs in EPZs is relatively smaller than the number of 
FIEs located outside (about 5 percent of total FIEs). In addition to setting location 
dummies by regional classification, the models in (6.10) and (6.11) will control for FIEs 
located inside industrial zones or export processing zones, respectively37. 
Some previous studies have found the degree of export intensity of FIEs varies 
significantly depending on the home country of the FDI. For instance, Athukorala et al. 
37 By the Investment Law of Vietnam approved in November 2005, an export processing zone (EPZ) is an 
industrial zone requiring to produce export products, intermediates for exported goods and exporting 
activities . Therefore, the committed export ratio may be less than l 00%. 
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(1995) argue that third-world MNEs possess some characteristics that enable them to 
play a specific role in export expansion compared to MNEs from developed countries. 
In addition, there is evidence that the export intensity of U.S MNE affiliates located in 
many parts of the world does not follow the same patterns observed for MNEs head-
quartered in other developed countries (Lipsey and Mucchielli 2002). This study will 
capture this issue by classifying the FDI source country into six different groups based 
on economic development, trade relationship with Vietnam and accumulated FDI 
inflows during the last 20 years. These groups could be Japan, USA, NICs, Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand, using ASEAN as the base dummy. For a more general 
companson, all countries are also divided into developed and developing country 
groups. 
Usually, the determinants of the export decision and export intensity are mostly 
the same but are different in the magnitude and significance level of coefficients. Based 
on specific perspectives, the importance of an exceptional factor in either ·of these 
equations can be argued. The literature supports the construction of separate estimation 
equations for export decision and export intensity. Incorporating all the above 
adjustments related to the determinants of FIE exports with the basic models (in 6. 7, 6.8 
and 6.9), empirical models for the export decision of FIEs are proposed as follows: 
{
y , = I 
Y; = 0 
if q~>O (6.10) 
o/w 
q~ =/Jo+ /J1/Z + fJ2 Y + fJ3 KI+ fJ4WR + fJ5ERP +fJ6FDJ + fJ7 FDIRD _A + {J8SKILL 
7 6 
+¢1 L COUNTRY1 +rr LREGJONr +t+c1 
j = l r~I 
And the export propensity equation is: 
{
Y; = EXR; 
Y; = 0 
if EXR ; > 0 
o/w 
(6.11) 
EXR, = a 0 +a1/Z + a 2 Y +a 3 KI + a 4 WR +a5 ERP + a 6FDI +a 7 FDIRD _A+ a 8 SK!LL 
7 6 
+ <D j L COUNTRY1 + '¥ r L REG JON r +I + r. , 
1~1 r~I 
Where: 
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y Firm revenue (gross output is FDIRD A Industry·average R&D expenditure 
not available in MPI data) of FIEs 
KI Capital/Jabour ratio SKILL Share of skilled workers 
WR Industry wage rate REGION (r) A vector of six regional dummies 
ERP Effective rate of protection COUNTRYG) A vector of 7 dummies for source· 
IZ A dummy for locating in lZs country group 
EPZ A dummy for locating in EPZ 8 The error term 
FDI Foreign share in capital stock T A vector of year dummies, 2000· 
2004 
Comprehensive definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix (A6.2). All 
variables are measured at firm level except for wage rates (WR), share of skilled 
workers (SKILL) and R&D expenditure (FDIRD _A). Information on these variables is 
not available from the MPI records or the two GSO surveys from which the data on the 
other varables were compiled. These variables are measured at the four·digit VSIC level 
using unpublished GSO data (See Section 6.3.4 for details). 
6.3.3 FDI spillovers on export performance of domestic firms 
Models (6.7), (6.8) and (6.9) are modified to develop empirical models for export 
deCision and export intensity, based on theoretical considerations and the nature of data 
availability. The common factors of production (X) - employment and capital are used 
in different ways. The literature prefers capital intensity (KI) to capital stock as a key 
determinant of exports even though the results are mixed (Wakelin 1998; Siddharthan 
and Nollen 2004). Employment can be a good proxy for firm size. However, the 
inclusion of both e!llployment and output in an export equation may affect the results 
when both are good proxies for the firm size. Evidence in the preceding section supports 
using gross output instead of employment to avoid bias as most exporting firms are 
labour·intensive. The optimal solution for quantity of exported goods in equation (6.7) 
shows the price of goods is also an important factor, especially for the world-market 
price. However, this information is not available in the GSO survey. The wage rate is 
included in the model because it may be a good proxy for skill intensity. 
The impact of FIEs on the export performance of domestic firms is of most 
interest. These spillovers are not only demonstrated by the presence of flEs within the 
same industry (FDIS) but also through the effect of FIE-export activity (FIE_EXA) and 
FIE technology innovation activity (FDIRD _A). Of these, FDIS measured by foreign 
171 
share in industry employment may be a sign of competition or ownership effect in the 
production phase. The effect of FIE-export activity is agued to be different from the 
effect of total-export activity as FIEs derive exclusive benefits from the marketing 
network and expertise of parent companies. FIE_ EXA is expected to be an information 
extemality from the geographical location of FIE export (defined below); and 
FDIRD _A measured by expenditure for research and development (R&D) may bring 
FIE innovation spillovers. 
To control for simultaneity effects the export behaviour of domestic firms may 
be affected by the exports of nearby domestic firms or from within the same industry; 
total-export activity (EXA) is included. Similarly to Aitken et al. (1997), the 
measurement of FIE EXA and EXA controls for both geographical and industrial 
effects but there are some differences. Aitken et al. (1997) compute MNE export 
concentration as well as local export concentration using state and three digit ISIC 
levels. As the data are not available for all 64 Vietnamese provinces, computing 
FIE_EXA and EXA at the provincial level is not possible. This study calculates these 
variables by six regions and four-digit VSIC level. Therefore, FIE_EXA is defined as 
the share of regional-industry FIE exports in national industry exports relative to the 
share of regional exports in national manufacturing exports. Likewise, EXA is the share 
of regional-industry exports in national industry exports relative to the share of regional 
exports in national exports. If spillovers exist, all the above variables are assumed to 
have significantly positive coefficients. The formulas for calculating these two 
indicators are as follows: 
EX1, I EX1 EXA1, = 6 
FIE _ EX 1, I EX 1 F!E _ EXA1,= 6 
EX, /LEX, EX, / LEX, 
r =l r=I 
Where EX is total industry-region exports, FIE_EX is industry-region exports of 
foreign invested enterprises, j and rare denoted for a given industry and a given region. 
Other variables (Z), such as firm ownership, central and local government policy 
will affect both the production and distribution process. An important hypothesis is that 
the spillover effects on exports of SOEs may differ significantly from those on the 
exports of private firms. SOEs received a lot of subsidies and preferences in both the 
production and distribution periods in the pre-reform period. Moreover, because of 
direct government control in international trade and other restrictions preventing private 
firms from becoming legal export entities, most exporters pre-2000 were state-owned 
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agencies and SOEs (Auffret 2003). Even today, huge financial support and other 
invisible advantages continue to be given to SOEs (see Chapter 3). The role of SOEs in 
Vietnam is still important as they contribute about 50 percent of gross national 
investment. Therefore, such favourable treatment for SOEs associated with other 
competitive advantages, like firm size, trade experience, and trade network, may help 
SOEs to obtain more benefits from FIE presence compared to domestic private firms. 
To capture the difference in exports, a dummy for SOEs (SOE) is incorporated in all 
specifications. To examine the difference in spillover effects from FIEs, interactions 
between the SOE dummy and proxies for FIE spillovers are included. Moreover;the 
model is controlled for this difference by separate estimation for SOEs and domestic 
private firms. 
Although economic policy in Vietnam has changed dramatically in recent years, 
it still retains some negative effects on firm efficiency. A complex income tax system, 
import restrictions and high protection of indigenous industry have all been shown to 
have a negative impact on growth and market competition. Consequently, empirical 
models will consist of three interchangeable variables: tax rate, effective rate of 
protection (ERP) and subsidy rate. 
The effects of FIE presence and FIE-export activity may also be different from 
'comer to corner', i.e., not the same amongst firm locations and sectors. The effect of 
firm location is examined by two methods; one is to include dummies for six regions, 
with the North Mountainous area as the base dummy. Another is to compare spillovers 
in Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh City and the rest of Vietnam. The investigations for Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City stem from the high concentration of both FOi and domestic 
investment in these two cities. They also offer more advantages in transportation costs, 
infrastructure and investment climate. 
Based on the above considerations, the following equations examine the effects 
of FIEs on the export decision and export intensity of domestic firms. 
Y ; = 1 
y, = 0 
if q~>O 
o/w 
(6.12) 
qj, =/Jo+ f31Y + /32 Kl +/3 3WR + /J4POllCY • + /35FDJS + {J6F1E_EXA + f31 EXA + /38FD!RD _ A+ 
6 36 
/39 LOCAL _ RD+ j310 SOE + a, I REGION,+ b 1 ISECTOR 1 + &; 
r= I J •l5 
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And the FDI spillovers equation for domestic firm export intensity is: 
y , =EXR 1 
Y1=0 
if EXR1 > 0 
o/w 
(6.13) 
EXR1 = a 0 + a 1Y + a 2 KI + a 3WR + a 4POLICY" + a 5FDIS" + a 6F1E_EXA + a 7 EXA + a 8 FDIRD _A 
6 36 
+a9LOCAL _RD+a10SOE+c, LREGJON, +d1 LSECTOR1 +&, 
r=I 1=15 
Where: 
FDIRD A Industry-average 
expenditure ofFIEs 
R&D y 
KI 
WR 
Firm output, 
Capital/labour ratio 
Firm wage rate LOCAL RD Share of domestic-firm R&D in 
POLICY* A vector of policy variables: total industry R&D 
tax rate (TAX), effective rate REGION (r) A vector of six region dummies 
EXA 
FIE-EXA 
FDIS* 
of protection (ERP) and 
subsidies (SUB) SECTORU) 
Total-export activ ity 
FIE-export activity 
Foreign share in industry SOE 
employment (4-digit VSIC). £ 
6.3.4 Data sources 
A vector of 22 industry 
dummies (two-digit VSIC 
level) 
A dummy for SOEs 
The error term 
The data used in estimating the models is compiled from two main sources. First is the 
unpublished data from the administrative record of MPI used to estimate models (6~ 10) 
and (6.11) of the export behaviour of FIEs. This source contains over 3,355 operating 
FIEs, with some information on the location of foreign investment, the home FDI 
country and important factors, like realized capital, employment, actual export and 
revenue from 1996 up to 2004. Unfortunately, information on wage rates, R&D 
expenditure, and skilled workers integrated from the GSO data is only available for the 
period 2000-2004, and hence the data from 1996-1999 are dropped. Furthermore, the 
MPI data cover only the proportion of total FIEs operating in Vietnam up to 2004. 
Because all EPZ firms are export-oriented, to avoid distortion, they are excluded from 
the sample. Regression results using data of all EPZ and non-EPZ firms are reported in 
Appendix A6.4 for reference. 
Second, data compiled from the armual surveys of manufacturing conducted by 
the GSO in 1998 and 2000 are used to estimate the spillover models (models 6.12 and 
6.13). As noted in Chapter 5, the GSO has been conducting this survey annually since 
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2000. Unfortunately, the infonnation on export perfonnance has only been collected for 
these two years. Returns for 1998 contain data for nearly 5000 firms, of which domestic 
firms account for about 3800 firms, although the 2000 data aimed to cover all 
enterprises in Vietnam, about 9,000 domestic manufacturing firms reported. Some 
modification had to be made in the empirical model because of difference. in data 
between two years (1998 and 2000). Using the l 998 data, this study has an additional 
variable, the subsidy/revenue ratio (SUBS). It is impossible to make panel data from 
different yearly data sources; this study plans to undertake estimation of (6.12) and 
(6.13) using separately the 1998 and 2000 data. For the purpose of testing whether or 
not coefficients are different between the two years, a pooled regression is constructed 
with a year dummy (T2000) and its interactions with other exogenous variables. 
6.3.5 Estimation method 
The export decision and export intensity equations are mostly estimated by the Probit 
and Tobit models, respectively. OLS or other linear estimates are not suitable for this 
purpose as the estimated coefficients may be biased or the predicted values of the export 
probability either negative or greater than one. However, the use of either the Tobit or 
Probit model also creates problems as it may lead to selection bias or endogeneity when 
a significant ratio of observations is not used (Heckman 1979). The reason being data 
can be ignored by researchers or fail to be collected from the survey (missing data). In 
that case, the choice of the sample selection correction model proposed by Heckman . 
(1979) is preferred. Nevertheless, the results of the Heckman selection model are not 
easily interpreted and require some critical assumptions on the high correlation between 
the selection indicator and error term. In the case where at least one additional 
independent variable for equations is lacking on the selected sample, it is extremely 
difficult to distinguish the problem caused by selection bias or functional-form 
misspecification (Wooldridge 2003 ). 
Accordingly, this study proposes to test the choice of the fo llowing estimation 
methods: a Heckman selection model or a combination of separate Probit and Tobit 
estimates. Another test would be the appropriateness between the Probit and Tobit 
models. A simple way to evaluate the fit of the Tobit model is to check the significance 
and sign of the coefficients estimated from the same model by Probit and Tobit 
estimates. For instance, if the coefficient of an exogenous variable x(i) is negative and 
significant in the Pro bit model but positive in the Tobit model, the choice of the Tobit 
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model might not be appropriate. The dispersion of information may have some negative 
effects on the testing results for specification and estimation methods. 
It is important to note that data extracted from the administrative records of MPI 
may suffer from some selection bias. The number of FIEs covered in these records only 
account for about one third of total FIEs in operation. The missing information on firm 
exports (dependent variable) from this data source is also significant, especially for 
2003 and 2004. Two important indicators are counted for every year: the number of 
firms with an exporting commitment versus the number of firms reporting positive 
exports. As a result, the ratio between the latter and the former in 2003 and 2004 was 
39.8 and 38.7 percent, respectively (Table 6.7). This indicates that a number of firms 
have not reported their export performance to MPl. Missing values for exports 
(dependent variable) in later years may cause a serious problem if the model is 
estimated by the Probit and Tobit models (Appendix A6. l). To overcome this problem, 
estimation procedures of the Heckman selection model are used. Besides, the testing of 
the significance of the correlation coefficient between error terms ( p ) will act as a 
sufficient condition for using this method. A noteworthy issue for applying · the 
Heckman selection model is that the first step (using the Probit model to estimate 
whether or not FIE exports are observed) requires at least an additional variable not 
included in the second step (to estimate the export intensity of FlEs). This extra variable 
helps to explain the results more efficiently.38 The result may be less convincing if two 
equations have the same functional forms. It should be remembered that under this 
framework, only the results of the second step are used for interpreting the determinants 
of export intensity (model 6. 11). 
For the purpose of estimating the export spillover models (equations 6.12 and 
6.13), we use both the Tobit and Probit models. The main reason for the use of these 
methods is the nature of the firm data surveyed in 1999 and 2001, which cover most 
enterprises in all manufacturing industry and ownership types. These were official 
surveys carried out with technical and financial support from The World Bank, so that 
the data problem issue was tightly controlled. The analysis gives attention to estimating 
inter-sectoral regression, as this approach has been conducted by a large number of 
previous studies, and separate estimates will also be undertaken for selected industries . 
The focus will be on three leading-export industries: food and beverage products (VSIC 
15); manufacture of garments and textiles (VSIC 17-1 9) and manufacture of wood 
38 For more details, see methodology arguments in appendix A 6. 1(Wooldridge2003). 
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products and furniture (VSIC 20 and 36). The regressions for these three groups use the 
same equations, (6.12) and (6.13) but do not include ERP since these variables would be 
swept out from the models. 
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The value of export/revenue ratio (EXR) is time-averaged following the formula: 
2004 
LEXu 
£XR = 1~~°c: * 100/ n · 
L RE,, 
Where: EX - actual exports; RE - firm revenue, n is the number 
1=2000 
of firms at the same age. 
Figure 6.3: Correlation between average export/output ratio and firm age 
Table 6.7: Suspicion of missing data for dependent va riable 
Year Number of firms Number of fums Ratio(%) 
with commitment reporting positive 
on exports exports 
2000 515 611 118.6 
2001 677 675 99.7 
2002 806 785 97.4 
2003 915 364 39.8 
2004 993 383 38.7 
Source: Calculat ion by author from unpublished MPI data. 
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6.4 Results 
This section is divided into two subsections. First, the econometric results of the 
determinants of FIE exports are interpreted. This is followed by the findings on the 
spillover effects of FIE presence on local-firm exports. Finally, spillover estimates are 
presented for selected industries. 
6.4.1 Export behaviour of FIEs 
It the previous section, we argued for using the Heckman selection model instead of 
doing separate estimates as suggested by the Probit and Tobit models. This argwnent is 
further supported by the testing reported in Table 6.8 on the significance of p for all 
specifications. The results confirm the existence of selection bias thus supporting the 
Heckman selection model. 
There are two alternative methods of estimation - Heckman's full maximum 
likelihood estimate and Heckman's two-step estimate. After discussion on the 
advantages of using an additional variable in the first step, the results of the Heckman 
full maximum estimate will be discussed. For a robustness check, Appendix (A6.3) 
presents the results for Heckman's two-step estimates. Table 6.8 reports the estimation 
results for four alternative specifications of model (6.11) on FIE export intensity. They 
differ from each other in the following features. The first specification includes foreign 
share in capital stock (FDIS), whereas the second specification replaces this variable by 
entry-mode dummies (TYPE 1-TYPE3). The third column replaces regional dummies 
with three dummies for Hanoi (base dummy), Ho Chi Minh City (HCM) and the rest of 
Vietnam (OP). The last column shows the difference between developed and developing 
countries using DEC instead of dummies for 7 country groups. 
Among the explanatory variables, FDI is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level or better in every equation. Thus there is overwhelming statistical 
support for the hypothesis that increased FDI participation promotes export expansion. 
Under the law, there are no compulsory regulations on export intensity of FlEs except 
for their commitment (Section 6.2). All EPZ firm s are excluded from the sample, so the 
export performance relates to behaviour of the firm rather than regulatory compulsion. 
The magnitude of the FDI coefficient is robust across the equations. To calculate the 
marginal effect of FDI holding other variables at mean values, the same marginal effect 
is found across all equations, that the equity share of foreign investors increases one 
percentage point the export/output ratio of FlEs may increase by 0.005 percent (Table 
6.9). The replacement of FDI by dummies representing three forms of investment: fully-
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owned FIEs (TYPE 1 ), joint-ventures (TYPE2) and others (TYPE3, a proxy for 
shareholding and capital holding companies, Chapter 4), is investigated in equation 2 
(Table 6.8). Since TYPEl acts as a base dummy, the coefficient of TYPE2 is interpreted 
as the difference in export intensity between fully-owned FIEs and joint ventures. The 
result shows both TYPE2 and TYPE3 are negative and significant at the one percent 
level implying that export probability of fully-owned FIEs is higher than for any other 
entry modes. Comparing between fully-owned FIEs with joint ventures, holding other 
effects constant, the export intensity of the former is about 21 percent higher than the 
latter. 
The findings in Section 6.2 show a clear distinction in export performance by 
home-country groups of the FDI. Holding other effects constant, in general, developed-
country FIEs are more export-intensive than developing-country FIEs (see column 4 of 
Table 6.8). A dummy is used for FIEs from ASEAN countries as the base dummy to 
compare with the other six groups. It is clear that FIEs from Japan, the NICs and Europe 
have higher export intensity than FIEs from ASEAN. ln contrast, the export 
performance of FIEs from the US and ASEAN is not significantly different. 
In terms of policy effects, the coefficient of IZ is positive across specifications 
but insignificant. lt indicates a trivial difference in export/output ratio between FIEs 
located inside or outside lZs. In contrast, when the regression is carried out with the 
inclusion of EPZ firms (Appendix 6.4) both EPZ and IZ dummies are positive and 
significant. Testing for difference between EPZ and IZ has been conducted for all 
equations and the results show that EPZ FIEs have far higher export intensity than non-
EPZ FIEs. The other policy variable, ERP, is negative but insignificant in all four 
equations. This indicates tariffs are unlikely to affect exporting FIEs because most are 
located in low protection industries. Another reason is derived from policy progress in 
removing restrictions from tariffs and setting up a harmonized tax system to attract 
foreign investment. 
The results for the geographical location dummy are reported only for Hanoi 
(base dummy) and Ho Chi Minh City. For other regions the coefficient of this variable 
was found to be statistically insignificant. The coefficient of HCM is positive and 
significant, implying FIEs located in Ho Chi Minh City perform at a higher 
export/output ratio than those located in Hanoi. Reasonably, the southern city owes 
many advantages to transportation costs, market competition and, especially, the change 
in the investment climate. In contrast, FIEs located in Hanoi are likely to concentrate on 
the domestic market due to the huge population in this city and surrounding areas. 
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However, the investment environment in Hanoi is unlikely to encourage export owing 
to the many restrictions on entry costs, land access and capacity of legal institutions 
(USAID and veer 2006). 
The coefficients of the other determinants of export performance suggest further 
research for Vietnamese manufacturing. Firm size has a negative but insignificant 
impact on export intensity regardless of specification. Moreover, both coefficients of 
capital intensity (KI) and wage rates (WR) are negative and significant. As discussed 
previously, most FIEs are labour-intensive and quite autonomous from their parent 
companies (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005). Therefore, higher wages may lead to 
higher variable costs, preventing firms from exporting. The significant but negative sign 
of FDIRD _A indicate FIEs with high investment in R&D activity are not associated 
with a high export/output ratio in the short run since R&D expenditure increases 
production costs. This is especially true in the case of Vietnam as most exporting FIEs 
are labour-intensive with small scale economies. Furthermore, the unexpected effect of 
industry-average R&D expenditure may not capture the true effect due to aggregated 
data and the bias in data reported from FIEs that seems to overstate R&D activity, most 
likely to access more government benefits. Some previous studies, like Nguyen Thi Tue 
Anh et al. (2005) and Le Quoc Hoi (2006), argue that FIEs in Vietnam are autonomous 
with low technology levels compared to MNE affiliates in other host countries. 
As expected, the more skilled workers employed by FIEs relative to domestic 
firms the higher the export intensity gained by these FlEs. This result is straightforward 
as most exporting firms in Vietnam are labour-intensive and the wage gap between the 
two types of workers is not as large as in other developing countries. Therefore, the use 
of more skilled workers makes FIEs more productive and competitive. The correlation 
coefficient between wage rates and industry share of skilled workers is small (0.011), 
allowing inclusion of both variables in the same model. 
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Table 6.8: Determinants of FIE export intensity (Heckman selection model with 
full maximum likelihood estimate) 
Dependent Including FOi Including Hanoi vs. HCM Developed vs. 
variable: EXR Entry mode Developing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FDI 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(8.08)*** (8.17)*** (8.44)*** 
TYPE2 -0.207 
(8.72)*** 
TYPE3 -0.377 
(5.08)*** 
JAPAN 0.246 0.242 0.246 
(7.15)* ** (7.02}*** (7.12)*** 
USA -0.016 -0.027 -0.027 
(0.22) (0.37) (0.35) 
NICS 0.167 0.167 0.152 
(5.33)* * * (5.40)*** (4.82)*** 
AUS -0.003 0.005 -0.026 
(0.04) (0.07} (0.34) 
EUROPE 0.185 0.178 0.187 
(5.19)*** (4.97)*** (5.16)*** 
DEC 0.063 
(3.21)*** 
IZ 0.027 0.018 0.025 0.021 
(1.46) (0.96) (1.38) (1.12) 
y 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.36) (0.18) (0.51) (0.05) 
KI 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(4.36)*** ( 4.25)*"'* (3.90)*** (4.28)*** 
WR -0.01 7 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 
(11.02)*** (11.00)*** (10.97)*** (l J.13)*** 
ERP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.74) (0.33) (0.67) (0.62) 
FDIRD A 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.01 6 -0.017 
(2.77)*** (2.76)*** (2.83)*** (2.71 )*** 
SKILL 0.001 0.001 0.00 1 0.001 
(2.74)*** (3.16)*** (2.33)** (2.89)*** 
HCM 0.107 
(2.70)*** 
Regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5239 5239 5239 5239 
Censored Obs 3617 3617 3617 3617 
Wald ch? 797 864 697 643 
A. 0.11 0.11 0.1 I 0.12 
p 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33 
Wald test of p = 0 36.6 32.3 32.9 39.4 
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
*** Sign ificant at l % level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6.9: Marginal effects of export determinants for FIEs 
Including FDI Including Hanoi vs. Developed vs. 
Variables\Model Entry mode HCM Developing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FDI 0.005 0.005 0.005 
TYPE2 
-0.207 
TYPE3 
-0.377 
JAPAN 0.246 0.242 0.246 
USA -0.016 -0.027 -0.027 
NICS 0.167 0.167 0.152 
AUS -0.003 0.005 -0.026 
EUROPE 0.185 0.178 0.187 
DEC 0.063 
IZ 0.027 0.018 0.025 0.021 . 
y 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
KI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
WR -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.01 8 
ERP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
FDIRD A -0.016 -0.016 -0.01 6 -0.017 
SKILL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
HCM 0.107 
OP 0.085 
Notes: Heckman Selection Mode, full maximum likelihood estimate was used. 
This is undertaken by the command "mfx" after Heckman selection estimate. 
The specifications are the same as Table 6.8. 
The mean values are used for calculating marginal effects except for dummies. 
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Table 6.10: Structure break testing for the difference in coefficient between two 
years, 1998 vs. 2000 
Variable Probit estimate Tobit estimate Direction of 
change 
Coefficient T value Coefficient T value 
y 0.0017 3.94*** 0.0080 5.11*** Positive, 
Y * T2000 -0.0002 2.95*** -0.0010 2.64*** decreasing 
KI 0.0001 0.68 0.0014 1.11 Positive, 
KI* T2000 -0.0005 2.24** -0.0028 1.50 Insignificant 
WR 
-0.0008 0.27 0.0016 0.08 Negative, 
WR* T2000 0.0240 4.00*** 0.1214 3.17*** decrease 
FDIS -0.0064 2.95*** -0.0512 2.34** Negative, 
FDIS * T2000 0.0090 3.76*** 0.0908 3.76*** decreasing 
FIE EXA 
-20.788 4.58*** -144.858 3.81 *** Negative, 
FIE EXA *T2000 13.422 2.25** 82.672 1.55 Decreasing 
EXA 10.891 4.51*** 75.327 6.77*** Positive, 
EXA*T2000 -6.649 2.44** -51.128 4.00*** Decreasing 
TAX 
-0.1 187 6.77*** -0.9038 9.13*** Negative, 
TAX*T2000 -1.6432 1.31 -8.6660 3.79*** increasing 
Notes: Using pooled data set, 1998-2000. 
Other variables: SOE, ERP, regional dummies, sector dummies are included but not 
reported here. 
183 
6.4.2 Spillover effect of FIEs on export performance of domestic 
firms 
The results of the testing reported in Appendix A6.7 of the significance of the 
coefficient of error term ( p or A.) support the use of Probit and Tobit procedures to 
estimate equations (6. 12) and (6.13), respectively. The effects of FDI on export decision 
and export intensity are investigated together with other exogenous variables. Therefore, 
the estimation results for these two equations are interpreted separately. A point worth 
emphasising for both the export decision and export intensity equation is that they are 
estimated using the 1998 and 2000 data separately, based on the results of testing. for 
difference in coefficients between the two years reported in Table 6.10. A pooled data 
set and a year dummy (T2000) are constructed. All time-variant variables are interacted 
with the year dummy. These interactions are included in the model as exogenous 
vari.ables indicating the difference in effects between the two years. The results show 
five of seven interactions are significant at the one percent level implying the 
coefficients are different between the two years. As a result, the focus is on separate 
estimation in order to exploit some exclusive information from each year. 
Export decision of domestic firms 
Table 6.11 reports separate estimates for the export decision of domestic firms using the 
1998 and 2000 data. The t-ratios of regression coefficients reported here have been 
derived using White's heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
The preceding discussion shows the impact of FDI on the export decision of 
domestic firms may be through three factors: competition effect (FDIS), FIE-export 
activity (FIE_EXA) and the demonstration effect (FDIRD _A). First, the competition 
effect of FDI is likely to be ambiguous as the FDIS coefficient changes its sign and 
significance level across equations. Over time, there may be a shift from a negative to a 
positive competition effect; i.e., using the 1998 data, FDIS is negative and significant in 
4 out of 5 equations, whereas using the 2000 data, FDIS is negative in only 3 out of 7 
equations. This seems to suggest spillover effects are endogenous to the reform process. 
In other words, the growth of the domestic private sector is crucial for gaining spillovers 
from FIEs. In the initial period of reform, when the private sector was weak and small, 
spillovers may have been negative. Over time, development of the private sector has 
helped domestic firms gain from FIE presence. The substitution of FDIS by another 
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variable, foreign share in industry skilled workers (FDl_SKILL_S) provides no more 
evidence on spillovers. 
The main concern of this chapter is the extemality of FIE-export activity on the 
export performance of domestic firms measured by the estimated coefficient of 
FIE_ EXA. The estimate suggests the presence of FIEs had a negative impact on the 
export decision of domestic firms in both years, regardless of the particular specification 
used. This indicates that the concentration of FIE exports in a given industry and a 
given region has a crowding-out effect on the export probability of domestic firms. This 
type of effect may be more severe than the competition effect (FDIS) as the estimated 
coefficients of FIE_EXA are always larger than FDIS. Calculating the marginal effect 
of FIE_EXA in the first equation of Table 6.11 and holding other variables at mean 
values, indicates one measurement unit of increase in FIE-export activity results in a 
likelihood of decreasing exports by 3.5 percent. This result complements the ambiguous 
competition effect of FDI found earlier and helps reach the conclusion that, with the 
exclusion of the time constraint, the entry of FDI through the operation of FIEs may 
harm the export probability of domestic firms. In contrast, total-export activity (EXA) 
plays a very important role in the possibility of domestic firm exports as its coefficients 
are positive and strongly significant in all equations. However, the estimated size of 
FIE-export spillover effects is always bigger than the total-export effect and both 
variables are highly significant. Therefore, it is possible to say the negative effect of FIE 
exports is stronger than the positive impact from other domestic-firm exports. 
In looking at the demonstration effect, the industry-average R&D expenditure of 
FIEs is included (FDIRD _A). Unfortunately, the information on R&D expenditure is 
only available for the 2000 data, so a comparison cannot be captured on the innovation 
effect between the two years. Looking at the equations including FDIRD _A, the 
coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at the five percent level. Moreover, 
the appearance of FDlRD A seems to improve the significance level of positive effects 
of domestic-firm R&D (LOCAL_RD). This indicates R&D activity in FIEs may induce 
a complementary effect on local firm R&D activity and both may have a positive impact 
on the export decision of domestic firms. The effect of FIE R&D is separated from the 
competition effect (FDIS) as the correlation coefficient between these two variables is 
only 0.16. 
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Table 6.11: Effects of FIEs on export decision of domestic manufacturing firms 
1998 - Probit estimate 2000 - Probit estimate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FDIS -0.0043 -0.0074 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0079 
(l.70)* (3.07)*** (0.02) (0.17) (2.42)** 
FIE EXA -20.2658 -19.3866 -12.5184 -24.9853 -10.7512 -14.4393 
(4.18)*** (4.59)*** (3.60)*** (5.45)*** (1.99)** (2.63)*** 
EXA 12.1518 10.2606 8.6629 15.9916 6.7337 6.1926 
(4.47)*** (4.64)*** (4.04)*** (7.66)*** (2.43)** (2.69)*** 
FDI SKILL S -0.0016 
- -
(0.79) 
FDIRD A 
Other exogenous IMPORT, IMPORT, IMPORT, IMPORT, LOCAL RD LOCAL RD 
variables SUBR, TAX, SUBR, ERP, SUBR, TAX, SUBR, TAX ERP 
SOE SOE, Y, KI, SOE, HANOI, TAX, SOE, Y, KI, SOE, Y, KI, 
Y, KI, WR WR HCM, Y,KI, SOE, Y, KI, WR WR 
WR WR 
Region dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observa.tions 3762 3762 3762 3655 5153 5153 
Wald x·u> 540 486 414 566 1205 1173 
Notes: For brevity, only variables of interest are reported. All robust T/Z statistics are presented in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1% level;** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
(7) (8) 
0.0080 
(2.75)*** 
-11.4239 -11.5506 
(2.00)** (2.03)** 
4.7674 7.2355 
(2.28)** (2.33)** 
0.0020 
(0.74) 
LOCAL RD LOCAL RD 
TAX TAX 
SOE, HANOI, SOE, Y, KI, 
HCM, Y, KI, WR 
WR 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
5153 5153 
1053 1209 
(9) 
0.0012 
(0.37) 
-11.1544 
(2.04)** 
6.6963 
(2.44)** 
0.1340 
(2.43)** 
LOCAL_RD 
TAX 
SOE, Y, KI, 
WR 
Yes 
Yes 
5153 
1202 
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All policy variables (SUBR, TAX and ERP) have the expected sign in the export 
decision equation. In the context of the world-wide market, government subsidies 
mostly delivered to SOEs (SUB) are likely to have a negative impact on firm export 
decisions unless they are in the form of export incentives. However, the coefficient of 
this variable is insignificant in most specifications, indicating government support for 
SOEs has been substantially removed. Other policies, such as corporate income tax ratio 
(TAX) and protection policy (ERP) for domestic products are proven to be critical 
constraints for the export decision, especially in the early period. As expected, from the 
changes in policy toward removing restrictions and international market integration, 
exporting activity would experience more positive than negative impacts. However, the 
coefficient of ERP included in all three equations is negative and statistically significant 
implying protection for domestic products through tariffs may discourage domestic 
firms from entering the international market. The coefficient of ERP is underestimated 
because of assuming no change in protection policy throughout the years of study. 
All other determinants are consistent with the theoretical expectation in every 
equation, with the exception of the effect of wage rates (WR). Using the 1998 data, the 
wage rate is positive but insignificant in all equations. When the empirical model is 
modified slightly in order to use the 2000 data, a higher wage is associated with higher 
export probability. Under the slow-moving unskilled/skilled employment structure, 
higher wages may be accompanied by higher productivity, so that firms have more 
likelihood of exporting. Another possibility is that in a developing labour market like 
Vietnam, wage rates may be distorted by legal minimum wages and differences in wage 
determination between economic sectors, especially the state-owned area.39 
The export behaviours of domestic private firms and SOEs are found to be 
significantly different. In all equations, the estimated coefficient of SO Es is positive and 
highly significant. This indicates SOEs are more likely to export than domestic private 
firms. One possible explanation is that rriost SOEs inherited a lot of advantages 
provided by the government since the pre-reform period, such as huge capital stock and 
technology, a large pool of skilled employment and a trade relationship with 
international partners. Furthermore, although there was some policy change in those 
years in terms of removing restrictions on export participation, it was still difficult for 
the domestic private sector to enter the international market. However, the concern of 
this study is the ownership differences in competition spillovers, information spillovers 
from FIE exports and from other domestic exports on the export decision of a given 
39 See Friedman (2004) for more discussion on wages, ownership and labour practices. 
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domestic firm. Therefore, the interactions between the SOE dummy with FDIS, 
FIE EXA and EXA are included.40 The two first interactions with FDIS and FIE_EXA 
are positive in all equations and highly significant when using the 1998 data. This 
means the competition and export concentration from FIEs cause a smaller nega.tive 
impact on the export decision of SOEs than on the export decision of domestic private 
enterprises. However, the difference in the effects of local export concentration on SOE 
and private exports is confusing as the sign of the last interaction changes between the 
two years of study. 
Other export determinants have expected signs but are not statistically 
significant. The role of firm size measured by gross output (Y) is positive and 
significant. As some previous studies have found, employment can be a good proxy for 
firm size and causes a diminishing effect on export behaviour (Wakelin 1998; Buck et 
al. 2000). The present study replaces Y with two variables: firm employment and its 
square (EMP and SQ_EMP). The results from two equations (from using data for the 
two years separately) substantiate the hypothesis that "although size may be an 
advantage in exporting, this may not apply to very large firms which can be more 
oriented towards the domestic market due, for example, to a domestic monopoly that 
gives them no incentive to export" (Wakelin 1998, p.833). The other widely examined 
factor in the export behaviour model - capital intensity (Kl) is shown as having an 
ambiguous effect. KI is always insignificant and has a fluctuating sign across all 
equations. Looking at difference by regions, all regional dummies are included but this 
study focuses on the differences between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City compared with 
the rest of Vietnam (the base dummy). The results show domestic firms located in Ho 
Chi Minh City have higher export likelihood than other places, whereas the export 
decision of domestic firms in Hanoi is not much different from elsewhere. 
Impact of FIE presence on export intensity of domestic firms 
The preceding analysis using a Probit model with controls for heteroskedasticity acts as 
an unrestricted model to examine the determinants of export decision in which the roles 
of FDI are of most interest. For the higher level of investigation, i.e., how FDl entry and 
the exports of FlEs affect the export intensity of domestic firms, estimation using the 
Tobit model was chosen. The Tobit model is taken as a truncated or restricted model 
40 The interactions between SOE and other interest variables are SOE_FDIS, SOE_FIE_EXA and 
SOE EXA. 
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whose dependent variable is observed if it is greater than zero. The results are presented 
in Table 6.12. In general, the Tobit estimated coefficients are highly consistent with 
those of the Pro bit model but with some general differences. 
The effect of FIE exports (FIE_EXA) is negative and significant in all 
equations, but with large differences in size of effect and significance level from year to 
year. Despite a little difference in specification, the exports of FIEs seem to have a 
higher negative effect on the export perfonnance of domestic firms in 2000 compared to 
1998 but the significance level decreases over the two years. The pooled-data regression 
in Table 6.10 also confirms that positive spillovers (both FDIS and FIE_EXA) increase 
in the latter year. This requires further econometric analysis using updated information 
to find both short-run and long-run externalities from FIE exports. 
In contrast, the effect of total-export activity (EXA) is positive and highly 
significant although the coefficient of this variable is much lower than that of FIE_ EXA 
within the same equation. The impact of foreign ownership (FDIS) in the Tobit model 
has a similar pattern to the Probit model, i.e., the negative effect of FDIS dominates at a 
significant level in most equations. The third indicator for measuring FDI spillovers, 
R&D expenditure of FIEs, is positive but insignificant. This provides more evidence 
that the R&D activity of FIEs does not have a significant effect on exports or on the 
productivity perfonnance of domestic firms even though it may have some influence on 
the export decision of local competitors. The reason for this may be the nature of FIEs 
in Vietnam. They are not established by leading international MNEs and have relative 
independence from their parent companies. Furthennore, FlEs may not give priority to 
R&D activity, so that the technology gap between these firms and local competitors is 
not very high. Another explanation is that FIEs in Vietnam have been successful in 
preventing technology leakages. They keep their trained workers and attract the best 
ones from domestic firms (see the section on labour turnover in Chapter 7: FDI, 
Employment and Wages). 
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Table 6.12: Effects of FDI on export intensity of domestic firms 
Variables 1998- Tobit estimate 2000 - Tobit estimate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FDJS -0.0039 -0.0071 -0.0005 
-0.0009 -0.0376 0.0388 0.0016 
(2.05)** (3.49)*** (0.23) (0.05) (2.11)** (2.24)** (0.09) 
FIE EXA -15.8097 -16.5703 -10.5488 -20.1911 -45.4636 -62.2015 -53.4514 -46.5548 -46.9934 
(5.41)*** (5 .36)* * * (3.80)*** (6.67)*** (1.81)* (2.41)** (2.02)** (1.84)* (1.86)* 
EXA 8.5713 7.9803 6.5685 12.2150 27.9746 25.5258 20.5620 28.5419 27.8406 
(9.34)*** (8.32)*** (7.30)*** (11.07)*** (3.68)*** (3.33)*** (2.68)*** (3.65)*** (3.66)*** 
FDI SKfLL S -0.0010 0.0020 
- - (0.68) (0.16) 
FDIRD A 0.5752 
(1.37) 
Other exogenous IMPORT, IMPORT, IMPORT, IMPORT, LOCAL RD LOCAL RD LOCAL_RD LOCAL RD LOCAL_RD 
variables SUBR., TAX, SUBR, ERP, SUBR, TAX, SUBR, TAX ERP TAX TAX TAX 
SOE, Y, KI, SOE, Y, Kl, SOE, HANOI, TAX, SOE, Y, Kl, SOE, Y, KI, SOE, HANOI, SOE, Y, KI, SOE, Y, Kl, 
WR WR HCM, Y, KI, SOE, Y, KI, WR WR HCM, Y,KI, WR WR 
WR WR WR 
Regional dummies Yes yes No Yes yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes yes yes Yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3841 3841 3841 3734 5164 5164 5164 5164 5164 
Censored obs 3 142 3142 3142 3042 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 
Log likelihood R 1040 788 833 1043 1125 1218 973 1125 1127 
Notes: *** Significant at l % level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. For brevity, only variables of interest are reported. 
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Table 6.13: FDI spillovers on exports in selected industries 
Export decision (EXD) 
Food & beverages Garment & textiles Wood & furniture Food & beverages 
1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 
FDIS -0.015 -0.013 -0.004 0.020 -0.007 0.003 -0.014 
(2.33)** (2.32)** (1.09) (4.70)*** (2.05)** (0.3 l) (3.07)*** 
FIE EXA -113.4 11 -26.250 -45.697 -19.797 -45.397 -24.206 -64.852 
(4.56)* ** (1.93)* (3.05)*** (2.22)** (3.3 l)*** (0.94) (4.35)*** 
EXA 34.362 1.847 27.256 2.846 20.765 6.044 19.275 
(7.68)** * (0.66) (7.51)*** (1.13) (2.38)** (1.12) (6.71)*** 
No of 871 1906 1404 2499 413 578 871 Observation 
Censored 704 Observation 
Log Likelihood NA 457 
ratio 
Wald X 2 U) 221 289 286 625 74 I 124 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity is controlled for Probit model. 
For brevity only variables of interest are reported (coefficient and T value). 
***Significant at 1% level;** significant at 5% level; and* significant at 10% level. 
2000 
-0.013 
(l.55) 
-32.170 
(2.77)*** 
4.674 
(1.23) 
1906 
1701 
447 
Export intensity (EXR) 
Garment & textiles Wood & furniture 
1998 2000 1998 2000 
-0.003 0.179 -0.006 0.021 
(1.18) (6.42)*** (2.38)** (1.01) 
-37.155 -116.359 -28.834 -77.449 
(5.42)*** (2.32)** (3.11)*** ( l.68)* 
17.758 24.453 12.398 14.092 
(7.25)*** ( 1.43) (2.12)** (1.80)* 
1404 2499 440 578 
1090 1944 285 378 
480 677 136 118 
NA 
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In terms of ownership differences, SOEs record a significantly higher export intensity 
compared to domestic private firms. Apart from the reasons listed in the preceding 
discussion, differences in ages and number of firms also affect the results. The state-
owned sector covers only a small number of experienced exporting firms, whereas the 
private sector contains a huge number of newly established firms. The difference in FDI 
effects on the export performance of SO Es and domestic private enterprises is the same 
as in the Probit analysis. Implicitly, both market competition (FDIS) and export 
information effects (FIE_ EXA) on SOE exports are lower than on exports of domestic 
private firms. However, total-export activity (EXA) has a less detrimental effect on the 
export intensity of the private sector than on the state-owned sector. 
Results for selected industries 
This section investigates the effect of the presence of FIEs on the export performance of 
domestic firms in three selected industries: food and beverage products (VSIC 15); 
manufacture of garments and textiles (VSlCl 7-19); and manufacture of wood products 
and furniture (VSIC20 and VSIC36). These are the industries in which most FIEs are 
concentrated. 
Table 6.13 reports the estimated results for the key variables, competition effect 
(FDIS), total FIE-export activity (FIE_EXA) and total-export activity (EXA) using the 
same functional forms as in equations (1) and (5) of Table 6.11. In general, the FDI 
effects differ by industry and the nature of data used. Using the 1998 data, the 
competition effect of FIEs (FDIS) on the export behaviour of domestic firms is negative 
in all three industries but insignificant in garments and textiles. Using the 2000 data, 
this kind of effect is negative and significant in only the food processing industry. More 
interestingly, domestic firms in garments and textiles obtain benefits from ownership 
spillovers (FDIS) in making export decisions and increasing the export/output ratio. The 
results for effect from total FIE-export activity (FIE_ EXA) are not as consistent as 
FDIS. The coefficient of FIE_ EXA is always negative and significant, indicating 
exports of FIEs that are concentrated in a given industry have a negative impact on the 
export decision and export intensity of domestic firms. Moreover, the size of this effect 
on domestic firms is lower for export decision but higher for export intensity when 
comparing the 1998 and 2000 data. The effect of total-export activity (EXA) is highly 
consistent amongst the three industries and between the two years. Although the 
estimated coefficient is positive in all equations it seems highly significant when using 
-
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the 1998 data. Perhaps the role of domestic firms in exporting has relatively decreased 
due to direct competition from FIEs in the same industry and the challenges from world 
market integration. 
In conclusion, this study of the detenninants of export performance using firm-
level data provides consistent results on the negative impacts of FOi entry through total 
FIE-export activity and FIE competition (or foreign ownership) on the export behaviour 
of domestic firms. Although bringing a positive influence to the export decision of 
domestic firms, the R&D activity of FIEs does not affect their export intensity. In 
contrast, the total-export activity within a given industry and region tends to increase 
the export performance of domestic finns. There is also a clear difference in export 
behaviour between SOEs and domestic private firms. SOEs are found to exhibit greater 
export propensity than domestic private firms, even though there is evidence that both 
types of firms have lower export propensity compared to FIEs. The poor export 
performance of local private firms compared to SOEs may reflect the fact that private 
sector-oriented reforms in Vietnam have not yet become deep-rooted: domestic private 
firms might be burdened by many trade and non-trade barriers relative to SOEs, like 
export and import quotas, access to credit and international relations. In addition, most 
private firrns are small scale ventures with a fairly short performance record and 
therefore may face more difficulties in international market competition. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined two key themes related to the role of foreign invested 
enterprises (FIEs) in the expansion of manufacturing exports from Vietnam. The first 
them is the factors impacting on the export performance of FlEs. The second relates to 
spillover effects of the presence of FlEs in the form of competition effect (or ownership 
effect), FIE-export activity (information extemality) and demonstration effect on export 
decision and export intensity of domestic firms. The spillovers were investigated in 
conjunction with other exogenous factors like total-export activity and geographical 
firm location. 
The evidence shows that FIEs have played a crucial role in export expansion 
from Vietnam. Participation of FIEs in exporting was found to exist in every two-digit 
VSIC industry but to be concentrated in labour-intensive industries. This means MNEs 
enter Vietnam with their main objective of taking advantage of cheap labour in 
international production (efficiency-seeking FDI). There have not been many high 
technology FIEs established. Instead, FIEs are likely to have higher firrn size in terms of 
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employment. In general, the export/output ratio of FIEs has increased over time, but is 
still below the export-committed ratios declared in their investment applications .. 
FIE export behaviour was estimated by the Heckman selection model to control 
for the serious problem of missing data on firm-level exports. The empirical models 
explore unpublished MPI data supplemented by industry-average data derived from the 
GSO 2000-2004 enterprise survey. The estimated results clearly confirm the important 
role of foreign ownership in manufacturing export performance. That is, fully-owned 
FIEs have a higher export/output ratio than joint ventures and other entry modes. The 
policy on the purpose of export orientation has been somewhat effective, despite some 
serious issues arising. The policy encouraging MNE affiliates to locate in industrial 
zones, especially in export processing zones, has taken effect with higher export 
intensity. In comparison between two groups of countries, FIEs from the developed 
world clearly achieve higher export intensity than those from developing countries. The 
picture of FIE exports disaggregated by the specific groups of home countries is more 
straightforward. In comparison with FlEs from ASEAN, FlEs from Japan and the NICs 
perform at a higher export/output ratio. The gap between European and ASEAN FIEs is 
smallest. In contrast, there is no difference between the export performance of the US, 
Australian and ASEAN FIEs. These findings confinn a higher export orientation of 
investment from Asian countries, especially Japan and the NlCs. The export intensity of 
FIEs is also highly geographically concentrated as most high exporting FIEs are located 
in the south of Vietnam, like in Ho Chi Minh City and some adjacent provinces. 
Looking at the effects of FDI on the export decision and export intensity of 
domestic firms, the results are highly consistent in indicating a negative effect from 
FIEs on the export performance of domestic firms. This situation stems from the 
weakness of domestic firms. Most are private-owned with no experience in world trade, 
having small economies of scales and facing biased treatment from the government 
compared to SOEs. In contrast, total-export activity controlled for industrial and 
geographical variation is found to have positive and significant effects. However, the 
inter-industry estimation demonstrates total-export activity is much weaker than FIE-
export activity in terms of absolute values. This means high export concentration within 
a sector or region may encourage domestic-finn exports but the negative impact from 
FIE exports may be stronger. In addition, the competition effect from the presence of 
FIE seems to be sensitive to the particular functional form used and to industry 
characters. 
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Estimating spillover models for selected industries gives more interesting 
results. The competition effect is found to be more clearly negative in the food and 
garment industries (labour intensive) due to the large number of FIEs in those areas. For 
capital intensive industries, participation evaluate·d by foreign share of employment in a 
sector may not be important. In contrast, the geographical export location of both FIEs 
and other domestic exporters is very important. In comparing FDI effects on different 
ownership types, dummies for SOEs and their interactions with interest variables were 
included. The results show SOEs performed with higher export probability and export 
intensity than private firms. Moreover, SOEs are less likely to be affected by any 
detrimental export information from FIEs. However, both FIE-export activity and ·FIE 
competition effect (FIE-EXA and FDIS) change significantly over time, indicating that 
further study using a dynamic approach to examine spillovers is needed. The 
remarkable policy change after 2000 associated with trade openness and private sector 
development may also require updated firm-level data on exports for analysis. 
195 
Chapter 7: FOi, Employment and Wages 
7.1 Introduction 
There have been. a number of studies on the nexus between foreign direct inves.tment 
(FDI) and host country wages, with the emphasis on wage comparison between 
domestic-owned and foreign-invested enterprises (Dunning 1993; Aitken et al. 1996; 
Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Zhao 2001; Lipsey and Sjoholm 2004). However, there is a 
dearth of systematic empirical analyses of the impact of FDI on other aspects of host-
country Iahour market effects such as employment generation, structural change in 
employment patterns and the relationship between ownership and factor proportions in 
domestic manufacturing. In aiming to fill this gap, this chapter investigates the direct 
effect of FIEs on employment generation with an emphasis on growth and composition 
of labour absorption, labour turnover and factor proportions. A comparison of wages 
paid by domestic firms and FIEs is also conducted, taking account of industrial and 
regional peculiarities and other important factors. This is followed by an examination of 
ownership difference in labour-demand adjustment. 
7.2 Measuring the employment effects of FDI 
7 .2.1 Overall trend 
Under Vietnam' s centrally-planned economy, the labour market was extremely 
restricted. Labour was allocated in two main sectors: agriculture collectives in rural 
areas; and the state-owned sector (including SOEs and government agencies) in the 
urban areas. The non-farming private sector was very weak as the state-owned sector 
accounted for most formal sector employment. Except for. the majority of people living 
in rural area, labour allocation and wage determining in the formal sector were directed 
by the government at different levels. The SOE managers had no role in setting wages, 
or hiring and firing workers. Labour mobility between two firms was almost impossible, 
especially from SOEs to private firms because of restrictions on transferring pension 
rights, health insurance and other benefits. Workers also preferred to stay in SOEs 
because they derived superior job security and social benefits (pension, health 
insurance, paid leave) that were not available from private firms as a consequence of 
developing the imperfection market. Labour mobility between two geographical regions 
was also very limited because residency transfer was required but not allowed, in 
particular for people moving from rural to urban areas (O 'Connor 1996; Jenkins 2004). 
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Even if people had moved to cities, it was not easy to find a job because they were not 
under the government's direction and there were not many opportunities in the 
underdeveloped private sector. 
Over the past two decades of reform, the Vietnamese labour market has been 
restructured and liberialised. Restrictions on wage setting and labour mobility have been 
considerably relaxed. As a result, there has been a remarkable shift in labour utility 
amongst ownership types as well as industries. In particular, the share of farming jobs in 
the working population decreased significantly, from 49.5 to about 38.8 percent over the 
period 1993-2004, whereas, the share of non-farming private employment (including 
non-farm employment, domestic private firms and FIEs) increased from 25.6 to 34.8 
percent over the same period (World Bank 2006). Since 2000, domestic private 
enterprises have grown fast becoming the main provider of wage employment. 
The role of FIEs in creating new jobs has been discussed in some previous 
studies. For example, Nguyen Tuan Dung (1 999) and Le Dang Doanh (2002) found the 
number of new jobs produced by FIEs was lower than expectations when compared 
with the important share of FDI in total investment. This situation might hold as their 
studies focus on the first period of reform from 1986 to 2000 when most FIEs were joint 
ventures. From 2000 onward, things changed significantly as a result of the notable shift 
in foreign investment from IS production to export-oriented production. Table 7.1 
shows foreign share of total employment increased by only 0.5 percent over the period 
1993-2000 and one percent during 2000-2005. By 2005, the foreign-owned sector 
accounted for the smallest share of working population (about 676,000 people or 1.6 
percent). However, this information may underestimate the number of workers 
employed by FIEs as it is based on pilot surveys of the national population conducted 
by the GSO. Based on data on the annual enterprise surveys that collect information 
from all enterprises, the number of workers in manufacturing FIEs in 2005 was much 
higher, achieving over one million people (Table 7.4). This data source may estimate 
more precisely than the national population survey on the number of FIE employees. 
Most FlEs are in manufacturing, making it more important to evaluate their 
contribution within this sector rather than in the economy as a whole because the latter 
has been dominated by agriculture and self-employment. Vietnamese manufacturing has 
recorded a notable gain in job creation although data limitation precludes reporting the 
change in manufacturing employment between the first year of reform in 1986, and the 
years under study (2000-2004). However, from the current available data, it can be 
concluded that the employment effect of FDl has been substantial in recent years. By 
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2005, employment in FIE accounted for over one third of total employment in the 
formal manufacturing sector (Table 7.2). As discussed in Chapter 4, this significant 
increase was underpinned by a notable shift in the composition of FIE output from 
domestic market-oriented production towards export-oriented production. In other 
words, policy reform led to a huge entry by fully-owned FIEs using a high level of 
labour intensity for export-oriented strategies. The structure of manufacturing 
employment has been changed by the relative employment increase for both FIEs and 
domestic private firms in line with a decline in SOE employment. In 2005, the share of 
FIEs in manufacturing employment surpassed both domestic private firms and SOEs. 
Table 7.2 also presents disaggregated data on manufacturing employment at two 
points of time, 2000 and 2005, decomposed by four specific ownership types: fully-
owned FlEs, joint ventures, domestic private firms and SOEs. FIEs have played an 
increasing and important role across most two-digit industries. They were particularly 
important (accounting for over 50 percent of total employment) in five industries which 
use a high import ratio of inputs and advanced technology: leather products; office 
accounting equipment and computers; electrical machinery; and radio, television and 
communication equipment. Moreover, there were nine sectors in which FIEs accounted 
for over 40 percent of total employment. Decomposing by entry mode, the share of joint 
ventures in manufacturing employment has been small and stable over time. Most of the 
increase in FIE employment has been by fully-owned FIEs which have been 
increasingly involved in export oriented activities. Comparing the two domestic 
ownership types, domestic private enterprises were distributed more equally in every 
industry but only dominated in two sub sectors: wood products and paper products. The 
employment share of SOEs has significantly declined over time although still 
accounting for about 30 percent of total manufacturing employment and over 40 percent 
of total employment in eight two-digit VSlC industries. 
7.2.2 Growth in manufacturing employment 
The index of employment helps explain more about the employment mix of FDl effects. 
Table 7.3 shows all firm types have increased in employment absorption, with faster 
growth in FIEs compared to domestic firms. Over 2000-2005, the armual average 
gr°'vth rate of FIE employment was 26 percent while the index for domestic firm 
employment was 9.1 percent. In particular, fully-owned FIEs recorded the highest 
growth followed by domestic private firms. The lower growth in SOE employment is 
explained by the government's effort to restructure SOEs and privatize a number of 
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unimportant ones. In terms of absolute values, the number of new jobs that created by 
all FIEs was smaller than created by all domestic firms but was larger than for either 
domestic private firms or SOEs. Growth in FIE employment was higher than for 
domestic firms in almost all industries. Industries having the most impressive growth in 
FIE employment included wearing apparel, publishing and printing, furniture, and 
transportation vehicles (excluding motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers). In contrast, 
domestic enterprises gained the largest growth in office, accounting and computing 
equipment; motor vehicles and trailers; coke and refined petroleum products; and 
fabricated metal products. In comparison with SOEs, employment growth for domestic 
private firms was much higher in most two-digit industries. SOEs were stronger than 
domestic private firms in some sectors related to electronics and automobiles which 
require advanced technology, a large capital scale and receive a high level of protection. 
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Table 7.1: The number of employed people aged 15 years and over by main ownership type 
Year 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Employment (1000 persons) 
State-owned 1,762 2,973 3,094 3,533 3,606 3,501 3,604 3,751 4,035 4 ,108 4,127 
Domestic private 29,785 31,005 31 , 128 31,083 31,884 33,882 34,597 35,318 36,019 36,847 37,906 
Foreign-owned 32 144 130 184 190 227 362 440 520 631 676 
Percentage of total (%) 
State 5.6 8.7 9.0 10.2 10.1 9.3 9.3 9.5 10.0 9.9 9.7 
Domestic private 94.3 90.9 90.6 89.3 89.4 90.1 89.7 89.4 88.8 88.6 88.8 
Foreign-owned 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Total 31,579 34,122 34,352 34,801 35,680 37,610 38,563 39,508 40,574 41,586 42,709 
Source: - Pham Diem Quynh et al. (2002) for the period 1996-1999. 
- GSO website (www.gso.gov.vn) for the period 2000-2005. 
- World Bank (1999, 2006) and Jenkins (2004) for 1993 and 1996 data. 
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Table 7.2: Manufacturing employment by ownership, 2000 and 2005 
2 digit VSIC Total employment Percenta2e shares 
(1000 people) All FIEs Fully-owned Joint ventures Domestic private SO Es 
FIEs 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
I 5: Food products 267 414 12.9 16.2 7.8 10.6 5.0 5.6 39.0 47.1 48.2 36.7 
16: Tobacco products 12 15 2.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.9 1.6 1.0 95.6 96.1 
17: Manufacture of textiles 124 165 19.6 27.6 15.6 24.1 4.0 3.5 22.7 27.7 57.7 44.7 
! 8: Wearing apparel 232 528 19.2 44.0 15.9 39.5 3.3 4.5 31 .9 29.0 48.9 27.0 
19: Leather products 293 547 38.5 62.3 35.1 57.6 3.4 4.6 38.8 26.4 22.7 11 .3 
20: Wood products 55 115 14.9 16.5 11 .6 13.7 3.3 2.8 58.3 51.5 26.8 32.0 
21: Paper products 37 67 10.7 15.4 9.1 14.7 1.6 0.7 49.6 47.3 39.8 37.3 
22: Publishing and printing 23 41 1.6 6.0 0.6 4.9 0.9 1.1 11.0 24.8 87.4 69.2 
24: Chemical products 63 86 14.4 21.7 7.7 13.5 6.7 8.3 18.7 33.2 66.9 45.1 
25: Rubber and plastic 48 111 27.0 37.8 20.9 32.7 6.1 5.1 38.9 39.6 34.1 22.5 
26: Other non-metallic 126 214 7.9 10.3 3.2 5.3 4.7 4.9 31.8 44.7 60.4 45.0 
27: Basic metals 29 42 8.8 14.7 3.7 10.7 5.0 4 .0 12.9 27.8 78.3 57.5 
28: Fabricated metal 47 115 21.0 27.6 12.9 23.7 8.1 3.9 32.2 42.4 46.9 30.0 
29: Machinery and equipment 33 53 10.0 16.3 7.3 13.3 2.6 3.0 21.7 35.7 68.3 48.0 
30: Office, accounting 
machinery 3 11 98.3 95.5 98.3 95.5 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.0 2.6 
3 1: Electrical machinery 39 79 56.8 70.2 52.2 65.8 4.6 4.4 9.7 14.9 33.5 14.9 
32: Radio, television 18 38 49.2 71 .8 30.4 57.5 18.8 14.3 11.4 13.7 39.4 14.5 
33: Medical and optical 7 13 45.8 58.1 37.9 51.4 7.9 6.7 29.8 26.6 24.4 15.3 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers 15 36 32.5 45.9 15.5 33.5 16.9 12.4 22 .8 19.1 44.7 35.0 
3 5: Other transport means 39 87 21 .5 37.7 9.1 19.1 12.4 18.7 17.4 16.9 61.1 45.4 
36: Furniture n.e.c 73 245 34.6 49.5 31 .7 46.2 2.9 3.4 55.1 36.0 10.3 14.4 
Total 1585 3021 22.3 37.0 17.6 32.0 4.7 5.1 33.3 33.7 44.4 29.3 
Source: Author's calculation from the unpublished returns to the enterprise survey conducted by GSO (2000-2005). 
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Table 7.3: Annual compound growth of employment, 2000-2005 (%) 
2 digitVSIC All firms FIEs Domestic Fully- Joint Local 
firms owned FIE ventures private 
15: Food products and beverages 9.1 14.3 8.3 16.0 11 .6 13.3 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 3.8 4.5 .3.8 4.5 -5.4 
17: Manufacture of textiles 6 .0 13.4 3.8 15.6 3.0 10.3 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 17.9 39.2 9.6 41.3 25.9 15.7 
19: Manufacture of leather products 13.3 24.7 2.8 . 25.1 20.4 4.9 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 15.8 18.2 15.3 19.8 11.9 12.9 
2 1 : Paper and paper products 12.4 21 .0 11.2 23.9 -5.7 11.3 
22: Publishing and printing 11.9 45.7 10.9 67.8 14.7 31.6 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 6.3 15.4 4.4 18.8 10.8 19.2 
25: Rubber and plastic products 18.3 26.5 14.6 29.3 14.3 18.7 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 11 .1 17.2 10.5 23.4 12.1 19.0 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 7.7 19.4 6.2 33.0 2.6 25.6 
28: Fabricated metal products 19.7 26.5 17.6 35.2 3.7 26.5 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 10.1 21.4 8.5 24.1 12.6 21 .6 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 29.2 28.4 57.2 28.4 32.3 
31: Electrical machinery and aooaratus n.e.c 15.2 20.2 6.9 20.7 14.4 25.4 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 15.8 24.8 2.9 31.5 9.6 20.1 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 13.4 19.0 7.7 20.5 9.8 10.8 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 18.4 26.9 13.3 38.1 11.3 14.3 
35: Manufacture of other transport means 17.3 31.2 12.0 35.9 27.3 16.6 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 27.3 36.8 20.9 37.3 31 .1 17.0 
Total 13.8 26.0 9.1 28.2 15.7 14.0 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO (2000-2005) by the following formula: r = [exp(ln(Xn ) - ln(X 0 )) -:- 1]*100. 
n 
SO Es 
3.4 
3.9 
0.7 
4.7 
-1.4 
19.9 
11.0 
6.8 
-1.8 
8.9 
4.8 
1.2 
9.5 
2.6 
-2.0 
-5.2 
3.3 
12.7 
10.6 
36.1 
4.7 
202 
7.2.3 Composition of manufacturing employment 
Data on the industry composition of manufacturing employment are presented in Table 
7.4. Manufacturing, employment is heavily concentrated in leather products, wearing 
apparel, textiles and food processing. Despite the considerable proportion accounted for 
by non-metallic mineral products, industries with a high employment share, such as 
leather products, wearing apparel and food processing, are more labour-intensive and 
highly export-oriented. The industry employment composition for FIEs and domestic 
firms is almost the same. However, employment in domestic firms is more equally-
distributed across industries than for FIEs. More than half of FIE employment was 
located in labour-intensive industries (manufacture of leather products, and wearing 
apparel and textiles), while this industry composition for domestic firms was about 30 
percent. Based on the information on employment composition, it seems that domestic 
firms were more concentrated in food processing, whereas FIEs invested more in 
furniture manufacture. 
Table 7.5 shows the skill ratio measured by the number of skilled employment 
divided by total employment in a given industry. Skilled workers here refer to people 
who are highly educated and work as technical staff. On average, the skilled/unskilled 
worker ratio for FIEs is about four percent higher than for domestic firms. Joint 
ventures had higher skill intensity than fully-owned FIEs, mainly because the former 
took over a number of skilled workers from SOEs when they were transformed into a 
new firm type. Between the two domestic ownership types, SOEs employed more 
skilled workers than domestic private firms but the gap was not as large as that between 
domestic firms and FIEs. Across 22 sectors, the patterns were mixed when comparing 
labor-intensive and capital-intensive industries. FIEs were more skilled in almost all 
industry (17 out of 22) sectors and the gap between the two ownership types was 
modest in some labour intensive industries, like wearing apparel and leather products. 
The dispersion of skill ratio in domestic firms across industries was higher than in FIEs. 
The coefficient of variation (CV) of the skill ratio for FIEs and domestic firms is not 
much different (0.25 vs. 0.26). The CV for join ventures is highest (0.47), followed by 
SOEs (0.38). The ratio between maximum and minimum values for FlEs and domestic 
firms was 2.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
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Table 7.4: Industrial composition of employment by ownership(%) 
2 digit VSIC Total emoloyment FIEs Domestic firms 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 16.9 13.7 9.7 6.0 18.9 18.2 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.7 
17: Manufacture of textiles 7.8 5.5 6.9 4.1 8.1 6.3 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 14.6 17.5 12.6 20.8 15.2 15.5 
19: Manufacture of leather products 18.5 18.1 32.0 30.5 14.6 10.8 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 3.5 3.8 2.3 1.7 3.8 5.0 
21 : Paper and paper products 2.4 2.2 1.1 0.9 2.7 3.0 
22: Publishing and printing 1.5 1.4 0.1 0.2 1.9 2.0 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 4.0 2.8 2.6 1.7 4.4 3.5 
25: Rubber and plastic products 3.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 2.8 3.6 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 8.0 7.1 2.8 2.0 9.4 10.1 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.6 2.1 1.9 
28: Fabricated metal products 2.9 3.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 4.4 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 2.1 1.8 0.9 0.8 2.4 2.3 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 2.5 2.6 6.3 5.0 1.4 1.2 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 1.1 1.2 2.5 2.4 0.7 0.6 
33: Medical and ootical instruments, watches and clocks 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.3 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.0 
3 5: Manufacture of other transportation means 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.9 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 4.6 8.1 7.2 10.8 3.9 6.5 
Total employment (1000 persons) 1,585 3,021 353 1,119 1,232 1,903 
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Table 7.4: Industrial composition of employment by ownership (continued,%) 
2 digit VSIC Fully-owned FIEs Joint ventures Domestic private SO Es 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 7.5 4.5 18.3 15.2 19.7 19.2 18.3 17.1 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.6 
17: Manufacture of textiles 6.9 4.1 6.8 3.8 5.3 4.5 10.2 8.4 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 13.2 21.6 10.3 15.7 14.0 15.1 16.1 16.1 
19: Manufacture of leather products 36.9 32.6 13.7 16.6 21.5 14.2 9.4 7.0 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 2.3 1.6 2.5 2.1 6.1 5.8 2.1 4.1 
21: Paper and paper products 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.3 3.5 3.1 2.1 2.8 
22: Publishing and printing 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.9 3.2 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 1.8 1.2 5.8 4.6 2.2 2.8 6.0 4.4 
25: Rubber and plastic products 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.5 4.3 2.3 2.8 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1.4 1.2 8.1 6.9 7.6 9.4 10.8 10.9 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 0.4 0.5 2.0 1.1 0.7 1.1 3.2 2.7 
28: Fabricated metal products 2.2 2.8 5.1 3.0 2.8 4.8 3.1 3.9 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.9 3.2 2.9 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 7.3 5.4 2.4 2.3 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.3 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 2.0 2.2 4.6 3.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.6 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.9 1.2 3.5 2.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.4 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 1.3 1.7 6.6 10.7 1.3 1.4 3.4 4.5 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 8.3 11.7 2.9 5.4 7.6 8.7 1.1 4.0 
Total employment (1000 persons) 279.0 965.8 73.7 152.8 528.2 1016.8 703.8 885.8 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO (2000-2005). 
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Table 7.5: Share of skilled labour in manufacturing, 2000-2005 (%) 
2 digit vscc Total FIEs Fully-owned Joint venture All domestic Domestic SO Es 
FIEs firms private firms 
15: Food products and beverages 21.9 31.7 30.9 33.1 20.3 21.0 19.5 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 28.0 37.3 37.3 27.8 37.4 27.7 
17: Manufacture of textiles 23.7 25.5 24.7 30.2 23.1 21.8 23.9 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 18.0 17.1 16.7 19.9 18.5 19.1 17.9 
I 9: Manufacture of leather products 19.8 21.8 21.8 22.4 17.6 18.6 15.7 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 16.2 18.8 17.8 22.4 15.8 17 .1 12.6 
21: Paper and paper products 24.3 24.6 24.4 28.7 24.3 24.7 23.4 
22: Publishing and printing 33.1 24.7 14.9 52.7 33.4 21.6 37.1 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 31.1 39.0 38.5 39.8 29.3 32.3 27.6 
25: Rubber and plastic products 22.8 25.0 24.7 26.8 21.8 20.8 23.4 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 23.2 31.9 26.7 37.3 22.3 20.8 23.5 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 18.6 36.9 32.6 44.0 16.1 24.7 12.9 
28: Fabricated metal products 22.6 26.8 22 .7 42.5 21.2 19.3 23.9 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 32.2 29.9 26.5 42.6 32.5 28.6 34.7 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 32.1 32.1 32.0 87.9 32.4 41 .3 7.4 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 25.3 25.3 24.3 37.5 25.4 22.8 26.8 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 30.2 29.5 24.1 44.3 31.4 24.7 35.7 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches 27.5 31 .6 30.6 38.3 22.9 19.7 29.5 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 28.8 33.8 25.8 49.2 25.5 23.9 26.5 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 27.1 27.6 25.0 30.4 26.8 22.0 28.7 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 26.9 39.0 40.0 28.4 17.3 19.3 8.4 
Total 22.4 25.3 24.2 30.7 21.2 20.5 21.9 
CV 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.26 0.30 0.38 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO (2000-2005). Time average is for the period 2000-2005. 
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7.2.4 Labour turnover 
Labour mobility from FIEs to domestic finns is an important channel for technology 
spillovers. However, capturing information on labour mobility is difficult, especially in 
a country with a weak census system and unreliable census data. So far, the evidence for 
the small ratio of labour movement in Vietnam has been sketchy. Friedman (2004) 
claims about 80 percent of workers in FIEs had no previous experience in other settings; 
more than one third of the workers in domestic private firms and SOEs had changed 
jobs but most mobile workers were within this ownership type. The main reason for this 
may be the surplus in the unskilled labour market. The reform permits flexible mobility 
for the huge, young labour force from rural areas. For instance, about 30 percent of Ho 
Chi Minh City's population is estimated to be immigrants with non-permanent 
registration. Moreover, 42 percent of households in selected provinces have at least ·one 
migrant member (World Bank 2006). These unskilled workers meet the FIE demand for 
numerous and unskilled employment. In addition, FIEs prefer to recruit and train 
unemployed people rather than pay higher wages for experienced workers with low 
practical skills from SOEs. Another reason derived from the wage rate differentiation is 
that most FIEs and domestic private firms are young and hence willing to provide 
higher wages to retain trained workers. 
A survey conducted by CIEM (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005) failed to find 
significant spillover effects for domestic firms from labour turnover measured by asking 
the interviewees whether or not they had had experience in working for FIEs before. 
Over 2001-2003, only two percent of the labour source for domestic firms had hold 
experience in FlEs and there had only been labour movement in the food processing 
industry. In contrast, the labour turnover amongst domestic firms was considerable 
(24.5 percent of total source). The finding from Friedman (2004) shows that labour 
redundancy in surrounding rural areas is the most important source not only for 
domestic enterprises but also for FIEs. However, the information in Figure 7.1 derived 
from Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005) seems to be inconsistent with Friedman (2004) 
on the extent of labour turnover for domestic firms. This evidence shows FIE workers 
were more mobile than those in domestic firms, even when controlling for industry 
characteristics. The major reason for this contradiction is that the two studies observed 
different small samples. To capture the full pattern of labour turnovers, a further study 
using a larger sample size is necessary. 
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electronics 
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Figure 7 .1: Labour turnover ratio by owners hip and sector in the period 
2001-2003 (%) 
Source: CIEM survey, Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2005). 
Notes: This is the percentage of the number of employees moving to other enterprises 
over the average of firm employment during the period 2000-2003. 
7.3 Ownership and factor proportions 
7.3.1 Trends and patterns 
Capital intensity (KI) is defined as the ratio of capital stock over employment, where the 
numerator (capital stock) consists of proprietor's capital (equity) and other debts the 
enterprise has to pay. The current values of capital stock are deflated into real values 
using the deflater of fixed-capital formation from the national accounts. The 
denominator (employment) is the number of workers to whom a firm pays a wage or 
salary, excluding those who receive firm materials to produce goods at home 
(subcontracting) or persons sent from schools and training centres to work as 
apprentices. 
In line with other studies (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1988; Hill 1988; Nguyen 
Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005), this study finds FlEs are more capital-intensive than domestic 
enterprises although the difference has narrowed over the five years of the study, 2000-
2005 (Table 7.6). In particular, the Kl gap of FIEs over domestic firms was nearly four . 
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times in 2000 but had reduced to about 150 percent in 2005. This is because the KI of 
FIEs declined substantially, in contrast with a significant increase in the KI of domestic 
firms. Across disaggregated industries, the KI level of FIEs reduced in 18 out of 22 
sectors and the KI of domestic firms increased in 20 out of 22 sectors. However, the 
increase of domestic firm KI seemed to overwhelm the decrease in FIE capital intensity 
as overall manufacturing KI increased from 94.8 to 103.0 million dong over the same 
period. 
Further evidence shows capital intensity differ significantly among specific 
entry modes of firms and domestic ownership types. Domestic private firms had the 
lowest capital intensity even though this ownership type significantly increased KI 
levels between 2000 and 2005 (from 38.7 to 68.9 million dong). Owing to a lot of 
financial support and government priorities in the pre-reform period, SOEs were 
stronger in terms of capital endowment and this ownership type also had a noteworthy 
increase in capital accumulation over the same period (KI rose from 74.8 to 117.6 
million dong). Using the manufacturing average of KI in 2005, there was a big gap 
between domestic private firms and SOEs as the KI level of the former achieved about 
only 60 percent of the latter. SOEs were also more capital-intensive than domestic 
private firms in most two-digit VSIC sectors ( 15 out of 22 sectors) regardless of 
whether these industries are Jabour-intensive (manufacture of garments, leather 
products) or capital-intensive (electronics, automobiles). 
In contrast with the impressive increase in KI of both domestic ownership types, 
the KI of both joint ventures and fully-owned FIEs decreased sharply. Of these, the KI 
of joint ventures dropped at a faster speed, although the Kl decline of fully-owned FIEs 
had more impact on the overall declining trend of all FIEs because the number of fully-
owned FlEs was much larger. In addition, the decrease in Kl of fully-owned FIEs 
appeared in the wider coverage (18 sectors) compared to joint ventures (16 sectors). In 
2005, joint ventures were still more capital-intensive than either type of domestic 
ownerships while fully-owned FlEs were less capital-intensive than SOEs. 
The Kl gap between fully-owned FIEs and domestic private firms was not as big 
as before. Since 2000, the change in policy from IS to EP has caused a major proportion 
of new foreign investment to be formed in fully-owned FIEs. This entry mode is more 
labour-intensive and export-oriented than joint-ventures for the following reasons. First, 
fully-owned FIEs in Vietnam are generally autonomous with the parent companies 
(Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005). Perhaps this high extent of autonomy is associated 
with the small scale of economy empowered by MNEs for their affiliates. Second, as 
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discussed in Chapter 4 on the Trends and Patterns of FDI in Vietnam, most FIEs 
originate from Asian developing countries that are not as strong as MNEs from 
developed countries in terms of capital and technology. Except for Japan, MNEs from 
developing countries are also more export-oriented than those from developed countries 
(Chapter 6). Third, joint ventures were more capital-intensive than fully-owned FIEs 
because they had a small number of firms and were mainly formed with selected 
capital-intensive SOEs. MNEs have sought to formulate joint ·ventures with only 
productive and large SOEs. These joint ventures mostly aim to supply domestic demand 
for high technology products (electronics, automobiles) and so require large capital 
accumulation. 
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Table 7.6: Capital intensity by ownership and sector in the period 2000-2005 (million dong) 
Sector All firms FIEs Domestic firms 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 120.0 123.9 431 .2 271.9 74.1 95.2 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 147.8 236.6 409.2 1,189.1 140.4 208.6 
17: Manufacture of textiles 96.6 134.8 247.3 282.1 59.8 78.6 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 28.1 26.5 47.7 29.1 23.4 24.4 
19: Manufacture of leather products 28.9 29.4 46.8 34.7 17.6 20.8 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 35.8 50.7 79.0 95.5 28.3 41 .8 
21 : Paper and paper products 117.1 146.7 325.8 214.5 92.2 134.4 
22: Publishing and printing 109.7 126.9 92.4 115.9 110.0 127.6 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 152.4 249.8 526.0 459.4 89.5 191 .6 
25: Rubber and plastic products 122.7 130.5 221.4 163.9 86.1 110.1 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 191 .1 164.8 1,237.9 549.9 101.6 120.7 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 136.3 303.6 901.4 656.0 62.8 243.0 
28: Fabricated metal products 119.3 131 .5 320.0 197.0 66.1 106.5 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 99.1 126.9 395.2 242.3 66.3 104.4 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 549.8 288.3 558.3 296.8 61.7 109.3 
31 : Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 142.7 160.2 179.6 152.0 94.4 179.6 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 264.6 188.9 362.4 189.2 169.7 188.2 
3 3: Medical and optical instruments, watches and 165.9 107 7 303.9 129.1 49.3 78.0 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 290.9 285.8 760.5 446.3 65.0 149.3 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 187.2 338.1 557.9 306.2 85.5 357.4 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 40.8 54.6 63.4 61.5 28.8 47.8 
Total 94.8 103.0 218.6 122.5 59.3 91.6 
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Table 7.6: (continued) 
Sector Joint ventures 
2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 432.6 246.6 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 409.2 1,189.1 
17: Manufacture of textiles 120.2 132.2 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 39.2 24.2 
19: Manufacture of leather products 36.2 35.9 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 141.5 133.9 
2 1: Paper and paper products 125.5 107.6 
22: Publishing and printing 95.1 269.0 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 503.0 561 .9 
25: Rubber and plastic products 374.7 205.4 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 1,838.0 915.1 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 1,047.0 828.6 
28: Fabricated metal products 589.1 444.4 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 422.1 299.3 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 
- -
31: Electrical machinery aud apparatus n.e.c 642.3 339.8 
32: Radio, television and communicat ion equipment 689.7 422.8 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and 172.5 80.3 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1,156.9 1,011.7 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 739.0 382.5 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 78.9 50.6 
~tat 492.2 277.7 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished GSO enterprises survey 2000-2005. 
'-'No data available. 
Fully-owned FIEs Domestic private firms SO Es 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
430.3 285.5 48.5 82.1 94.8 112.0 
- - 66.3 108.2 141.6 209.6 
280.2 304.0 44.4 96.3 65.9 67.7 
49.4 29.7 21.1 20.4 24.9 28.8 
47.9 34.6 15.8 21.3 20.7 19.7 
61 .2 87.7 21.3 40.2 43 .7 44.4 
361 .0 219.3 49.2 100.3 145.8 177.5 
88.3 82.3 63.0 100.7 115.9 137.3 
546.0 396.6 78.3 142.0 92.6 228.1 
176.6 157.4 95.9 112.7 74.9 105.5 
338.6 211 .7 48.8 65.8 129.4 175.2 
705.0 592.4 123.4 318.0 52.8 206.6 
151.3 155.9 62.3 111 .8 68.8 99.1 
385.5 229.6 90.7 111 .9 58.5 98.8 
558.3 296.8 61 .7 146.0 - 82.4 
139.2 139.5 109.3 208.2 90.1 151 .1 
160.1 131 .2 86.0 103.9 194.0 267.9 
331 .1 135.5 44.8 80.0 54.8 74.4 
329.0 237.1 29.8 88.8 83.0 182.3 
311.6 231.5 70.5 132.6 89.7 440.8 
61.9 62.3 25.4 50.4 47.0 41.4 
146.3 97.9 38.7 68.9 74.8 117.6 
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7.3.2 Determinants of factor proportions - econometric estimation 
Model specification 
This section examines the difference in capital intensity between domestic firms and 
FIEs with control for other exogenous factors. The empirical models are as follows: 
Kl = F(FOR, y, w, AGE, EX, FOR* EX, REGION, SECTOR, T) (7.1) 
And: 
Kl= F(JV,PUREFDJ,SOE,y, w,AGE, EX,JV* EX, PURE* EX, SOE"' EX,REGJON,SECTOR,T) 
(7.2) 
Where the dependent variable KI is a firm's capital intensity in log form; wand 
y are a firm's average wage and output in log form, respectively; FOR is a dummy 
taking one if a firm is foreign owned, JV is a dummy for joint ventures; PUREFDI is a 
dummy for fully-owned FIEs; SOE is a dummy for state-owned enterprises; AGE is a 
firm 's age; EX is a dummy for exporting firms in 2000; SECTOR is a vector of 
dummies for two-digit VSIC level (21 dummies), REGION is a vector of regional 
dummies (6 variables), Tis a vector of year dummies from 2000-2004 
The first model compares KI between the two main ownership types (FIEs and 
domestic firms) while the second model compares the KI of joint ventures, fully-owned 
FIEs and SOEs with domestic private firms (the base dummy). The same data source 
(GSO enterprise survey for the period 2000-2004) is used as discussed in other chapters. 
Since the information on exports is available for 2000, a dummy is constructed for 
exporting firms with an assumption of no new firms entering the world market 
afterwards. All variables are deflated from current into real values using appropriate 
deflators (see Chapter 5: FDI and Productivity Performance of Manufacturing Firms). 
FIEs are widely acknowledged to have more advanced technology and better 
performance in terms of using capital and employment in comparison to domestic firms 
in developing countries and are therefore, likely to be more capital-intensive. In the 
models (7.1) and (7.2), ownership dummies representing all FIEs (FOR) and specific 
entry modes (JV and PUREFDI) are expected to be positive. SOEs have also had a long 
process of capital accumulation, received preferential treatment from the government 
and commercial state-owned banks and therefore, caused a bias towards capital 
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intensity. Consequently, in relation to domestic private firms, SOEs are predicted to be 
more capital intensive (or the SOE coefficient is positive). However, the theory supports 
a positive correlation between firm size and capital intensity regardless of different 
parentages. This study captures separately the effect of firm size by inclusion of firm 
outputs (y). The expected sign of this variable will be positive because the role of 
employment may decrease when the scale of production increases (Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya 1988). 
One of the most important hypotheses, derived from the previous section's 
findings, is the causal relationship between export orientation, ownership and capital 
intensity. In the case of Vietnam, highly export-oriented firms may be more labour-
intensive than domestic-oriented firms in order to exploit comparative advantages for 
labour costs and other inputs. In addition, fully-owned FIEs are expected to be more 
labour-intensive because they are more export-oriented. Based on these arguments, it is 
expected that coefficients of EX and their interactions with other ownership dummies 
(FOR, JV, PUREFDI and SOE) will be negative. The choice of technology level is 
strongly linked with capital intensity and scale of employment. ln general, advanced 
technology requires a smaller number of workers but at the higher skill levels. 
Therefore, wage rates may be an important determinant of capital intensity as they 
mostly reflects the use of skilled workers and the technology level. 
Models (7.1) and (7.2) are estimated by pooled OLS with control for 
heteroskedasticity. They are used for an overall equation with all observations except 
for manufacture of refined petroleum and gas in order to avoid possible distortions from 
this sector. Moreover, both models are also estimated for six industry groups: foods and 
beverages (VSlC 15), textiles (VSlC 17) wearing apparel and leather products (VS I Cl 8-
19), wood and furniture products (VSIC 20, 36), electronics (VSIC 30-33) and 
automobiles (VSIC34-35). The underlying reason for undertaking those estimates is 
derived from the statistical descriptions of significant variation in KI across industries. 
Regression results 
The econometric estimates presented in Table 7.7 show that FIEs taken together as one 
ownership group are more capital-intensive than domestic firms. The coefficient of 
FOR is about 0.76 (strongly significant) indicating that, ceteris paribus, the KI level of 
FIEs is 76 percent higher than that of domestic firms. At the disaggregated level, both 
joint ventures and fully-owned FIEs are more capital-intensive than domestic private 
firms. However the KI gap between fully-owned FIEs and domestic private firms is 
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significantly smaller than the KI gap between joint ventures and domestic firms (1.04 
and 0.66).41 
All estimates for six specific industry groups result in a positive coefficient of 
the KI gap between FIEs and domestic private firms (FOR) at any significance level. 
However, the magnitudes of ownership dummies are different across within-industry 
estimations, implying that every industry has owned an exclusive KI and given 
technology levels. The KI gap is highest for automobiles (1.10), followed by wearing 
apparel and leather products (0.59) and lowest in manufacture of wood and furniture 
products (0.21). This is reasonable as there are only a small number of FIEs working in 
the automobile assembly industry which requires high technology and huge capital 
accumulation. ln a separate analysis, fully-owned FlEs were found to be more capital 
intensive than domestic private firms in all six industry groups, whereas the KI gap 
between joint ventures and domestic firms is positive in five industry groups. The Kl 
gap between joint ventures and domestic firms involved in the manufacture of wood and 
furniture products is not significant when controlling for exporting firms. 
The results in all 14 specifications (Table 7.7) confirm the important role of 
export orientation in determining the factor intensity differential. The coefficient of the 
dummy for exporting firms was negative and significant in the overall equations as well 
as in every specific-industry group except for automobile manufacturing. This strongly 
indicates export-oriented firms are more labour-intensive than domestic-market oriented 
firms. However, this trend does not hold for the automobile industry because almost all 
products of the industry are supplied for the domestic market i.e., highly protected. 
Exporting FIEs are found to be more labour-intensive than either domestic firms or 
domestic-oriented FlEs as the interaction between FOR and EX is negative, albeit at a 
low significance level. However, interactions of a dummy for exporting firms (EX) with 
each entry mode (JV and PUREFDI) result in a negative but insignificant sign. This is 
reasonable because the KI gap may be most significant when comparing between fully-
owned FIEs and joint ventures rather than comparing within an entry mode. Across six 
industry groups, exporting FIEs are more labour-intensive than other FIEs in four out of 
six equations although the coefficient (FOR *EX) is significant only in the automobile 
industry. To conclude, exporting firms are less capital-intensive than non-exporting 
firms and parentage does not significantly affect the Kl difference of the former. 
41 The test for the difference between these coefficient results in rejecting the null hypothesis with F test 
equals to 58.7) 
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Another noteworthy comparison is the KI gap between domestic private firms 
and SOEs. The results are straightforward as SOEs are found to be more capital-
intensive in overall manufacturing and in five out of six industry groups. The KI gap is 
highest in manufacture of textiles (74 percent), followed by manufacture of wood and 
furniture products (50 percent) and automobiles (45 percent). This is explained by the 
fact that these industries require a large capital investment. With the exception of some 
joint ventures in automobiles, most firms working in these industries are fully or partly 
state-owned. Excluding the textile industry, exporting SOEs do not have lower KI 
compared with either other SOEs or private firms. This is because most SOEs have had 
a long time to accumulate capital since the pre-reform period. However, they suffer 
from past employment excess and are still oriented by the government in terms of 
employment creation as a social objective apart from profit maximization. 
Other determinants of KI have expected signs and significance levels. Firm size 
measured by gross output is positive to KI indicating capital accumulation in large firms 
is higher than in small firms. The wage coefficient is also positive and significant in all 
equations regardless of industry characteristics. This partly supports the theory that an 
industry with higher wages may use more advanced techniques and have a higher ratio 
of skilled workers. 
The difference in KI between SO Es and both forms of FIEs is examined by re-
estimating equation (7.2) with a replacement of the base dummy from PRIVATE by 
SOE. The results reported in Appendix (A 7.6) are quite similar to the previous findings. 
Based on the overall equation, it is clear that both joint ventures and fully-owned FIEs 
are more capital-intensive than SOEs. Obviously, the KI gap is higher in comparison 
between SOEs and joint ventures. The KI difference between exporting FIEs and 
exporting SOEs is negative in the overall equation but not significant. Looking at the 
within-industry estimates, joint ventures are more capital-intensive in three sectors and 
fully-owned FIEs more capital-intensive in four sectors. However, ownership type is 
unlikely to affect the KI of exporting firms. For example, exporting fully-owned FIEs 
are more capital-intensive than exporting SOEs in only two sectors (textiles and 
processes food products). For other sectors, the KI gap of exporting firms between 
ownership types is not important. 
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Table 7.7: Regression results on capital intensity and ownership (Dependent variable: log of real capital stock per employee, Kl) 
Dependent Over all Food and beverage Textiles Apparels & Wood & Furniture Electronics Automobiles 
variable: Kl (VSIC15) (VSICl 7) leather product (VSIC 20, 36) (VSIC30-33) (VSIC34-35) 
(VSIC 18-19) 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
FOR 0.756 0.572 0.338 0.588 0.207 0.548 1.095 
(28.69)* ... (9.70)*** (2.63}*** (7.51)"'** (2.37)** (7.27)*** (11.25)**'* 
(y) 0.161 0.151 0.137 0.138 0.280 0.242 0.033 0.024 0.058 0.034 0.184 0.175 0.303 
(49.00)*** (42.69)*** (26.85)*** (25.56)* ... (14.04)*** (11 .38)*** (2.53)** (1.71}* (4.79}*** (2.71)*** (11 .13)*** (10.46}*** (20.87}*** 
(w) 0.428 0.419 0.402 0.401 0.581 0.593 0.366 0.368 0.561 0.570 0.536 0.472 0.176 
(39.91 )*** (39.16)*** (22.24)*** (22.15)*** (8.76)*** (9.05)*** (7.86)*** (7.87)*** (17.42) .... (17.72)'** (11.92)*** (10.60}*** (4.06)*** 
EX -0.273 -0.283 -0.521 -0.554 -0.555 -0.431 -0.323 -0.332 -0.214 -0.252 -0.310 -0.228 0.031 
(15.87)*** (13.66)*** (1 3.73)*** (11 .55)*** (7.06)*** (4.43)*** (7.14r** (6.20)*** (4.76)*** (5.33)*** (3.16)*** (1.96)** (0.34) 
FOR*EX -0.061 0.528 -0.081 -0.013 0.309 -0.035 -0.308 
(1.84)* (6.44)*** (0.54) (0.16) (2.9W** (0.28) (2.31)** 
AGE -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 -0.023 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 -0.008 
(15.66)*** (18.02)*** (3.26)"** (3.10)*** (6.3or· (7.25}*** (0.13) (0.98) (4.43)*** (6.67)*** (4.59)*"* (3.96)"** (4.39}*** 
JV 1.038 0.496 0.633 0.147 -0.021 0.966 
(24.83)*** (4.91)*** (3.51)*** (0.42) (0.18) (10.07)*** 
JV*EX -0.014 0.736 -0.762 0.580 1.127 -0.065 
(0.26) (5.79)*** (3.51)*** (1.64) (7.78)*** (0.40) 
PUREFDI 0.663 0.603 0.367 0.625 0.262 0.434 
(21.02)*** (8.84)*** (2.4or (7.84)*** (2.69)*** (4.70)*** 
PURE*EX -0.016 0.460 0.020 -0.030 0.219 -0.122 
(0.40) (4.40)*** (0.11) (0.33) (1.89)* (0.81) 
SOE 0.182 -0.046 0.739 0.159 0.500 0.195 
(9.49)*** (1.05) (6.54)*** (2.16)** (5.34)*** (2.17)** 
SOE*EX -0.010 0.114 -0.480 0.001 0.171 -0.208 
(0.33) (1.62) (3.28)*"* (0.00) (1.52) (1 .09) 
F value 775 718 318 257 76 64 48 41 76 74 94 88 185 
Observations 39169 39169 12093 12093 1571 1571 3393 3393 4516 4516 1276 1276 1676 
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.29 0.29 0.42 0.44 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.49 0.50 0.60 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies (T), sector dummies (SECTOR) and region dummies (REGION). 
* Significant at l 0% level, * * significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1 % level. 
(14) 
0.260 
(16.13)*** 
0.124 
(2.90)*** 
0.114 
(0.65) 
-0.013 
(6.74)*** 
1.801 
(14.19)*** 
-0.329 
(1.49) 
1.032 
(8.65)*** 
-0.387 
(1 .83)* 
0.452 
(6.04)*** 
-0.278 
(1.39) 
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1676 
. 0.62 
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7.4 Ownership and manufacturing wages 
A wage comparison between FIEs and domestic firms should take account of the quality 
of workers and other factors of wages. As discussed in Chapter 2, FIEs may pay more 
because they employ higher skilled or educated workers or because of the differences in 
age, experience and job positions. They want to keep the best workers as well prevent 
technology leakages. Wage differences may be affected by firm and industry 
characteristics. Wages may also be influenced by government regulations in a different 
manner during the transition process. 
As data limitations do not allow all these aspects to be captured, this chapter 
concentrates on ownership differences in wage rates disaggregated by specific sectors 
and regions. It is likely that the presence of FIEs affects the wage structure of domestic 
firms. Evidence from Friedman (2004) shows most SOEs have converted their 
com pressed wage structure to a more flexible one as a result of restructuring towards a 
market mechanism. The legally minimum wages for domestic private firms and FIEs 
have also been revised frequently although they are still far below from the average 
wages. Of these, the minimum wage for FIEs is always higher for either skilled or 
unskilled workers (O'Connor 1996; Belser 2000). 
Table 7.8 provides data on real manufacturing wages by two-digit industry and 
ownership categories for 2000 and 2005. The wage rate here is measured by the 
industrial average of compensation for a worker, and includes salaries, bonuses, 
subsidies, health insurance, pension insurance and any other costs firm owners pay on 
behalf of workers. The price deflater used for calculating real wages is the annual CPI. 
It is evident that, the average wage of FIEs was significantly higher than that 
paid by domestic firms (by 54. 7 percent in 2000 and 12.4 percent in 2005). In particular, 
joint ventures paid the highest wages followed by SOEs and fully-owned FIEs while 
domestic private firms paid the lowest. Apart from the reasons already highlighted the 
higher wages paid in joint ventures could stem from the possibility that foreigners have 
selected the best domestic SOEs for business formulation. Over the five years (2000-
2004), manufacturing wage rates have increased at a rate of 13.5 percent. This increase 
has come from the change in domestic-firm wages. Over the same period, wages in both 
domestic private firms and SOEs have increased by 38 percent (2.5 million dong) and 
19 percent (1.8 million dong), respectively. In contrast, the wages of both joint ventures 
and fully-owned FIEs have decreased by 10 percent (1.9 million dong) and seven 
percent (0.8 million dong). 
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The decline in FIE wages seems to partly reflect the shift in new direct 
investment from domestic market-oriented production to export-oriented production 
that generally employs more unskilled workers. Looking at the differences in wage 
levels between FIEs and domestic firms at two-digit industry level, wages have 
continued to remain high in FIEs operating in domestic-market-oriented or capital-
intensive industries (e.g. automobiles, machineries, etc), whereas there has been a wage 
decline in electronics and other export-oriented industries. It seems that overall wages in 
joint ventures have decreased at a faster rate than those in fully-owned FIEs. However, 
the two-digit industry data confirm a more substantial decline in wages from fully-
owned FIEs compared to j oint ventures. The former reduced wages in 13 sectors while 
the latter reduced wages in nine sectors. Wage rates actually vary drastically amongst 
sectors within ownership type. Exploring the coefficient of variation (CV) as a tool for 
comparison, the results show FIE wages were more diverse than domestic-firm wages 
across industries. 
Friedman (2004) finds the same results for wage comparison. The wage rate 
applied for each ownership group was likely to be in line with skill levels. Minimum 
wages were higher for FIEs and lower for domestic private firms. However, the within-
ownership wage gap represented by the maximum-minimum salary ratio was also much 
higher in firms with foreign investment. Friedman (2004) also gives a clear difference 
in wage determination amongst ownership types. For new workers, the state wage 
schedule was still significant in SOEs even though it no longer existed. Meanwhile, 
both domestic private enterprises and joint ventures listed the legal minimum wage as 
the most important criterion. There was an exception in that some domestic private 
enterprises used the prevailing market wage instead of the legal minimum wage rate. 
For determining wage increases, all three types of ownership used worker 
characteristics (e.g. education, experience) as the important criteria. There was a notable 
difference between state and private ownership. SOEs remained influenced by the state 
wage schedule, whereas domestic private enterprises used worker efficiency and FIEs 
explored the prevailing market wages as additional criteria for a wage increase. 
The differences in wages by ownership type may have been affected by the 
characteristics of firm location. Table 7.9 provides the 2000 and 2005 wages for all firm 
types in six main regions. Over the fi ve years, wages in all six regions increased and the 
highest wage rate was in the South East area which includes Ho Chi Minh City and the 
most competitive provinces like Binh Duong and Dong Nai. The lowest level of wage 
rate was in the Central Coast area where there are a modest number of FIEs as well as 
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domestic firms. The evidence shows FIEs, on average, paid significantly higher wages 
than local firms in every region except for the South East area. However, wage rates 
differ by entry mode. Joint ventures paid the highest wage rates in all regions and the 
wage gap with domestic firms remained similar evee in the highly competitive regions 
(the Red River Delta and South East area). In all six regions, fully-owned FIEs paid 
higher wages than domestic private firms but not SOEs. The average wage rate paid by 
SOEs was higher than that paid by fully-owned FIEs in four of six regions. The decline 
of CV indicates that wage dispersion across regions decreased for every ownership type. 
The wages paid by fully-owned FIEs varied the least. Although wage levels amongst 
SOEs varied somewhat in comparison to fully-owned FIEs, the difference in wage 
dispersion was not particularly great (0. 15 compared to 0.13). 
Lastly, the ownership difference in the wage share of value-added (ratio of total 
wage bill over value-added, Table 7.10) is examined. In general, between 2000 and 
2005, the wage share in total manufacturing value-added increased significantly from . 
27. 7 to 30.6 percent. In particular, in 2005 FIEs spent 28.1 percent of value-added for 
labour wages and domestic enterprises spent 32.5 percent for the same purpose. Over 
time, SOEs and joint ventures compensated more for workers, whereas domestic private 
firms paid less in terms of relative values. However, both domestic private fim1s .and 
fully-owned FIEs paid the largest share in value added for wages and other 
compensation (35.9 and 35.3 percent, respectively). The smallest wage share in value-
added belonged to joint ventures ( 15.5 percent). Incorporating the wage rate comparison 
in the previous section, joint ventures have the highest wage rates but the lowest wage 
share in value-added. ln contrast, wage rates in both fully-owned F!Es and domestic 
private firms are much lower and these firms spent a significant proportion of value-
added for employment compensation. 
Despite the difference in labour productivity, the explanations for all ownership 
types are not the same. Fully-owned FIEs are located predominantly in labour-intensive 
and export-oriented industries, like garments, textiles, leather products and electronics. 
Over the past twenty years, these industries have been most affected by import and 
export restrictions. Most domestic private firms are young and small in terms of both 
labour size and capital stock. Even though they are more productive, their wage/value 
added ratio is still high because they are involved in relatively more labour-intensive 
industries. The simple reason for the low wage shares of joint ventures and SO Es is that 
they are involved in highly capital-intensive industries. 
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Table 7.8 : Wage rates by sectors and ownership (million dong) 
2 digit VSIC Total Fully-owned FIE Joint ventures Local private SO Es 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 9.0 11.0 18.2 16.0 18.9 17.9 5.9 8.9 9.1 11.1 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 20.0 27.3 16.7 40.8 4.9 8.2 20.4 27.1 
17: Manufacture of textiles 8.8 9.3 11.0 11 .1 14.1 15.3 5.0 6.8 9.3 9.5 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 8.7 8.9 10.9 8.9 9.6 8.6 7.4 8.7 8.8 9.1 
19: Manufacture of leather products 7.3 8.4 9.6 9.0 10.2 9.5 5.9 8.0 5.9 6.4 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 6.8 7.7 10.9 10.7 9.2 12.5 5.4 7.3 7.7 6.4 
21: Paper and paper products 10.8 10.4 13.1 15.0 21.0 15.5 6.8 8.5 14.7 10.8 
22: Publishing and printing 14.7 17.0 11.2 16.1 27.4 17.0 7.2 12.3 15.5 18.7 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 14.8 21.5 26.2 27.3 34.5 40.7 11.3 14.1 12.5 21.6 
25: Rubber and plastic products 11 .7 11.7 12.0 12.3 17.2 13.0 8.0 9.5 14.6 14.7 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 10.4 12.0 15.6 14.0 33.4 26.4 6.6 8.8 10.3 13.3 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 13.6 15.6 29.3 21.7 29.0 32.2 6.9 10.0 13.0 15.9 
28: Fabricated metal products 9.9 11.3 12.8 12.9 23.5 23.2 7.2 10.4 8.6 9.7 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 9.3 13.4 15.9 17.6 18.8 17.5 9.4 11.4 8.2 13.4 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 15.0 9.9 15.1 9.9 7.1 14.1 7.0 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 12.9 14.7 10.8 13.2 20.3 20.9 8.2 13.8 16.6 20.5 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 14.7 15.8 11.0 13.4 25.5 28.5 9.6 13.2 13.7 15.3 
33: Medical and ootical instruments, watches 13.6 13.7 18.9 14.6 14.5 11 .9 9.6 12.5 10.1 13.4 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 11 .8 15.7 11.4 12.8 26.6 26.9 6.8 11.5 8.9 16.9 
3 5: Manufacture of other transportation means 11.2 14.6 13.4 13.7 20.2 18.5 6.9 11.2 10.2 14.7 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 8.3 10.0 10.4 10.5 8.1 11.7 7.4 9.7 6.5 8.4 
Weil!htcd average wa2e 9.6 10.8 11.6 10.8 19.0 17.1 6.6 9.1 10.0 11.8 
Coefficient of variation (CV) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO using the consumer price index (CPI) to deflate total compensation for labour. 
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Table 7.9: Wage rates by geographic location and ownership (million dong) 
Region Year All All FIEs Fully- Joint All Domestic SO Es 
manufacturing owned FIEs ventures domestic Private firms 
firms firms 
North Mountainous areas 
2000 7.6 10.8 10.3 11.3 7.3 3.7 7.9 
2005 9.9 10.5 9.6 14.7 9.8 6.4 11.4 
Red River Delta 
2000 8.0 19.0 16.2 20.6 7.0 4.7 8.3 
2005 9.8 11 .6 9.0 17.4 9.3 7.7 10.9 
Central Coast 
2000 7.4 11 .2 9.3 15.4 6.9 6.4 7.1 
2005 9.0 9.6 7.4 15.5 8.9 7.8 10.0 
Central Highlands 
2000 6.9 9.5 8.8 10.7 6.6 6.9 6.2 
2005 8.4 8.9 8.3 11 .3 8.3 7.8 8.9 
South East area 
2000 11.4 12.9 11 .6 20.3 10.5 7.8 14.0 
2005 11.9 11 .9 11 .3 18.4 12.0 10.6 14.1 
2000 8.5 . 12.3 10.8 15.3 8.2 5.7 9.6 Mekong Delta 
2005 10.0 10.1 10.2 9.7 10.0 8.4 11.2 
2000 9.6 13.2 11.6 19.0 8.5 6.6 10.0 Total 
2005 10.8 11.7 10.8 17.1 10.4 9.1 11.8 
CV 
2000 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.28 
2005 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.15 
Notes: Author' s calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO (2000-2005). 
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Table 7.10: Wage share of value added(%, using current value) 
2 digit VSIC Total Fully-owned FIE Joint ventures L ocal private SO Es 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
15: Food products and beverages 17.0 20.2 15.7 16.4 9.1 12.2 65.1 25.9 14.4 20.8 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 8.2 8.3 0.0 0.0 30.0 7.5 54.3 4.9 8.0 8.4 
17: Manufacture of textiles 49.0 31.7 117.0 22.2 31.6 37.5 42.7 30.2 44.7 43.5 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 49.1 66.8 54.9 61.3 57,9 76.7 70.7 93.3 40.2 56.5 
19: Manufacture of leather products 61.4 67.6 57.6 60.2 64.4 37.4 71.3 108.0 56.8 93.0 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 37.0 42.3 74.0 41.7 15.8 19.6 40.4 47.9 29.9 41 .8 
21: Paper and paper products 29.8 29.1 29.9 32.2 -19.3 28.8 23.1 28.5 30.4 28.3 
22: Publishing and printing 29.8 32.4 34.2 68.8 44.7 45.0 22.9 23.6 30.1 34.2 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 22.6 27.1 19.0 26.1 16.0 16.3 22.8 27.1 26.7 35.7 
25: Rubber and plastic products 27.5 29.2 22.8 37.0 31.3 19.3 17.9 22.7 46.8 35.3 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 23.6 24.9 283.1 20.4 17.8 14.6 32.8 33.7 21.7 25.2 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 26.6 19.2 47.6 17.5 9.0 9.0 7.1 9.9 50.3 36.2 
28: Fabricated metal oroducts 42.7 27.7 52.0 36.7 27.2 15.8 32.7 23.6 68.2 37.0 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 33.9 37.4 16.0 21.3 19.1 16.8 38.5 35.4 45.6 63.3 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 12.3 14.6 12.2 14.1 47.7 40.9 74.2 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 33.5 26.7 41 .3 28.4 7.3 14.3 22.2 22.6 63.8 33.7 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 19.2 22.7 29.6 23.3 15.9 17.3 13.4 31 .0 20.2 30.1 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches 44.0 40.3 51.4 35.8 17.8 33.1 49.4 40.7 50.9 87.4 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 9.2 12.9 9.8 13.6 5.6 5.0 33.9 34.8 15.2 33.5 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 18.9 23.0 24.2 21.3 11.8 13.4 8.3 28.9 33.9 34.9 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 50.8 51.4 50.7 48.7 48.0 42.4 64.4 57.3 22.5 51.3 
Total 27.7 30.6 35.5 35.3 14.5 15.5 40.6 35.9 25.6 30.0 
Source: Author's calculation from unpublished enterprise survey by GSO (2000-2005). 
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Wage comparison - econometric estimation 
The previous section c.oncluded that FIEs pay relatively higher wages on· average 
compared to domestic enterprises. The results differ with specific entry modes and 
domestic ownership types and the importance of ongoing changes in the industry 
structure in explaining these differences has been highlighted. In addition, there may be 
other reasons like employment skills and firm-specific characteristics. The purpose of 
the econometric analysis in this section is to examine the quantitative difference in 
wages paid by FIEs and domestic enterprises by explicitly controlling for these factors. 
The analysis is based on estimating the following models: 
w= F(FOR, SKILL, SECTOR, REGION, T, X) (7:3) 
w = F(PUREFDI, SOE, SOEFDI, PRIFDI, SKILL, SECTOR, REGION, T, X) (7.4) 
Where w is a firm's average wage in log form, FOR is a dummy taking one if a 
firm is foreign owned, PUREFDI is a dummy for fully-owned FIEs, SOE is a dummy 
for state-owned enterprises, SOEFDl and PRIFDl are dummies for joint ventures with 
SOEs and domestic private firms respectively, SECTOR is a vector of dummies for 
two-digit VSlC level (21 dummies), REGION is a vector of regional dummies (6 
variables), T is a vector of year dummies from 2000-2004 (5 variables) and X is a 
vector of firm ' s characteristics including size, capital intensity, education level and 
workers' gender. Both firm size (y, firm output) and capital intensity (Kl, measured by a 
ratio of capital stock over employment) are used in log form. SKILL is the ratio of 
skilled employment over total employment where skilled employment is measured by 
the number of people who work as technical staff in the firm. This is the only 
information related to skilled workers provided by the GSO surveys. Moreover, an 
additional variable on education of employment is included, i.e., the share of employees 
having at least a college degree or above (EDU). The data availability allows controlling 
for the difference between male and female wages by including the share of female 
workers in total employment as an exogenous variable (FE). Details of all variables are 
presented in Appendix A 7 .5. 
Based on the the findings of previous studies (Belser 2000; Friedman 2004; 
Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005) and our recently statistical analysis, we expect the 
coefficients of all ownership dummies (FOR, PUREFDI, PRIFDI and SOE) to be 
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positive. The theory also offers some fundamental determinants of wages including firm 
size, capital intensity, job types and worker characteristics. Large firms often pay higher 
wages. High ·capital intensity is associated with a high ratio of skilled workers, 
advanced technology and high labour productivity. Therefore, both firm size (y) and KI 
are expected to be positive. The effect of skills on wages is more complicated. Ideally, 
the investigation of wage equations should be constructed separately for skilled and 
unskilled workers (Aitken et al. 1996; Zhao 2001) or using relative wages42 as a 
dependent variable (Feenstra and Hanson 1997). Because the data are not available. for 
each group of workers, the same models are estimated for both worker groups with an 
additional variable to control for the effect of skills on wages. The share of skilled 
workers in total employment is expected to have a positive sign. Lastly, worker 
characteristics may include many specific indicators, such as age, gender, education 
level, religion and culture. However, the GSO enterprise survey can not cover such an 
extended range of information. Using the data available, education levels and the ratio 
of female workers are included as other factors of wages. High education levels may 
help people get higher paid jobs. Female workers may be discriminated against in 
getting wages. 
The models are estimated using unbalanced firm-level panel data compiled from 
the Annual Manufacturing Survey conducted by the GSO during the period 2000-2004. 
As discussed, wages are deflated by the CPI and output by a two-digit VSlC deflator 
provided by the GSO. Real capital stock is obtained using the deflator of fixed asset 
formation in the national accounts. An OLS estimation method is employed with control 
for heteroskedasticity. 
The results are reported in Table 7 .11. The estimation results for the basic 
models (7.3) and (7.4) are in the first and second column, respectively. The appearance 
of both SKILL and EDU in the same model should be noted. They are found to be not 
highly correlated with each other (the correlation coefficient is only 0.39). For brevity, 
all variables on regional dummies, industry dummies and year dummies are estimated 
but not reported. The first column shows the estimated coefficient of FOR is positive 
and highly significant. Holding other effects constant, wages in FIEs are likely to be 18 
percent higher than wages in domestic enterprises. In the second specification, FOR is 
replaced by three specific dummies for entry modes including fully-owned FIEs 
(PUREFDI), joint ventures with SOEs (SOEFDI) and joint ventures with domestic 
42 Relative wages are measured by the ratio between the wages of blue-collar and white-co llar workers. 
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private firms (PRIFDI). A dummy for state-owned enterprises (SOE) is also included in 
order to compare the difference between the two domestic ownership types. As 
expected, all entry modes pay higher wages than domestic private firms, especially in 
joint ventures with SOEs. Holding other effects constant, wages in SOE joint ventures 
and fully-owned FIEs were about 34 percent and 12 percent higher, respectively, than 
wages in domestic private firms. In contrast, wages in SOEs were 8.6 percent lower 
than wages in domestic private firms. The main reason for this is being the high capital 
intensity of SOEs. When controlled for capital intensity, SOE wages turned out to be 
lower than for domestic firms. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 .11, model (7 .3) is further investigated for Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City. The results are consistent with the finding of higher wages in 
FIEs compared to domestic firms. However, with the assumption on other factors 
constant, the wage gap between FIEs and domestic enterprises in Hanoi seems to be 
higher than in Ho Chi Minh City. This may indicate that the wage gap is smaller in the 
more competitive location. Most export-oriented FIEs are located in HCMC and, as 
discussed earlier, these firms are labour-intensive and pay relatively lower wages but 
not when adjusted for other characteristics. Using another approach, the difference is 
examined in the wages of the two major groups: labour-intensive and capital-intensive 
industries. For the first group, wearing apparel and leather products manufacturers are 
selected (VSIC 18 and 19) and all electronic enterprises under VSIC 30 to 33 are chosen 
for the second group. The results in the last two columns show opposite patterns. FIEs 
pay relatively more for workers in the electronic industries but not in the manufacture of 
wearing apparel and leather products. This is explained by the fact that FIEs employ 
many unskilled workers in the latter industries. Moreover, wearing apparel and leather 
products have been highly competitive and export-oriented in Vietnam since the reform 
began. 
Other determinants of wages have the expected sign and significance level. Both 
skills and education level have a positive effect on wages in all equations except for 
Hanoi, where EDU is still positive and strongly significant, but SKILL is negative and 
insignificant. This is because these variables are highly correlated to each other (their 
correlation coefficient is 0.74), reflecting a trend that highly educated people are rriore 
likely to acquire skilled jobs in Hanoi than in Ho Chi Minh City. In general, large firms 
pay higher wages than small firms (the economies of scale effect). Moreover, capital 
intensity (KI) has a positive effect on wages indicating capital-intensive firms pay 
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higher wages than labour-intensive firms. In contrast, the female share of the labour 
force has a negative and significant effect on wages. This implies, holding other effects 
constant, average wages in firms with a high ratio of female/male workers, are lower 
than average wages in firms having a low ratio of female/male workers. 
Table 7.11: Wage comparison between FIEs and domestic enterprises 
Dependent: Overall Hanoi Ho Chi Labour Electronics 
log of Minh intensive 
average (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
wa2e (w) 
FOR 0.1 796 0.4794 0.2161 0.0171 0. 1748 
(20.92)*** (13.86)*** (15.78)*** (0.80) (4.52)*** 
SKILL 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0015 0.0022 0.0037 
(7.13)*** (6.88)*** ( 1.01) (4.08)*** (3.94)*** (2.67)*** 
EDU 0.0053 0.0053 0.0035 0.0065 0.0075 0.0040 
(17.93)*** (17.94)*** (4.64)*** (11.72)*** (4.71)*** (2.36)** 
FE -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0025 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0040 
(30.69)*** (29.50)*** (6.3 1)*** (7.17)*** (4.47)*** (6.06)*** 
y 0.1 556 0.1575 0.1516 0.1461 0. 1473 0. 1407 
(115.92)*** (1 12.58)*** (38.73)*** (52.15)*** (32.70)*** (17.02)*** 
KI 0.0920 0.0922 0.0792 0.0688 0.0756 0.1210 
(34.82)*** (34.94)*** (9.58)*** (13.47)* ** (7.45)*** (7.25)*** 
PRlFDI 0.1280 
(4.96)*** 
PUREFDI 0.1 242 
(12.70)*** 
SOE -0.0860 
(1 2.53)*** 
SOEFDI 0.3375 
(19.76)*** 
Regional Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
dummies 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
dummies 
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
F value 1372 1295 146 229 191 111 
Observations 70829 70829 8013 16107 61 72 1973 
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.46 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at I 0% level,* * significant at 5% level; *** significant at I% level. 
Labour intensive industries include manufacture of wearing apparel and leather 
products (VSIC I 8 and VSIC 19). Electronic industries include VSIC30 to VSIC33. 
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7.5 Ownership and labour demand adjustment. 
This section focuses on a comparison of ownership in firm employment adjustment and 
the wage elasticity of labour absorption. The statistical findings on higher employment 
growth and more jobs created in FIEs (Section 7.2) may suggest a higher demand 
adjustment in this firm type compared to domestic firms. 
7.5.1 Modelling for dynamic labour demand and firm ownership 
The empirical analysis in this section is based on the labour demand model developed 
by Hamermesh (1993) and applied by Navaretti et al. (2003) and Fabbri et al. (2003). It 
begins with the Cobb-Douglass production function: Y(L, P) = Ala K I-a . (7.5) 
Where L is labour, K is capital, a is a constant, A is some scale parameter. The total 
cost function is assumed as follows: TC(L, K) == LW +KR (7.6) 
Where Wand Rare the wage and rental cost of capital, respectively 
The problem is to minimize total costs subject to Y(L, P) =AL a K 1-a >= Y where Y is the 
firm output threshold assumed to be constant. 
The Lagrangian form is f(L, K ) = LW +KR+ A.[Y - ALa K 1-a] 
And the Kuhn - Tucker conditions for interior solutions are: 
[ l = W-).Aala-IK l-a = 0 
[K = R - M(l - a)La K-a = 0 
f_. =Y-ALaKl-a = 0 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
From the two first conditions, it is possible to work out the relationship between the 
optimal solutions L" and K·: .£, = .!!...~ . Substituting to the last condition finds the 
· K W 1- a 
solution for K* and then one of the first two conditions is used to find the optimal 
solution for L*: 
Based on these optimal solutions, ihe cost function will be derived as: 
C(W, R, Y) = zwa R1-a Y where Z is a constant. 
Transforming the optimal solution for L • into log form with lower letters denoting 
logarithmic values: 
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I == z+ y +(a-I)w+(l-a)r (7. 10) 
By definition, a - I and 1- a are wage elasticity of labour demand and cross-elasticity of 
labour demand, respectively. 
For estimation purposes, the analogue model will be estimated using firm-level data: 
(7 .11) 
Where the subscript "i" captures firm observation at time t. T is time trend variable to 
control for technical progress. 
Controlling for the dynamic adjustment of labour demand, following Navaretti et al. 
(2004, p.169) on partial adjustment of employment demand between two consecutive 
time periods t and t-1 ; the relationship between labour demand at time t and t- 1 is 
assumed by the formula: 
(7.12) 
Where O <= r <= I captures the speed of adjustment of employment in firm i. Taking the 
logarithm of both sides of (7 .12) and manipulating using small notations for the log 
form, labour demand can be expressed as: Iii = yl,: +(I - y)l;1_ 1 (7. 13) 
Incorporating this equation with the static labour demand model in (7.11), the equation 
below can be used to estimate the speed of adjustment, wage and output elasticities of 
labour demand. 
Where: /31 captures output elasticity of labour demand 
{J2 =a - I captures wage elasticity of labour demand 
I - /Js = r captures speed of labour adjustment 
(7.14) 
For comparison between domestic firms and FIEs, an ownership dummy (FOR) is 
introduced, taking I for a firm that is foreign invested and 0, otherwise. Taking the 
interaction of this variable with all exogenous variables in (7.14) and controlling for 
firm-specific characteristics ( 77; ), the final equation for estimation is achieved. 
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lu = {30 + j31yu + f32 w;1 + f33r, + /34T + j351;1-1 + f36 FORy;1 + f31 F0Rwil + j38 F0Rr, + (7. lS) 
f39 FORT + f310FORlu-I +r]; + &u 
The proxies and measurement of variables: 
lu : Employment of a given firm at time tin log form 
Y;1 : Real gross output of a given firm at time tin log form 
w;1 : Real wage rate of a given firm at time t in log form 
r1 = log(l+i1 I P,1 I P11 _1)-l (7.16): The rental cost of capital, P(it): industry 
producer price index; i(t): country level nominal interest rate (Navaretti et al. 
2003). 
7.5.2 Data and methodology 
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the same dataset used in the 
productivity analysis in Chapter 5 with some modification. First, the underlying theory 
of the model assumes firms are "well-settled" in a given country. Therefore, the model 
is estimated using data relating to firms which have been in operation throughout the 
period under study (2000-2004 ). Thus, the data cover only the 5213 firms which 
commenced operation in 2000 or before and for which data on employment, capital 
stock and output were avaialable. The estimation of rental cost of capital (r) is done by 
applying equation (7 .16) using data on the base interest rate for long term lending (from 
the C.E.I.C Asia database) and the ind~stry producer price index at two-digit VSIC 
level (provided by GSO). 
As in Chapter 5 (FDI and Productivity Performance of Manufacturing Firms), 
the dynamic GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond ( 1991) is used to estimate 
equation (7.15). There is a fundamental difference in the employment structure between 
firm ownership types. In particular, a large proportion of SOE employment has been 
persistent in the same firms since the pre-transition period. The labour turnover from 
SOEs is expected to be negligible. It is expected that labour adjustment between 
domestic private firms and SOEs will be different. However, the balanced data may 
include a small number of SOEs. For that reason, equation (7. 15) is examined with and 
without SOEs. 
Ideally, equation (7 .15) should be estimated separately for skilled and unskilled 
labour. Because the GSO survey data report only total employee compensation, wages 
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can not be extracted for each type of worker. Instead, two alternatives ·are compared, 
excluding and including an exogenous variable controlling for the effect of skills on 
labour demand. The literature has identified two major issues for investigation: one is 
that a firm with a high demand for skilled workers may have smaller firm size in terms 
of employment. The other is that skills may have less effect on the labour demand of 
MNE affiliates because they are able to pay higher wages for a number of skilled 
workers in order to expand production. With the addition of skilled share in total firm 
employment (SK.ILL) in the model, it is expected the coefficients of this variable and its 
interaction with the ownership dummy (FOR) will be negative and significant. 
7.5.3 The results 
Table 7.15 reports the results for equation (7.15) using firm-level data. Four 
specifications are presented. The first two include all firm types while the last two 
exclude SOEs based on the argument of sluggish change in SOE employment even 
during the reform period. The last equation investigates the difference in labour demand 
adjustment between joint ventures and fully-owned FIEs. The first and third equations 
ignore the role of skills on Jabour demand whereas the other three control for this 
impact. All coefficients for domestic firms have the expected sign and most are highly 
significant. Employment in the previous year plays a positive role in the current Jabour 
demand of domestic firms. However, the role of lag employment is not as important as 
in FIEs as the interaction between FOR and l(t-1) is negative and significant. Firm 
outputs also have a significant and positive effect on labour. demand and the difference 
in this effect is negligible between domestic and foreign-invested firms. The rental cost 
of capital seems to be in proportion to employment but is significant only if the skill 
factor is included. Wages have a strongly significant and negative effect on labour 
demand for both ownership types but this effect seems smaller for FIEs. The time trend 
(T) that controls for all technical progress and other shocks is positive and highly 
significant. It may indicate domestic finns experience some significant changes in 
techniques and capital accumulation over time. However, the positive sign of interaction 
between time trend and ownership dummy (FOR *T) may indicate a structure change in 
entry modes of FIEs from joint ventures to fully-owned F !Es since 2000. 
It is important to examine the difference between joint ventures and fully-owned 
FIEs as the previous findings show that fully-owned FlEs are more labour-intensive and 
export-oriented than joint ventures and therefore, had an overwhelming effect on 
employment creation and growth over the period 2000-2005. In doing so, equation (5) 
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re-estimates model (7 .15) using only FIE data. Interactions are constructed to show the 
differences between the two entry modes by multiplying a dummy for fully-owned FIEs 
by all other coefficients. It is thus straightforward to conclude that employment in 
previous years is very important for joint ventures as the coefficient of l(t-1) is positive 
and significant. This effect is not as important for fully-owned FIEs because the 
interaction (PUREFDI*l(t-1)) is negative. As before, both wage and skill variables 
have expected sign and significance level indicating higher wages and skill levels are 
associated with using fewer workers. Wages seem to have a higher negative effect on 
the employment of fully-owned FIEs, albeit not significant. Finn output has a positive 
effect on labour demand but is not important for either firm type. The time effect (T) is 
positive only for fully-owned FIEs, pointing to the fast growth of employment caused 
by reform in this form of investment. 
Estimates of the short-run and long-run elasticities of labour demand with 
respect to wages and output for domestic firms and FIEs are reported in Table 7 .13; 
these are based on the estimation results reported in Table 7.12. The results show that 
both domestic firms and FIEs experience a relatively high speed of adjustment in labour 
demand. However, labour demand of FIEs changed faster and more persistently than in 
domestic firms. Controlling for employment-skill factor in the demand equation causes 
the speed of adjustment for domestic firms to increase considerably. This finding is 
consistent with the statistic description of the remarkable employment growth for both 
ownership types, especially FIEs. The high speed of adjustment may capture the growth 
of employment between time (t) and (t-1) rather than other aspects of labour fluctuation. 
In comparison between joint ventures and fully-owned FIEs, the result clearly shows 
that the latter achieve a higher rate of positive employment adjustment (0.95). In 
contrast, the change in employment of joint ventures is likely to be negative and at a 
slow rate (-0.20). 
To comment on the factor price elasticity of labour demand, and in contrast to 
Navaretti et al. (2003), it is found that the magnitude of both the short run and long run 
wage elasticity of domestic firms was higher than FIEs in all alternative model 
specifications. The magnitude of wage elasticity for FIEs remains similar for both the 
short and long run, whereas the long run values for domestic firms are higher. The 
results imply domestic firms are more sensitive to change in wages than FIEs. An 
underlying reason for this difference is the way FIEs retain workers through paying 
higher wages compared to local firms. The wages paid by FIEs also pressure change in 
domestic firm wages. However, wage dispersion in domestic firms is comparatively 
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high and hence affects labour demand. Unlike factor pnce elasticity, the output 
elasticity of labour demand does not vary between domestic and foreign invested firms. 
FIE employment seems more elastic with respect to output in the short run and this 
pattern is the result of the higher output elasticity in fully-owned FIEs. This high 
sensitivity of employment by firm output for fully-owned FIEs compared to joint 
ventures in the short run ((0.17 vs. 0.09) again partly confirms that the former is more 
labour-intensive than the latter. Moreover, the short run and long run values are similar 
despite the difference in specification and sample size. For example, the inclusion of a 
skills factor in the labour demand model narrows the adjustment/elastic gap between 
domestic firms and FIEs but not substantially 
Labour demand adjustment and ownership using industry-level data. 
Wage rates may be determined at industry level rather than firm level and the legal 
minimum wage is still regulated differently for each ownership group. Moreover, for 
many MNEs, analysis at industry-data level is more appropriate because an MNE may 
own many firms and then internal employment movement occurs without difficulty. 
Based on these arguments, this study investigates the model in (7 .15) with the use of 
industry-level data at four-digit VSIC level. All va,riables like employment, output, 
capital and wages are aggregated separately from the firm data for domestic and foreign 
ownership. This study also examines the effect of government power on labour demand 
by adding a new exogenous variable - share of state-owned capital in total industry 
capital stock (SOES). The results of SOE privatization have been constrained since the 
government wants to retain control in many economic fields. Through capital 
investment for SOEs, the government may help improve SOE performance without 
having a significant effect on employment generation. 
Table 7.14 includes three specifications differentiated by including skill factor 
(SKILL) and SOES. The expected signs of the coefficients are consistent with the firm 
level results (Table 7 .15), with the exception of the wage effect in FIEs (represented by 
an interaction between w and FOR). At the industry level, wage elasticity of labour 
demand in FIEs seems higher than for domestic firms in both the short and long terms. 
This is reasonable because most employees want to get higher paid jobs in order to 
compensate for the high risk of losing their job in FIEs compared to domestic firms. 
The coefficient of lagged dependent variable becomes smaller than before but is 
insignificant in two of three equations. This makes the speed of employment adjustment 
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for domestic firms increase and virtually achieves the level of FIEs. The magnitudes of 
output elasticity are higher than using the firm-level data and the pattern is more 
significant, e.g., FIE employment is more elastic with respect to gross output than 
domestic-firm employment 
The inclusion of a skill variable does not improve the quality of the estimated 
specifications. Both the coefficient of skill variable (SKILL) and its interaction are 
positive but insignificant. In contrast, controlling for government influence (through 
using SOES) on the labour demand model seems necessary because it increases the 
significance level of some other exogenous variables. The evidence indicates that an 
increase in the share of state-owned capital (SOES) has a negative impact on labour 
demand. This is understandable because most of the investment is devoted to 
overcoming difficulties and technology changes in existing firms and may not help 
create new jobs within a given firm or industry. Incorporated with findings from the 
productivity analysis, it can be concluded that the remaining high government control 
through investment for SOEs may restrict privatization and the formation of an equal 
environment for investment and hence discourage development of the private sector 
including MNE entry. 
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Table 7.12: Regression results on labour demand model 
Dependent All firms Excludinl! SOEs Joint 
variables: log of No skill Including No skill Including ventures vs. 
employment (I) control skill share control skill share fully-owned 
(1) (2) (3) (4) FIEs (5) 
J(t-1) 0.1635 0.0778 0.1771 0.0915 1.1 983 
(5.22)*** (2.69)*** (5.59)*** (3. 12)*** (2.07)** 
(y) 0.1741 0.1700 0.1741 0.1700 0.0932 
(34.40)*** (34.96)*** (33.76)*** (34.35)*** (1.62) 
(w) -0.3256 -0.3087 -0.3276 -0.3 106 -0.2643 
(38.09)*** (38.03)*** (37.67)*** (37.66)*** (4.50)*** 
(r) 0.0288 0.] 311 0.0284 0.1315 -0.0373 
(1.21) (5.56)*** ( 1.1 7) (5.48)*** (0.35) 
SKILL -0.0833 -0.0838 -0. 1329 
(16.60)*** (16.42)*** (4.29)*** 
T 0.0258 0.0122 0.0253 0.0115 -0.0649 
(10.39)*** (4.63)*** (10.02)*** (4.32)*** (1.44) 
FOR*l(t-1) -0.1968 -0.1031 -0.2021 -0. l 095 
(5.03)*** (2.81)*** (4.92)*** (2.84)*** 
FOR*y 0.01 75 0.0030 0.0246 0.0095 
(0.88) (0.16) ( 1.10) (0.44) 
FOR*w 0.0760 0.0681 0.0508 0.0454 
(3.21 )*** (2.99)*** (l .90)* (1.76)* 
FOR*r -0.017 1 -0.0199 -0.0030 -0.0063 
(0.27) (0.32) (0.04) (0.09) 
FOR*SKILL -0.0246 -0.0273 
(1.48) (1.45) 
FOR*T 0.0454 0.0301 0.0497 0.0328 
(7.23)*** (4.27)*** (6.97)*** (4.08)*** 
PUREFDI* l(t-1) -1.1514 
(1.99)** 
PUREFDI*y 0.0763 
( l .26) 
PUREFDI *w -0.0056 
(0.09) 
PUREFDl *r 0.1513 
(1.27) 
PUREFDI *SKILL 0.0252 
(0.73) 
PUREFDI *T 0.1069 
(2.36)** 
Observations 15639 15639 15081 15081 2295 
Number of id 5213 5213 5027 5027 765 
Notes: Dynamic models are estimated by methods used in Arellano and Bond (1991). 
*Significant at 10% level;** Significant at 5% level;*** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7.13: Labour demand adjustment in the short run and the long run 
Indicators Formula Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Domestic FIEs Domestic fl Es Domestic FIEs Domestic FI Es Domest ic FIEs Joint Fully-
finns firms firms private private ventures owned 
firms finns FIEs 
Speed of I- /Js I - /Js - /Jto 0.84 1.03 0.92 1.02 0.82 1.02 0.91 1.02 -0.20 0.95 
adjustment 
Short run wage /32 /32 + /31 -0.33 -0.25 -0.31 -0.24 -0.33 -0.28 -0.31 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 
elasticity 
Long run wage 
_h__ /32 + /31 
-0.39 -0.24 -0.34 -0.24 -0.40 -0.28 -0.34 -0.25 1.30 0.27 elasticity 1- j35 1- /Js - /JIO 
Short run 
output /31 /31 + /36 0.17 0.19 0.1 7 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.09 0.17 
elasticitv 
Long run /31 /J1 + fJG 
output 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.1 7 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.1 9 0.45 0.18 
elasticity 1- /35 l-/Js - /310 
Notes: See Table 7.12 for more information on specifications. 
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Table 7.14: Regression results on labour demand model using 4-digit VSIC data 
Dependent 
variables: log of (1) (2) (3) 
employment (1) 
l(t-1 ) 0.0598 0.0440 0.1771 
(0.81) (0.61) (3.04)* ** 
(y) 0.4011 0.3995 0.3872 
(17.17)*** (16.88)*** (15.09)*** 
(w) 
-0.1201 -0.1153 -0.1856 
(2.34)** (2.25)** (3.50)*** 
(r) -0.0324 -0.0280 0.0039 
(0.34) (0.29) (0.04) 
SKILL 0.0119 0.0115 
(0.54) (0.53) 
T 0.0750 0.0806 0.0624 
(4.18)*** (4.58)*** (4.14)*** 
FOR*l(t-1) -0.0885 -0.0748 -0.2202 
(1.19) (1.02) (3.68)*** 
FOR* y 0.0763 0.0770 0.0890 
(2.14)** (2.15)** (2.41)** 
FOR*w -0.3484 -0.3549 -0.2859 
(5.16)** * (5.26)*+ * (4.12)*** 
FOR* r -0.2010 -0.1949 -0.2079 
(1.46) (1.40) (1.58) 
FOR* t 0.0471 0.0444 0.0650 
(2.14)** (2.03)** (3.31)*** 
FOR* SKILL 0.0066 0.0116 
(0.24) (0.43) 
SOES -0.00002 
(3.18)*** 
Number of 911 911 875 
Observations 
Number of id 271 271 243 
Indicators Des FIEs DEs FIEs Des FIEs 
Speed of adjustment 0.94 1.03 0.96 1.01 0.82 1.04 
Short run wage 
-0.1 2 -0.47 -0.12 -0.47 -0.19 -0.47 
elasticity 
Long run wage 
-0.13 -0.46 -0.13 -0.47 -0.23 -0.45 
elasticity 
Short run output 0.40 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.48 
elasticity 
Long run output 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.46 
elasticity 
Notes: Dynamic models are estimated by methods used in Arellano and Bond (1991). 
DEs: Domestic enterprises. 
Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 10% level, * * significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1 % level. 
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7 .6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined different aspects of the FDI impact on employment and 
wages in Vietnamese manufacturing. It first focussed on the three key points of 
employment generation from FIEs, factor proportions and wages paid by FIEs m 
comparison with domestic firms. This was followed by an investigation of ownership 
differences in labour demand adjustment using dynamic modelling to estimate three 
criteria: speed of adjustment, factor price elasticity and the output elasticity of labour 
demand. The analysis was substantially based on unpublished GSO and MPI data. 
The results provide significant support for the positive effects of FD I m 
employment generation. FDI has played an increasingly important role in employment 
generation for the manufacturing industry, especially since 2000. During the six years 
under study (2000-2005), the increase in employment by FIEs exceeded that of either 
domestic private firms or SOEs. Annual growth rate of FIE employment in the same 
period was nearly 30 percent while that of domestic firms was only about 10 percent. 
FIEs are also larger (in terms of employment size) and more capital intensive than 
domestic firms. The capital intensity gap between FIEs and domestic firms was found to 
be still significant although it has narrowed over time. 
Wages are found to be higher in FIEs, especially for joint ventures. 
Incorporating all criteria, it can be concluded that higher wages in joint ventures result 
from higher capital intensity. Fully-owned FIEs are more important in employment 
generation as this entry mode has concentrated on labour-intensive and export-oriented 
industries and obtained a high employment growth rate. The ownership differences vary 
significantly across industries regardless of the indicators being compared. For instance, 
on average, joint ventures are more capital-intensive than fully-owned FIEs but the gap 
is insignificant in nearly half of 22 sectors. Domestic-firm wages and capital intensity 
are shown to converge toward the level of FIEs but there is no explicit sign of 
convergence amongst two-digit industries as well as between two entry modes. The 
increase in domestic-firm wages may indicate spillovers from FlE wages or better 
performance by the former. This suggests further study is needed on wage spillovers 
from FDl when the micro data on wages of every skilled worker group become 
available. 
Analysis of labour demand adjustment has yielded some interesting results. 
Results from using both firm and industry-level data show fundamental similarities but 
also some considerable differences. Despite the fact that employment volatility has 
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changed rapidly, the first lag of labour demand is still important to the current firms' 
employment. Both domestic and foreign invested firms have displayed an exceptionally 
high speed of adjustment but the level of FIEs is still higher, especially when using 
firm-level data. Fully-owned FIEs are found to have a far higher speed of labour 
adjustment compared to joint ventures. This result is consistent with the statistic 
description of the employment contribution of FIEs, especially for fully foreign-owned 
firms. Both coefficients of wages and outputs have expected sign and are highly 
significant. In comparison with domestic firms, the wage elasticity of FIE employment 
is smaller in both the short and the long run. 
However, the trend is reversed when using aggregated data. As for the difference 
in the output elasticity of labour demand, the ownership type seems not to have a 
significant effect when using firm-level data, regardless of time constraint. ln contrast, 
both the short run and long run output elasticity of labour demand in FIEs was likely to 
be higher than that of for domestic firms using industry-level data. Again, fully-owned 
FIEs exhibit higher employment sensitivity by firm output in the short run, meaning that 
this firm type is employing more workers than joint ventures. Owing to data limitations 
it was not possible to estimate the labour demand adjustment by skill group. However, 
the inclusion of a skilled/unskilled worker ratio as an exogenous variable helps to 
indicate that skill factor may have a negative impact on Jabour demand at firm level but 
is not significant at industry level. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
8.1 Findings 
Following a hesitant start in the late 1980s, Vietnam has gone a Jong way in its market-
oriented policy reforms. The FDI policy regime and overall investment environment has 
improved slowly but steadily over the past two decades, with notable improvements in 
the New Millennium. In regard to policy reform, several major successes have been 
obtained. The. first is the removal of discrimination between domestic and foreign 
investors through the adoption of the newly-unified Investment Law and Enterprise Law 
in 2005. These laws in accordance with other implementing decrees regulate all 
investment and corporate activities in the same manner even though they are from 
different economic sectors. Second is the separation of investment regulations and 
corporate rules into different laws that help to clearly evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each legal document. The amalgamation of separate Jaws into two united 
laws is an important step in creating a level playing field for all firms in the domestic 
market. Third is comprehensive reform to integrate Vietnam into the international 
market (AFTA, BTA, etc), highlighted by accession to the WTO at the end of 2006. 
These changes are expected to lead to a huge boost in foreign investment and economic 
growth in Vietnam. Evidence from JETRO annual surveys and development of PCI by 
VNCI and VCCI also state the investment climate in Vietnam has significantly 
improved. Competition in attracting FDI has been expanded amongst local authorities 
by following suggestions from the corporate PCl. 
FDI inflows showed an impressive growth over the first two decades of reform, 
especially in the mid-l 990s (1994-1997) and more recently (2004-2006). These 
growing FDI inflows have accompanied notable structural change in their ownership 
structure. Thanks to the substantial policy reform from 2000, fully-owned FIEs have 
become the most important form of foreign investment, substituting for joint ventures. 
The 2005 adoption of the two important investment and enterprise laws created 
potential opportunities for all entry modes. Consequently, there has been remarkable 
FDI growth in association with diversification of investment purposes in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. In addition to fully-owned FIEs and joint ventures, 
direct investment has flowed into specific forms of M&A, like shareholding companies 
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and capital-holding companies. Among the various sub-groups within FIEs, the relative 
importance of fully-owned FIEs has increased over time as a result of a palpable shift in 
FDI policy, from domestic-market-oriented production toward export-oriented 
production. A significant proportion of FDI has been invested in IZs and EPZs in order 
to take advantage of the infrastructure and government incentives in these economic 
zones. FDI has become an important source of capital in Vietnam, accounting for about 
16 percent of gross domestic investment in recent years. This type of investment has 
come from a range of country sources, with a clear indication of an increase in FDI 
from developed countries and predominance of Asian developing country FDI. 
The key components of this thesis include investigation of the FDI effects on 
firm performance in three fundamental facets, productivity, exports and factor 
proportions and employment. Chapter 5 finds the direct effects of FDI to be 
straightforward with a positive contribution coming from the foreign share in capital to 
firm productivity. FIEs also play an important role in the enhancement of aggregate 
productivity as their productivity was found to be higher than that of domestic firms. 
The results are consistent even though there may still be problems of endogeneity of 
FDI and running either within-industry or LP models. 
The spillover effects of FIE presence on the productivity of domestic firms are 
found to depend on firm 's absorptive capacity, labour quality, competition level, the 
technology gap and the entry modes of investment. The most important finding is that 
spillovers have a high connection with ownership structure in the host country and the 
development of the domestic private sector in Vietnam. In transition economies, the 
initial entry of FDl may be associated with severe economic conditions characterised by 
dominance of SOEs and the weakness of the private economic sector. These fac.tors 
seem to explain why foreign investors take over market share from domestic firms 
rather than transfer technology and other positive spillovers in Vietnamese 
manufacturing. The negative effects from FIEs on domestic firms indicate that the 
higher competition caused by the presence of the former has forced the inefficient latter 
to lose market share. Obviously, as with productivity, spillovers also have a dynamic 
nature, i.e., when the economy is developed with the private sector as the main driving 
force, domestic firms may experience larger spillover effects. Spillovers are also related 
to the specific industries and the level of aggregated data. The results clearly point to 
capital-intensive industries being more likely to gain positive spillovers than labour-
intensive ones. Using industry-level data gives more chance of positive spillovers as the 
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results reflect the overall benefits from FDI rather than capturing specific firm 
consequences. A robustness check using an LP model with all possible connections 
taken into account (Appendix AS .10) provides consistent findings for negative 
spillovers but these effects are highly correlated with other factors. Preliminary results 
for dynamic models on FDI spillovers confirm the time effect of FDI and firm outputs 
and the possible benefits when measuring FDI presence by both industry and location. 
Empirical evidence in Chapter 6 shows that FIEs play an important role in the 
expansion of manufacturing exports from Vietnam. Fully-owned FIEs are more export-
intensive than any other form of investment. Moreover, Asian FDI, especially 
investment from Japan and NICs, has proven to be more export-oriented than "Western" 
FDI (including European and US investment). 
In regard to the spillover effects of FDI on the export expansion of local firms, 
two key aspects were investigated: competition effect (FIE presence) and FIE-export 
activity. The presence of FIEs was not found to be contemporaneous with foreign 
capital stock but with the foreign share of employment in a given industry, as shown by 
the argument in Chapter 5. FIE-export activity is investigated separately from total-
export activity, premised on the hypothesis that the trade of FIEs may exhibit different 
patterns from the trade of domestic firms owing to differences in comparative 
advantages in the world market. Consequently, the competition effect from FIEs on 
exports was found to be weaker than that on productivity. On the other hand, FIE-export 
activity was found to exert a negative effect on both the export decisions and export 
intensity of domestic firms, regardless of whether different functional forms and 
samples are used. Estimates for the 1998 and 2000 data indicate a dynamic movement 
from negative to positive spillovers. This seems to imply that domestic finns may 
capture benefits from FIE presence as they acquire trade experience and achieve a 
certain level of capacity. All in all, the results of the two chapters on productivity 
implications (Chapter 5) and export performance (Chapter 6) suggest that local firms 
have not so far benefited from spillor effects from FDI because of the nature of their 
performance at the early stage of economic transitions in the economy rather than 
because of intrinsic characteristics of the behaviour of FIEs. 
Concerning the employment effect of FDI, there is strong evidence that FlEs 
have contributed significantly to employment creation in Vietnamese manufacturing. 
The employment intensity of FIE operations has increased over time, underpinned by a 
significant shift in FDI away from domestic market-oriented production towards export-
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oriented production. Recently, the FIE share of manufacturing employment surpassed 
the share of SOEs and was approximately equal to the share of the domestic private 
sector. A significant difference was also found in factor proportions between ownership 
types. The degree of capital intensity of FIEs is significantly higher compared to 
domestic firms even though the former employs more workers than the latter. This 
indirectly indicates the weakness of domestic firms relative to FIEs in terms of scales of 
operation and technology levels, which is to be expected in a latecomer transition 
economy. The significant increase in the KI of domestic private firms does not make 
them comparable to FIEs and SOEs despite the fact that a decline in KI has occurred in 
both foreign entry modes, especially fully-owned FIEs. A noteworthy conclusion of 
Chapter 7 relates to the differences in factor proportions between export-oriented and 
domestic-market-oriented firms. Export-oriented firms were significantly less capital-
intensive than domestic-market oriented firms, regardless of the difference in parentage. 
The econometric results also confirm fully-owned FlEs are more labour-intensive than 
joint ventures, partly because most follow an export-orientation strategy. 
The pattern of wages in FIEs also strongly reflects a structural shift in FIE 
output composition away from domestic-market-oriented production towards export-
oriented production. On the one hand, the decline in average FIE wages indicates an 
increase in using more workers and the preference by new direct investment for labour-
intensive industries. This is a desirable outcome for development in Vietnam's labour-
surplus economy. The wage share in value-added in FIEs has begun to increase in 
recent years. This suggests the greater export orientation of FIEs and the resultant 
increase in employment of mostly low-skilled workers has begun to raise the living 
standard of those in the low income brackets. 
Results from the econometric analysis of labour demand adjustment suggest 
that FlEs are characterised by a higher speed of adjustment in labour absorption. 
Comparing the two entry modes, employment in fully-owned FlEs was much more 
elastic than in joint ventures. Fully-owned FIEs performed at a high and positive value 
in adjustment speed of labour demand, whereas joint ventures seemed to rely greatly on 
workers who had been employed in the previous years. In addition, this thesis 
concentrated on two fundamental factors of adjustment, the wage and output elasticity 
of labour demand. To be more specific, wage rates in FIEs were found to be higher but 
the wage elasticity of labour demand of these firms is lower than in domestic firms (at 
firm level). This is explained by the higher wages in joint ventures whlle these firms 
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employ a small and inelastic number of employees. The output elasticity of labour 
demand in fully-owned FIEs was also significantly higher than that of joint ventures. 
This finding acts as auxiliary evidence for the earlier conclusion on labour-intensive 
characteristics of fully-owned FIEs relative to joint ventures. 
8.2 Policy implications 
The main implication derived from this thesis is that a host-country government should 
focus on reform to enhance the positive effects from FOi rather than on attracting a 
huge quantity of foreign investment. Developing countries worldwide recognize there is 
always going to be intense competition for FOi and that the role of the general 
investment climate is therefore more important than any individual incentives or 
subsidies. Improvement of the investment environment can be achieved by 
incorporating several strategies, set out below. 
Vietnam has gained a high level of basic education but a low level of vocational 
education. As reviewed in Chapter 2 on the theoretical framework, human capital is an 
important factor of FDl spillovers. Vietnam has accumulated a large amount of foreign 
investment thanks to lower production costs, of which low labour wages relative to the 
wages of other regional countries are the most important. At this stage of development, 
policy attracting FDI into low-wage and export-oriented industries is likely to be the 
best choice for the Vietnamese economy. However, this policy is successful only if the 
govenunent focuses on improvement in other aspects of the labour market, like wage 
premiums, market relations (labour unions), immigration and social insurance. In the 
long term, when wages increase, the availability of highly-skilled workers will act as a 
key factor in further attraction of FOL Therefore, apart from improving the overall 
investment climate, vocational and business management training programs with 
government support are recommended in order to provide high quality workers for both 
domestic firms and FIEs. 
The uneven distribution of FDI by location and industry should be addressed 
and improved through using various incentive tools. Intuitively, FDI flows will be 
spatially uneven but perhaps preferential treatment for FIEs in remote and mountainous 
areas should be promoted in line with developing infrastructure and labour training 
programs. Decentralisation in approving, licensing and supervising FIEs is necessary 
and should be placed under the central government's master plan to avoid "unhealthy" 
competition and massive development of inefficient EPZs/IZs in nearby regions. 
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Infrastructure development should be emphasised within EPZ and IZ areas, including 
road and seaport systems and a stable electricity supply. This strategy requires critical 
improvement of state management on ODA and long-term loans as recommended by 
many international agencies. 
Privatisation should be accelerated as a major solution for reforming SOEs and 
helping reduce preferential treatment amongst ownership types. The optimal investment 
climate ca1U1ot be achieved if SO Es continue to play a leading role in the economy and 
receive large government support because the dominant role of SOEs is strongly 
associated with a crowding-out effect from this sector to the domestic private sector in 
terms of resource access, policy and equal government treatment. The only solution is to 
strengthen the privatisation process for all SOEs except for those working in public 
goods (defence, environment). Valuation of all SOE assets is necessary in order to be 
listed on the securities market. Foreign investors should be encouraged to participate in 
this process to avoid undervaluation of state assets and speed up firm restructuring. 
Promoting export-oriented FDI is a good strategy for export expansion and 
economic growth in Vietnam. With comparative advantages in production cost but a 
small domestic market, the government should encourage MNEs to establish production 
bases in Vietnam and export their products to world markets. ln doing so, Vietnam 
needs to carefully phase in its commitments with the WTO to reduce tariffs and remove 
trade and non-trade barriers. 
Institutional reform is very important in improving the investment climate. As 
discussed in the preceding chapters, reform of government institutions has been slower 
than reform in the economy and society as a whole. ln many cases, government activity 
has actually been an obstacle to development as it has deeply interfered with 
enterprises' operations and retained the old biased attitude towards the private economic 
sector. As a result, construction of laws and other legal documents has been undertaken 
by separate ministries and not by the national assembly, leading to inconsistency and 
instability in Vietnam's legal system. 
The crowding-out effect of FIE on domestic firms may be more severe in the 
case of Vietnam where domestic firms' low capacity makes it difficult to compete with 
FIEs. This repeats the pattern observed in China in the first decade of reform. 
Fortunately, restructuring of SOEs in the 1990s and the subsequent growth of China's 
domestic firms resulted in more spillovers than crowding-out effects. Accordingly, 
Vietnam should aim to create good conditions for obtaining positive spillovers using a 
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range of solutions. Of these, support from government to raise the capacity of domestic 
finns is very important. Common measures may include labour training programs, 
information exchange, trade promotion and encouragement ofR&D activity. 
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Appendices 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
A2.1 Modelling on the product market effect of FOi 
Navaretti and Venables (2004) separate the product market effect of FDI by 
transmission mechanism and FDI linkages (horizontal and vertical FDI). This study 
reviews the effect of horizontal FDI on the host economy, i.e., whether the presence of 
MNE affiliates affects the participation of local firms in the product market. 
They apply the constant elasticity of the substitution (CES) utility function for 
investi&ating horizontal FDI effects on a single host country that has some competitive 
local firms to produce a single product (x). A host country (country 1) has n1 domestic 
firms setting the same price ( p 1 ). This country has a number of m multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) setting a different price to domestic firm (Pm). These MNEs are 
from a home country with n 2 domestic firms having the same price of product at p2 • 
When products from that home country are exported to the host country, tariffs, 
transportation costs and distribution costs have to be added to the price of each unit of 
goods. Assuming the price of imported goods is p 2r, where r is a fixed coefficient for 
the mark-up cost of the imported product. 
The price index ( G1 ) given by CES utility assumption has the following function: 
(2.1) 
The industry expenditure function in the host country (E) will be 
E=n1P1X1 +n2(P2T)x2 +mpmxm (2.2) 
With an additional assumption on the identical firm for each group, the demand 
functions for local-firm product ( x1 ), FlE product ( xm) and imported product ( x2 ) are a 
partial derivative from the expenditure function (E): 
- uc<T-IE X1 = P1 l (2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
Using Roy's identity ( x = E 0 1- 71 --> E = E 0 11- 71 ), substituting for the demand functions, 
gives: 
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- uau-TJ E 
X1 =Pt I 
- - u au-7] E 
X m - P,,, I 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
Navaretti and Venables (2004) estimate the possible effects of FDI on both 
consumer welfare and the market power of local firms. The latter aspect is reviewed to 
see the direction for local firms when MNEs enter and imported goods are not 
restricted. Suppose MNE entry replaces the importers, i.e., dn2 =-I and price index (G) 
dm 
is constant, and hence the demand for each firm's output, measured by (x) has to be 
constant to hold the assumption on price index. Consequently, taking the derivative of 
the number of local firms ( n 1 ) with respect to the number of MNEs (m), and with some 
manipulation, gives 
is the ratio between sales of 
imported goods over sales of MNE products produced domestically. It is assumed to be 
less than unity. So, if <p = o means there is no imports at the begiMing, the presence of 
MNEs will crowd out local-firm participation by a ratio of PmXm . If <p =I This means 
P1 X1 
MNE entry targets the domestic market to substitute imported goods, so that there will 
be no crowding-out effect. 
The results indicate FDI entry could have both direct and indirect effects on the 
local-product market. The direct effect is the replacement of domestic products and 
imported products by the products of the MNE affiliates. The indirect effects are the 
number of local firms crowded out by the competition of MNEs. If local firms are not 
identical, MNEs will force out less efficient ones. Moreover, if the country uses tariffs 
for imported goods, the MNE presence will cause a loss of public revenue. In all cases, 
they conclude horizontal FDI seems to cause crowding-out of local production. 
Modelling the factor market effects, Navaretti and Venables (2004) concentrate 
on direct changes in employment with respect to the extent of MNE entry as a form of 
horizontal FDl. Their model is of labour demand for both local firms and MNE 
operation in the local market. Holding the prices and output per firm constant but with 
two types of firms hav ing two different unit cost functions, they find the crowding-out 
effect of employment on local firms is only small if the host country attracts large 
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import-substitution FDI or MNEs are forced to pay a much higher wage rate than local 
firms. However, relying on employment analysis to evaluate the crowding-out effect of 
MNE presence is not always accurate. Most developing countries have a huge 
unexploited pool oflabour. Moreover, MNE entry provides more opportunities .for local 
firms to apply high technology and hence, employment demand tends to decrease. 
Therefore, their analysis should be extended to other factors of production, like the 
effects on total investment or savings, technology and intermediate inputs. 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
A4.1 Data sources 
This study makes use of data from two main sources. One is the MPI data used for 
analysing general trends and patterns of FDI and the determinants of FIE exports. 
Another is the annual GSO enterprise survey employed for empirical analysis in the 
three core chapters examining the effects of FDI on productivity, export performance, 
wages and employment adjustment. 
The main data source is unpublished returns to the annual enterprise survey 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). The survey has been 
conducted annually since 2001 and finn-level data for five years (2000-2004) were 
obtained for study purposes. The survey covers enterprises operating in all production 
and service sectors, with the exception of agricultural cooperatives, forestry sectors and 
household businesses. The GSO relies on the statistical offices at both district and 
provincial level to conduct the survey. The data on every finn are entered and stored 
individually by the tax code and the Vietnamese standard industrial classification 
(VSIC) at the four-digit level. Based on the main activity of business, each enterprise 
belongs to a unique code of VSIC. Currently, VSIC has been determined to make data 
comparable to the international standard of industrial classification (ISIC). Firms 
closing down or not yet operating are not objectives of the survey. After data· are 
transferred to the central office, they are edited and corrected by technical staff under 
the supervision of the World Bank. 
The survey covers all key aspects of manufacturing perfonnance: gross output, 
capital stock, employment, wage bills, total sales, export and type of ownership. 
Initially, the firm level data are tabulated by 14 different ownership types and grouped 
into five main ownership categories: State owned enterprise (SOE), private enterprise, 
joint-ventures with SOEs, joint-ventures with private enterprise and fully foreign 
invested enterprise. Firms operating in manufacturing industry for which data are 
available for all years are selected for' the analysis. The number of manufacturing firms 
covered by the survey has increased over time. In 2000, there were about 10,500 
manufacturing firms, of which around 1,000 were FDI firms. By 2004, this had 
increased to about 2 1,000 and 4,000, respectively. 
The second source of data is the industrial survey also conducted by the GSO in 
1999. This survey was a project funded with UNDP and UNIDO technical assistance. 
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Based on the results of the survey, the industrial statistics system began the first step in 
confonning to the international standard of industrial classification (ISIC). The survey 
covered the 17 largest provinces and cities, accounting for about 50 percent of firms, 
over 70 percent of total capital and employment in manufacturing and nearly 80 percent 
of gross output. All enterprises legally registered and operating with more than five 
employees were covered. The content of this survey comprises all these principle 
indicators but the question of intermediate inputs is specified into specific input factors. 
The time point for this data collection was 31112/1998. This source of data used for 
statistical analysis in the chapter on export performance. 
Unpublished data from the Minister of Plalliling and Investment (MPI) was used 
as a complementary source for analysing the trends and patterns of FDI as well as 
investigating the export performance of FIEs in Vietnam. The data cover about 4000 
manufacturing FIEs during in the period 1996-2004. A short 2000-2004 panel was 
selected for empirical work because it provides essential information on location, source 
country, sector and firm characteristics, like employment, capital, exports, and revenue 
and ownership types. 
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A4.2 FOi in Vietnam and selected developing countries 
A4.1 FDI inflows (billion USD) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
Year countries countries 
1988 164.93 134.63 31.14 3.19 0.72 3.65 1.11 0.01 
1989 192.90 162.26 29.48 3.39 1.67 2.89 1.78 0.00 
1990 201 .61 165.64 36.90 3.49 2.61 5.57 2.58 0.18 
1991 154.80 114.57 43.28 4.37 4 .04 4.89 2.05 0.38 
1992 170.47 115.55 54.58 11.01 5.14 2.20 2.15 0.47 
1993 224.14 143.28 81.41 27.51 5.74 4.69 1.81 0.93 
1994 254.29 148.22 108.74 33.77 4.58 8.55 1.37 1.94 
1995 340.34 219.67 115.95 37.52 5.82 11.59 2.07 1.78 
1996 392.42 239.38 151.98 41 .73 7.30 9.13 2.34 1.80 
1997 489.71 287.19 198.91 45.26 6.32 13.61 3.88 2.59 
1998 712.03 511 .90 194.05 45.46 2.71 7.69 7.49 1.70 
1999 1,099.92 861.73 231.88 40.32 3.90 16.07 6.09 1.48 
2000 1,409.57 1, 145.91 252.46 40.71 3.79 17.22 3.35 1.29 
2001 832.25 610.18 219.72 46.88 0.55 15.04 3.81 1.30 
2002 617.73 442.77 157.61 52.74 3.20 5.73 1.07 1.20 
2003 557.87 360.83 172.03 53.51 2.47 11.41 1.80 1.45 
2004 710.75 410.94 233.23 60.63 4.62 16.06 1.06 1.61 
2005 916.28 555.93 334.29 72.41 3.97 20.08 3.69 2.02 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www.unctad .org, 2007 
A4.2 FDI inflows as percentage of Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
year countries countries 
1988 3.8 4.0 3.9 2.6 8.3 46.9 5.8 0.3 
1989 4.2 4.6 3.3 2.9 14.8 29.8 7.1 0.6 
1990 4.0 4.3 3.6 3.5 17.9 46.8 7.5 21.2 
1991 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.9 22.6 33.6 5.0 35.9 
1992 3.2 2.8 3.8 7.3 23.7 12.5 4.9 28.0 
1993 4 .1 3.5 6.4 12.2 22.1 23.1 3.7 32.2 
1994 4.4 3.4 8.6 17.3 15.3 36.1 2.4 49.3 
1995 5.3 4.5 8.0 15.4 15.0 41.3 3.0 33.8 
1996 6.0 4.9 9.2 14.9 17.0 26.1 3.1 27.8 
1997 7.5 6.0 11.6 14.9 14.6 36.9 7.6 36. 1 
1998 11 .1 10.6 12.3 13.6 14.0 25.0 29.9 23.1 
1999 16.6 16.8 14.7 11.3 22.5 57.8 23.8 20.1 
2000 20.5 22.0 14.9 10.3 16.4 62.8 12.4 15.0 
2001 12.5 12.2 13.1 10.5 2.5 60.1 14.4 13.6 
2002 9.2 8.9 9.9 11 .5 14.5 25.6 3.7 11.4 
2003 7.4 6.5 10.0 12.4 10.8 45.7 5.2 15.2 
2004 8.2 6.5 10.7 8.0 19.1 58.0 3.4 10.5 
2005 10.0 8.7 12.8 9.2 15.2 78.9 7.2 11.3 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www.unctad.org, 2007 
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A4.3 Inward FDI flows as percentage of Gross domestic products (GDP) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
year countries countries 
1988 0.84 0.90 0.98 0.82 2.07 14~24 1.79 0.06 
1989 0.94 1.05 0.85 0.78 4.29 9.49 2.46 0.06 
1990 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.91 5.93 15.11 3.02 2.78 
1991 0.67 0.63 1.10 1.09 8.23 11.32 2.09 4.91 
1992 0.69 0.59 1.27 2.28 8.69 4.42 1.93 4.80 
1993 0.89 0.73 1.70 4.58 8.58 8.03 1.45 7.03 
1994 0.95 0.70 2.08 6.22 6.15 12.11 0.95 . 11 .94 
1995 1.15 0.94 2.08 5.36 6.55 13.81 1.23 8.59 
1996 1.30 1.02 2.47 5.11 7.24 10.29 1.28 7.31 
1997 1.63 1.25 2.96 5.04 6.31 14.24 2.57 9.37 
1998 2.39 2.20 3.06 4.80 3.76 9.12 6.70 6.19 
1999 3.57 3.54 3.79 4.07 4.92 20.43 4.97 5.17 
2000 4.45 4.66 3.82 3.77 4.21 18.02 2.73 4.11 
2001 2.65 2.50 3.34 4.04 0.63 16.64 3.37 3.95 
2002 1.89 1.74 2.35 4.17 3.37 6.69 0.75 3.39 
2003 1.52 1.26 2.33 3.64 2.38 11.19 1.37 3.67 
2004 1.72 1.29 3.04 3.52 3.91 13.79 0.87 3.52 
2005 2.06 1.67 3.22 3.65 3.03 17.20 2.0·9 3.80 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www.unctad.org, 2007 
A4.4 Cross-border M&A sales {billion USD) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
year countries countries 
1988 115.62 112. 75 2.87 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.00 
1989 140.39 135.33 5.06 0.00 0.70 0.11 0.00 0.00 
1990 150.58 134.47 16.05 0.01 0.09 1.14 0.07 0.00 
1991 80.71 74.39 5.79 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.08 0.00 
1992 79.28 70.14 8.20 0.22 0.05 0.28 0.50 0 00 
1993 83.06 68.26 14.27 0.56 0.52 0.36 0.04 0.00 
1994 127.11 111 .62 15.03 0.71 0.44 0.36 0.09 0.00 
1995 186.59 169.44 16.49 0.40 0.10 1.24 0.16 0.00 
1996 227.02 190.94 35.73 1.91 0.77 0.59 0.23 0.01 
1997 304.85 234.17 67.00 1.86 0.35 0.29 0.63 0.06 
1998 531.65 446.79 82.67 0.80 1.10 0.47 3.21 0.00 
1999 766.04 686.74 74.03 2.40 1.17 2.96 2.01 0.06 
2000 1143.82 1070.91 70.61 2.25 0.44 1.53 2.57 0.02 
2001 593.96 504.93 85.81 2.32 1.45 4.87 0.96 0.00 
2002 369. 79 322.50 44.53 2.07 0.48 0.56 0.25 0.01 
2003 296.99 244..43 42.13 3.82 0.08 1.77 0.05 0.02 
2004 380.60 315.85 54.70 6.77 0.64 1.19 1.24 0.07 
2005 716.30 598.35 100.63 8.25 1.45 5.80 0.34 -
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www.unctad.org, 2007 
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A4.5 FDI flow per capita (USD) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia 
year countries countries 
1988 32 155 8 3 42 
1989 37 186 7 3 96 
1990 38 189 9 3 146 
1991 29 130 11 4 221 
1992 31 128 13 9 273 
1993 40 158 19 23 297 
1994 45 163 24 28 231 
1995 60 240 27 31 286 
1996 68 260 34 34 349 
1997 83 310 42 37 295 
1998 119 549 40 37 124 
1999 182 920 49 32 173 
2000 230 1,217 53 33. 165 
2001 134 644 45 37 24 
2002 98 464 31 42 134 
2003 88 376 33 42 101 
2004 110 426 46 47 184 
2005 141 573 56 56 155 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www. unctad.org, 2007 
A4.6 FDI outflows (billion USD) 
Country/ World Developed Developing China Malaysia 
year countries countries 
1988 180.27 168.23 12.04 0.85 0.20 
1989 230.45 210.71 19.59 0.78 0.27 
1990 229.89 217.67 12.70 0.83 0.13 
1991 195.87 182.03 13.69 0.91 0.18 
1992 192.39 167.42 23.22 4.00 0.12 
1993 237.84 197.23 39.72 4.40 1.06 
1994 274.85 227.32 48.36 2.00 2.33 
1995 359.86 304.89 52.98 2.00 2.49 
1996 397.89 333.28 63.68 2.11 3.77 
1997 483.14 404.69 81.00 2.56 2.68 
1998 694.40 642.57 53.72 2.63 0.86 
1999 1, 108.17 1,036.77 88.23 1.77 1.42 
2000 1,244.47 1,107.82 143.23 0.92 2.03 
2001 764.20 681.68 78.57 6.89 0.27 
2002 539.54 489.44 47.78 2.52 1.90 
2003 561.10 510.63 29.02 -0.15 1.37 
2004 813.07 685.72 83.19 1.81 2.06 
2005 778. 73 640.73 117.46 11.31 2.97 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database online www.unctad.org, 2007 
MPI data for Vietnam, 2006. 
Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
1,268 21 0 
980 33 0 
1,848 4 7 3 
1,579 37 6 
693 38 7 
1,431 32 13 
2,534 24 27 
3,333 35 24 
2,646 40 24 
3,669 65 34 
1,958 124 22 
4,237 100 19 
4,103 55 16 
3,447 63 16 
1,398 15 15 
2,211 31 18 
3,467 23 19 
4,641 59 24 
Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
0.12 0.02 0 
0.88 0.05 0 
2.03 0.15 0 
0.53 0.18 0 
1.32 0.15 0 
2.15 0.23 0 
4.58 0.49 0 
4.47 0.89 0 
7.88 0.93 0 
12.43 0.58 0 
2.32 0.13 0 
7.78 0.35 0 
5.08 -0.02 0 
22.71 0.35 0 
4.09 0.11 0 
3.71 0.49 0.21 
10.67 0.36 0.01 
5.52 0.25 0.08 
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Appendix for Chapter 5 
AS.1 List of two-digit VSIC industry 
ISIC Definition 
c Mining an Quarrying 
10 Mining of coal and lignite 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
13 Mining of metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying 
D Manufacturing 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture and tobacco products 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
19 Manufacture of leather products 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products 
21 Paper and paper products 
22 Publishing and printing 
23 Coke and refined petroleum products 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products 
·29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 
33 Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transportation means 
36 Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 
37 Recycling 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
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A5.2 Output price index (at two-digit VSIC level) 
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
l 0: Mining of coal and lignite 175.1 174.6 211.3 221.5 232.1 
11: Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 199.6 182.0 206.7 274.2 363.7 
13: Mining of metal ores 204.3 226.2 222.3 269.2 325.9 
14: Other mining and quarrying 152.1 156.0 l 57.1 168.0 179.5 
15: Food products and beverages 185.6 182.4 179.6 192.4 206.2 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 132.4 131.7 136.4 135.2 134.0 
I 7: Manufacture of textiles 153.4 170.8 162.6 174.1 186.4 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 190.0 178.9 225.9 241.2 257.4 
19: Manufacture of leather products 163.4 165.6 174.0 189.5 . 206.3 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 168.4 171.3 191.3 205.1 219.8 
21: Paper and paper products 154.9 171.6 187.9 202.3 217.8 
22: Publishing and printing 183.7 I 89.4 192.8 228.5 270.8 
23: Coke and refined petroleum products 404.0 300.6 311.4 334.8 359.9 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 154. l 147.4 167.9 188.7 211.9 
25: Rubber and plastic products 163.0 168.7 178.6 203.9 232.8 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 117.6 123.7 126.8 137.7 149.5 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 154.5 168.2 178.9 209.7 245.8 
28: Fabricated metal products 174.5 185.9 227.1 244.1 262.3 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c I 51.1 161.5 169.6 190.7 2 14.5 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 134. l 306.0 399.5 436.9 477.8 
31 : Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 212.6 218.3 211.3 230.6 25 1.6 
32: Radio, television and communication 
equipment 167.7 I 55.6 179.4 196.7 215.8 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches, 
clocks 25 1.8 273.6 269.5 317.2 373.3 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 181.9 224.7 272.4 272.l 271.8 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 208.6 297.6 234.1 259.4 287.5 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 189.2 199.4 2 14.I 264. 1 325.6 
40: Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 143.8 154.8 157.9 163.0 168.4 
41: Collection, purification and distribution of 
water 149.6 147.3 143.8 161.6 181.5 
Source: GSO, www.gso.gov.vn 
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AS.3 Input price index (at two-digit VSIC level) 
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
10: Mining of coal and lignite 202.5 200.8 223.0 240.3 259.4 
11 : Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 239. l 21 6.4 219.0 245.0 274.4 
13: Mining of metal ores 207.1 215.2 214.5. 252.3 297.5 
14: Other mining and quarrying 175.1 172.2 180.5 199.5 221.0 
15: Food products and beverages 175.4 174.9 183.8 194.7 206.7 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 148.5 153.4 163.2 169.9 177.2 
17: Manufacture of textiles 158.9 168.3 167.9 183.3 200.5 
I 8: Manufacture of wearing apparel 162.0 I 72.1 175.9 190.5 206.6 
19: Manufacture of leather products 166.2 169.3 176.6 193.7 212.7 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products I 79.7 176.8 187.l 198.0 209.8 
21: Paper and paper products 178.9 179.2 192.4 209.2 227.7 
22: Publishing and printing 176.2 188.3 203.0 238.2 280.4 
23 : Coke and refined petroleum products 330.4 260.3 274.4 305.l 341.3 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 162.5 157.1 174.7 196.3 220.7 
25: Rubber and plastic products 172.l 171 .3 182.0 205.3 231.8 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 172.7 165.2 173.1 190.0 208.9 
2 7: Manufacture of basic metals 162.7 171.8 183.2 21 1.9 245.4 
28: Fabricated metal products 173 .0 180.7 209.2 225.9 244.8 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 165.9 18 I .3 197.1 222.5 251 .7 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 160.7 228.5 270.3 295.4 323.7 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 179.5 179.9 196.9 217.8 241.3 
32: Radio, television and communication 
equipment 170.3 161.5 183.7 203.9 226.5 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches, 
clocks I 76.9 195.4 2 15.8 242.3 272.5 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 178.5 213.1 253.7 260.2 267.6 
3 5: Manufacture of other transportation means 230.4 240.9 228.6 254.0 282.9 
3 6: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 178.3 188.3 202.5 237.6 279.7 
40: Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 270.4 240.7 253.5 276.4 301.5 
41: Collection, purification and distribution of 
water 202.7 186.4 191.3 210.9 232.8 
Source: Weights for input price index are extracted from the 2000 Input-Output table. 
Author's calculat ion from weighted output price index. 
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A5.4 Variable description and expected sign for the regression 
Name Description Expected 
sign 
y Log of real output 
LP Log of labour productivity 
TFP Total factor productivity measured as ratio of firm's value added 
over weighted average of employment and capital stock 
K Log of real capital stock + 
M Log of real intermed iate inputs + 
L Log of workers employed by firm + 
HERF Proxy for level of concentration Herfindahl index calculated at 4 -
digit vsrc level 
HERFERP The product between HERF and ERP, this index proxies for -
competition level controlled for both domestic and imported 
products 
COM Take 1 if industry is highly competitive measured by the absolute + 
value of HERFERP greater than 5.0, 0 is otherwise 
SCALE Proxy for economies of scale, measured by the ratio of firm + 
output over firm average output in the same industry (at 4 digit 
leve l) 
FDI Foreign share of legal capital in the firm + 
EXD Take l if exporting firms, 0 otherwise + 
PRIVATE 1 if firm is Private enterprise Base 
dummy 
SOE 1 if firm is State owned enterprise +/-
SOES State own share in capital stock in a given industry +/-
FOR 1 if FDI firm, 0 if domestic firm + 
SOEFDI 1 if firm if Joint-venture between SOE and foreign firm + 
PRlFDI 1 if firm is Joint-venture between private and foreign firm + 
PUREFDI l if firm is 100% foreign invested firm + 
AGE Firm's age measured by difference between 2000 and the year of + 
establishment 
STZE I if firm has more than 50 employees ( large firm ), 0 other wise + 
ERP Effective rate of protection -/+ 
FDIS Foreign share of employment in a sector j ( 4 digit-level) +/-
FDJSR Foreign share of employment in a sector j (4 digit-level) located +/-
in a region x 
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A5.4 (continued) 
Name Description Expected 
sign 
JVS Joint ventures share of employment in an industry (at 4 VSIC +/-
digit level) 
GREENS Fully foreign invested enterprise's share of employment in an +/-
industry (at 4 VSIC digit level) 
SKILL Share of skilled workers in a firm +/-
HANOI 1 if the firm is located in Hanoi, 0 other wise +/-
HCM 1 if the firm is located in Ho Chi Minh city +/-
TECH Labour productivity ratio between FDI and domestic firms within +/-
industry (at 4 digit level) 
TECHGAPl Take l if high-tech gap exists in a industry (TECH is greater than +/-
l 0) 
TECHGAP2 Take l if total R&D expenditure in the period of an industry is +/-
greater than 10 
SECTOR(J) 1 if firm belongs to two-digit VSIC sector J. There are 22 sectors +/-
GAR Take I if garment, textiles and leather manufacturing (code +!-
17'18) 
ELEC Take I if firm belongs to electronic industry (VSIC code 30-33) +/-
INTERNET 1 if a firm connects to the internet + 
E-trade l if a firm has e-trade transaction + 
Website 1 if a firm has its own website + 
FDIRD_A FIE average R&D in a given industry in the whole period (at 4 + 
digit level) 
ALOCAL RD Local firm average R&D in a given industry in the whole period + 
- (at 4 digit level) 
Log wage Logarithm of real wage +/-
REGION(x) I if firm locates in a given region (x) There are 6 different regions +/-
Tl 11 Year dummies that include T2000-T2004 +/-
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AS.5 Diagnostic testing results 
Null hypothesis (Ho) Model number Test Distribution Statistics Conclusion Sil!nificant level 
Unobserved fixed effects Column 2, Table Hausman test 
Reject Ho At any significant 
exist 5.4 z(lO) 542 level 
Redundancy of excluded 2SLS, Column 1, LR IV redundancy test 
z(l) 747 Reject Ho At any significant instrument: log wage Table 5.5 level 
Redundancy of excluded 2SLS, Column l, LR IV redundancy test 
x(l) 566 Reject Ho At any significant instrument: internet Table 5.5 level 
Redundancy of excluded 2SLS, Column 1, LR IV redundancy test 
xO) 76 Reject Ho At any significant instrument: FDIRD A Table 5.5 level 
Exogenous of FIE dummy 2SLS, Column 1, Wu - Hausman F test F(l, 59955) l.33e+03 At any significant Table 5.5 Durbin - Wu - Hausman Reject Ho level (FOR) 
chi-sq test x(l) l.30e+03 
No unobserved fixed effects Column 1, Table Hausman test 
z(l l) 52 Reject Ho At any significant in spillovers model (FDJS) 5.8 level 
No unobserved fixed effects Column 8, Table Hausman test 
z(l l) 50 Reject Ho At any significant in spillovers model (FDISR) 5.9 level 
No unobserved fixed effects Column 1, Table Hausman test At any significant 
in spillovers model (NS & 5. 11 z(I J) 84 Reject Ho level 
GREENS) 
Exogenous FDIS Column l, Table Hausman test (1978) with F(l,31751) 29.5 Reject Ho Any reasonable level 5.8 fixed effect estimate 
Exogenous FDISR Column 8, Table Hausman test (1978) F(l,31751) 3.37 Reject Ho Any l 0% significant 5.9 level 
Exogenous JVS & GREENS Column 1, Table Hausman test (1978) F(l,31750) 0.30 Reject Ho Any reasonable level 5 .11 36.02 
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AS.6 Correlation matrix 
internet website e-trade FOR PUREFDI SOEFDI PRIFDI RD share FDIRD_A Log TEC (w) 
internet 
website 0.339 
e-trade 0.364 0.339 1 
FOR -0.178 -0.056 0.015 
PUREFDI -0.1 14 0.021 0.010 0.608 
SOEFDI -0.118 -0.111 0.030 0.708 -0.065 
PRIFDI -0.049 0.054 -0.055 0.232 -0.021 -0.025 1 
RD share 0.148 0.071 0.063 0.037 0.014 0.036 0.001 1 
FDIRD_A -0.043 0.001 0.071 0.210 0.018 0.268 -0.019 -0.020 1 
Log TEC -0.165 -0.135 -0.079 0.204 0.018 0.246 0.022 0.123 0.160 1 
(w) -0.397 -0.294 -0.170 0.121 0.061 0.121 -0.042 -0.209 0.108 0.340 1 
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AS. 7 Random effect estimate for the direct effect of FDI on productivity 
Dependent All firms Firms disaggregated by size Firms disaggregated by Control for Endogeneity 
variable: Log re~ ion 
of output (y) (1) (2) (3) (4) SmalJ (5) Large (6) Hanoi (7) HCM (8) (9) 
(k) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.041 0.092 0.037 0.045 0.037 -0.053 
(19.41)*** (19.38)*** (19.40)*** (14.89)*** (15.60)*** (5.65)*** (I 1.09)*** (25.81)*** (9.26)*** 
(m) 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.908 0.807 0.903 0.913 0.912 0.898 
(367.74)*** (367.69)*** (367.71)*** (329.48)*** (105.23)*** ( 116.06)*** (233 .31)*** (844.95)*** (461.28)*** 
(1) 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.065 0.099 0.090 0.070 0.062 0.096 
(37.08)*** (37.08)*** (37.06)*** (23.23)*** (19.88)*** (11.51)*** (19.57)*** (38.53)*** (32.57)*** 
FDI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.001 -0.0001 
(10.00)*** (I 0.01)*** (9.37)*** (5.92)*** (3.67)*** (0.60) (5.34)*** (0.71) 
HERF -0.037 -0.039 
(1.36) (1.30) 
SCALE 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.009 
(4.81)*** (4.81)*** (4.81)*** (7.01)*** (9.01)*** (4.07)*** (4.48)*** (31.14)*** (21.22)*** 
SKILL -1.82e-06 -1.8le-06 -l .82e-06 0.00004 -2.63e-06 -0.0001 -0.00002 -l.09e-06 9.80e-06 
(3.53)*** (3.52)*** (3.53)*** (0.69) (4.61 )*** (0.81) (7.39)*** (0.99) (0.76) 
HERFERP -0.00001 -8.04e-06 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00003 
(3.05)*** (2.04)** ( I.48) (2.32)** (1.66)* (2.69)*** (3.53)*** 
FDI*HERF 0.0001 
(0.29) 
FOR 1.409 
(20.26)*** 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64473 64473 64473 43134 21339 7660 15795 57681 59953 
Number of id 21411 21411 21411 16097 5314 2745 5630 21411 20840 
Robust z-stat1stics are m parentheses. 
*Significant at 10% level;** significant at 5% level;*** significant at 1% level. 
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AS.8 Robust check on for productivity performance using labour productivity 
Dependent Fixed eff ccts 2SLS 
variable: (LP) Basic 5 ownership Hanoi HCM Small firms Larfe firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FOi 0.006 0.027 
(6.56)*** ( 14.1 5)*** 
FOR 5. 166 10.566 3.815 9.228 4.787 
(45.45)*** (1 5.60)*** (24.86)*** (28.01 )*** (19.14)*** 
PRJFDI 1.168 
(18.63)*** 
PUREFDI 4.963 
(44.21)*** 
SOE 0.661 
(3 1.11)*** 
SOEFDI 1.915 
(35.73)*** 
Time dummies Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 59615 53969 58758 58758 6955 13782 39916 18842 
F value 261 270501 533 650 49 208 170 198 
Notes: All robust T statistics are presented in parentheses, except for the second column. 
The fixed effects estimates w ith endogeneity of FOi use the first lags of this variable as an instrument. 
The 2SLS estimates assume dummies on FIEs (FOR) to be endogenous. The additional instruments for 2SLS are INTERNET dummy, real wages and 
F DIRD _A. These variables are selected based on high correlation with FOR and high significant in the reduced form regression. 
* * * Significant at l % level; ** significant at 5% leve l; and * significant at 10% level 
274 
A5.9 Productivity spillovers and absorptive capacity (interaction approach) 
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variable: log 
of local firm 
output (v) 
FDIS -0.0038 -0.0070 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0062 
(5.05)*** (11.44)*** (10.79)*** (10.78)*** (8.67)*** 
(k) 0.0884 0.0887 0.0887 0.0886 0.0887 
(15.29)*** (15.35)*** (15.34)*** (15.33)*** (l 5.35)*** 
(m) 0.8079 0.8076 0.8074 0.8075 0.8076 
(129.58)*** (129.65)*** (129.61)*** (1 29.64)*** (129.56)*** 
(I) 0.0974 0.0974 0.0975 0.0965 0.0973 
(16.52)*** (16.52)*** (16.54)*** (16.49)*** (16.51)*** 
HERFERP -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 
(3.76)*** (4.20)*** (4.03)*** (4.15)*** (4.14)*** 
SCALE 0.0205 0.0206 0.0206 0.0207 0.0206 
(15.87)*** (15.28)*** ( 15 .30)*** (15.06)*** (15.29)*** 
SKILL 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.0001 0.00003 
(0.55) (0.55) (0.54) (1.05) (0.54) 
SIZE* FDIS -0.0068 
(5.69)*** 
LOCAL R&D 5.13e-06 
* FDIS 
(6.25)*** 
LP GAP * -0.0001 
FDTS 
(2.98)*** 
SKILL* FDIS -4 .23e-06 
(1.47) 
HCM * FDIS -0.0017 
( l .22) 
HANOI * 0.0012 
FDIS 
(0.69) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56837 56837 56837 56837 56837 
Number of id 19131 19131 19131 19131 19131 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
* Significant at l 0% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** s ign ificant at 1 % level. 
Firm's SIZE is classified by the number of employees; Local R&D is industry average 
of local firm R&D expenditure; LP gap is measured by industry LP of FJEs over that of 
local firms. 
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AS.10 Robust check for spillovers using labour productivity model 
Dependent variable: log of FDIS FDISR JVS GREENS 
local firm LP 
Overall model -0.013 -0.002 -0.002 -0.017 
(9.03)*** (2.06)** (0.55) (10.20)*** 
Bv firm size 
Small firm -0.012 -0.001 0.010 -0.018 
(6.12)*** (0.99) (2.25)** (7.74)*** 
Large firm . -0.01 5 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 
(6.66)*** (l.82)* (2.20)** (6.43)*** 
By local ownership 
SO Es 0.002 0.002 0.01 5 -0.001 
(0.44) (0.42) (1 .28) (0.22) 
Local private firms -0.01 5 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.019 
(10.25)*** (2.44)** (0.04) (11.07)*** 
B v local R&D expenditure 
LowR&D -0.020 -0.007 0.004 -0.026 
(11.12)*** (4.79)*** (0.1 0) (1 2.13)*** 
High R&D 0.006 0.008 0.01 7 0.004 
(2.14)** (4.34)*** (2.74)*** ( 1.27) 
Bv Labour productivity xap 
The Spillovers variables -0.013 -0.001 0.006 -0.017 
(8.64)*** (1.23) ( 1.58) (10.14)*** 
Spillovers * LP gap (TECH) -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0003 
(4.78)*** (3.50)*** (3.3 1 )*** (5.01)*** 
Bv competition level 
The Spillovers variables -0.01 4 -0.004 -0.002 -0.018 
(9.56)*** (3.24)*** (0.45) (10.58)*** 
Spillovers * HERFERP -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00010 -0.00001 
(13 .91)*** (11.08)*** (10.86)*** (5.09)*** 
Low competition group 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.003 
(2.97)*** (2.08)** (3.77)*** (0.96) 
High competition group 
-0.023 -0.004 -0.031 -0.021 
(12.53)*** (3.02)*** (6.79)*** (1 0.1 4)*** 
For specific sectors 
FOODS -0.006 0.002 -0.028 -0.0004 
(2. 12)** (0.80) (3.27)*** . (0.13) 
GAR -0.046 -0.023 -0.092 -0.040 
(8.28)*** (4.78)*** (3.73)*** (6.0 1 )*** 
ELEC 0.015 0.008 0.059 0.008 
( J.63) ( 1.41) (3.98)*** (0.90) 
Notes: For brev ity, only coefficients of interest variables are reported. 
All T statistics are presented in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1% level; ** s ignificant at 5% level; and* significant at 10% level. 
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Appendix for Chapter 6 
A6.1 Application of the Heckman selection model for the export 
behaviour of FIEs 
The Heckman selection technique as in Wooldridge (2003) is applied to FIE export 
behaviour. Derived from theory, the author modelled FIE export intensity as (6.11): 
EXR; = a 0 + a 11Z +a2 EPZ +a3Y +a4 Kl +a5WR+ a 6 ERP +a 7FDI +asFDIRD _A +a9 SKILL 
7 6 
+<D 1L COUNTRY/+'¥/ I REGION/ +1+81 
J=l /=I 
Where, the dependent variable (EXR) is the export/output ratio. For simplicity, this 
model is written in shorthand: EXR, =x;/3+&; 
Let n be the size of a random sample of FIEs with their information recorded by MPI. If 
observing the full set of variables from the n firms (both dependent and exogenous 
variables), OLS, Probit or Tobit techniques would be used. With serious doubt on 
missing information for the dependent variable, as discussed in Section 6.4 on 
methodology that many FIEs do not report their exports to the MPI, all n observations 
will not be used. Let s=l indicate the observations that will be used and s=O the 
observations that will not be used because of missing data; a new effective model can 
now be derived for estimation: sEXR, = sx1/J + sc; 
In the case where the error term has zero mean and is uncorrelated with exogenous 
variables the estimator will be consistent. Moreover, when s is a function only of the 
exogenous variables or when there is a random sample, the estimators are still 
consistent and unbiased (Wooldridge 2003). However, in the case wheres and the error 
term ( s;) are correlated the estimator will be inconsistent. To prove this argument, the 
common case of sample selection called incidental truncation is explored. For example, 
the observed FIE exports depend on another variable rather than explanatory variables 
in the primary model. Thus, s can be written as: 
EXR, = x;f3+ e 1 
s; = l(z1y +u, ;;;iO) 
Remembering s takes two values, one if FIE export is observed and zero, otherwise 
(missing information). z, is a set of exogenous variables including all variables in x; 
and other elements affecting the observation of s. Using conventional assumptions that 
two errors ( & ; and u, ) are normal distribution and independent of z1 the expectation of 
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the dependent variable can be derived, conditional on z and v as: 
E(EXR I z, v) = x{J + E(e I v) 
The case of correlation between two error terms, for instance, E(i I v)= pv where p .is a 
parameter, gives E(EXR I z, u) ""x{J + pv 
For the case s=l, the expectation of the dependent variable is expressed as: 
E(EXR I z, s = 1) = x/J + p.1(zr) 
Where -1(zy) is the inverse Mills ratio when s=l. This equation shows when p is 
different from zero, the estimator of fJ will be biased due to the omitted variable 
( -1(zy) ). The procedures developed by Heckman (1979) aim to correct this issue via the 
following steps. 
The first step uses all n observations to estimate a Probit model of s. Estimators of the 
coefficients in 0, r are obtained and the inverse Mills ratio computed -1(zy). The second 
step runs a regression with the selected sample, that includes observations with positive 
exports or s=l. The exogenous variables include a vector in the main model (x) and 
estimated inverse Mills ratio ( -1(zr) ). 
Implicitly, the pro bit model of s on exogenous variables (z) is to examine the possibility 
of observing the dependent variable (EXR). This is not the same with the likelihood of 
the FIE decision on exports. Therefore, the results from the first step cannot be used to 
interpret for the model on the export decision of FIEs as in Greenaway et al. (2004 ). 
Under the testing result on significance of p , if the Heckman selection model is 
preferred, only the results in the second step will be used to explain the export intensity 
of FIEs. Additional variables in vector (z) compared to vector (x) help distinguish the 
problem caused by sample selection with misspecification (Wooldridge 2003). 
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A6.2 Variable description and their expected signs in estimated equations 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
EXD The dummy variable, take one for firms with positive 
export and 0 otherwise 
EXR The export /revenue ratio (%) 
y Firm gross output (million USO/billion dong) + 
EMP The number of employment in a firm (1000 persons) + 
SQ_EMP Squared EMP -
KI Capital intensity measured by the ratio of capital stock + 
over employment 
WR The firm wage rate or industry wage rate ( 4 digit ISIC +!-
level) 
FDIRD A The average of R&D expenditure in sector I (4 digit + 
ISIC level) measured in billion dong 
SKILL The foreign share of skilled labour in sector I ( 4 digit + 
ISIC level) 
ERP Effective rate of protection in sector I in 2003 (2 and 3 -
digit ISIC level) 
JAPAN 1 if FDI from Japan, 0 otherwise + 
USA 1 ifFDI from the USA, 0 otherwise + 
NICS I if FDI from the new industrial countries (NI Cs), 0 + 
otherwise 
A SEAN 1 if FDI from ASEAN countries, 0 otherwise + 
AUS 1 if FDI from Australia and New Zealand, 0 otherwise + 
EUROPE I if FDI from European countries, 0 otherwise + 
DEC I if FDI from developed countries, 0 otherwise + 
FDI Foreign share of total investment(%) + 
TYPE2 I if joint-ventures, compared to fully foreign invested -
firms 
TYPE3 1 if other type of foreign investment (holding -
companies or joint stock companies), compared to fully 
foreign invested firms 
HANOI I if a firm is located in Hanoi +/-
HCM l if a firm is located in Ho Chi Minh City + 
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Variable Definition Expected sign 
OP A dummy for other firms not located in either Hanoi or +/-
Ho Chi Minh 
REGION(x) 1 if firm locates m a given region (x) There are 6 +/-
different regions 
SECTOR(x) 1 if a firm is located in sector (x) there are 22 sectors at +/-
two digit ISIC level. 
T Year dummies that include T2000-T2004 +/-
T2000 Year dummy, Take 1 for 2000, 0 for 1998. +/-
FDlS Foreign share of employment in sector l ( 4 digit ISIC + 
level) 
FIE EXA Total FIE-export activity: Share of regional-industry + 
-
FIE exports m national industry export /share of 
regional exports in national manufacturing exports ( 4 
digit ISIC level) 
EXA Total-export activity: share of regional-industry exports + 
in national industry export /share of regional exports in 
national manufacturing exports ( 4 digit ISIC level) 
SOE l if a firm is state-owned, 0 if a firm is private-owned + 
IMPORT Share of firm import in total inputs + 
TAX Total indirect taxfrevenue ratio at firm level -
SUBR Total subs idy /revenue ratio (for year 1998 only) -
LOCAL RD Share of R&D expenditure in domestic firms with total +/-
R&D expenditure in a sector at 4 digit TSIC level 
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A6.3 Determinants of FIE export intensity (Heckman two-step estimate) 
Dependent Including FDI Including Hanoi vs. HCM Developed vs. 
variable: EXR Entry mode Developin!! 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FDI 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(8.90)*** (9.13)*H (9J7)*U 
TYPE2 -0.232 
(9.54)*** 
TYPE3 -0.467 
(4.93)*** 
JAPAN 0.338 0.317 0.334 
(6.70)*** (6.61)*** (6.69)**"' 
USA -0.039 -0.047 -0.050 
(0.59) (0.72) (0.75) 
NICS 0.1 75 0.174 0.159 
(5.48)*** (5.59)*** (5.01)*** 
AUS -0.028 -0.017 -0.053 
(0.31) (0.19) (0.59) 
EUROPE 0.184 0.177 0.185 
(4.71)*** (4.61)*** (4.70)* ** 
DEC 0.092 
(3.75)*** 
IZ 0.039 0.03 l 0.031 0.036 
(l.86)** (1.49) (1 .52) (1.74)* . 
y 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 1 
( 1.80)* (I. 70)* (1.64) (1.84)* 
Kl -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(8.61)*** (8.00)*** (8.25)*** (8.87)*** 
WR -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
(l l.54)*** (11.30)*** (11.48)*** (11.90)*** 
ERP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.33) (0.00) (0.15) (0.29) 
FDIRD A -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 
(2.40)** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2. 54)*"' 
SKILL 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(3.16)*** (3.54)*** (2.69)*** (3.42)*** 
HCM 0.097 
(2.43)* * 
OP 0.088 
(2.40)** 
Regional Yes Yes No Yes 
dummies 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5239 5239 5239 5239 
Censored 3617 3617 3617 361 7 
Observation 
Wald chi ' () 1142 1182 1095 1020 
Lambda ,t 0.318 0.281 0.316 0.292 
(4.21 )*** (3.87)*** (4.04)*** (4.11)*** 
p 0.75 0.69 0.74 0.70 
Notes: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. 
* ** Significant at I% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at l 0% level. 
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A6.4 Determinants of FIE export intensity (Robust check by including EPZ firms) 
Dependent variable: Including Including Hanoi vs. Developed vs. 
EXR FDI Entry mode HCM Developing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FDI 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(8.80)*** (9.05)*** (9.25)*** 
TYPE2 
-0.233 
(10.07)*** 
TYPE3 -0.467 
(5.12)*** 
JAPAN 0.310 0.289 0.304 
(6.90)*** (6.77)*** (6.84)*** 
USA -0.043 -0.053 -0.053 
(0.66) (0.84) (0.82) 
NICS 0.185 0.178 0.170 
(6.03)*** (5.98)*** (5.56)*** 
AUS 
-0.035 -0.021 -0.061 
(0.40) (0.25) (0.69) 
EUROPE 0.187 0.176 0.187 
(4.96)*** (4.80)*** (4.95)*** 
DEC 0.078 
(3.50)*** 
IZ 0.047 0.033 0.040 0.042 
(2.30)** (1.65)* (2.01)** (2.07)** 
EPZ 0.257 0.228 0.232 0.295 
(7. 17)*** (6.52)*** (5.90)*** (7.81)*** 
y 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.75)* (1.6 l) (1.60) (1.85)* 
KI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(8.01)*** (7. 71 )* "'* (7.64)*** (8.20)*"'* 
WR 
-0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 
(11.97)*** (11.63)*** (1 1.92)*** (12.35)*** 
ERP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.63) (0.22) (0.46) (0.50) 
FDIRD A -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.01 7 
(2.46)** (2.42)** (2.45)** (2.56)** 
SKILL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(2.65)*** (3.02)*** (2.20)** (2.78)*** 
HCM 0.096 
(2.47)** 
Regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5589 5589 5589 5589 
Censored Observation 3786 3786 3786 3786 
Wald chi2() 1378 1442 1332 1248 
Lambda ,t 0.305 0.262 0.302 0.292 
( 4.4] )*** (3.98)*** (4.24)*** (4.40)*** 
p 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.71 
Notes: Method: Heckman Selection Model, Two - step estimate. 
Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. 
* ** Significant at I% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at I 0% level. 
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A6.5 Marginal effect on export behaviour of domestic firms 
Variables 1998 2000 
Probit estimate Tobit estimate Probit estimate Tobit estimate 
y 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0047 
KI -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 
WR 0.0001 0.0005 0.0041 0.0794 
FDIS -0.0007 -0.0039 0.0001 -0.0009 
FIE EXA -3.4574 -15.8097 -2.3148 -45.4636 
EXA 2.0731 8.5713 1.4498 27.9746 
IMPORT 0.0007 0.0027 
NA NA 
SUBR -0.01 66 -0.0650 
TAX -0.0262 -0.1275 -0.3191 -6.5864 
SOE 0.1036 0.2736 0.2014 2.7732 
LOCAL RD 0.0001 0.0024 
Observations 3762 3841 5153 5164 
Notes: The dprobit command with control for hetero and "mfx" estimate are used. 
The mean values of continuous variables and the change of dummies from 0 to I are 
used to calculate marginal effect. 
This table reports marginal effect after estimation for equations I and 5 in Tables 6.11. 
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A6.6 Matrix of correlation coefficients (using the 2000 data) 
y Kl WR FDIS FIE EXA EXA LOCAL_ RD TAX SOE FDIRD_A FDl_SKILL_S ERP 
y 1 
Kl 0.2377 1 
WR 0.3052 0.2583 1 
FDIS -0.0123 0.0351 0.0744 1 
FIE EXA 0.0458 0.024 -0.0023 0.0824 1 
EXA 0.0426 0.0123 -0.0553 -0.4368 0.3383 1 
LOCAL RD 0.0501 -0.0276 -0.0222 -0.4286 0.0548 0.2305 1 
-
TAX 0.0664 0.052 0.0169 -0.0135 0.0477 -0.0384 0.0122 1 
SOE 0.2739 0.1261 0.2132 0.016 0.0599 -0.0762 0.0936 0.0532 1 
FDIRD A -0.0097 0.0165 0.0342 0.155 -0.0185 -0.0996 -0.4656 0.0048 -0.0157 1 
FDl_SKILL_S -0.0162 0.0644 0.0507 0.8008 0.0349 -0.4366 -0.4983 0.0164 -0.0179 0.1716 1 
ERP -0.0324 -0.0356 -0.1272 -0.3049 0.0421 0.42 -0.0639 0.0576 -0.1807 -0.0897 -0.2401 1 
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A6.7 Testing results for selection bias problem (Null hypothesis (Ho): No selection bias: p = 0) 
Table, Equation, Estimate p value Coefficient Distribution Statistics Conclusion Significant level 
model number method of A.; 
Table 6.8 (1) TSE 0.75 0.32 Wald test - x(l) 4.21 
FML 0.32 0.11 36.6 
Reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.8 (2) TSE 0.69 0.28 Wald test - x(I) 3.87 
FML 0.31 0.11 32.3 
Reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.8 (3) TSE 0.74 0.32 Wald test - x(l) 4.04 
FML 0.32 0.11 32.9 
Reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.8 (4) TSE 0.70 0.29 Wald test - x(I) 4.11 
Reject Ho At any significant level 
FML 0.33 0.12 39.4 
Table 6.11 (5) TSE -0.22 -1.28 Wald test - x(l) 0.65 Do not reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.1 1 (6) TSE -0.27 -1.57 Wald test - xO) 0.73 Do not reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.11 (7) TSE -0.28 -1.59 Wald test - x(l) 0.75 Do not reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.11 (8) TSE -0.19 -1.09 Wald test - x(l) 0.55 Do not reject Ho At any significant level 
Table 6.11 (9) TSE -0.22 -1.26 Wald test - x(l) . 0.64 Do not reject Ho At any significant level 
Notes: The number in bracket() in column 1 is the order of equation in the table. 
FML: Heckman Full Maximum Likelihood; TSE: Heckman Two Step Estimate. 
P is correlation coefficient between two unobserved errors in decision equation (selection equation) and intensity equation. 
A., is inverse Mills ratio (see Wooldridge, 2003). . 
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Appendix for Chapter 7 
A7.1 Number of employees per firm across ownership type and sector (average 2000-2004) 
Sector (2 digit VSIC level) Total Domestic firms FIEs 
Local SO Es Local All FIEs JV with JV with All JVs Fully-
firm private SOE private owned 
FIEs 
15: Food products and beverages 64 5'8 133 40 182 311 106 219 166 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 405 440 586 22 90 90 90 
17: Manufacture of textiles 163 152 296 80 222 493 120 344 207 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 205 168 227 135 345 403 233 302 352 
19: Manufacture of leather products 750 521 499 532 1,341 1,340 1,016 1,178 1,358 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 44 41 36 42 117 122 78 106 121 
21 : Paper and paper products 52 48 70 40 103 114 58 72 105 
22: Publishing and printing 26 26 40 11 34 42 19 30 35 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 75 73 146 37 84 174 36 122 69 
25: Rubber and plastic products 62 51 73 43 124 127 151 137 121 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 93 89 176 54 168 232 146 208 141 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 95 92 264 31 126 154 8 118 131 
28: Fabricated metal products 31 26 32 23 88 115 47 95 86 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 65 65 117 36 69 90 31 68 69 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 166 9 3 13 526 526 
3 I: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 140 71 151 33 353 172 12 144 400 
32: Radio, televis ion and communication equips 105 55 82 36 237 274 11 257 229 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches 121 86 62 101 190 70 88 74 251 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 66 46 89 27 168 280 11 259 140 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 115 93 187 41 216 744 164 505 145 
36: Manufacture of furniture, n.e.c 84 56 26 69 254 370 173 224 257 
Total 97 76 122 56 268 268 155 224 279 
Source: Author' s calculation from unpublished GSO enterprises survey 2001-2005. Time average is for the period 2000-2004. 
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A 7.2 Firm size by source country of investment and entry modes (average 2001-2004) 
Country/Region All FIEs Fully-owned FIEs Joint ventures 
1. Japan 181 183 197 
2. USA 36 32 40 
3. NICS (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) 150 156 128 
4. ASEAN 80 69 103 
5. Australia and New Zealand 48 65 27 
6. European countries 106 117 94 
7. Others 49 61 27 
All developed countries 115 120 111 
All developing countries 128 137 100 
Total 124 133 104 
Source: MPI unpublished data, time average of total employment in FIEs. 
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A 7.3 Measure of convergence in capital-labour ratio (Kl) by industry, 2000-2004 
KI of joint ventures= 1.00 KI ofFIEs =1.00 
2 digit VSIC Domestic private SO Es Fully-owned FIEs All domestic firms 
2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
15: Food products and beverages 0.12 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.77 1.10 0.21 0.28 
16: Manufacture and tobacco products 1.47 0.19 1.55 0.18 1.55 0.18 
J 7: Manufacture of textiles 0.38 0.60 0.56 0.53 2.36 2.52 0.25 0.24 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.38 0.68 0.56 0.94 1.30 1.11 0.38 0.73 
19: Manufacture of leather products 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.60 1.28 0.89 0.34 0.56 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 0.11 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.58 0.27 0.39 
21 : Paper and paper products 0.38 0.66 0.98 1.14 3.56 1.44 0.19 0.59 
22: Publishing and printing 0.41 0.29 0.77 0.39 0.60 0.26 1.02 0.93 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.51 l.05 0.71 0.22 0.48 
25: Rubber and plastic products 0.24 0.46 0.17 0.41 0.48 0.64 0.35 0.64 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.26 0.17 0.07 0.19 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 0.15 0.28 0.06 0.17 0.85 0.61 0.07 0.29 
28: Fabricated metal products 0.09 0.23 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.51 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 0.23 0.39 0.15 0.28 0.94 0.78 0.18 0.40 
30: Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.03 0.34 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 0.17 0.50 0.14 0.39 0.21 0.35 0.54 1.10 
32: Radio, television and communication equipment 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.24 0.34 0.62 0.74 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.23 0.34 0.47 0.50 1. 71 0.94 0.16 0.41 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.10 0.23 
35: Manufacture of other transportation means 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.44 0.38 0.53 0.12 0.53 
36: Mauufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 0.31 0.93 0.43 0.98 0.74 1.23 0.42 0.78 
Total 0.07 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.61 
Source: Author's calculation from the unpublished enterprise survey by GSO. 
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A 7.4 Measure of convergence in wage rates for total manufacturing sector, 2000-2004 (index, wage rate for joint ventures with SOEs = 100) 
Firm type\ Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Local private firms 31.83 35.07 35.33 35.59 42.28 
SO Es 47.94 51.80 52.36 54.24 55.34 
Joint ventures with local private firms 57.32 52.16 64.48 42.94 49.81 
Fully-owned FIEs 53.88 57.91 50.14 50.46 53.20 
Coefficient of variation (CV) 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.38 
Source: Author's calculation from the unpublished enterprise survey by GSO. 
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A 7.5 Variable description and expected signs 
Name Description Expected 
sign 
w Logarithm of real wage (firm average) Dependent 
L Log of workers employed by firm Dependent 
y Log of real output + 
KI Real capital intensity in log form (measured by ratio of + 
capital stock over employment 
R Rental cost of capital in log form, measured by the formula +/-
r, = log(I + i1 I P11 I P;, _1 ) - 1 where P(it): industry producer 
price index at two-digit VSIC level; i(t): country level 
nominal interest rate (annually). 
PRIVATE 1 if firm is Private enterprise Base 
dummy 
SOE 1 if firm is State owned enterprise +/-
SOES State own share in capital stock in a given industry +/-
FOR 1 if FDI firm, 0 if domestic firm + 
SOEFDI 1 if firm if Joint-venture between SOE and foreign firm +/-
PRIFDI 1 if firm is Joint-venture between private and foreign firm +!-
PUREFDI l if firm is 100% foreign invested firm +/-
SKILL Share of technical workers in total employment in a firm + 
EDU Ratio of workers with college degree or higher over total + 
employment 
FE Ratio of female workers over total workers +/-
HANOI 1 if the firm is located in Hanoi, 0 other wise +/-
HCM 1 if the firm is located in Ho Chi Minh city +/-
SECTOR(J) l if firm belongs to two-digit VSlC sector J. +/-
LI A dummy for labour intensive industries: VSIC 18 and 19 +/-
ELEC Electronics: take 1 if firm belongs to electronic industry +/-
(VSlC code 30-33) 
REGION(x) 1 if firm locates in a given region (x) There are 6 different +/-
regions 
T A vector of year dummies that include T2000-T2004 +/-
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A7.6 Regression results of capital intensity and ownership (the base dummy is 
SO Es) 
Dependent Overall Food and Textiles Wearing Wood& Electronic Automobil 
variable: Kl beverage (VSIC17) apparels Furniture s es 
(VSIC15) & leather (VSIC 20, (VSIC30- (VSIC34-
products 36) 33) 35) 
(VSIC 18-
19) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRIVATE -0.182 0.046 -0.739 -0.159 -0.500 -0.195 -0.452 
(9.49)*** (1.05) (6.54)*** (2.16)** (5.34)*** (2.17)** (6.04)*** 
JV 0.856 0.542 -0.106 -0.012 -0 .521 0.771 1.349 
(19.79) ... (5.13)*** (0.54) (0 .04) (3.67)*** (6.98)*** (11.53)*** 
PUREFDT 0.480 0.648 -0.373 0.466 -0.238 0.239 0.580 
(13.98) .. * (8.58)*** (2.13}** (4.93) .. * (1.85)* (2.08)** (4.84)*** 
y 0.151 0.138 0.242 0.024 0.034 0.175 0.260 
(42.69)tt• (25.56)*** (11.38)*** (1 .71)* (2.71 )*** {10.46)*** (16.13)*** 
w 0.419 0.401 0.593 0.368 0.570 0.472 0.124 
(39.16)*** (22.15)*** (9.05)* .. (7.87)°* (17.72)*** (10.60)*** {2.9Dt** 
EX -0.292 -0.439 -0.910 -0.332 -0.081 -0.437 -0.163 
(12.02)*** (8.04)*** (8.01 )*** (5.30) ... (0.77) (2.77)*** (1.63) 
JV*EX -0.004 0.621 -0.282 0.580 0.956 0.144 -0.052 
(0.07) (4.78)H* (1.23) (1 .64) (5.57)*** (0.74) (0.31) 
PUREFDI -0.006 0.346 0.500 -0. 030 0.048 0.086 -0.109 
*EX (0.15) (3.21 )*** (2.59)*** (0.31 ) (0.32) (0.47) (0.70) 
PRIVATE 0.010 -0.114 0.480 -0.001 -0.171 0.208 0.278 
"'EX (0.33) (1.62) (3.28) .. * (0.00) (1 .52) (1.09) (1.39) 
AGE -0.011 -0.005 -0.023 -0.002 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 
(18.02)*** (3.10)*** (7.25)*** (0.98) (6.67)*0 (3.96)*** (6.74)*** 
Observatio 
ns 39169 12093 1571 3393 4516 1276 1676 
F value 718 257 64 41 76 88 180 
R-squared 0.42 0.29 0.44 0.14 0.23 0.50 0.62 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies (T) and 
region dummies (REGION). Sector dummies (SECTOR) are included in the fi rst 
equation. 
* Significant at I 0% level, * *significant at 5% level;*** significant at l % level. 
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